Introduction
This is an introduction to the first major sea battle of
World War 2 using the highly readable and frankly thrilling
London Gazette despatch, penned by Rear Admiral Harwood who
was on the bridge of HMS Ajax throughout the action. Honours
have also been added from the London Gazette, together with
the casualty lists compiled by Don Kindell.
Also included are the honours awarded to crew members of
some of the merchant ships captured by the Admiral Graf
Spee. As these were also involved in the action to free
Allied merchant seamen from the German tanker Altmark in
southern Norway, Royal Navy honours for this action are also
listed.
Thanks as always to Photo Ships for most of the
images.
Gordon Smith
Naval-History.Net
Contents
EVENTS
IN OUTLINE
Atlantic - September 1939
Pocket battleship "Admiral
Graf Spee" sank her first ship in the Atlantic off Brazil
on the 30th September.
Atlantic - October 1939
"Graf Spee" claimed four more
merchant ships (including Huntsman on the 10th and
Trevanion on the 22nd) in the South Atlantic before
heading into the southern Indian Ocean. Seven Allied
hunting groups were formed in the Atlantic and one in the
Indian Ocean to search for her. In total the Royal and
French Navies deployed three capital ships, four aircraft
carriers and 16 cruisers.
Atlantic - November 1939
"Graf Spee" sank a small
tanker southwest of Madagascar and headed back for the
South Atlantic. More Allied hunting groups were formed.
Atlantic - December 1939
13th, Battle of River Plate
(see map above) - Now back in the South Atlantic, “Graf
Spee” claimed three more victims (including Doric Star on
the 2nd and Tairoa on the 3rd; by this stage, may of
the prisoners were on board the German tanker "Altmark")
to bring the total to nine ships of 50,000 tons, before
heading for the South American shipping lanes off the
River Plate. Cdre Harwood with Hunting Group G -
8in-gunned cruisers Exeter and Cumberland and 6in light
cruisers Ajax and New Zealand Achilles - correctly
anticipated her destination. Unfortunately “Cumberland”
was by now in the Falklands. At 06.14 on the 13th, 150
miles east of the Plate Estuary, “Graf Spee” (Capt
Langsdorff) was reported to the northwest of the three
cruisers [1 - see map]. Faced with “Graf Spee's" heavier
armament, Cdre Harwood decided to split his force in two
and try to divide her main guns. “Exeter” closed to the
south [2] while the two light cruisers worked around to
the north [3], all firing as they manoeuvred.
“Graf Spee” concentrated her
two 11in turrets on “Exeter” which was badly hit [4]. By
06.50 all ships were heading west [5], "Exeter” with only
one turret in action and on fire. “Ajax” and “Achilles”
continued to harry the pocket battleship from the north
[6], but at 07.25 "Ajax" lost her two after turrets to an
11in hit [7] and “Achilles” already had splinter damage.
HMS Exeter was forced to break off and head south for the
Falklands [8], but "Graf Spee" failed to press home her
advantage. By 08.00, still with only superficial damage,
she headed for the neutral Uruguayan port of Montevideo,
the cruisers shadowing [9]. “GRAF SPEE” entered port at
midnight. As other Allied hunting groups headed for the
area, much diplomatic manoeuvring took place to hold her
there. Finally, on the 17th, Capt Langsdorff edged his
ship out into the estuary where she was scuttled and blown
up. Only “Cumberland” had arrived by this time. Langsdorff
then committed suicide.
Europe - February 1940
16th, The “Altmark” Incident
- "Altmark" was “Graf Spee's” supply ship with Merchant
Navy prisoners onboard. She was located off Norway and
took refuge in Jossingfiord, within territorial waters.
That evening destroyer “Cossack” (Capt Vian) went
alongside with a boarding party and after a short struggle
released the prisoners with the cry 'The Navy's here!'
BACKGROUND MAPS
River Plate Estuary, including Montevideo (Google)
Location of Jossingfiord,
southern Norway (Google)
SHIPS TAKING PART
(with links to British
ship histories)
German
armoured ship/"pocket
battleship" Admiral Graf Spee (6-11in, 8-5.9in, 8-21in
tt)
oiler Altmark, Jossingfiord action
British
heavy cruiser Exeter,
1st Division - light cruiser Achilles,
Ajax (total
armament - 6-8in, 12-6in, 12-4in, 22-21in tt)
oiler Olynthus
heavy cruiser Cumberland,
after the action
destroyer Cossack,
Altmark Incident, Jossingfiord
BATTLE OF THE RIVER PLATE
KMS Admiral Graf Spee
HMS Exeter
HMS Ajax
HMS Achilles
HMS Cumberland
RFA Olynthus
AFTERMATH
A and B turrets, HMS Exeter
(Maritime Quest)
damage to Admiral Graf Spee - burnt out aircraft
scuttled and ablaze off Montevideo
wrecked
ALTMARK INCIDENT, JOSSINGFIORD
KMS Altmark in Jossingfiord (Wikipedia)
HMS Cossack
CASUALTIES
ROYAL NAVY
(with thanks to Don Kindell)
Wednesday,
13 December 1939
BATTLE OF THE RIVER PLATE
Achilles, light cruiser (RNZN)
GRANT, Ian,
Ordinary Seaman, 1734 (NZD), killed
MILBURN, Neville, Ordinary Telegraphist, D/SSX
23288, killed
SHAW, Archibald, Able Seaman, 1030 (NZD), killed
STENNETT, Frank, Telegraphist, D/JX 148899,
killed
Ajax, light cruiser
BASHFORD, Cyril,
Corporal, CH/X 959, killed
BURRELLS, Albert, Marine, CH/X 1688, killed
CLEMENTS, James, Marine, CH/X 654, killed
FARLEY, William, Ordinary Seaman, C/JX 151605,
killed
FOLLETT, Harry, Sergeant, CH/X 688, killed
FRANCOM, Ernest, Steward, C/LX 21835, killed
LAMBARD, William, Marine, CH/X 1663, killed
Exeter, heavy cruiser
AINGE, Walter,
Chief Petty Officer, D/J 52100, DOW
BACK, Frederick,
Engine Room Artificer 4c, D/MX 54489, killed
BETHELL, Frank, Able Seaman, D/JX 151055, killed
BETHELL, Joseph, Able Seaman, D/SSX 22452,
killed
BLANDFORD, Bert, Marine, PLY/X 711, killed
BOWES, Raymond, Ordinary Seaman, D/JX 150342,
killed
BOWMAN-MANIFOLD, John, Lieutenant Commander,
killed
BRIGHT, Daniel, Stoker Petty Officer, D/KX
78984, killed
BURRAS, Stanley, Stoker 1c, D/KX 92228, killed
CAMPBELL, Frederick, Stoker 1c, D/KX 88775,
killed
CLARKSON, Richard, Able Seaman, D/JX 151372,
killed
CROKER, Alfred, Marine, PLY/X 835, killed
DAVIES, Gilbert, Able Seaman, D/SSX 22679,
killed
DOVE, Gilbert, Act/Petty Officer, D/JX 134624,
killed
DYER, Frederick, Shipwright 3c, D/MX 47145,
killed
FRENCH, Frederick, Able Seaman, D/SSX 20765,
killed
GIBSON, Stanley, Able Seaman, D/JX 139907,
killed
HARRINGTON, Stanley, Marine, PLY/ 22286, killed
HARRIS, Hugh, Petty Officer Telegraphist, D/J
51924, killed
HIGGINBOTTOM, Alan, Chief Yeoman of Signals, D/J
100565, killed
HILL, Ronald, Boy Bugler, PLY/X 2238, killed
HONEY, Leslie, Leading Signalman, D/JX 138212,
killed
JONES, Albert, Stoker Petty Officer, D/K 65933,
killed
KAVANAGH, Michael, Telegraphist, D/SSX 16949,
killed
KELLY, Albert, Stoker 1c, D/KX 82448, killed
LUMSDEN, Arthur, Telegraphist, D/JX 142445,
killed
MACLEOD, William, Stoker 1c, D/KX 81482, killed
MANNING, George, Stoker 1c, D/K 59242, killed
MARSH, William, Corporal, PLY/X 1361, killed
MCDONNELL, Francis, Able Seaman, D/SSX 15579,
killed
MCEVOY, James, Marine, PO/X 2091, killed
MILLS, Edward, Marine, PLY/X 1914, killed
MONKS, Christoper, Stoker 2c, D/KX 96243, killed
MORSE, Clyde, Act/Sub Lieutenant, MPK
NAYLOR, Thomas, Able Seaman, D/JX 138243, killed
O'LEARY, Patrick, Stoker 1c, D/KX 92212, killed
PARRY, David, Telegraphist, D/JX 141568, killed
PETT, Bryan, Stoker 1c, D/KX 92198, killed
PULLYBLANK, Leslie, Leading Supply Assistant,
D/MX 50647, killed
RANDLE, Frank, Stoker Petty Officer, D/K 37155,
killed
REMICK, Tom, Chief Yeoman of Signals, D/J 45240,
killed
RICHARDS, Brynmor, Able Seaman, D/JX 141181,
killed
RICHARDS, Glyndwr, Leading Seaman, D/JX 127862,
killed
RICKCORD, John, Midshipman, killed
RIGLAR, Arthur, Telegraphist, D/JX 144826,
killed
SMALL, Richard, Blacksmith 3c, D/MX 51352,
killed
SPENCER, Harry, Able Seaman, D/SSX 16592, DOW
SQUIRE, Ernest, Boy 1c, D/JX 158659, killed
STEELE, Robert, Stoker Petty Officer, D/K 60833,
killed
STUBBS, Agean, Marine, PLY/X 1370, killed
TAYLOR, Robert, Telegraphist, D/JX 146419,
killed
TEAGUE, Samuel, Chief Petty Officer Stoker Petty
Officer, D/K 57454, killed
THOMPSON, James, Stoker 1c, D/KX 81575, killed
TOVEY, George, Stoker Petty Officer, D/KX 80186,
killed
TREGIDGO, Albert, Chief Petty Officer, D/J
89888, killed
TYLER, Donald, Paymaster Sub Lieutenant, killed
WILSON, Patrick, Stoker 1c, D/KX 86441, killed
WOODS, Humphrey, Captain, RM, killed
Thursday,
14 December 1939
Exeter, heavy cruiser
HILL, Leonard,
Able Seaman, D/J 44825, DOW
PHILLIPS, Alfred, Act/Leading Seaman, D/JX
142946, DOW
Friday,
15 December 1939
Exeter, heavy cruiser
GEORGE, Evan,
Leading Stoker, D/K 65213, DOW
Saturday,
16 December 1939
Exeter, heavy cruiser
LEGG, Frank, Petty
Officer Cook, D/MX 52427, DOW
Sunday,
17 December 1939
Exeter, heavy cruiser
POWTON, Richard,
Chief Petty Officer Cook, D/M 27983, DOW
Saturday,
23 December 1939
Exeter, heavy cruiser
COLLINGS, Anthony,
Chief Shipwright 2c, D/M 143336, DOW
Saturday,
20 January 1940
Exeter, heavy cruiser
RUSSELL, Wilfred
A, Marine, PLY/X 214, DOW
ALTMARK INCIDENT, JOSSINGFIORD, 16 February 1940
There
were no Royal Navy deaths, injuries not known
BRITISH
HONOURS AND AWARDS
BATTLE OF THE RIVER PLATE
Recorded
in The London Gazette, issue 34759, 22
December 1939
SECOND SUPPLEMENT
TO
The London Gazette
Of FRIDAY, the 22nd of DECEMBER, 1939
SATURDAY, 23 DECEMBER, 1939
CENTRAL CHANCERY OF THE ORDERS OF KNIGHTHOOD.
