Source:
ADM 199/379
Battle Cruiser Squadron's
War Diary commenced on 1 March 1940. Before this
time, their activities were carried by the Rosyth
War Diary which only began on 5 November 1939 (ADM
199/362) and more broadly in the Daily Operations
Report for First Lord (ADM 199/1939 et al)
This Diary
includes
details of HMS Renown's engagement with German
Battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau
on 9 April 1940
Contents
Battle
Cruiser
One War Diary, 1-31 March 1940
War
Diary
of Vice Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser
Squadron, 1-30 April 1940
Enclosure
No. 1 - 5th to 9th
April
Report of
Proceedings. 9th
April. Engagement between RENOWN and two
German warships
Commanding Officer, H.M.S. RENOWN’s letter No.
2022/061
Technical remarks on
the gun armament engagement of 9th April.
Navigational Record During the Engagement
between H.M.S. Renown and
Scharnhorst and Hipper on 9th
April 1940
Letter from S.H.
Phillips, Principal Assistant Secretary, on
RENOWN’s displacement and
performance in high seas.
Vice Admiral Whitworth’s (B.C.S.)
report on the RENOWN engagement.
Admiral Forbes’ Report of Proceedings
on RENOWN engagement.
Letters
from various Naval Departments commenting on the
RENOWN during the Engagement
with the German ships
9th April 1940.
BATTLE CRUISER ONE WAR DIARY
Commenced
1
March 1940
(previous
to this time, BC1 activities were carried by other
Diaries)
(Enclosure to B.C.
One’s
No. 184/B.C.S. 42/4 of
27 March 1940)
MARCH
1940
1st March
H.M.S.
HOOD,
flying the flag of the Vice Admiral Commanding, Battle
Cruiser Squadron,
at
Greenock.
H.M. Ships
REPULSE and RENOWN at Devonport.
2nd March
2.
H.M.S.
REPULSE, escorted by HARDY, HOSTILE, and VIMY left
Devonport for Greenock.
3.
H.M.
Ships HOOD and VALIANT, screened by KELLY, KANDAHAR,
FAULKNOR, FAME, FORESTER, and SIKH proceeded via the
Minches to a position
North and East of the Shetlands and Faroes to act in
support of the Northern
Patrol and of the force covering the Norwegian Convoys
O.H.N. 17.
3rd March
4.
H.M.
Ships FAME and FORESTER were detached to investigate
contact and each dropped
four patterns.
As
reported
in FORESTER’s message 1030/4, a small stream of oil was
issuing from
contact which was on bottom at 60 fathoms in position
58-27N, 005-46W.
5.
H.M.S.
KELLY was also detached at 2130 to investigate contact
in approximate
position 61-02N, 4-01W.
Six
depth
charges dropped without apparent result.
6.
H.M.S.
RENOWN escorted by ACASTA, KIMBERLEY, and
FIREDRAKE left Devonport for Greenock.
7.
H.M.S.
REPULSE and escort arrived Greenock.
4th March
8.
During
the night of 3rd and 4th March, heavy weather was
encountered
and continued throughout the day and the destroyers
FAME, FORESTER, and KELLY,
which had been detached, were unable to rendezvous as
arranged.
9.
H.M.S.
RENOWN and escort arrived Greenock.
5th March
10.
H.M.S.
KELLY rejoined screen
6th March
11.
H.M.S.
FAME rejoined screen
7th March
12.
FORESTER
who had developed condenser trouble while investigating
contact on 3rd
March proceeded to Scapa to effect repairs. She rejoined
the screen at 1400.
13.
Long
and short rang H.A. practices were carried out by H.M.
Ships HOOD and VALIANT
on approaching Scapa which was reached at 1800.
8th March.
At
Scapa
14.
German
aircraft seen over the Flow and observed to drop two
bombs or mines in
the vicinity of the Calf of Flotta.
15.
As a
result, an area to the north eastward of the Calf of
Flotta was declared
dangerous and the Commander in Chief, Home Fleet, who
was due to arrive at
Scapa at 1800 in RODNEY, with H.M. Ships REPULSE and
RENOWN in company, decided
to remain at sea till the area had been swept.
16.
The
1st Lord of the Admiralty, the Rt. Hon. Winston
Churchill,
accompanied by his Parliamentary private Secretary Mr.
Brendan Bracken, M.P.
and the Flag Commander to the Board of Admiralty, who
had taken passage from the
Clyde in H.M.S. RODNEY with a view to inspecting the
defences at Scapa, were
transferred from H.M.S. RODNEY to H.M.S. KIMBERLEY for
passage to H.M.S. HOOD.
H.M.S. KIMBERLEY entering through Switha Gate.
The
1st
Lord’s party was accommodated on board H.M.S. HOOD for
the night.
9th March
17.
The
Commander in Chief, Home Fleet, in H.M.S. RODNEY with
H.M. Ships REPULSE and
RENOWN arrived Scapa at
1000.
18.
The
1st Lord’s Party transferred from H.M.S. HOOD to H.M.S.
RODNEY
during the afternoon.
10th March
At
Scapa
11th March
19.
Flag
of the Vice Admiral Commander, Battle Cruiser Squadron,
transferred from H.M.S.
HOOD to H.M.S. RENOWN at 1800.
12th March
At
Scapa
13th March
At
Scapa
20.
H.M.S.
HOOD proceeded to
Greenock
to give
leave preparatory to refit.
14th March
At
Scapa
15th March
At
Sea
(Enclosure to B.C. One’s No. 266/B.C.S. 41/4 of
11th
May
1940)
16th March
H.M.S.
RENOWN
flying the flag of the Vice Admiral and H.M.S. REPULSE
at Scapa. H.M.S. HOOD at
Greenock.
2.
