Extracted from ADM199/1478
SECRET
Office of the Commander in Chief,
British Pacific Fleet
10th June 1946
BAF.11.6
SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY
COMMANDER IN CHIEF’S DISPATCHES –
1ST DECEMBER 1945
TO
11TH JUNE 1946
Be pleased to lay before Their Lordships my
final dispatch which continues that dated 6th
December 1945 numbered 1340/BPF/1780/OPS (n.b.
“Preparation of Naval Occupation Forces for China
Coast).
2. It covers the period of my departure
from
Australia to set up my headquarters at
Hong Kong,
until the transfer of the command to Vice Admiral Sir
Denis Boyd at Singapore on
11th June 1946.
3. During this period the main tasks
undertaken have been the continued transport of
R.A.P.W.I., the reduction of the Australian Base, the
reductions in the Fleet, the establishment of B.C.O.F.
in Japan, and the difficulties wit the Chinese
government in obtaining clearances for His Majesty’s
Ships to visit Chinese Ports. All these matters
are described in the dispatch.
4. Over and above these problems was the
necessity of keeping a contented fleet in conditions
were the natural reaction of most officers and men was a
desire to get home to their families in peace-time
England, of which many had seen so little during the
years of war.
5. To achieve this I endeavoured
to make sure by constant planning ahead that the relief
of Age and Service Groups was punctually carried out;
that the ships were kept continuously on the move to
make life interesting; that the ships returning to the
United Kingdom were informed of their date of departure
as early as possible to give them something to look
forward to; and that I and my Flag Officers constantly
visited ships, big and small, and talked with and to
their officers and ship’s companies.
6. As a result
I am sure that a good spirit prevails and I leave the
Fleet with confidence that my successor will find this
is so.
7. Nevertheless, there is not yet a
feeling in the Fleet that they have settled down to a
peacetime foreign station routine. There is, of
course, still much to be done, but I do not think one
will get such a feeling until the fleet is reduced to
its peacetime number, and every officer and man who left
England before the surrender of Japan, has had a chance
to go home.
8. This I think is amply illustrated by
the meager response to the extended service scheme and
by the many applications from active service ratings to
transfer to Hostilities Only
engagements or to purchase their discharge. I do
not believe these are founded on a lasting desire to
leave the Navy permanently, but to a short sighted,
though natural, urge to get home by any means, which if
it does not success will not unduly dismay them.
The concessions recently granted by Their Lordships to
enable men to return home who have seen little of their
families during the war, will do much to help through
the realization that their case is appreciated.
9. I am at the moment of writing returning
to
England
in H.M.S. DUKE OF YORK and shall strike my Flag on
arrival at Plymouth on 11th July.
Though the period of my command of the British Pacific
Fleet has not been without difficulties, I am grateful
to Their Lordships for their support and understanding
under conditions of much difficulty at home,
particularly during the period of our part in the
Pacific War, when the country was recovering from the
vast strain on its resources necessitated by the defeat
of Germany.
(Sgd) Bruce Fraser
Admiral
Enclosure:
Dispatch
SECRET
REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS
Enclosure
to Commander in Chief, British Pacific Fleet’s
Letter
No. BAF.11/6 of 10th
June 1946
REDUCTION IN STRENGTH OF BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET
During the period under review there has been a
steady
reduction in the strength of the Fleet, covering all
classes of ships. Further reductions already
planned will
reduce the Fleet to its post war strength by October
1946.
2. The promulgation
to the Fleet of the reductions as they have been
decided, has largely helped to
keep the ships’ companies contented, as ships longest
abroad have been the
first to go home. Except for the
cruisers all the ships who
have seen service in the
British Pacific Fleet from its first operations have
gone home or are going
shortly. The cruisers have not been so
fortunate and those who have no definite date of
departure in sight have the
prospect of continuing on abroad and seeing ships who
left England after the
war was over in the Pacific, going home before them.
3. I have represented
the case of the cruisers to Their Lordships with
suggestions to reduce the time
abroad of these ships. I feel it is most
important that reasonable and definite dates should now
be given and if cruiser
crews are not available, that fast minelayers should be
used temporarily.
RELIEF OF AGE AND SERVICE GROUPS
4. In conjunction
with the reduction of the size of the Fleet, the relief
of Age and Service
Groups has gone steadily forward. With
the Fleet at one time spread over half the Pacific,
careful planning and close
cooperation with the Drafting Authority was
essential. Reliefs for personnel of ships in
Japanese
Waters had at tone time to travel 15,000 miles from
England
to join
their ships.