St.
James's Palace, S.W.1,
23 December, 1939.
The KING has been graciously pleased to give orders
for the following appointments to the Most
Honourable Order
of the Bath, in recognition of the gallant
and successful action with the "Admiral Graf Spee"
(to be dated the 13th December, 1939).
To be an Additional Member of the Military Division
of the Second Class, or Knights
Commanders, of the said Most Honourable
Order:
Rear-Admiral Henry Harwood Harwood, O.B.E.,
Commanding South American Division of the America
and West Indies Station.
To be Additional Members of the Military Division of
the Third Class, or Companions
of the said Most Honourable Order:
Captain William Edward Parry, R.N., H.M.S. Achilles.
Captain Charles Henry Lawrence Woodhouse, R.N.
H.M.S. Ajax.
Captain Frederick Secker Bell, R.N., H.M.S. Exeter.
Recorded
in The London Gazette, issue 34796,
20 February 1940
SECOND
SUPPLEMENT TO
The London Gazette
Of TUESDAY, the 20th of FEBRUARY, 1940
FRIDAY, 23 FEBRUARY, 1940
Admiralty,
Whitehall.
23 February, 1940.
The KING having already been graciously pleased,
after the first phase of the Battle, to give
orders for the following appointments to the
Most Honourable Order of the Bath, in
recognition of the gallant and successful action
with the "Admiral Graf Spee" (to be dated the
13th of December, 1939):
To be an Additional Member of the Military
Division of the Second Class, or Knights
Commanders, of the said Most Honourable Order:
Rear-Admiral Henry Harwood Harwood, O.B.E.,
Commanding South American Division of the
America and West Indies Station:
To be Additional Members of the Military
Division of the Third Class, or Companions, of
the said Most Honourable Order:
Captain William Edward Parry, R.N., H.M.S.
Achilles,
Captain Charles Henry Lawrence Woodhouse, R.N.,
H.M.S. Ajax,
Captain Frederick Seeker Bell, R.N., H.M.S.
Exeter;
An announcement to this effect was published on
the 23rd of December in the Second Supplement to
the London Gazette of Friday the 22nd of
December, 1939. (above)
His Majesty has now been further graciously
pleased to give orders for the following
appointments to the Distinguished Service Order
for services in the same action:
To be Companions of the Distinguished
Service Order:
Captain Douglas H. Everett, M.B.E., Royal Navy,
H.M.S. Ajax,
Commander Douglas M. L. Neame, Royal Navy,
H.M.S. Achilles,
Commander Robert R. Graham, Royal Navy, H.M.S.
Exeter;
who, as Commanders of their Ships, having done
all they could during the long months of waiting
to perfect their Ships and Ships' companies, so
that they stood the test of battle, when the day
for action came, heartened all by their
readiness, example and encouragement.
Lieutenant Ian Dudley De'Ath, Royal Marines,
H.M.S. Ajax;
who, in charge of a Turret when an 11-inch shell
passed through the working chamber below, went
at once to the hatch, which had been blown open
and was giving out sparks and smoke, to find out
the damage. He gave the orders needed to ensure
the safety of ammunition and at once did what he
could to bring the Turret into action again. He
set a fine example of courage and presence of
mind.
Lieutenant Richard E. Washbourn, Royal Navy,
H.M.S. Achilles;
who, when early in the action several splinters
struck the Gun Director Tower, at once killing
three men and wounding two others inside the
tower, though wounded on the head by a splinter
which half stunned him and killed the man behind
him, continued to control the main armament with
the utmost coolness. He set a magnificent
example to the rest of the Director Tower crew,
who all stood to their posts and made light of
the incident. Thus the Primary Control kept
working and secured throughout the action a high
rate of hits on the enemy.
Commander (E) Charles E. Simms, Royal Navy,
H.M.S. Exeter;
who, by his zeal and energy, brought his engines
to full power in record time, and by his
thorough knowledge of the ship and perfect
organisation, checked the damage. His calm and
cheerful manner set a fine example to his
fellows.
Distinguished
Service Cross.
Midshipman Archibald Cameron, Royal Navy, H.M.S.
Exeter;
who, when an 11-inch shell burst above an
ammunition locker and set it alight, with great
calmness and foresight ordered two guns' crews
to take shelter. The locker exploded, wounding
some of the second crew and setting alight
another locker. As soon as the main fire abated,
with the help of an Able Seaman, he smothered
the flames of the burning woodwork. The two of
them then threw the unexploded shells over the
side. These were still hot and the brass
cartridge cases were either missing or split
open. The bottom row of ammunition had not
burned, and this also was thrown over the side.
Throughout the action he showed the utmost
coolness and resource. He never failed to make
the best use of his guns' crews.
Conspicuous
Gallantry Medal.
William G. Gwilliam, Able Seaman, H.M.S. Exeter;
who helped Midshipman Cameron to smother the
flames of a burning ammunition locker, and to
throw hot shells, with their brass cases either
missing or split open, over the side. He showed
no regard for his own safety in putting out
fires on the Upper Deck near the aircraft from
which petrol was leaking.
Samuel John Trimble, Sergeant, Royal Marines,
H.M.S. Achilles;
who, early in the action, when several splinters
struck the Gun Director, at once killing three
men and wounding two others inside the tower,
was severely wounded; but stood fast without
flinching or complaint throughout the hour of
action that followed, bearing his wounds with
great fortitude. When the medical party came he
helped them to move the wounded and then made
his own way to the Sick Bay with little aid.
Wilfred A. Russell, Royal Marines, H.M.S.
Exeter;
who, having his left forearm blown away and his
right arm shattered when a Turret was put out of
action by a direct hit from an 11-inch shell,
refused all but first aid, remained on deck and
went about cheering on his shipmates and putting
courage into them by his great fortitude; and
did not give in until the heat of the battle was
over. He has since died of wounds.
Stoker (First Class) Patrick O'Brien, H.M.S.
Exeter;
who, when ordered from the Damage Control
Headquarters to make contact with the Main
Switchboard, found his way through the Chief
Petty Officers' Flat where an 11-inch shell had
just burst. Through the dense and deadly smoke,
escaping steam and high explosive fumes, he made
contact with the Main Switchboard and so with
the Engine Room Artificer in the Forward Dynamo
Room. From there he returned by way of the Upper
Deck and led his party into the reeking Flat.
H.M.S.
Ajax.
Distinguished Service Cross.
Lieutenant-Commander Desmond P. Dreyer, Royal
Navy;
who, as Gunnery Officer of the ship, controlled
the fire with great skill and ensured the high
efficiency of his department.
Lieutenant Norman Kelsoe Todd, Royal Navy;
who carried out navigating duties with the
utmost coolness and accuracy throughout the
action.
Lieutenant Edgar D. G. Lewin, Royal Navy;
who was catapulted after the action had started
when the air-worthiness of his aircraft was in
doubt, and made a landing and recovery under
difficult conditions after the battle.
Warrant Shipwright Frank Henry Thomas Panter,
Royal Navy;
who, when knocked down and wounded by the
explosion of an 11-inch shell which started
fires, filled the compartment with smoke and put
out all lights, went at once to the centre of
the damage, where he encouraged and directed the
repair parties and did all he could to limit and
control the ill-effects.
Warrant Engineer Arthur P. Monk, Royal Navy;
who made all preparations for catapulting the
aircraft. He later went to the scene of the most
serious damage and by hard and skilful work,
devotion to duty and cheerful example, did much
to keep heart in the repair parties.
Gunner Reginald C. Biggs, Royal Navy;
who, in charge of a Turret, dealt very well with
the failure of one ammunition hoist, and by his
zeal and energy saw to it that his guns fired
all they could in the time,
H.M.S.
Achilles.
Distinguished Service Cross.
Lieutenant George G. Cowburn, Royal Navy;
who handled the ship with the utmost skill and
coolness and was undismayed when the Commanding
Officer and the Chief Yeoman of Signals were
wounded alongside him. The Ship's immunity from
being hit was mainly due to him. The running
commentary on the progress of the action which
he passed to the Lower Conning Tower was of the
greatest value, as it was broadcast to all
positions between decks, including the Engine
Room.
Surgeon-Lieutenant Colin G. Hunter, Royal Navy;
who was very junior for the responsible duty of
Principal Medical Officer. He is a New
Zealander. He had gained the confidence of the
ship's company and won their esteem and
affection, and so contributed much to the
contentment of the Lower Deck. During the action
his First Aid organisation worked very well, and
he showed good judgment in dealing with the
seriously wounded.
Gunner Eric J. Watts, Royal Navy;
who, though early in the action the Director
Control Tower was hit by six splinters of a
shell which killed or wounded half the
personnel, carried out his duties as Rate
Officer most ably throughout. When his rate
keeping was no longer required, he left his
position and calmly tended the wounded.
Gunner Harry T. Burchell, Royal Navy; who,
throughout the first action and the sixteen-hour
chase which followed, carried out his duties
with the greatest zeal and efficiency and
relieved the Principal Control Officer of much
trouble and responsibility, so that he could
concentrate on observing and identifying the
fall of shot. His conduct was exemplary.
H.M.S.
Exeter.
Distinguished Service Cross,
Commander Charles J. Smith, Royal Navy;
who showed great calm and resource when
communications had failed, in passing an order
for port helm and in firing the starboard tubes
at the correct moment. When required he conned
the ship from aft, and after the action worked
tirelessly to repair electrical damage, although
wounded in the leg.
Commander Richard B. Jennings, Royal Navy;
who throughout the action controlled the?main
armament with great calmness and?skill. When
only one Turret was left in?action he tried to
spot from the after?control position though
standing over the?muzzles of the guns.
Throughout and after?the battle he was untiring
in his work of?keeping the turret in action and
in directing?the ship's company to clear away
the debris,?the Commander being wounded
Lieutenant Aidan E. Toase, Royal Marines;
who was very active and resourceful in assisting
to render the turret safe after it had been hit
by an 11-inch shell.
Surgeon-Lieutenant Roger W. G. Lancashire, Royal
Navy;
who, during the action and throughout the
passage to the Falklands, with no sleep, worked
cheerfully and unceasingly in tending the
wounded.
Midshipman Robert W. D. Don, Royal Navy;
who, throughout the action showed great calm,
resource and initiative, especially in running
hoses into the burning Marines' barracks, in
fighting a fire over the lower steering
position, and in rescuing the wounded.
Warrant Shipwright Charles E. Rendle, Royal
Navy;
who controlled the shoring up and general
repairs to the after section of the ship during
the action. His untiring energy and great skill
in effecting repairs, and so making the ship
watertight after action, were beyond praise.