Air raid
on the Fleet Anchorage at
Scapa Flow
and the
Orkneys.
17th and 18th March
At
Scapa
19th March
3.
H.M.
Ships RENOWN and REPULSE screened by INGLEFIELD, ILEX,
BEDOUIN, FORTUNE,
DELIGHT, and DIANA left Scapa at 1400.
The
Commander
in Chief, Home Fleet, in RODNEY with H.M. Ships VALIANT
and WARSPITE
also sailed from Scapa.
4.
Both
forces were proceeding to support operation on the
Norwegian Coast, being
carried out by the 2nd Cruiser Squadron and 8 destroyers
(Operation DU)
as well as carry out the capital ships’ normal function
of supporting the
Norwegian convoys and Northern Patrol.
20th March
5.
H.M.S.
DIANA detached to Sullom Voe to refuel.
6.
H.M.S.
FORTUNE reported passing raft bearing name of S.S.
SYDFORD of Haugesund.
Later she reported confirmed contact at 1820 in position
63-27N, 0-36E and
dropped depth charges.
7.
Destroyer
remained in vicinity during the night.
21st March
8.
H.A.
practice was carried out by H.M. Ships RENOWN and
REPULSE.
9.
H.M.S.
FORTUNE rejoined screen.
22nd March
10.
H.M.S.
DIANA rejoined from Sullom Voe and reported that her A/S
gear was out of
action.
11.
H.M.S.
DELIGHT was detached to refuel at Sullom Voe.
12.
H.M.S.
DIANA boarded Norwegian tanker AINO bound Bergen and
Oslo from Gibraltar with
9000 tons diesel and fuel oil. Ship had Naval Clearance
and was allowed to
proceed.
13.
H.M.S.
HASTY from Battle Fleet Screen took placed of H.M.S.
DIANA in the Battle
Cruiser screen, the latter with A/S gear out of action
taking up ahead position of
Battle Fleet Screen.
23rd March
14.
H.A.
practice carried out by H.M. Ships RENOWN and REPULSE.
15.
H.M.S.
DELIGHT rejoined after aliberg
at Sullom Voe.
16.
H.M.
Ships FEARLESS and ILEX from the Battle Fleet joined
Battle Cruiser screen and
BEDOUIN and HUNTER joined Battle Fleet screen.
17.
H.M.
Ships INGLEFIELD and FORTUNE fuelled from H.M.S. RENOWN.
24th March
18.
Nothing
of interest
25th March
19.
Parted
company with Commander in Chief, Home Fleet at 1030 in
position 63-48N,
9-14W and carried out full aliber
main armament throw
off firing, RENOWN firing first then REPULSE.
20.
Main and
Secondary Armament full calibre
took place after dark.
26th March
21.
Rejoined
Commander in Chief, Home Fleet, at 1400 in position
63-04N, 3-30W.
27th March
22.
Battle
Practice Target and H.A. practices which were to take
place before
entering harbour had to be cancelled owing to the
weather.
23.
Ships
arrived Scapa at 1100.
28th and 29th March
At
Scapa
30th March
24.
H.M.S.
HOOD sailed from
Greenock
to
carry out refit at Devonport.
25.
Major
Atlee – Leader of the Opposition- came on board RENOWN
and was taken
round the ship.
31st March
26.
Single
enemy aircraft sighted over the Orkneys at 0850. Shore
batteries opened
fire and the aircraft turned away.
27.
H.M.S.
HOOD arrived at Devonport.
WAR
DIARY OF VICE
ADMIRAL COMMANDING, BATTLE CRUISER
SQUADRON
(No. 347/B.C.S. 41/4 of 5th June 1940)
APRIL
1940
1st – 4th April 1940
H.M.
Ships
RENOWN (flying flag of Vice Admiral Commanding, Battle
Cruiser Squadron) and
REPULSE at Scapa. HOOD at Devonport
refitting.
5th to 9th April
Report of proceedings to A.M. 9th April are
attached (Enclosure No. 1)
9th April
H.M.S.
RENOWN
in action with two enemy warships believed to be
SCHARNHORST and HIPPER (Note: in fact SCHARNHORST
and
GNEISENAU). Detailed report of this action was
forwarded to the Admiralty
by the Commander in Chief, Home Fleet, (No. 933 H.F.
1325 of 29th
May 1940).
9th to 12th April
Reports
of
proceedings are attached (Enclosure
No. 2).
13th April
Click to enlarge
Flag
of
Vice Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Squadron,
transferred to H.M.S.
WARSPITE. 2nd
Battle of Narvik (map above). A report of this
operation was
forwarded to the Commander in Chief, Home Fleet (B.C.S.
No. 017, dated 25th
April 1940) for transmission to Admiralty.
H.M.S.
RENOWN
in company with Commander in Chief, Home Fleet.
14th to 28th April
Reports
of
proceedings attached (Enclosure No.
3).
14th to 17th April
H.M.S.
RENOWN
in company with Commander in Chief, Home Fleet until
A.M. 17th
April.
17th to 18th April
At
0400
on 17th April, H.M.S. REPULSE left Scapa to join convoy
F.P. 1
proceeding to Norway, but before
making contact with convoy was directed by Commander in
Chief, Home Fleet, to
take RENOWN under his orders and proceed at full speed
to cover H.M.S. SUFFOLK
damaged by bombs.
At
2200
17th April when H.M.S. SUFFOLK had reached Fair Island
Channel, H.M.S.
REPULSE proceeded North to cover F.P. 1 and H.M.S.
RENOWN continued to escort
H.M.S. SUFFOLK till arrival at Scapa at 0700 on Thursday
18th.
19th April
H.M.S.
RENOWN
left Scapa for Rosyth to dock.
20th April
H.M.S.
RENOWN
arrived Rosyth
22nd April
H.M.S. RENOWN de ammunitioned.