5. As far as possible
ships were given spells in rotation at
Sydney,
not
only for leave and recreation but to enable the Drafting
Authority to adjust
the complements.
MOVE OF HEADQUARTERS OF COMMANDER IN CHIEF, BRITISH PACIFIC
FLEET,
FROM
SYDNEY TO
HONG
KONG
6. After the first
few weeks following the end of the war, it was clear
that the main sphere of
activity of the British Pacific Fleet was centred
on
the
China
Coast and Japan. After my visit to Hong
Kong in September, 1945, arrangements were put
in hand to
prepare accommodation.
7. With my departure
from
Sydney
it was
necessary to establish an authority there to carry on
the affairs of the Fleet
in
Australia.
Vice Admiral (Administration) therefore moved
from
Melbourne
to Sydney at the
same time as I moved to
Hong Kong.
Vice Admiral (Administration) was given an
operational role as well as his administrative one, and
was appointed Flag
Officer Southern Area for this purpose.
8. On 1 December, I
sailed from
Sydney
in DUKE
OF YORK with a small staff, the remainder travelling in
REAPER.
9. Three days were
spent in
Singapore
on
passage, and I arrived at
Hong Kong
on
21st December 1945.
MOVE OF DRAFTING POOL TO
CEYLON
10. Towards the end
of 1945 the Admiralty had indicated that it desired that
the British Pacific
Fleet Drafting Pool should be moved from
Sydney
to Ceylon.
11. Although the
advantage of reducing the long haul from
England
to Sydney would
mean a reduction in shipping requirements, it was
obvious there were
disadvantages in this move if made prematurely.
At the end of 1945 and during the first month of 1946
the flood of Age
and Service Group reliefs was in full
spate.
The size of the fleet was still considerable and the
movement of
personnel correspondingly great. To move
the drafting pool meant a drafting moratorium of about
three weeks, and it was
a question of whether more harm than good would be done
by a move at this
time. It was really a matter of timing.
12. The latter part
of April and beginning of May was eventually decided on
for the move. This was later that the Admiralty
had hoped
for, but was earlier than the British Pacific Fleet
Drafting Authority would
have preferred.
13. The planning of
the move to
Ceylon
was a
complicated operation which entailed tieing
the
British Pacific Fleet to a predetermined programme
over a period of weeks while the move was taking place
so that drafting at Sydney would
continue until the last possible moment.
14. The move was
completed without mishap except that VICTORIOUS was
carrying the major portion
of the drafting pool was damaged by weather crossing the
Great
Australian
Bight and could not proceed beyond
Fremantle
without repairs. Fortunately, INDOMITABLE
outwardbound for
Sydney
arrived
Fremantle shortly afterwards and she quickly turned
round and sailed for Ceylon with
the VICTORIOUS load.
15. Early May,
Commodore B.L. Moore hoisted his broad pendant in H.M.S.
GOULD at
Colombo
as
COMBRAX, British Pacific Fleet. Drafting
has again been resumed and although it is early to
comment, there does not
appear to have been any dislocation in the Age and
Service Group reliefs during
the period of the move.
CLOSING DOWN IN
AUSTRALIA
16. The closing down
of facilities for the British Pacific Fleet in
Australia
was
closely connected with the reduction in the size of the
fleet, particularly
carriers, the rehabilitation of Hong Kong and Singapore,
and
the move of the drafting pool. The
latter effected the actual reduction of personnel in
Australia as the
machinery of the drafting office was required to draft
personnel to England. The drafting pool could not,
therefore, leave
Sydney
until
the number of personnel in Australia had
been greatly reduced.
17. Vice Admiral
(Administration) and Flag Officer, Naval Air Pacific
organized the closing down
in
Australia
which
has now been completed with the departure of
INDEFATIGABLE from Sydney on
9th June 1946.
There is a small rear party left in Australia to deal
with stores, etc.
18. Vice Admiral Rivett-Carnac,
BC, CBE, DSC, hauled down his flag as Vice
Admiral (Administration) on 27th April and
Rear Admiral R.H. Portal,
CB, DSC, hauled down his flag as Flag Officer, Naval Air
Pacific
29th April 1946.