H.M.S.
Ajax.
Distinguished Service Medal.
Albert E. Fuller, Petty Officer;
who was in charge of an electrical repair party
near a compartment in which an 11-inch shell
burst putting out all lights and causing much
damage to electrical gear. He at once took
efficient action to provide lighting and control
the damage, and showed great courage, presence
of mind and good leadership.
William G. Dorling, Chief Mechanician (Second
Class);
who was in charge of the Stokers' Fire and
Repair party near a compartment in which an
11-inch shell burst cutting pipes and starting
fires. He at once took efficient action to
control the damage and showed great courage,
presence of mind and good leadership.
Bertram Wood, Stoker (First Class);
who showed special bravery, presence of mind and
forwardness in controlling damage when an
11-inch shell burst near him. He entered "X"
lobby when a number of casualties had occurred,
and, single handed, put out a fire.
Frank E. Monk, Stoker (First Class);
who showed special presence of mind and
forwardness in controlling damage when an
11-inch shell burst near him.
Duncan Graham, Shipwright (Third Class);
who set a magnificent example by his courage and
forwardness near severe damage.
James W. Jenkins. Electrical Artificer (Third
Class);
who showed special presence of mind
and?forwardness in controlling damage when
an?11-inch shell burst near him.
Raymond G. Cook, Sergeant, Royal Marines;
who showed great presence of mind and initiative
in carrying out orders when a Turret was
severely hit and fires and casualties occurred.
Thomas S. Reginald Norman Buckley, Marine;
who when a Turret was hit showed great presence
of mind and efficiency in ensuring the safety of
the ammunition.
Clarence H. Charles Gorton, Petty Officer;
who, being in charge of a Turret, worked hard
and well, showed great devotion to duty, and
ensured the maximum output from his turret
throughout the action.
John W. Hill, Petty Officer;
who as Director Layer, carried out his most
important duties with great skill thereby
contributing much to the fighting efficiency of
the ship throughout the action.
Leonard C. Curd, Leading Seaman;
who carried out most important Fire Control
duties, usually performed by an Officer, with
marked success throughout the action, and set a
fine example of cheerful efficiency.
Robert D. Macey, Able Seaman;
who, being in charge of a Shell Room, set a fine
example of cheerful and good hard work and
ensured that there was no delay in ammunition
supply in the Turret which was able to fire the
greatest number of rounds.
Robert McClarnan, Able Seaman;
who, being in charge of a Magazine, set a fine
example of cheerful, hard and skilful work.
Richard C. Perry, Stoker (First Class);
who worked with energy, skill and initiative in
making repairs to the catapult motor during
action.
H.M.S.
Achilles.
Distinguished Service Medal.
Edgar V. Sherley, Able Seaman;
who was severely wounded when the Director
Control Tower was hit by splinters. He behaved
with great courage during his long wait until
proper medical attention came. The nearest door
of the D.C.T. through which he would normally
have been evacuated was jammed by splinter
damage, and it was necessary to remove him by a
devious and difficult route in the heat of the
engagement. He gave all the help he could to the
Medical Party during this painful operation. He
bore the pain of his wounds with great patience
and fortitude.
Ian Thomas L. Rodgers, Ordinary Seaman;
who, when early in the action several splinters
struck the Gun Director Tower at once, killing
three men and wounding two others inside the
tower, was immediately ordered across, and
proceeded to carry out essential duty coolly and
skilfully for the rest of the engagement.
Allan M. Dorset, Boy (First Class);
who, though early in the action several
splinters struck the Gun Director Tower at once,
killing three men and wounding two others inside
the tower, behaved with exemplary coolness,
despite the carnage around him. He passed such
information as was available to him to the guns,
and repeated their reports clearly for the
information of the Gunnery Officer.
William G. Boniface, Chief Petty Officer;
who, though early in the action several
splinters struck the Gun Director Tower at once,
killing three men and wounding two others inside
the tower, maintained a good range plot
throughout the engagement.
William R. Headon, Petty Officer;
who, though early in the action several
splinters struck the Gun Director Tower at once,
killing three men and wounding two others inside
the tower, kept up an accurate output for a
prolonged action of over two hundred broadsides.
He was faced with an especially difficult task
in hand training; with large alterations of
course at full speed and with wide angles of
rudder. During the lull he helped to remove dead
and wounded.
Alfred Maycock, Petty Officer;
who, though early in the action several
splinters struck the Gun Director Tower at once,
killing three men and wounding two others inside
the tower, kept an accurate output for a
prolonged action of over two hundred broadsides.
During the lull he helped to remove the wounded
and dead.
Harry H. Gould, Able Seaman;
who, though early in the action several
splinters struck the Gun Director Tower at once,
killing three men and wounding two others inside
the tower, maintained throughout the engagement
a good range plot, even when the body of a
shipmate fell on him through the D.C.T. floor.
Leslie Hood, Acting Chief Mechanician (Second
Class);
who was most helpful in the Engine Room, and
showed zeal and energy throughout the action.
William Job Wain, Chief Stoker;
who was, in the words of one of the staff of "A"
Boiler Room, an "inspiration and help to them
all." He steamed this boiler room with the
highest efficiency, using great initiative in
setting and adjusting the sprayers to obtain the
best flame and a minimum of smoke.
Lincoln C. Martinson, Chief Yeoman of Signals;
who showed great zeal and untiring energy in
training and organising the V/S Department. The
smartness of Achilles' flag-hoisting had been
commented on both by the Commodore Commanding,
New Zealand Squadron, and the Rear Admiral
Commanding, South America Division, and did not
fail in battle. When seriously wounded and in
great pain, he continued to inquire after the
welfare of the V/S department and wanted to know
how his men were doing.
William L. Brewer, Chief Petty Officer
Telegraphist;
whose training and organisation of the W/T
department successfully withstood the supreme
test of battle. His coolness and ability, when
under fire, in repairing damage to W/T
equipment, on the upper deck and below decks,
resulted in Achilles' W/T being in full working
order again in a very short time, and in getting
the first Enemy Report through.
George H. Sampson, Chief Ordnance Artificer
(First Class);
whose skilful maintenance of the gun armament
material secured that at the end of the action
all guns were fully in action and all hoists
working. At no time was the rate of fire of any
turret slowed up by any failure in the
ammunition supply or by any defect.
Albert G. Young, Cook;
whose energetic example and most cheerful
demeanour were an inspiration to the rest of his
quarters during the whole of this action and the
sixteen hour chase that followed.
Frank T. Saunders, Sergeant, R.M.;
who acted with courage and initiative throughout
the engagement, overcoming each difficulty and
breakdown as it occurred, and by his fine
example and leadership urged his quarters to
still further efforts.
H.M.S.
Exeter.
Distinguished
Service Medal.
James McGarry, Engine Room Artificer, Second
Class;
who on his own initiative at the beginning of
the action flooded the petrol compartment. After
the two shell bursts near him and in dense
fumes, with dead and dying around him, himself
blown against a bulkhead and temporarily
stunned, he maintained complete charge. He got
Shipwrights to investigate damage and organised
stretcher parties and the work in his area. On
the arrival of the Engineer Officer he made a
complete report while a messenger supported him.
Frank L. Bond, Engine Room Artificer, Fourth
Class;
who, on a shell entering the Flat in which he
was, stood fast in the dense fumes, and, waiting
until the last man was reported clear of a
Magazine, then flooded it. He then went to the
main centre of the fire to ascertain damage. He
found the flooding valve spindles shot away, the
fire main shattered but enough flow of water
into-the magazine from the damaged fire main. So
he carried on fighting the fire in the Chief
Petty Officers' flat. After the action he
performed his duties with marked zeal and
cheerfulness.
Arthur B. Wilde, Sergeant, Plymouth;
who, ordering the evacuation of a Turret after
the Gun House had been hit by an eleven-inch
shell, calmly put a tourniquet of rope round the
stump of a Marine's arm. He then returned to the
Gun House where he found a fire over the rammer
of the left gun. This rammer contained a charge
of cordite. He organised a chain system of
buckets to the turret, put out the fire, removed
the cordite, and threw the charge over the side.
Herbert V. Chalkley, Acting Petty Officer;
who, shortly after an eleven-inch shell burst in
the Chief Petty Officers' Flat above the dynamo
room in which he was, managed to open the door
in the escape truck and crawl over the wreckage
to the switchboard hatch. He could not clear the
wreckage away, and realising that his services
could be dispensed with in the dynamo room, he
scrambled up the dynamo escape trunk to the
upper deck, returned to the flat and helped the
fire parties in getting the fire under control
and isolated circuits there. The conditions in
these two flats were very bad at the time that
he was trying to escape from the dynamo room.
His work with the fire parties was outstanding.
Charles D. Pope, Sick Berth Chief Petty Officer;
who, when returning from the fore part of the
Sick Bay with bottles of Morphine Sulphate
Solution, was knocked flat and temporarily
unconscious by a shell bursting and badly
perforating that end of the Sick Bay. The
bottles were broken, but when he recovered he
went back through the smoke and fumes and not
finding more solution brought back with him
Morphia Ampoules. Throughout the action he
displayed great coolness, initiative and
cheerful optimism despite the floods in the Sick
Bay. After the action his nursing and devotion
to the wounded was exemplary.
Charles F. Hallas, Petty Officer;
who was the Torpedo Gunner's Mate in charge of
the torpedo tubes. Although wounded at the start
of the action he remained at his station until
all torpedoes were fired. He then formed parties
to deal with fires on deck and help the wounded.
After the action he worked unceasingly in
repairing damaged circuits. His cheerfulness
throughout was a great encouragement to all who
were working with him.
John L. Minhinett, Stoker, First Class;
who, when taken wounded to the After Medical
Station, refused all attention until he was
certain that the message he had been carrying
had been delivered. This message stated that the
steering had been changed over to Number 3
position.
Eric A. Shoesmith, Acting Leading Airman,
F.A.A.;
who on his own initiative, despite his clothing
being soaked in petrol, climbed on to the top of
the centre section of the aircraft and cleared
the triatic stay which had fallen across it,
thus freeing: the aircraft for jettisoning.
While he did this the ship was under heavy fire,
the petrol leaking from the aircraft was a great
danger, and a Turret was firing on a forward
bearing.
George E. Smith, Plumber, Third Class;
who, shortly after the explosion in the Chief
Petty Officers' Flat, took a party of Stokers
there to free the Main Switchboard Room's hatch.
At the time the flat was in darkness, reeking
with fumes and smoke, full of debris and with
the possibility of little deck supporting.
Frederick Knight, Joiner (Third Class);
who, while bleeding in the face and badly shaken
by the 11-inch shells exploding on the
forecastle Messdeck, used great initiative in
improvising stretchers for the wounded, in
examining compartments underneath the damage and
in plugging holes in the upper deck.
William E. Green, Petty Officer;
who, as Chief Quartermaster, when the upper
steering position was put out of action by an
11-inch shell exploding on a Turret ensured that
the secondary steering position was correct and
fully manned. Finding it to be so he started aft
to see that the after steering position also was
correct; on his way he was seriously wounded.