H.M.S.
REPULSE
arrived Scapa
23rd April
H.M.S.
RENOWN
completed de ammunitioning. Movement into dock postponed
24 hours on
account of weather.
24th to 30th April
H.M.S.
RENOWN
in dock at Rosyth.
List of
Engagement Reports
Enclosure
No. 1 - 5th to 9th
April,
Report of
Proceedings. Engagement between RENOWN and two
German warships
Commanding Officer, H.M.S. RENOWN’s letter No.
2022/061
Technical remarks on
the gun armament engagement of 9th April.
Navigational Record During the Engagement between
H.M.S. Renown and
Scharnhorst and Hipper on 9th
April 1940
Letter from S.H.
Phillips, Principal Assistant Secretary, on
RENOWN’s displacement and
performance in high seas.
Vice Admiral Whitworth’s (B.C.S.)
report on the RENOWN engagement.
Admiral Forbes’ Report of Proceedings
on RENOWN engagement.
Letters
from various Naval Departments commenting on the
RENOWN during the Engagement
with the German ships
9th April 1940.
Enclosure
1
REPORT
OF
PROCEEDINGS
(B.C.S. 41/4, dated 29th April 1940)
H.M.S. RENOWN
c/o G.P.O.
29th
APRIL
1940
No.
B.C.S.
41/4
Sir,
I
have
the honour to forward the following report of
proceedings covering the period
of Operation WILFRID (Minelaying off Norwegian Coast)
and
subsequent movements until a.m. 9th
April 1940.
5th April
2.
In
accordance with the orders contained in your signal
timed 1229 of 5th
April, I sailed from Scapa in
RENOWN at 1800,
HYPERION, HERO, GREYHOUND, and GLOWWORM in company.
3.
While
on the route southwards through the swept channel to the
West of the Orkneys,
RENOWN carried out H.A. Sleeve target firings.
4.
At
1852, a signal was made to RENOWN and Close Screen
“We
are
proceeding to operate on the Norwegian Coast and
expect to rendezvous with ESK,
IMPULSIVE, ICARUS, IVANHOE, HARDY, HOTSPUR, HAVOCK,
and HUNTER at 0700 tomorrow
Saturday and BIRMINGHAM, FEARLESS, and HOSTILE at 2000
Saturday, 7th
April.”
And
at
2031, the following night intention signal to the Close
Screen
“Intend
to
alter course to North at 2030 and to 056 degrees at
0200. Speed of advance
will be maintained during the night. Rendezvous at
0700 is in position 61-06N
01-44W. If ordered to take up Night Cruising
disposition destroyers form up by
sub divisions, 2 miles 45 degrees on their respective
bows.”
6th April
5.
At
0631, GREYHOUND reported to me that GLOWWORM had lost a
man overboard and had
turned back to search. Visibility was 1 – 2 miles.
This
unexpected
turn back of GLOWWORM in low visibility prevented my
informing him
of our intended alteration of course to 041 degrees at
0700. As a result he
never again made contact.
6.
At
0700 contact was made with Captain (D) 2nd Destroyer
Flotilla in
HARDY with the following destroyers in company:
HOTSPUR, HAVOCK, HUNTER and Minelayers ESK (D
20),
IMPULSIVE, ICARUS, and IVANHOE.
7.
HYPERION
and HERO were detached to Sullom Voe and I gave the
following
instructions to HYPERION.
“When
ordered
to proceeded with HERO try
and get in touch
with GLOWWORM on your way to Sullom Voe. GLOWWORM
parted company at 0642 to
look for a man overboard and is unaware of our course
and speed. If you fail to
sight GLOWWORM pass following signal in cypher
on
arrival at Sullom Voe. My position course and speed at
0730 was BQBP 0712 (n.b. from S.P. 02274 (3) TABLE
OF LETTERED
COORDINATES: BQ – 61N, BP – 2W, which is obviously
not correct), course
041, speed 13 knots. Further
rendezvous at 2000
7
April 67 degrees N. 10 degrees E. Ends.
HYPERION repeat back signal to GLOWWORM.”
7th April
8.
Course
was continued to the Northeastwards for the position 67
degrees North, 10 degrees
East, where it was the intention to detach
the minelaying force for the operation.
BIRMINGHAM,
HOSTILE,
and FEARLESS were ordered in Commander in Chief’s 1147/5
to join me in
this position.
9.
The
weather throughout the day was poor; the wind force 5
-6, from between West and
South-west, visibility 2 miles, sea 4-5, and I was
concerned for the stability
of the minelaying destroyers with their heavy top
weight, which was making them
roll heavily.
10.
At
1215, ICARUS reported the loss of a man overboard.
11.
At
1739 information was received in Admiralty Message
1720/7 that enemy heavy
forces were at sea in the Bight.
12.
The
rendezvous was reached at the time ordered but touch was
not made with BIRMINGHAM. The
minelaying force was detached and I proceeded to the
Northwest. GREYHOUND only
was now in company and it was my intention to patrol 30
miles to the westward
of Skomvoer Light, while the operation was in progress.
13.
The
transmission of the instructions for GLOWWORM which
HYPERION was ordered to
make had not been heard and at 1730 GLOWWORM reported to
the Commander in Chief
that she had failed to regain touch.
14.
At 2157
I sent the following instructions to BIRMINGHAM and
GLOWWORM
“Intend
to
be in position 67-15N, 10-40E (R) 67-10N, 10-40E
at
0500 tomorrow Monday, and then patrol to the West of a
line joining this
position and 67-45N, 10-40E. Position at 18900 will be
67-30N, 10E (R) 67-30N,
10E. Join me.”
15.
At
2211, the Commander in Chief ordered GLOWWORM to make
the rendezvous already
ordered for
BIRMINGHAM
at 2000
7th April. It was not until 0119 on the 7th April that
the
message given by HYPERION was intercepted by RENOWN.