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEATH OCCUPATION
FORCE IN
JAPAN
19. Preliminary
preparations were put in hand in November and December
by the Commander in
Chief,
East Indies,
to form a Naval
Port Party for the establishment of the British
Commonwealth Occupation Force.
20. On December 14th,
Kure
was
selected as the port of entry for the British
Commonwealth Occupation Force,
and early in January the Port Party under Captain J.A. Grindle,
C.B.E. sailed from Ceylon in
GLENEARN for
Hong Kong.
On 21st January clearance for the
Port Party to land at Kure was
obtained from S.C.A.F. and GLENEARN with various
auxiliaries in company arrived
at
Kure
on 1st
February.
21. The first task of
the Port Party was to take over the Port Directorate
from the United States
Navy. This was not completed, however,
before the first echelon of the British Commonwealth
Occupation Force had
arrived.
22. Although the
disembarking of the British Commonwealth Occupation
Force went according to
plan, the Naval Officer in Charge,
Kure,
had
many difficulties to contend with, not the least being
the weather. Lack of skilled Japanese labour
slowed down the erection and equipping of the Naval
shore establishment, and it has been necessary to retain
GLENEARN as
headquarters and accommodation ship for the Port Party
until the beginning of
June.
23. Besides operating
the port through which the British Commonwealth Force is
supported, the Naval
Officer in Charge, Kure is responsible to COMNAVJAP for
the turn round of a
number of Japanese repatriation ships running to
Hiroshima and the cataloguing
and destruction (n.b.
original document reads “distribution”, but is scored
out in pen and corrected)
of enemy naval equipment within the area of the
British Commonwealth Force.
HIS
MAJESTY’S SHIPS IN JAPANESE WATERS
24. A force, known as
Force “T” and consisting of a battleship or cruiser and
two or three destroyers
has been maintained in Japanese waters under the
operational control of
COMINFIFTHFLEET and later COMNAVJAP on the withdrawal of
the former. The force has been commanded by a Flag
Officer and has been based primarily on
Yokohama.
In addition the Royal Australian Navy has
maintained a force of two destroyers, sometimes
augmented by a cruiser in Japan. These ships have
formed part of Force “T” and
have been dependant on the British Pacific Fleet for
supply.
25. The
United
States
Navy has been
systematically reducing its forces in Japan, and at
the end of the typhoon season when ships will return to
Hong
Kong our forces in
Japan
are
likely to be reduced correspondingly.
MOVEMENTS OF HIS MAJESTY’S SHIPS ON THE
CHINA
COAST
26. As early as
September 1945, it was clear the movements of His
Majesty’s Ships on the
China
Coast and
visits to Chinese ports were going to be resisted by the
Chinese government if
they could find some excuse for doing so.
This attitude, which still holds, arises, I think, from
a desire to
exercise the new found sovereignty of China.
The fact that their behavior is frequently
discourteous and boorish to an ally in war, and that
their own people suffer
from the Government’s refusal to accept our assistance
in many ways cuts no ice
with them. The impression that one has
is that Kuomintang would rather see a large number of
Chinese people suffer
than accept assistance or cooperation of Great
Britain. To cede the latter would be to give up
the
ideal of sovereignty of China.
27. Up to the end of
1945, it was possible without much difficulty for His
Majesty’s Ships to visit
Chinese ports to assist in evacuation of
internees. When I arrived at Hong Kong in December
1945,
I was visited by our Naval Attache
who pointed out
that our reason for visits of His Majesty’s Ships to
Chinese ports was now
wearing then and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was
beginning to say that they
could not understand what our ships were doing in
Chinese ports, particularly
Shanghai, for such long periods.
28. An aide-memoire
was therefore prepared for the Naval Attache
setting
out the reasons why we wished to send ships to Chinese
ports. I also issued a Memorandum to Flag and
Commanding Officers setting out the object of the
British Pacific Fleet in
Chinese waters. These two papers were
forwarded to the Admiralty under cover of Commander in
Chief, British Pacific
Fleet’s No. 673/BPF/01/19 of
18th
April 1946.
29. The main feature
which the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs appears to
have disliked is the
maintaining of His Majesty’s Ships at
Shanghai
which savoured somewhat of
a garrison. These ships on the other hand have
done good
work maintaining good relations with the Chinese at
Shanghai, assisting and
encouraging the British Community and firms, who are
having great difficulty
keeping going, and keeping up our end vis
a vis our American
ally.