Joseph A. Rooskey, Chief Mechanician (Second
Class);
whose work was outstanding among all those on
the catapult platforms jettisoning the aircraft.
His calmness, skill and initiative were most
valuable and set a splendid example to all those
around him.
Alfred J. Ball, Able Seaman;
who when taken wounded to the Fore Medical
Station himself gave first aid to the other
wounded and by his willingness and cheerfulness
was of great help to the Fore Medical Station.
Stephen J. Smith, Petty Officer;
who was in charge of the After Repair Party. A
few minutes after the action opened a shell
bursting close to the ship aft caused the
flooding of Number 3 Breaker Room and much
damage to the leads there. His prompt action in
running emergency circuits to a Turret and the
after steering motor helped to maintain the ship
in action.
Thomas G. Phillips, Engine Room Artificer (Third
Class):
who got the two extra dynamos on load in record
time. As the result of an explosion he and his
party were trapped in the forward Dynamo Room
which filled with dense fumes and smoke. One
dynamo had stopped and with the exhaust fan out
of action he skilfully effected the repairs
needed to get the machine running again.
Sidney A. Carter, Master-at-Arms;
who, though wounded in the right knee and
severely bruised by a splinter early in the
action, carried on tirelessly and devotedly his
duty in the After Medical Party.
Eric T. Dakin, Sick Berth Attendant;
who had been in the ship only a week, having
been lent from H.M.S. Ajax, his first ship. His
conduct throughout the action was exemplary. He
carried out instructions perfectly, his
first-aid treatment was very good and his quiet
gentle manner gave great confidence to the
wounded. His ability to take charge and keep
order in difficulties was splendid.
Mentions
in Despatches.
H.M.S. Ajax.
Engineer Captain Lionel C. S. Noake, R.N.
Paymaster Commander Rutherford W. Moore, R.N.
Lieutenant-Commander Ralph C. Medley, R.N.
Lieutenant-Commander Richard R. S. Pennefather,
R.N.
Paymaster Lieutenant-Commander Victor G. H.
Weekes, R.N.
Surgeon Lieutenant-Commander Alexander J.
Burden, R.N.
Lieutenant Richard E. N. Kearney, R.N.
Chief Petty Officer Henry N. Watson.
Chief Yeoman of Signals George W. Harman.
Leading Signalman Daniel F. Parrott.
Chief Petty Officer Telegraphist John F.
Dagwell.
Band Corporal Angus J. H. Macdonald.
Marine Albert J. Hester, R.M.
Leading Seaman Cecil J. Williams.
Leading Seaman Henry Brennan.
Chief Ordnance Artificer (First Class) Arthur
Hoile.
Leading Telegraphist Frederick J. Chatfield.
H.M.S.
Achilles.
Commander (E) H. W. Head, R.N.
Paymaster Commander H. T. Isaac, R.N.
Lieutenant P. P. M. Green, R.N.
Lieutenant (E) Jasper A. R. Abbott, R.N.
Gunner (T) George R. Davis-Goff, R.N.
Warrant Electrician Joseph F. Swift, R.N.
Chief Petty Officer Leonard H. Boys.
Chief Petty Officer Ronald P. Burges.
Sailmaker Ivan D. Crawford.
Able Seaman Keith F. Connew.
Able Seaman James S. Borwick.
Able Seaman Collin W. Malcolm.
Able Seaman Bernard J. Sole.
Able Seaman Alexander Steve.
Able Seaman Laurence A. Webb.
Chief Engine Room Artificer (First Class)
Reginald A. Martin.
Chief Stoker John W. Welham.
Stoker Petty Officer Robert M. Lobb.
Stoker (First Class) David S. Allison.
Ordinary Telegraphist Alan V. Bell.
Chief Petty Officer Cook Hubert C. Luke.
Master-at-Arms Frederick E. Loader.
Acting Corporal Leonard J. Fowler.
Marine Ray O. Osment.
H.M.S.
Exeter.
Paymaster Commander Henry B. John, M.B.E.
Lieutenant Donald T. McBarnet, R.N.
Surgeon Commander John Cussen, R.N.
Sub-Lieutenant (E) John W. Mott, R.N.
Acting Sub-Lieutenant Clyde A. L. Morse, R.N.
Senior Master Ernest A. Doust, R.N.
Gunner Stanley J. Dallaway, R.N.
Stoker Petty Officer Albert S Jones
Chief Shipwright Anthony C. Collings.
Sergeant George W. Puddifoot.
Chief Stoker George I. Crocker.
Ordnance Artificer (First Class) William E.
Johns,
Leading Telegraphist Cyril H. Lansdowne
Electrical Artificer (First Class) Philip A.
England.
Chief Petty Officer Telegraphist Harold E.
Newman.
Sick Berth Petty Officer Clifford J. Scoble.
Chief Petty Officer Steward Joseph W. Watts.
Bandmaster (Second Class) Leonard C. Bagley.
ALTMARK INCIDENT, JOSSINGFIORD, 16 February
1940
Recorded
in The London Gazette, issue
34827, 9 April 1940
SUPPLEMENT
TO
The London Gazette
Of TUESDAY, the 9th of APRIL, 1940
FRIDAY, 12
APRIL, 1940
Admiralty,
Whitehall.
12th April, 1940.
The KING has been graciously pleased to give
orders for the following Appointments to the
Distinguished Service Order:
To be a Companion of the Distinguished
Service Order:
Captain Philip Louis Vian, Royal Navy,
H.M.S. Cossack;
for outstanding ability, determination and
resource in the preliminary dispositions
which led to the rescue of 300 English
prisoners from the German Armed Auxiliary
Altmark, and for daring, leadership and
masterly handling of his ship in narrow
waters so as to bring her alongside and
board the enemy, who tried to blind him with
the glare of a searchlight, worked his
engine full ahead and full astern, tried to
ram him and drive him ashore and so
threatened the grounding and loss of
Cossack.
Lieutenant-Commander Bradwell Talbot Turner,
Royal Navy, H.M.S. Cossack;
for daring, leadership and address in
command of the party which boarded Altmark
while the ships were manoeuvring under high
power, changing relative positions and not
in full contact, so that he had to leap a
fathom to reach her. He pulled up the Petty
Officer next behind him, who had jumped
short and hung by his hands, made fast the
hawser, and, cheering, led his party at the
double to the bridge. Having disarmed such
enemy officers as carried firearms, he took
over from a German first the starboard then
the port telegraph and set it to "Stop"
instead of "Full Speed Ahead," so that
Altmark could not ram Cossack, but grounded
aft on a shelf, making about 4 knots
sternway.
His Majesty has also been graciously pleased
to approve the following awards:
The
Distinguished Service Cross.
Paymaster Sub-Lieutenant Geoffrey Craven,
Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, H.M.S.
Cossack;
for outstanding ability and resource as an
essential member of the Boarding Party
Mr. John James Frederick Smith, Gunner,
Royal Navy, H.M.S. Aurora;
for prowess, leadership and devotion to
duty, in command of the second section of
the Boarding Party.
The
Distinguished Service Medal.
Petty Officer Norman Leslie Atkins, H.M.S.
Cossack;
for gallantry and leadership in charge of a
section of the Boarding Party
Petty Officer Herbert Tom Barnes, H.M.S.
Aurora;
Able Seaman Peter John Beach, H.M.S.
Cossack;
Able Seaman James Harper, H.M.S. Cossack;
Able Seaman Albert William Marshall, H.M.S.
Cossack;
Able Seaman Stanley Douglas Bennett, H.M.S.
Aurora;
Signalman Donald Phillip Samuel Davies,
H.M.S. Afridi (Lent Cossack);
Stoker First Class Norman Leslie Pratt,
H.M.S. Aurora;
for gallantry and devotion to duty in the
boarding of Altmark.
Mentions
in Despatches.
Lieutenant Commander Hector Charles Donald
MacLean, Royal Navy, H.M.S. Cossack; for
outstanding ability and resource in helping
her Commanding Officer to handle Cossack in
the fjord, and for distinguished service as
Staff Officer (Operations) to Captain (D),
Fourth Destroyer Flotilla.
Petty Officer Steward Rosario Asciak, H.M.S.
Cossack;
Petty Officer Cook Dominick Spiteri, H.M.S.
Cossack;
Petty Officer Steward Cannelo Sammut, H.M.S.
Cossack;
for cheerful and ready work in caring for
and feeding 55 Officers, prisoners released
from Altmark.
BRITISH MERCHANT SHIPS CAPTURED by the
ADMIRAL GRAF SPEE
Recorded
in The London Gazette, issue
34815, 19 March 1940
SUPPLEMENT
TO
The London Gazette
Of TUESDAY, the 19th of MARCH, 1940
WEDNESDAY, 20 MARCH, 1940
CENTRAL CHANCERY OF THE ORDERS OF
KNIGHTHOOD.
St.
James's Palace, S.W.1.
20th March, 1940.
The KING has been graciously pleased to
give orders for the undermentioned
appointments ….. for the publication in
the London Gazette of the names of
personnel of the Merchant Navy specially
shown below as having received an
expression of commendation for their
good services.
Commended:
Captain William Stubbs, Master, s.s.
"Doric Star" (Blue Star line Limited,
London) -
action 2 December 1939
S.S. "Doric Star" was armed with one 4"
gun. Her crew was 64, none of whom was
hurt. She became suddenly aware of the
presence of the enemy by the landing on
her deck of a piece of a shell which had
exploded about 100 yards off her port
quarter. The Master went on the bridge
and sighted the masthead of a warship
some 15 miles away. He ordered a signal
to be sent out. A little later another
shell, fired from about 8 miles, landed
not more than 200 yards off, on the
starboard bow. The superstructure of a
battleship was now visible, and "Doric
Star" amplified her distress call. The
raider, winch was "Admiral Graf Spee,"
temporarily named "Deutschland," and
roughly disguised to look like "Renown"
or "Repulse," now sent out morse lamp
signals telling "Doric Star" not to use
her wireless, but no notice was taken
and the Radio Officer kept sending calls
until he heard them repeated by other
ships. The Master stopped his ship. From
about half a mile away "Admiral Graf
Spee" sent a launch with a boarding
party, who asked what the cargo was, and
when the Master told them wool they
looked at all the hatches and seeing
wool under them failed to find out that
the cargo was in fact meat, butter and
cheese. "Doric Star's" crew were given
ten minutes to get ready to leave the
ship. The enemy hung bombs over the
side, some of which exploded before they
left, but failed to sink the ship, so
that seven shells and one torpedo had to
be put into her.
To be an Additional Member
of the Civil Division of the Most
Excellent Order of the
British Empire:
Patrick Joseph Cummins, Esq., Radio
Officer, s.s. "Tairoa" (Messrs. Shaw,
Savill and Albion Company, Limited,
London) -
action 3 December 1939
S.S. "Tairoa" was armed with one 4" gun.
Her crew was 81, three of whom were
injured by shrapnel. Before daybreak a
vessel was sighted about two points on
"Tairoa's" beam some five miles away.