8th April
16.
At
0432 Captain (D) 20 reported that Operation WILFRID
commenced, and at 0529,
Operation WILFRID completed.
17.
I
continue on patrol in accordance with my message 2157/7,
quoted above. BIRMINGHAM was not
sighted.
18.
At
0827, the following signal was received retransmitted by
Scapa Base W/T.
“Base
Ship
Scapa from GLOWWORM – 2 DE 350 II 4 240 “022 RJRU 45
0759” (n.b. S.P. 02274 TABLE OF LETTERED
COORDINATES: 022 degrees from 65 degrees North,
6
degrees East, 45 miles, timed 0759)
19.
I
ordered RENOWN to alter course to the southward and
proceed at the best
possible speed.
20.
Further
signals were received from GLOWWORM reporting the enemy,
the last was
“1
UN 00
6 180 RJRU 30 0855” (n.b. S.P. 02274
TABLE OF LETTERED COORDINATES: 180 degrees from 65
degrees North, 6 degrees
east, 30 miles, timed 0855)
21.
RENOWN
was steaming with a head sea. It was reported that the
ship was working
heavily forward and that the upper strake of the port
bulge was peeling away
from the ship’s side. Speed was therefore reduced to
avoid extension of the
damage.
22.
At
1045, I received the Admiralty message 1027/8, directing
the destroyers of the
minelaying force to join me.
23.
At
1114 Admiralty message 1100/8 was received saying that
there was a possibility
of a German landing at Narvik.
24.
At
this time RENOWN was in position 66-58 North,
09-50
East, proceeding to locate the enemy reported by
GLOWWORM. GREYHOUND only was
in company.
25.
On
the presumption that the enemy would proceed to Narvik,
and giving their force
a maximum speed of 25 knots, I found that I could reach
the line of advance
ahead of them at 1330. I steered for this point. In the
visibility, which was
now reduced to two or three miles, there was, however,
little chance of
intercepting an enemy force with only one destroyer in
company, and I decided
to turn to the Northeastwards at 1330 and rendezvous
with the minelaying force.
26.
At
1516, I received the following report:
“Admiral
Commanding
Orkneys and Shetlands from CinC,
Rosyth.
Following received from aircraft” “1 BC 2 CR 2 DR 360
11 5 11 270 CXRO 0725
1400.” (n.b. S.P. 02274 TABLE OF LETTERED
COORDINATES: 270 degrees 64 North, 56 West (in error
– should have been RR 9
East) timed 0725.)
This
force
might well have been that which had sunk GLOWWORM, whose
last report had
given the enemy course as 180 degrees.
27.
I
appreciated the situation as follows. The German force
reported by GLOWWORM
might
(a).
Return
to their base at once.
(b). Make for
Iceland
(c). Make for
Murmansk
where
it was possible a German tanker was waiting to refuel
them.
(d). Be
part of a force proceeding to Narvik.
28.
Our
own forces were at sea to the southward and I therefore
determined to dispose
my force to deal with the situation if the enemy ships
chose the alternative of
proceeding to the Northward. Accordingly, I prepared a
plan which provided for
a line ahead patrol by
destroyers to the westward of
Skomvoer Light, with RENOWN in a position some fifty
miles to the Northward. It
was my further intention to form an extended screen at
dawn and sweep to the
southwest.
29.
At 1715, in low visibility
the destroyer force joined me,
and at 1725 I altered course to the Westward with the
above intention.
30.
At
1752, I received the following signal
“B.C. One (R) C
in C H.F. D.2
from Admiralty. As
Sunderland
only
sighted part of force specified in my 1817 of 7th
April, it is
possible the undetected part is still making for
Narvik.”
The
undetected
part consisted apparently of two cruisers and twelve
destroyers.
31.
At
1915, I received the following Admiralty Message
“MOST IMMEDIATE.
The force under
your orders is to concentrate on preventing any German
force proceeding to
Narvik. 1850.”
32.
On
receipt of this signal I calculated that the enemy had
had ample time to reach
my vicinity if they were proceeding direct to Narvik.
Assuming
that
they had not yet passed me, I decided to proceed up West
Fiord with the
object of placing myself between the enemy and his
objective. There were two
objections to this course of action. One was the
possibility of being brought
to action in the confined space of the Fiord by a
superior force (Four of the
destroyers in company being minelayers had no torpedoes
and only two guns). The
other was the navigational danger due to approaching a
dangerous coast in low
visibility.
The
weather
at this time showed signs of improving, and I decided to
disregard both
these objections. But the improvement in the weather
proved only a lull, and it
came on to blow with great force from the Northwest,
accompanied by rain and
snow squalls and prolonged periods of bad visibility.
This
sudden
deterioration in the weather decided me to change my
plans because I
felt the enemy would make little progress and not try
and make West Fiord
during dark, and would probably stand to seaward during
the dark hours; so I
decided to do the same.
Later
on,
hearing that enemy forces had reached Narvik, I felt
very strongly that I
had made a mistake in not proceeding with my original
plan in face of the
navigational dangers due to weather.
After
the
second battle of Narvik on 13th April, I received strong
evidence from a German prisoner and other sources to
show that enemy forces had
arrived at Elvegaard, some ten miles from Narvik at
0200, 9th April;
which points to their having passed us in the low
visibility which prevailed
whilst our forces were concentrating. It seems therefore
that my plan to go up
West Fiord would not have been effective. As
things turned
out the change of plan brought RENOWN into action with
the two ships believed
to be SCHARNHORST and HIPPER in the early hours of the
morning of 9th
April. But I should like to emphasize, on the
information available at
the time, I still feel that I ought to have pursued my
original plan of
proceeding up West Fiord in face of the objections in
the way of this course of
action.