Every difficulty has been put in the way of changing
these ships round
and maintaining age and service group reliefs, and the
matter came to a head on
15th May when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
stated that the
Chinese had fundamental objections to the presence of
His Majesty’s Ships at
Shanghai, and followed this up shortly after with a
blank refusal to allow TRAFALGAR
to visit the port.
30. It was on account
of this thoroughly unsatisfactory state of affairs that
I decided to visit
Nanking.
31. The delay in my
arrival at
Nanking
due to
the grounding of NEWFOUNDLAND in the
Yangtze was unfortunate as I was not able to have talks
with all the Chinese
officials whom it was arranged I should see, as they
were unable to put off
their programme 24 hours
owing to other
engagements. On the other hand it
enabled me to bring up two destroyers with me, thus
increasing the strength of
the squadron.
32. Although my
reception of the various Chinese officials I met was
always cordial I did not
feel on my departure that much had been
accomplished. However, by the time I had returned
to
Hong
Kong, the Chinese Government had agreed to the
visit of TRAFALGAR
to
Shanghai,
and
the way had been opened to further visits to Nanking and
also to Hankow.
33. It was a source
of some satisfaction that
NEWFOUNDLAND
was the
first cruiser of any nation to visit Nanking since
the war and the first warship to salute the Chinese
government there.
34. During the
exchange of signals over His Majesty’s Ships at
Shanghai,
the
Chinese Government extended a cordial if somewhat
impractical invitation to our
ships to visit
North China
during
the summer months. Tsingtao and Wei
Hai Wei have been ruled out
by them but we are
offered limited use of Chinwangtwo
and Peiteho, neither of
which are suitable as the former has
very limited berthing space and the latter is an exposed
roadstead.
35. After the visit
of TRAFALGAR to
Shanghai
there
will be a period with no British Warship at this
port. It remains to be seen whether this will make
the Chinese Government more amenable to our requests for
visits in the future
or will be taken as a sign of weakness and our movements
on the China Coast will be
made more difficult. It is however,
certain that the absence of a British warship at
Shanghai will be
felt by the British Community and our Chinese friends
there.
36. I attach a copy
of the farewell letter that I wrote to the Generalissimo
as I did not see him
to say goodbye.
FINAL STAGE OF R.A.P.W.I. EVACUATION
37. The next planned
R.A.P.W.I. lift was of Europeans from
North
China, Peking, Tienstin,
and Tsingtao. HIGHLAND CHIEFTAN was detailed for
this
work. On her arrival in Hong
Kong it was found that her accommodation was
totally
inadequate for the job. The ship was
detained for a week while the Dockyard made a fine
effort and got her
ready. The lift was 222 women and
children in cabins and standees and 211 on troop
deck. In addition 718 males slung in
hammocks. The ship was visited in
Hong
Kong on the southerly voyage and the R.A.P.W.I.
appeared
happy thanks largely to the efforts of 25 naval ratings
who had been embarked
to look after the women and children, and of the ship’s
officers.
38. After this left,
roughly 1,000 R.A.P.W.I. remained who were content to
take any later lift which
might offer. The chance came with STRATHMORE
who had taken a British Occupation Force lift to
Kure.
Arrangements were made for SWIFTSURE to
collect the remainder of the R.A.P.W.I. from Tsingtao
and BIGBURY BAY from Tangko
and both ships rendezvous with STRATHMORE at Shanghai on
23rd
March. Some alarm was caused by an
outbreak of measles in STRATHMORE, but the ship managed
to disinfect herself
and arrived on e day later. On arrival
at
Hong Kong,
108 were
transferred to
AORANGI
for Australia.
39. All remaining
R.A.P.W.I. in
China
were
warned that this was the last organized lift and that
after this they must
shift for themselves.
40. One final lift of
displaced persons was carried out towards the end of May
when the hospital ship
EMPIRE CLYDE, accompanied by WHIMBREL, in two voyages
brought some 2500 Hong
Kong Chinese back to
Hong Kong
from Hainan. These people were the remnants of a
much
larger labour force
deported by the Japanese during
the war.
41. This was the end
of a very considerable undertaking by the Fleet during
which some fifty
thousand people, released prisoners of war, Dominion
soldiers and Airman due to
demobilization and internees of many nationalities were
assisted in reaching
their homes. It was work well in keeping
with the traditions of the Royal Navy.