The Master was already on the bridge
because he knew there was a raider
about. The enemy was not recognised as
she was bow on, and her flag could not
be seen. When it did show it proved to
be half a small ensign, black with
smoke, flying from a dummy funnel. When
within two miles she signalled with
flags "l am coming to board you," and
made two other flag signals which were
not read. "Tairoa" stopped still, not
recognising the enemy, but at
three-quarters of a mile it was noticed
that the ship had all her big guns
trained on her. The Radio Officer
started on the key and at once the
unknown ship fired several shots, which
damaged the steering gear, smashed the
wings of the bridge and dislodged the
sandbags round the Marconi room. The
Officers on the bridge went below. Three
times the Radio Officer tried again to
send out messages and each time the
enemy opened fire, but ceased as soon as
the wireless stopped. After the third
attempt to transmit, the enemy fired two
shells which blew the wireless away, one
smashing the receiver. Meanwhile, the
order had been given to abandon ship,
and the men had lowered and manned the
boats. The enemy ship proved to be
"Admiral Graf Spee," named "Deutschland"
for the time being and crudely disguised
as "Repulse" or "Renown." Captain
Langsdorf, of "Admiral Graf Spee" later
explained that he did not wish to take
life, but only fired when "Tairoa"
disobeyed a notice in English telling
her not to use her wireless. This notice
was not read. He complimented the Radio
Officer on his courage and devotion to
duty.
Recorded
in The London Gazette,
issue 34857, 24 May 1940
SUPPLEMENT
TO
The London Gazette
Of FRIDAY, the 24th of MAY, 1940
FRIDAY, 24 MAY, 1940
CENTRAL CHANCERY OF THE ORDERS OF
KNIGHTHOOD.
St.
James's Palace, S.W.1.
24th May, 1940.
The KING has been graciously pleased to
give orders ….. for the publication in
the London Gazette of the names of
personnel of the Merchant Navy specially
shown below as having received an
expression of commendation for their
good services.
COMMENDATIONS
George King, Esq., Second Engineer, s.s.
"Doric Star" (Blue Star Line Ltd.,
London) -
action 2 December 1939
The Second Engineer of s.s. "Doric Star"
was taken across to "Altmark" in a
pinnace from "Admiral Graf Spee". The
Senior Officers taken from English ships
remained in "Admiral Graf Spee" so that,
as one of the few English Officers in
"Altmark", special responsibilities fell
on this young Officer, who took charge
of Lascars and a mixed company of 275
seamen and firemen of various
nationalities. He took in hand the
discipline of these men and organised a
routine with a view to possible escape.
When they were rescued by H.M.S.
"Cossack", he directed the exit of all
the prisoners through the narrow
hatchway and knocked out an enemy armed
guard, armed with pistol and bayonet,
who was getting in the way. He then
returned with two other Officers and
searched all the flats to make sure that
no one was left behind.
Captain Albert Horace Brown, Master,
s.s. "Huntsman" (T. and J. Harrison,
Liverpool) -
action 10 October 1939
S.S. "Huntsman" was sunk by "Admiral
Graf Spee". The latter was flying a
French flag when she was seen by
"Huntsman". The French flag was not
lowered until she was less than a cable
from the English ship. The Master of
"Huntsman" saw that the bag of shIp's
papers and confidential books was sunk,
put his engines full speed astern, and
ran to the wireless room. The Operator
had already been told to send out a
message "Warship approaching"; when the
German flag was hoisted, the Master told
him to send "enemy warship". The message
was sent out twice and was picked up. A
crew from "Admiral Graf Spee" boarded
"Huntsman" and she was ordered to follow
at full speed. Four days later "Altmark"
arrived and three days after this
"Huntsman's" crew were ordered to go on
board her, but five Indians were kept to
work the winches. The Master refused to
leave until all his crew were off the
ship. The Officer of the boarding party
again ordered him off, but again he
refused, saying that it was his duty to
stay until every man was off his ship.
Another Officer came to see him; he
agreed with him and said he could stay.
Next day he was taken off with the five
Indians.
Captain William Burnaby Southouse Starr,
Master, s.s. " Tairoa" (Shaw, Savill and
Albion Company, Ltd., London) -
action 3 December 1939
S.S. "Tairoa" was armed with one 4" gun.
Her crew was eighty-one, three of whom
were injured by shrapnel. Before
daybreak a vessel was sighted about 2
points on "Tairoa's" beam, about five
miles away. The Master was already on
the bridge because he knew there was a
raider about. The enemy was not
recognised as she was bow on, and her
flag did not show. When it did show it
proved to be half a small Ensign, black
with smoke, flying from a dummy funnel.
When within two miles, she signalled
with flags " I am coming to board you ",
and made two other flag signals which
were not read. "Tairoa" stopped still,
not recognising the enemy, but at
three-quarters of a mile it was noticed
that the ship had all her big guns
trained on her. The unknown ship fired
several shots which damaged the steering
gear, smashed the wings of the bridge
and blew the wireless away. The order
was given to abandon ship, and the men
lowered and manned the boats. The enemy
ship proved to be "Admiral Graf Spee",
named "Deutschland" for the time being
and crudely disguised as "Repulse" or
"Renown". The Master of "Tairoa", a man
of over sixty, set a fine example
throughout.
Captain James Ninnes Edwards, Master,
Noel Charles Martinson, Esq., Radio
Officer.
s.s. "Trevanion " (The Hain Steamship
Company, Ltd., London) -
action 22 October 1939
S.S. "Trevanion" was unarmed. In the
early afternoon she sighted a battleship
on her port beam some seven miles away
flying a large French Ensign. When 4
points on "Trevanion's" bow, she put her
helm hard astarboard and headed for her.
At two miles she hoisted two flag
signals - " do not use your wireless"
and "I am sending a boat". She then came
up at full speed on "Trevanion's " port
side. Not until she was close abeam
could her German flag be seen. On the
Master's orders the Radio Officer sent
out the Raider Signal and ship's
position. The enemy at once opened fire
with a machine-gun and swept
"Tre-vanion's" upper deck from a range
of about 100 yards. The Master then went
to the bridge and mustered the crew on
deck. The Radio Officer stopped sending
the message and the machine-gun fire
ceased. The Master went to the wireless
room and stood by while the whole
message was sent out. All this time the
enemy was using his machine-gun with
tracer bullets, one or two of which
entered the wireless room, struck the
table and knocked the two Officers
backwards. The Master returned to the
bridge and found that no one had been
hurt. The enemy boat was now nearly
alongside. He rushed for his secret
papers, and, risking machine-gun fire,
threw them over the side and watched
them sink. As he was returning, the
enemy boarding party stopped him with
loaded revolvers. They asked him many
questions, but he answered them nothing
of which they wished to know.
"Trevanion's" crew were then taken
aboard the German ship, which proved to
be the "Admiral Graf Spee".
|
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Recorded
in The London Gazette, issue 37989, 17th June, 1947
SUPPLEMENT TO
The London Gazette
Of TUESDAY, the 17th of JUNE, 1947
THURSDAY, 19 JUNE, 1947
THE RIVER PLATE BATTLE
The following Despatch was submitted to the Lords
Commissioners of the Admiralty on the 30th December, 1939,
by Rear Admiral H. H. Harwood, K.C.B., O.B.E., Rear Admiral
Commanding South American Division:
H.M.S. AJAX,
30th December, 1939.
I have the honour to submit the following report of the
action between H.M. Ships AJAX (wearing the Broad Pendant of
the Commodore Commanding the South American Division.
Captain C. H. L. Woodhouse, Royal Navy), ACHILLES (of the
New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy, Captain W. E. Parry,
Royal Navy) and EXETER (Captain F. S. Bell, Royal Navy),
under my orders, and the German Armoured Ship ADMIRAL GRAF
SPEE on Wednesday, 13th December, 1939, and the sequence of
events leading to her self-destruction on Sunday, 17th
December, 1939.
All times throughout this report are in the time of Zone
plus 2, except where otherwise stated.
(Note:
Rear Admiral Harwood was on board HMS Ajax throughout
the action)
PRELIMINARY DISPOSITIONS
2. The British ship DORIC STAR had
reported being attacked by a pocket battleship in position
19 degrees 15' south, 5 degrees 5' east during the afternoon
of 2nd December, 1939, and a similar report had been sent by
an unknown vessel 170 miles south-west of that position at
0500 G.M.T. on 3rd December.
From this data I estimated that at a cruising speed of 15
knots the raider could reach the Rio de Janeiro focal area
a.m. 12th December, the River Plate focal area p.m. 12th
December or a.m. 13th December and the Falkland Islands area
14th December.
3. I decided that the Plate, with its larger number of ships
and its very valuable grain and meat trade, was the vital
area to be defended. I therefore arranged to concentrate
there my available forces in advance of the time at which it
was anticipated the raider might start operations in that
area.
4. In order to bring this about, I made the following signal
to the South American Division timed 1315 of 3rd December,
1939:
"In view of report pocket
battleship, amend previous dispositions. CUMBERLAND
self-refit at Falkland Islands as previously arranged but
keep at short notice on two shafts. ACHILLES leave Rio de
Janeiro area so as to arrive and fuel Montevideo 0600
(Zone plus 2) 8th December, EXETER leave Falkland Islands,
for Plate a.m. 9th December, covering S.S. LAFONIA with
returning volunteers. AJAX, ACHILLES concentrate in
position 35 degrees south, 50 degrees west at 1600 (Zone
plus 2) 10th December. EXETER to pass through, position
090 degrees Medanos Light 150 miles at 0700 12th December.
If concentration with AJAX and ACHILLES is not effected by
that time further instructions will be issued to EXETER.
Oiler OLYNTHUS is to remain at sea rendezvous until
situation clears instead of proceeding to Falkland
Islands."
5. Strict W/T silence was kept after passing this signal.
6. Concentration of all three ships was effected by 0700
Tuesday, 12th December, and I then proceeded towards
position 32 degrees south, 47 degrees west. This position
was chosen from my Shipping Plot as being at that time the
most congested part of the diverted shipping routes, i.e.,
the point where I estimated that a raider could do most
damage to British shipping.
7. On concentrating I made the following signal timed
1200/12th December to my Force:
"My policy with three
cruisers in company vrsus one pocket battleship. Attack at
once by day or night. By day act as two units, 1st
Division (AJAX and ACHILLES) and EXETER diverged to permit
flank marking. First Division will concentrate gunfire. By
night ships will normally remain in company in open order.
Be prepared for the signal ZMM* which is to have the same
meaning as MM* except that for Division read Single Ship."
* The signification of these
signals was:
ZMM—ships are to turn to course.. starting with the rear
ship.
MM—Commanders of Divisions are to turn their Division to
course.. starting with the rear Division.
8. I amplified this later in my signal 1813/12th December as
follows:
"My object in the signal ZMM
is to avoid torpedoes and take the enemy by surprise and
cross his stern. Without further orders ships are to clear
the line of fire by hauling astern of the new leading
ship. The new leading ship is to lead the line without
further orders so as to maintain decisive gun range."
I exercised this manoeuvre during the evening of 12th
December.
THE ACTION
Wednesday, 13th December,
1939
0530-0623.