33.
While
keeping to seaward, I decided to maintain a patrol of
destroyers to the
southwestward of Skomvoer Light with RENOWN in support
to the Northward.
34.
By
2000 the weather was such as to make it advisable to
keep my ships concentrated
and I conceived it my first duty to maintain them in a
condition of seagoing
and fighting efficiency.
35.
At
2014, I made the following signal
“Our
object
is to prevent German forces reaching Narvik. My
present intention is to
alter course at 2100 to 280 degrees and to turn 180
degrees in succession at
midnight.
Enemy heavy ships
and light forces have been reported off the Norwegian
Coast.
Position of
BIRMINGHAM
force
is not known.”
36.
At
2047, I received the Commander in Chief’s message
ordering REPULSE’s force to
join me. This force consisted of REPULSE, PENELOPE,
BEDOUIN, ESKIMO, PUNJABI,
and
KIMBERLEY.
37.
At
2203 I sent the following message
“BIRMINGHAM, REPULSE (R) Commander in Chief, Home Fleet,
Admiralty.
My
position course and speed at 2200 is 67-09N, 10-10E, course
310. Speed 8 knots, wind
north
west, force 10. Nine
destroyers
in company. Intend to patrol entrance to West
Fiord when
weather moderates.
38.
At
2210, I received a message that BIRMINGHAM was
also hove to in position 66-12N, 7-52E.
39.
At
2140, I received a signal from Captain (D) 2 stating
that the destroyers had
become unmanageable in the seaway. Accordingly course
was altered to 310
degrees, speed 6 knots.
9th April
40.
From
midnight
onwards
the weather improved but knowing that the destroyers
would be widely strung out
on account of the weather, I decided to wait until first
sign of dawn, and
sufficient light to make the turn to the southeastward
without losing touch
with them or any part of them.
41.
At
0230, course was altered 180 degrees to starboard in
succession. Snow squalls made
the visibility variable.
42.
Dawn
twilight strengthened to the Eastward and conditions
improved.
43.
At
0337, between squalls a darkened ship was sighted on the
bearing 085 degrees,
distance 10 miles.
44.
The
report of the subsequent action between RENOWN and nine
destroyers and the
German ships believed to be SCHARNHORST and HIPPER is
contained in B.C.S.
41/4A, dated 29th
April 1940, which will be forwarded when
completed.
I have the Honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant
(sgd) W.J. Whitworth
VICE ADMIRAL COMMANDING
BATTLECRUISER SQUADRON
Commanding
Officer,
H.M.S. RENOWN’s letter No. 2022/061
Dated
22nd
April
1940
H.M.S. RENOWN
22nd
April
1940
Sir,
I
have
the honour to report that at 0400 on
9th April 1940,
when in position
latitude 67-20 North, 9-40
East, off the Lofoten Islands, I
brought two enemy ships to action.
2.
Prior
to the action, RENOWN, in company with HARDY, HUNTER,
HAVOC, HOTSPUR, HOSTILE,
ICARUS, IVANHOE, IMPULSIVE, ESK, and GREYHOUND, was, at
2000 on 8th April
in position 67-07 North, 10-57 East, steering 260
degrees speed 12 knots.
During the night 8th there had been a strong
southwesterly gale with
a rough sea. At 1800 the wind veered to the northwest
and increased to full
gale force, accompanied by snow squalls and a heavy sea.
The barometer rose 22
m.b. from 990 m.b. (n.b. 99 typed and the
0 added in ink. 99 alone would be an incorrect number)
in six hours.
It
had
been intended to steer to the westward until
midnight and then turn to the eastward,
so as to be
to the southward of Skomvoer Light at dawn. Owing to the
high wind and heavy
seas this plan had to be abandoned, as the destroyers in
company were becoming
unmanageable. To ease their situation course was altered
to 310 degrees at 2207
and speed reduced to six knots. At 0200 on 9th April the
wind began
to moderate slightly and veered to the north northwest.
Snow and sleet squalls
were frequent and in them visibility was only a few
cables. Between squalls,
visibility was extreme. The sky and horizon to the
northeast were beginning to
get light. At 0240 it was decided to turn to the
eastward and course was
altered to 130 degrees and speed increased to 10 knots.
The
destroyers in company forming in a single line ahead
astern of RENOWN.
3.
At
0337 a large unknown ship was sighted in a gap between
the squalls on the
horizon, silhouetted against the light, on a bearing of
085 degrees (i.e. Red
45 degrees) at a distance of about ten miles. A second
ship was thought to have
been seen some distance astern of the first. The ships
were steering
approximately northwest. Both ships were lost sight of
in a large squall on the
horizon. Speed was increased to 15 knots and then to 20
knots and at 0350
course was altered to 310 degrees. At 0356, when the
turn was nearly completed,
the two ships were resighted
coming out of the squall
on a bearing of 035 degrees at a distance of about 9
miles, steering 300
degrees. After a short time they were identified was two
enemy cruisers, and
fire was opened at 0405 on the leading ship, later
identified as a ship of the
SCHARNHORST class and hereafter referred to as the
SCHARNHORST. The second ship
was identified as a 8 inch
cruiser of the HIPPER class
and is referred to hereafter as the HIPPER.
Fire
was
opened at an estimated range of 18,000 yards; this was
short: normal spotting
rules were applied and a straddle obtained with the
third double at a range of
18,600. The enemy thereupon altered away about 30
degrees and opened fire about
three minutes after RENOWN, found the range with their
third salvo and at about
this time hit RENOWN right aft and through the fore
lower mast.