9. At 0520/13th December, the Squadron was in position 34
degrees 34' south, 49 degrees 17' west. With the last of the
dawn I exercised manoeuvring signals, and then re-formed the
squadron on a course of 060 speed 14 knots in the order
AJAX, ACHILLES, EXETER. At 0614, smoke was sighted bearing
320 and EXETER was ordered to close and investigate it. At
0616 EXETER reported "I think it is a pocket battleship" and
two minutes later the enemy opened fire, one 11-in. turret
at EXETER and the other at AJAX.
10. The First Division immediately altered course together
by signal to 340 degrees to close the range. Captain F. S.
Bell, Royal Navy, of H.M.S. EXETER, hauled out of the line
and altered course to the westward in accordance with my
plan, in order to attack the enemy from a widely different
bearing and permit flank marking. All ships increased speed.
EXETER opened fire at 0620, ACHILLES at 0621 and AJAX at
0623.
An enemy report was immediately initiated and was broadcast
at 0634. Amplifying reports were made at 0640, 0646 and
0722.
11. From this point until the action was broken off, no
alter course signals were made. Captain W. E. Parry, Royal
Navy, of H.M.S. ACHILLES manoeuvred his ship as necessary to
clear her line of fire, remaining close to AJAX and
conforming to her movements. EXETER proceeded independently,
her initial course being about 280 degrees.
12. AJAX and ACHILLES opened in Single Ship firing, but
Concentration was employed as soon as W/T touch had been
established at about 0625,
13. It appeared at this stage as if the enemy was undecided
as to her gunnery policy. Her turrets were working under
different controls, and she shifted target several times
before eventually concentrating both turrets on EXETER.
0623-0630.
14. EXETER was straddled by GRAF SPEE's third salvo, one
shell of which burst short amidships, killed the starboard
tube's crew, damaged communications and riddled the
searchlights and aircraft. Preparations were being made at
this time for catapulting the aircraft, but as both were by
then out of action, they were manhandled over the side.
15. At 0624, after EXETER had fired eight salvos, she
received a direct hit from an 11-in. direct-action shell on
the front of "B" turret. This shell burst on impact, put the
turret out of action, and splinters swept the bridge,
killing or wounding all personnel there with the exception
of the Captain and two others, and wrecked the wheelhouse
communications.
16. Captain F. S. Bell, Royal Navy, then decided to fight
his ship from the after conning position, but owing to
communications being destroyed it was some time before the
ship could be brought under the control of that position,
and then it could only be done by means of a chain of
messengers to pass orders to the after steering position.
Meanwhile EXETER had swung to starboard, and was closing her
"A" arcs,* but she was brought back to port by an order from
the torpedo officer, Lieutenant-Commander C. J. Smith, Royal
Navy, who succeeded in getting word through to the lower
conning position.
* The arcs on which all guns
of a ship's main armament will bear, this allowing them to
fire simultaneously at the enemy.
Two more 11 in. hits were received in the fore part of the
ship during this phase.
17. AJAX and ACHILLES were in Concen tration firing and
seemed to be making good shooting. They were closing the
range rapidly and gaining bearing on the enemy.
0630-0638
18. About this time, the GRAF SPEE shifted the fire of one
11 in. turret on to the First Division and AJAX was
straddled three times at about 0631. The First Division
turned slightly away to throw out the enemy's gun fire.
His secondary armament was firing alternately at AJAX and
ACHILLES, but with no effect, though some salvos fell close.
19. AJAX catapulted her aircraft with Lieutenant E. D. G.
Lewin, Royal Navy, as pilot, at 0637, a very fine evolution
observing that "X" and "Y" turrets were at that time firing
on a forward bearing. Owing to delay in establishing W/T
communication the first air spotting report was not received
until 0654. This method was then employed for the rest of
the action.
20. The First Division turned back to port at 0634 in order
to close the range.
21. EXETER fired her starboard torpedoes in local control at
0632 as she turned back to her westerly course, but at 0637
the GRAF SPEE altered course some 150 degrees to port, and
steered to the north-westward under cover of smoke. AJAX and
ACHILLES immediately hauled round, first to north, then to
the west to close the range and regain bearing, accepting
the temporary loss of "A" arcs. Both ships were by this time
proceeding at full speed.
It appears probable that the First Division's concentration
and also EXETER'S fire had up to this point been most
effective and it is thought that this and the firing of
EXETER'S torpedoes were the cause of the enemy making smoke
and altering course away.
0638-0650.
22. At about 0638 EXETER altered course to starboard so as
to fire her port torpedoes. She then steered to the
north-east to close the First Division till about 0645 when
she turned to a westerly course to keep within range.
23. During this period, EXETER received two more 11 in.
hits. "A" turret was put out of action, and the second shell
burst in the Chief Petty Officers' flat amidships, started a
fierce fire, and caused the 4 in. magazine to be flooded by
burst water mains. All compass repeaters were now out of
action, and Captain Bell, using a boat's compass, resolutely
maintained EXETER in action with "Y" turret firing in local
control and the gunnery officer, Lieutenant-Commander R. B.
Jennings, Royal Navy, controlling the fire from the after
searchlight platform.
24. At 0640 an 11 in. direct action shell fell short of
ACHILLES in line with the bridge and burst on the water.
Splinters killed four ratings in the D.C.T. and stunned the
gunnery officer. Lieutenant R. E. Washbourn, Royal Navy.
Captain Parry and the Chief Yeoman who were on the bridge
were also slightly wounded at the time. The D.C.T. itself
was undamaged and, after a few minutes, resumed control from
the after control position which had temporarily taken over.
The survivors of the crew of the D.C.T. took over the duties
of the casualties in a most resolute and efficient manner.
About 0646 reception on ACHILLES fire control W/T set faded,
and thereafter she carried on in individual control.
0650-0708.
25. During the period ACHILLES was in individual control,
she had great difficulty in finding the line, and at first
her salvos were falling well short. Reports of the fall of
these salvos were transmitted by the aircraft of AJAX whose
gun control officer, not knowing that ACHILLES was no longer
in concentration firing, accepted them as referring to his
own fall of shot, and corrected accordingly.
The enemy was making smoke at the time, and conditions for
direct observations were very bad.
This resulted in AJAX salvos falling well over and the
target was not found again until 0708.
26. AJAX and ACHILLES hauled round to the north-westward at
0656 to open their "A" arcs. GRAF SPEE made frequent
alterations of course to throw out our gunfire, and from
0700 onwards she made great use of smoke; she appeared to
have some form of chloro-sulphonic apparatus aft, and used
this as well as smoke floats.
27. Captain Bell, of H.M.S. EXETER, hauled round to the
westward at 0650, and was still engaging the enemy,
adjusting his course so as to keep "Y" turret bearing.
EXETER now had a list of 7 degrees to starboard, and had
several compartments flooded forward as a result of an 11
in. hit under the forecastle. She was still being engaged by
GRAF SPEE, but the latter's fire appeared at this time to be
falling a considerable distance over EXETER.
0708-0728.
28. GRAF SPEE'S range from the First Division was still
16,000 yards at 0710. I then decided to accept the loss of
"A" arcs in order to close the range as rapidly as possible.
Course was altered to the westward, and AJAX and ACHILLES
were ordered to proceed at their utmost speed.
29. At 0716, GRAF SPEE made a drastic alteration of course
to port under cover of smoke, but four minutes later she
turned to the north-west and opened her "A" arcs on the
First Division. AJAX was immediately straddled three times
by 11 in. at a range of 11,000 yards, but the enemy's
secondary armament was firing raggedly, and appeared to be
going consistently over, between AJAX and ACHILLES.
30. At 0720, the First Division turned to starboard to bring
all guns to bear. Our shooting appeared to be very
effective, and a fire was observed amidships in GRAF SPEE.
31. At 0725, AJAX received an 11 in. delay action hit on the
after superstructure. The shell passed through various
cabins, then "X" turret trunk, wrecking the turret machinery
below the gunhouse and finally bursting in the Commodore's
sleeping cabin, doing considerable damage. A portion of the
base of the shell struck "Y" barbette close to the training
rack and jammed the turret. It was this shell that killed
four and wounded six of "X" turret's crew. This one hit
therefore put both "X" and "Y" turrets of AJAX out of
action.
32. It now appeared to me that GRAF SPEE intended to neglect
EXETER and was determined to close the First Division on a
northwesterly course. Thinking she would hold this course,
it was decided to fire one broadside of torpedoes from AJAX.
At 0724 AJAX turned to starboard and fired four torpedoes at
a range of 9,000 yards. GRAF 9PEE probably saw these being
fired, as she at once turned some 130 degrees to port,
though she came back to the north-west three minutes later.
0728-0740.
33. EXETER had been dropping gradually astern, as she had to
reduce speed owing to damage forward. She still continued
firing "Y" turret in local control until about 0730, when
power to the turret failed due to flooding. She could then
no longer keep up with the action, and about 0740 steered to
the southeast at slow speed, starting to repair damage and
make "herself seaworthy.".
34. AJAX and ACHILLES hauled back to about 260 degrees at
0728 to close the range still further. At 0731, the aircraft
reported
"Torpedoes approaching, they will pass ahead of you." I
decided, however, not to take any chances, and altered
course to 180 degrees, engaging the enemy on the starboard
side, with the range closing rapidly. So as to blank
ACHILLES' fire for as short a time as possible, I directed
her by signal to pass under the stern of AJAX.
35. At 0732 GRAF SPEE turned away to the west, making much
smoke and zigzagging to throw out the First Division's
gunfire, which, particularly from ACHILLES, appeared to be
very accurate at this stage. AJAX was also making very good
use of her three available guns. GRAF SPEE altered to the
south-west at 0736, and again brought all guns to bear on
the First Division.
36. By 0738 the range was down to 8,000 yards. At this time
I received a report that AJAX had only 20 per cent, of
ammunition left and had only three guns in action, as one of
the hoists had failed in "B" turret and "X" and "Y" turrets
were both out of action.
GRAF SPEE'S shooting was still very accurate and she did not
appear to have suffered much damage.
I therefore decided to break off the day action and try and
close in again after dark. Accordingly at 0740 AJAX and
ACHILLES turned away lo the east under cover of smoke.
37. One of GRAF SPEE'S last salvos brought down AJAX'S main
top mast and destroyed all her aerials. Jury aerials were,
however, soon rigged.
38. It subsequently transpired that the report of shortage
of ammunition in AJAX referred only to "A" turret, which had
been firing continuously for 81 minutes, but this was not
realised at the time.
39. GRAF SPEE made no attempt to follow, but steadied on a
course of about 270 degrees, proceeding at about 22 knots on
a course direct for the River Plate.
40. After opening the range under smoke for six minutes, I
again turned the First Division to the westward and ordered
ACHILLES to shadow in Sector "A", on the enemy's starboard
quarter, and AJAX in Sector "B", on his port quarter. The
range at this time being about 15 miles.
41. The general trend of GRAF SPEE'S retreat at this stage
was about 255 degrees. His very conspicuous control tower
made it an easy matter to shadow him at long range in the
excellent visibility prevailing.