The
hit
aft, apart from wrecking the gunroom bathroom,
Midshipmen’s chest flat and
chapel furniture and flooding the Admiral’s, Captain’s,
and Officers’ baggage
stores (230 tons), did no harm. The hit on the foremast
put most of the
wireless aerials out of action, until others could be
rigged. These were the
only two hits sustained by RENOWN during the whole
action, with the possible
exception of a near miss from HIPPER abreast the
mainmast.
As
soon
as the enemy turned away RENOWN altered towards, bring
the enemy to about 40
degrees on the starboard bow, and speed was increased to
about 26 knots (i.e.
telegraphs were put at full speed). The action then
became general, the enemy
on a retired course with his “A”
arcs just open and
RENOWN chasing followed by the destroyers who, although
at the extremity of
their range, were all firing rapidly. Later, due to the
heavy sea, they had to
fall back and were detached to patrol West Fjord.
The
enemy
started to take avoiding action, causing salvos to fall
out for line so
that the range was temporarily lost. At 0414 a hit was
observed in the fore
superstructure of SCHARNHORST and two minutes later a
second hit, in the form
of a quick rising column of smoke amidships, was also
observed. The latter was
not funnel or gun smoke as SCHARNHORST had stopped
firing after the first hit.
Two salvos later, although a salvo of three guns had
fired, only one splash
appeared. Previously splashes including overs
had
been clearly seen, and it can be assumed with confidence
that a further hit or
hits on SCHARNHORST had been obtained. The result of
this and the previous hits
was to make a reluctant enemy into a hurriedly retiring
one, as SCHARNHORST
turned directly away at high speed.
The
HIPPER
meanwhile had been firing rapidly at RENOWN but without
obtaining any
hits. She had been engaged by the starboard 4.5 inch
battery at a range of 18,
000 to 20,000 yards. At this range the fall of shot of
these small 4.5 inch
shell were only seen intermittently and the control
officer adopted the tactics
of firing blind ladders across the best obtainable
rangefinder range.
During
this
and subsequent periods I took advantage of the agility
of the modern fire
control now fitted in RENOWN to alter course within
small limits as necessary
to prevent the enemy establishing hitting.
As
soon
as the SCHARNHORST broke off the action and turned away,
HIPPER started to draw
across making smoke to try and screen her. The fire of
the main armament was
then shifted to HIPPER, who, after the first salvo, also
turned abruptly and
joined her consort in flight. She, however, swung
occasionally to bring her “A”
arcs to bear and fire a broadside. This finished the
main
part of the action, which lasted twenty minutes.
The
second
phase then consisted of a chase directly to windward and
into a heavy
sea. This second phase lasted about 1 ½ hours, with fire
only being possible
intermittently as both the enemy and RENOWN were passing
through squalls of
sleet lasting from a few minutes to, in one case, twenty
minutes.
The
HIPPER
was engaged as opportunity offered at a gradually
increasing range from
about 22, 000 to 29, 000 yards. As soon as RENOWN turned
into the sea at 26
knots after the first phase, heavy seas were taken over
the forecastle and it
became a practical impossibility to fight the armament.
Speed was therefore
reduced to 24 knots during the periods of engagement and
increased when the
enemy disappeared into squalls; the average speed during
the period was about
25 knots. An attempt was made to increase speed to the
maximum towards the end,
but the ship began to strain badly and speed had to be
reduced again.
The
fire
at HIPPER during this second phase was ineffective,
mainly due to the long
range, the end on view and the dodging of the enemy, who
altered course every
time RENOWN fired, and also the fact that the only two
foremost turrets were
bearing. During part of this phase also the right gun of
“A” turret was out of
action due to a mechanical failure of the anti flash
arrangements.
At
0600
the enemy went into a prolonged squall at a range of 29,
000 yards. They
reappeared at 0615 for a short period far ahead and out
of range. Contact was
then lost, and the enemy had disappeared by the time
RENOWN finally drew clear
out of the squalls about an hour later.
4.
Great
disappointment is felt that neither of the enemy was
damaged sufficiently to
stop him, as if this had happened there is little doubt
that he would have been
destroyed. I am confident, however, that SCHARNHORST,
apart from her engines,
was heavily hit. It was clear that her fire control was
put out of action
before she turned away as her whole armament stopped
firing. After turning away
and after quite a long period, her after turret came
into action again in what
appeared to be “local control”, as the triple salvoes
fired were ragged and
their positions inaccurate.
During
the
chase, RENOWN passed a number of objects in the water
distributed over quite
a large area which looked like inflated lifebelts about
two feet square. Their
position was such as to have been thrown or blown
overboard about the time hits
were observed on SCHARNHORST.
5.
I am
pleased to report that the bearing and behavior of the
ship’s company during
the action were excellent. All were out to do their best
with a cool
determination to defeat the enemy and ensure a crushing
victory. Had nature
been kinder their hopes should have been realised. They
are, however, looking
forward to an early opportunity to complete their
unfinished task.
6.
Although
not hit appreciably by the enemy, considerable and
extensive damage
was done in RENOWN by the blast from the 15 inch
turrets, including the blowing
in of the fore hatch abaft the breakwater, which allowed
the heavy seas
breaking over the forecastle to find their way before.
Much water also found
its way into the turrets, whose blast bags were torn
early in the action.
7.
The
only casualty in RENOWN was my Navigating Officer,
Lieutenant Commander Martin
J. Evans, who was wounded in the left foot by a splinter
of shell from a burst
short on the water. Two toes had subsequently to be
amputated. Although in
considerable pain, he continued to con the ship during
the action and showed
commendable coolness.
8.
A
report on lessons learned is being forwarded separately.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your
obedient Servant
(sgd) C.E.B. Simeon
Captain
(n.b.
in copying, the top line or two of each page of this
document was chopped. If
anyone could help with the missing information, it
would be most appreciated.)
Technical
Remarks
on the Gun Armament Engagement of 9th April.
No.