At 0807, as AJAX'S aerials were still down, I ordered
ACHILLES to broadcast GRAF SPEE'S position, course and speed
to all British merchant ships. A similar message was
broadcast every hour from AJAX until the end of the chase. I
also passed this information to Admiralty at 1017 and 1700.
42. At 0912, AJAX recovered her aircraft, the operation
being excellently performed under difficult conditions by
Captain C. H. L. Woodhouse, and the pilot of the aircraft,
Lieutenant E. D. G. Lewin, Royal Navy, and shadowing was
resumed.
43. At 0946 I ordered CUMBERLAND, then at the Falkland
Islands, to close the Plate at full speed. She left at 1200,
on the initiative of her Commanding Officer, Captain W. H.
G. Fallowfield, Royal Navy, who had by then only received
very jumbled messages. On receipt of my signal she at once
increased to full speed.
At 1005 ACHILLES over-estimating the enemy's speed had
closed to 23,000 yards. GRAF SPEE thereupon altered course
and fired two three gun salvos at ACHILLES; the first was
very short, but the second fell close alongside. She
appeared to wait for the first salvo to fall before firing
the second.
ACHILLES turned away at full speed under smoke and resumed
shadowing at longer range.
44. At 1104 a merchant ship was sighted close to GRAF SPEE.
She was stopped and was blowing off steam. A few minutes
later the following W/T signal was received on 500 k/cs:
AJAX (pre-war call sign) from GRAF SPEE—" please pick up
lifeboats of English steamer."
On coming up with the merchant ship she turned out to be the
British S.S. SHAKESPEARE. All her boats were hoisted, and in
response to my signals she reported that she was quite all
right and did not require any assistance. By this time she
was moving out to the southern flank.
At 1105 I received a signal from EXETER who reported that
all her turrets were out of action and that she was flooded
forward up to No. 14 bulkhead but could still do 18 knots. I
ordered her to proceed to the Falkland Islands at whatever
speed was possible without straining her bulkheads. She
later reported that one gun of "Y" turret could be fired in
local control.
At 1347 I informed the British Naval Attache, Buenos Aires,
that GRAF SPEE was heading direct for the Plate.
45. At 1543 ACHILLES signalled "Enemy in sight 297", and
later reported "Suspected 8 inch cruiser." However, at 1559,
she negatived the report, and the ship sighted was
subsequently identified as S.S. DELANE, whose streamlined
funnel gave her a similar appearance to a "Blucher" at very
long range.
46. Shadowing continued without incident until 1915, when
GRAF SPEE altered course and fired two salvos at AJAX who
immediately turned away under smoke. The first salvo fell
short and in line, the second in AJAX'S wake as she turned.
The range at this time was about 26,000 yards.
47. It now appeared that GRAF SPEE intended to enter the
Plate, and at 1902 I ordered ACHILLES to follow her if she
went west of Lobos, while AJAX would proceed south of the
English Bank in case she doubled back that way. I also
directed ACHILLES to take every advantage of territorial
waters while shadowing. My instructions were perfectly
carried out by Captain W. E. Parry who took ACHILLES inside
Lobos Island and close to the Uruguayan coast.
48. Just after sunset GRAF SPEE fired three salvos at
ACHILLES, the third being very close. ACHILLES replied with
five salvos and appeared to straddle. ACHILLES at this time
was just clear of Punta Negra.
49. The Uruguayan gunboat URUGUAY closed AJAX about 2115.
She appeared to be on patrol duty, but was soon left astern.
50. GRAF SPEE also fired single salvos at ACHILLES at 2132,
2140 and 2143, but the visibility to the eastward was very
bad for her at these times and firing must have merely been
intended to keep shadowers at a distance.
51. Those shots, however, did not deter Captain Parry from
keeping touch and by 2200 ACHILLES had closed to within five
miles of GRAF SPEE. The latter was well silhouetted first
against the afterglow, and then against the lights of
Montevideo. GRAF SPEE proceeded north of the English Bank
and anchored in Montevideo roads at 0050.
52. My chief pre-occupation at that time was how long did
GRAF SPEE intend to stay there. The primary necessity was to
keep to seaward of the GRAF SPEE if she came to sea again,
and at the same time to avoid being caught against the dawn
light. At 2350 I ordered AJAX and ACHILLES to withdraw from
the Plate, ACHILLES to patrol the area from the Uruguayan
coast to a line 120 degrees from English Bank, and AJAX the
southern area, both ships to move back into the Plate in
their respective sectors after dawn.
Thursday, 14th December
53. I requested His Britannic Majesty's Minister,
Montevideo, to use every possible means of delaying GRAF
SPEE'S sailing, in order to gain time for reinforcements to
reach me. I suggested that he should sail British ships and
invoke the 24-hour rule to prevent her leaving.
54. I learned that ARK ROYAL, RENOWN, NEPTUNE, DORSETSHIRE,
SHROPSHIRE and three destroyers were all closing the Plate,
but none of them could reach me for at least five days.
55. CUMBERLAND reported that she would arrive in the Plate
at 2200/14th December, having made the passage from the
Falkland Islands in 34 hours. I ordered her to cover the
sector between Rouen and English Banks, with ACHILLES to the
north of her and AJAX to the south. These dispositions were
maintained during the night of the 14th/15th December.
Should GRAF SPEE come out, she was to be shadowed and all
ships were to concentrate sufficiently far to seaward to
enable a concerted attack to be carried out.
Friday, 15th December.
I ordered R.F.A. OLYNTHUS, Captain L. N. Hill, to proceed to
Rouen Bank to be ready to fuel H.M. ships, and proceeded
there in AJAX. I ordered CUMBERLAND to close and cover AJAX,
remaining at visibility distance to the northward so as to
be able to give warning in case GRAF SPEE came out without
her sailing being reported.
57. I made the following policy signal timed 1135/15th
December:
"My object destruction.
Necessitates concentrating our forces. Increased risk of
enemy escape accepted. ACHILLES is now to watch north of
English Bank and CUMBERLAND to west of English Bank,
latter showing herself off Montevideo in daylight. If
enemy leaves before 2100, ships in touch shadow at maximum
range - all units concentrate on shadower. If enemy has
not left by 2100, leave patrol positions and concentrate
in position 090 degrees San Antonio 15 miles by 0030; AJAX
will probably join CUMBERLAND on her way south.
"If enemy leaves Montevideo
after sunset, CUMBERLAND is at once to fly off one
aircraft to locate and shadow enemy, if necessary landing
in a lee, risking internment, and trying to find a British
ship in the morning. If plan miscarries, adopt plan "B,"
all units concentrate in position 36 degrees south, 52
degrees west at 0600."
I also repeated my signal 1200/12th December (see paragraph
7) to CUMBERLAND at 1136/15th December, substituting
CUMBERLAND for EXETER in the original.
58. AJAX took in 200 tons of fuel from OLYNTHUS, bad weather
causing wires to part including the spans of two hurricane
hawsers. AJAX then proceeded to join CUMBERLAND.
59. I received a report that GRAF SPEE had landed a funeral
party this morning, and later, that she had been granted an
extension of her stay up to 72 hours, in order to make
herself seaworthy. It appeared that she had been damaged far
more extensively than I had thought likely, and had been hit
60 to 70 times in all. The British ship ASHWORTH was sailed
at 1900 and GRAF SPEE accepted the edict that she would not
be allowed to sail for 24 hours after this. At the same time
I could feel no security that she would not break out at any
moment.
Saturday, 16th December.
60. CUMBERLAND, AJAX, and ACHILLES made rendezvous off San
Antonio at 0030 in accordance with my plan. The squadron
closed the Plate towards dawn and AJAX flew off her aircraft
for a reconnaissance of the harbour. The aircraft was
instructed not to fly over territorial waters.
61. The aircraft returned at 0830 and the crew reported that
they had been unable to see anything owing to bad
visibility. They had been fired at while in the vicinity of
the Whistle Buoy. This seemed to indicate that GRAF SPEE was
taking advantage of the mist and was trying to break out.
All ships went to action stations, but a report received
shortly afterwards from Montevideo indicated that GRAF SPEE
was still in harbour!
62. I informed H.B.M. Minister, Montevideo, of the firing on
our aircraft, and suggested that an investigation into this
might be a way of delaying GRAF SPEE sailing. He replied,
however, that it was definitely not GRAF SPEE who fired, and
that it had possibly been the Argentine Guard Gunboat at
Recalada, or in some other position.
63. The Admiralty informed me in message 0219/16th December
that I was free to engage GRAF SPEE anywhere outside the
three-mile limit. I decided to move my patrol into the area
north and east of English Bank, as I considered that a
battle in the very restricted water just outside the
three-mile limit off Montevideo was impracticable, owing to
lack of sea room, and possibility of "overs" landing in
Uruguay and causing international complications.
64. Information from Montevideo was to the effect that GRAF
SPEE was still repairing damage, having obtained assistance
from the shore, and had provisioned. It was reported as
unlikely that she would sail that night; on the other hand,
once again I did not feel able to rely on such an optimistic
report.
65. I signalled the following appreciation to ships in
company timed 1615/16th December-
" My object Destruction
necessitates keeping my force together. My Appreciation.
Rely on getting his time of sailing and initial course
from shore. For subsequent movements rely on CUMBERLAND'S
aircraft reconnaissance reports.
"Enemy's courses of Action.
(a) North of English Bank, (b) Between English and Rouen
Banks. (c) Between Rouen Bank and San Antonio. (d) Double
back on any track. My Course of Action. I rule out
fighting him off Whistle Buoy as being politically
impossible. Until the dawn phase I want to keep the
advantage of light and from this it follows that I must
keep to the east and move to intercept him from area to
area depending on time and information. My Plan. To keep
within reach of intercepting him north of English Bank
moving south or doubling back as information comes in.
Tactical. I must keep CUMBERLAND so placed that she will
not have her fire masked initially, and therefore I will
work in divisions 8 cables apart with ACHILLES in close
order astern of AJAX.
"After action commences,
divisions have complete freedom of action. CUMBERLAND'S
aircraft is to be flown off as soon as news is received of
enemy's sailing."
66. The British ship DUNSTER GRANGE was sailed from
Montevideo at 1700 and a further period before GRAF SPEE
could be allowed to sail was claimed. It was, however,
reported that she had made very rapid progress with her
repairs, and might break out at any moment.
67. The difficulty of intercepting GRAF SPEE who had so many
courses of action open to her will, I feel sure, be
realised. It was in the dog watches of this evening that I
received the Naval Secretary's signal 1717/16th December
informing me from the First Lord of me Admiralty of the
honours so graciously bestowed by His Majesty the King on
myself, Captain W. E. Parry, Captain C. H. L. Woodhouse and
Captain F. S. Bell, and also that I had been promoted to
Rear Admiral to date 13th December. This was a most
stimulating tonic to us all and I took steps to pass it on
to H.M. Ships under my command, emphasising the share of all
concerned in the honours which their senior officers had
received.
The squadron spent the night patrolling on a north and south
line five miles to the east of the English Bank Light Buoy.
OLYNTHUS proceeded to sea with order to be at the Rouen Bank
by 1000 the next morning if GRAF SPEE had not broken out.