2056/65
Date.
23rd April 1940
To:
The
Commander in Chief, Home Fleet
Copy
to: The Vice Admiral
Commanding, Battle Cruiser Squadron
Submitted,
The
following
technical remarks on the gun armament are forwarded in
continuation
of my 2022/061 of 22nd
April 1940.
General
1.
Fire
was opened on SCHARNHORST at 0405 with an estimated
range of 180. Initial
salvos were observed short and a straddle was obtained
with salvo 6, after
crossing the target with salvo 5. Straddle range 186.
Fire
was
continued at an inclination between 050 and 070 left. At
0414 a hit was
observed on the fore superstructure of SCHARNHORST, and
two salvos later a
second hit was seen further after. A third salvo was
thought to hit at 0418;
only one splash was seen out of three shots fired. After
this the enemy made a
large alteration of course away to an inclination of 005
Left.
2.
Fire
was shifted at 0420 after 23 salvoes, to the right hand
ship HIPPER who was
crossing SCHARNHORST’s
stern an inclination about 060
left. Fire was opened on an estimated range of 200 at
0421. Initial salvos were
observed “over” and the target was crossed with the
first down ladder. HIPPER
immediately altered course away to an inclination of 020
Left and the
engagement became a chase.
3.
Fire
had to be checked on account of snowstorms on four
occasions between 0421 and
0557 when the last salvo (100) was fired. On one
occasion at 0430, the Control
Officer ordered “Broadsides” to improve the changes of
getting a short in line,
and five broadsides were fired. From this time onwards
“Y” turret would not
bear. Observations became very difficult, inclination
varying between 010 Left
and 005 Right.
Standard
spotting…..
(n.b.
top of page chopped)…in enemy deflection before
any alternation of
course had been observed. Remarked on this period are
given in Paragraph 7.
4.
Rangefinder. All rangefinders including
the D.C.T. were washed out by sea and spray before
opening fire. No rangefinder
ranges were obtained during the course of the firing.
“A”, “B”, and “Y”
rangefinders were continually submerged, and D.C.T. was
covered with spray as
fast as the rangefinder windows could be cleaned and
dried by men stationed to
this.
After
this
action, the rangefinders were dessicated and cleaned,
but as only one
motor dessicator is provided for the 15 inch armament it
was two or three days
before all the rangefinders were in action again. It is
recommended that at
least two motor dessicators should be provided for the
15 inch Rangefinders.
5.
Observation of Fall
of Shot. The 15 inch splashed were most of the
time difficult to see in the
poor visibility obtaining. The enemy was continually
covered by sheets of spray
as she drove into the sea, and this spray made a poor
background against which
to observe with accuracy.
During
the
early part of the action against SCHARNHORST, salvos 1
to 23, the enemy was
making a certain amount of smoke, which concealed all
the fall of shot astern
of her. To avoid losing a number of salvos unobserved
the Control Officer had
to keep the splashes further forward on the target than
is normally desirable.
This was appreciated at the time, but was considered
inevitable.
Two
hits
were observed as such. One as a
bright orange flame halfway
up the bridge structure, and one as a thin pillar of
small blowing upwards from
a vent in a position between the funnel and mainmast.
There
were
no observations of fall of shot from any position except
the D.C.T. Secondary
Spotting Officers are stationed in “B” turret and the
Armed Tower aft;
“B” turret saw nothing because of the heavy seas
breaking over the forecastle
and turret, while the Armed Tower either
would not bear or was blinded by the blast of “Y” turret
and the after group of
4.5 inch guns.
In
addition.....
(n.b.
top of page chopped)…
to control firing from the Armoured Tower, the bearing
must not be forward of
70 degrees, and the after group of 4.5 inch guns must
cease firing to allow the
control personnel to see the target.
There
was
no interference to spotting from enemy splashes short,
when spotting from
the D.C.T.
Conditions
for
observation and director layings were made difficult by
spray and water
which covered the glasses and telescopes. 14 clean
pocket handkerchiefs were
used for drying the Control Officer’s glasses alone. It
is considered that
conditions for director laying
would have been
improved had “Kent” clear
view screens been fitted in front of the director sight.
Gyro
firing
was only used intermittently, since visibility through
the stabilized
telescopes was insufficient under the conditions which
obtained.
6.
Control. During the earlier part of the
action, T.S. Control of the range spotting correction
was employed, and this
worked smoothly and well. Later on when the situation
became obscure due to
salvos continually falling out for line the Control
Officer ordered the range
corrections.
7.
Fall of Shot for Line. During the time
that the inclination was 50 degrees or broader, there
was little difficulty in
keeping the shots in line, but as soon as the enemy
turned away and maintained
a mean inclination of zero, line keeping was extremely
difficult. The bearing
of the enemy from the firing ship was always fine on the
bows usually less than
20 degrees, with the result that cross leveling errors
when present were very
large. The conditions were made more difficult when the
wind was on the bow.
This produced a list, and Director Layer had to wait
some times two or three
rolls before the ship was sufficiently upright, with the
trainer’s and layer’s
crosswires together, to permit a salvo to be fired. A
number of crossleveling
errors were reported to the Control Officer by the
Director Layer as the salvo
was fired, and without this check line keeping would
have been impossible.
During
the
chase….
(n.b.
top of page chopped)… the salvo was seen to fall,
and this was the cause of
the failure to obtain shots in line. The salvos appeared
to fall accurately
where the enemy would have been had she not altered
course. The average time of
flight was about 41 second.
After
a
number of salvos had been fired, some as deflection
doubles, with line
corrections on them, and some as uncorrected doubles, it
was realised that
little progress was being made. Double salvos were
therefore fired with the “A”
salvo allowing for an inclination of 015 right and “B”
salvo allowing for an
inclination of 015 left. This was more successful, and
the inclination allowed
varied from 010 and 020, as the enemy appeared to be
reacting. The only salvos
that fell in line between 0441 (Salvo 47) and 0557
(Salvo 100) were obtained by
these methods. Seven salvoes fell in line during this
period.