Sunday, 17th December.
69. I ordered ACHILLES who was getting low in fuel, to oil
from OLYNTHUS off the Rouen Bank during the forenoon. AJAX
and CUMBERLAND acted as look-outs at visibility distance
during the operation. The squadron then cruised in company
off the south-east of the English Bank, remaining
concentrated throughout the afternoon and ready again to
take up the same night patrol as on the previous night.
70. It was reported that GRAF SPEE had landed all her
borrowed welding apparatus during this forenoon. We all
expected that she would break out at any moment. I would
like to place on record the fact that at this stage the most
cheerful optimism pervaded all ships in spite of the fact
that this was the fifth night of waiting for the enemy.
71. At 1540 I received a signal that GRAF SPEE was
transferring between 300 and 400 men to the German ship
TACOMA lying close to her in the ante-port. At 1720, a
further report stated that over 700 men with their baggage
and some provisions had now been transferred, and that there
were indications that GRAF SPEE intended to scuttle herself.
Shortly after this GRAF SPEE was reported as weighing.
72. I immediately altered course to close the Whistle Buoy,
and increased to 25 knots. AJAX'S aircraft was flown off and
ordered to proceed towards Montevideo and report the
position of GRAF SPEE and also TACOMA.
GRAF SPEE left harbour at 1815 and proceeded slowly to the
westward. TACOMA also weighed, and followed her out of
harbour.
73. I ordered my squadron to assume the First Degree of
Readiness, in case GRAF SPEE intended re-transferring her
crew from TACOMA outside the harbour, or intended to break
out with or without her surplus crew.
74. AJAX aircraft reported sighting GRAF SPEE in a position
in shallow water some six miles south-west of Montevideo. At
2054 the aircraft signalled: "GRAF SPEE has blown herself
up."
75. The squadron carried on towards Montevideo, proceeding
north of the English Bank, AJAX and ACHILLES cheering ship
as they passed each other.
76. Once again Captain Woodhouse and Lieutenant Lewin made
an excellent recovery of AJAX's aircraft, this time under
almost dark conditions.
Navigation lights were then switched on and the squadron
steamed past the Whistle Buoy within about four miles of the
wreck of the GRAF SPEE. It was now dark, and she was ablaze
from end to end, flames reaching almost as high as the top
of her control tower, a magnificent and most cheering sight.
REMARKS BY REAR ADMIRAL
COMMANDING SOUTH AMERICA DIVISION.
Appreciation of conduct
of Commanding Officers and Ships' Companies.
77. I have the greatest pleasure in informing you of the
very high standard of efficiency and courage that was
displayed by all officers and men throughout the five days
of the operation under review.
78. Captain W. E. Parry, Royal Navy, of H.M.S. ACHILLES;
Captain C. H. L. Woodhouse, Royal Navy, of H.M.S. AJAX; and
Captain F. S. Bell, Royal Navy, of H.M.S. EXETER, all
handled their ships in a most efficient and resolute manner.
79. In addition I would like to place on record the very
great assistance that I received throughout this period from
my Flag Captain and Chief Staff Officer, Captain C. H. L.
Woodhouse, Royal Navy.
80. The speedy arrival of H.M.S. CUMBERLAND, Captain W. H.
G. Fallowfield, Royal Navy, from the Falkland Islands, was a
most creditable performance, especially as that ship was
self-refitting at the time the action commenced.
81. Throughout the days of waiting off the Plate, R.F.A.
OLYNTHUS, Captain L. N. Hill, arrived punctually at the
various rendezvous given him and did everything possible to
facilitate the refuelling of H.M. Ships.
82. Within my own knowledge, and from the reports of the
Commanding Officers there are many stories of bravery,
devotion to duty and of the utmost efficiency which shows
that H.M. Ships have been forcefully trained and made
thoroughly ready to deal with the many and various
exigencies of battle. In accordance with Admiralty message
1755/16th December, I am submitting separately a list of
officers and ratings whom I consider to be especially
deserving of award. I would remark, however, that the
standard throughout has been so high that the preparation of
this list has been very difficult.
83. I would like also to place on record the honour and
pleasure I had to taking one of H.M. Ships of the New
Zealand Division into action, and fully concur with the
Commanding Officer of H.M.S. ACHILLES in paragraph 27 of his
report where he remarks that "New Zealand has every reason
to be proud of her seamen during their baptism of fire."
84. Further, it is most satisfactory for me to be able to
inform you that the machinery and equipment generally of
H.M. Ships proved to be of the highest efficiency and well
able to stand up to the prolonged strain of battle.
Lessons learned.
85. The main impression left on my mind is of the adequacy
of our peace training. Little that had not been practised
occurred, particularly among the repair parties.
Nevertheless, there are a very large number of points
brought out in the reports by the Commanding Officers and I
would recommend that they should be carefully studied.
86. As soon as the three ships were in company at the
Falkland Islands I ordered committees of the Gunnery,
Torpedo and Engineer Officers to be formed so as to analyse
the lessons learned. Their conclusions have been forwarded
direct to Admiralty.
Enemy Tactics.
87. The most salient point is that GRAF SPEE closed on
sighting us, firing one turret at First Division and the
other at EXETER.
This initial closing of the range by the enemy had the
effect of bringing both the 8 in. and 6 in. cruisers into
effective gun range at once and so avoided for us the most
difficult problem of gaining range in the face of 11 in.
gunfire.
88. It would appear that GRAF SPEE was heavily handled by
the gunfire both of the First Division's concentration and
also by that of EXETER in the initial phase, the culminating
point perhaps being the firing of torpedoes by H.M.S.
EXETER. At this point GRAF SPEE turned away under smoke and
from that time onwards her Commanding Officer displayed
little offensive spirit and did not take advantage of the
opportunity that was always present either to close the
First Division or EXETER, the latter - and he must have
known it - only having one turret in action. Instead GRAF
SPEE retired between the two and allowed herself to be fired
at from both flanks. Only at one period, i.e., at 0720, did
she again open her "A" arcs and concentrate on the First
Division, and she immediately abandoned this when AJAX fired
torpedoes.
89. Her frequent alterations of course under smoke were,
from an avoiding action point of view, well carried out and
undoubtedly threw out our gunfire. This has shown up the
necessity for more frequent practice at a highly mobile
target at fine angles of inclination.
GRAF SPEE had an exceptionally high degree of
manoeuvrability and apparently used full wheel for her
turns. On many occasions this gave her an apparent list
which raised our hopes, but she always came upright again on
steadying.
90. At no time did GRAF SPEE steam at a higher speed than 24
knots, and generally her speed was between 19 and 22 knots.
It was noticed that from the time of first sighting she was
making a considerable amount of reddish-brown and
occasionally white smoke.
91. Enemy smoke screens were good but not entirely effective
as they did not rise high enough. A point brought out was
the necessity for remote control of our smoke floats.
Endeavours to light ours while the main armament was firing
presented many difficulties.
Enemy Gunnery.
92. GRAF SPEE'S 11 in. fire was accurate throughout,
particularly for line. The rate of fire was slow and there
were short periods in which either one or the other turret
did not appear to be firing, but by the evening phase both
turrets were in action. They certainly did excellent
shooting at AJAX and ACHILLES at a range of about 26,000
yards while these ships were shadowing. It was evident from
this that shadowing ships should, available speed
permitting, zigzag so as to prevent too accurate range
plotting by the enemy. It was also found desirably to make
drastic alterations of course when the first salvo was
fired.
93. Perhaps the roost interesting point was the mixing of
armour-piercing delay action projectiles and direct action.
AJAX'S one 11 in. hit and several of EXETER'S were of the
delay action type. A delay of 42 feet was measured in AJAX
and 65 feet in EXETER. It was most noticeable that at the
short range at which the action was fought the 11 in.
projectiles proceeded more or less on a horizontal course
through the ship and did not directly affect the vitals
below.
94. The direct action type produced most serious, and to a
certain extent unexpected results. They burst on impact with
either the ship or the water and showered splinters in all
directions, causing a very large number of casualties to
personnel and damage to rigging, electric cables and
material generally. I would stress the necessity for more
protection of bridges, fire control cables and such
important parts of the offensive organisation as the 6 in.
director tower. A large number of casualties on EXETER'S
bridge were caused by splinters from the hit on "B" turret
ricochetting off the roof of the bridge. Immediate steps
should be taken to pad toe under surface of bridge roofs.
95. The 11 in. shells that fell short made a black splash
and in the vicinity of bursts a black dust like soot was
found.
96. The enemy 6 in. fire was ragged and ineffective and
caused little, if any, anxiety.
97. There is some evidence that GRAF SPEE fired time-fuzed
H.E. possibly from her high angle guns.
Aircraft.
98. The flying off of AJAX'S aircraft with "X" and "Y"
turrets firing on a forward bearing while the aircraft was
waiting was a gallant and most resolute effort. The handling
of both AJAX and her aircraft during subsequent recoveries
was also very well carried out. During the past two months I
have been most impressed with the rough weather capabilities
of the Seafox type of aircraft.
99. EXETER'S Walrus aircraft had been refuelled for the dawn
phase, and it was unfortunate that both were hit by
splinters before either could be flown off. It was extremely
fortunate that the petrol which was being sprayed all over
the after part of the ship did not cause any fires. This
danger must always be present when an unexpected encounter
occurs. Again it emphasizes the necessity for emptying the
aircraft of petrol should a night encounter be likely and
for the ability to be able to fuel and defuel quickly.
100. Another point that comes out is the need for speeding
up the catapulting process.
101. The aircraft, once up, though extremely valuable at
times, was not entirely successful.
102. GRAF SPEE'S aircraft was out of action before the
battle and did not take part.
Increased Protection.
103. There must always be a tendency for a cruiser to desire
increased protection and most of the claims must, generally
speaking, be resisted. Nevertheless, there are portions of
the control and of the offensive armament that I feel very
strongly should be protected against splinters.
(a) The killing or wounding
of nearly the whole of EXETER'S bridge personnel is one
example. The bullet-proof plating, backed up by the
instrument plate was more or less successful in keeping
out most of the splinters. It should, however, be made
thicker and, as mentioned before, the underside of the
bridge roof should be padded to prevent splinters
ricochetting off it. It was this latter factor that was
the main cause of the casualties.
(b) The hitting of ACHILLES director control tower was
most unfortunate, and I consider that, particularly in
those ships with only one director tower it should be made
splinter proof and also that the leads to it should be in
a protected tube.
(c) The After Conning Position. This position was used
throughout most of the action in EXETER, but its
communications failed, and Captain Bell had to con the
ship through a chain of messengers. In AJAX casualties
from splinters occurred in this position, though it
appears they were downwards from a hit on the
main-topmast. I consider that the after conning position
should be protected and more attention paid to the
security of its communications.
(d) Other exposed personnel
liable to attack from splinters. I consider that the
experience of this action shows that some protection
should be given to torpedo tubes' crews, H.A. guns' crews
and 0.5 in. machine guns' crews.
(Signed) H. H. Harwood,
Rear Admiral Commanding,
South America Division.
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