8.
Fall of Shot for Range. During the
early part of the action, Salvos 1 to 25, range keeping
was not difficult,
straddles being obtained and hits observed. From then
onwards information
regarding the range was so scanty that little could be
done, except apply bold spotting
corrections when opportunity offered.
9.
Fire Control Table and Electric Circuits.
These functioned correctly throughout. There were no
mistakes in drill in the
T.S.
10. 15 inch Turrets.
The
turrets fired an average of 50 rounds a gun from “A” and
“B” turrets and 30
rounds a gun from “Y” turret.
Only
one
mechanical failure occurred during the action. During
the chase, at Salvo 48,
the right gun of “A” turret lowered the unloading cage
on to the upper cordite
chopper door in the working chamber, which was not fully
closed. The cordite
doors were wrecked and it was necessary to hammer them
up and leave them
permanently in the closed position. The cage and doors
took 15 minutes to
clear; the cage was then lowered and fire proceeded,
using secondary loading
from the gun house. In the meantime pressure was blanked
off from the cordite
telescopic rammers, and by the end of the action the gun
was in action again,
loading shell from the gun loading cage and cordite from
the auxiliary cordite
hoist. A report on Form S.1148 (h) is being forwarded.
11.
…..
(n.b. top of page
chopped)… in the main cage. In the first case the
shell, due to the
movement of the ship, was placed slightly out of
position on the Kenyon door,
and would not roll into the main cage. It was handspiked
into position with the
loss of one salvo. In the second case she shell surged
in the main cage on the
way up and fouled the structure when traversing into the
waiting position in
the working chamber. It was handspiked into the correct
position with the loss
of one salvo.
12.
The
conditions in the gunhouses and working chambers were
very severe. “A” and “Y”
blast bags were burst by the sea before the first salvo
had been fired. The bags
were new and had been in position for only six weeks. As
result, large
quantities of water entered the gunhouse and poured down
onto the working
chamber. The sighting ports of “A” and “B” were
often
submerged and quarters firing would not have been
practicable at the speed the
ship was steaming.
13.
The
primary lighting in “Y” turret and the primary and
secondary lighting in “A”
turret were fused quite early on. “A” Turret working
chamber had to rely on
torches and magazines handlamps until temporary leads
could be run. This did
not facilitate repair work at the right gun.
14.
After
salvo 50, when each gun had fired about 25 rounds, the
gunhouses and
working chambers were filled with steam from the sea
water boiling off the hot
gun barrels.
15.
The
air blast was not sufficient to check the flow of sea
water down the barrels of
“A” turret when the breech was opened to reload. There
is no doubt that “A”
turret fired on several occasions with water in the
barrels. The guns have been
visually inspected since firing and do not seem to have
suffered any damage.
16.The
lock and firing circuits were constantly being drenched
by sea water. After the firing the locks on the left of
“A” and the right of
“B” showed zero when tested for insulation. In spite of
this there were no misfires nor
failure of electric circuits except the
lighting.
17.…..
(n.b. top of page
chopped)…maintain a rapid rate of fire for any
length of time. These
numbers have now been increased to 10 men in the
handling room and 14 men in
the magazine and it is strongly recommended that this
number be approved
generally.
18.
The
shell rooms were manned with authorized complement and
had no difficulty in
maintaining the rate of fire required.
A
considerable amount of water found its way into “A”,
“B”, and “Y” shell rooms.
The walking pipe spaces filled up rapidly, the drains
being unable to cope with
the flow of water. As soon as the water was above the
level of the trunk guard,
it flooded over into the trunk and down into the handing
rooms and shell rooms.
The
handing
rooms were cleared by opening the hatch to the shell
rooms during the
lulls and allowing the water to drain down. The shell
rooms were pumped
continuously, and a greatest depth of one foot over the
floor plates was
recorded in “Y” turret.
19. 4.5 inch.
Fire
was opened on the SCHARNHORST at 0405 using an estimated
range of 150 (?).
Observation of fall of shot was impossible due to the
heavy seas and the whole
shoot was fired “blind.” Range was increased to the
maximum (180) by a series of
800 yards and 400 yards up ladder groups immediately
after opening fire.
Subsequent salvos were nearly all fired at this range.
The control officer
giving occasional “blind ladders” down and up again.
20.
At
0410 a salvo was spotted falling ahead (to the left of
the target
, and a right correction was made. This was the
only salvo spotted
during the action.
21.
Fire
was shifted at 0415 when it was apparent that the enemy
having made a big
alteration away, was beyond
the range of the armament.
Salvos fired 51.
22.…..
(n.b. top of page
chopped)…on this target and fire was ceased at
0429 after 72 salvos when
the enemy turned away in retreat.
23.
Conditions
for observation were practically impossible. Conditions
for laying
were bad and consideration interference was caused by 15
inch black, flash and
cordite smoke, and worst enemy splashes. This was,
however, more in the form of
inconvenience than a serious hindrance.
24.
Conditions
for rate keeping were very difficult. The inclination is
use started
at about 100 left in both cases, gradually altering to
10 left. The enemy was
altering course frequently to avoid being hit and seemed
to make large
alteration very quickly. The Rate Officer remarks that
he found the best time
for estimating inclination to be when the enemy was
silhouetted by the flash of
his own guns. No information of errors in rate was
obtainable from the fall of
shot.
25.
The
fire control equipment in the T.S. operated
satisfactorily.
26.
Guns. 4.5 inch guns and mountings were
satisfactory. Drill at the guns was good and crews kept
up a good rate of fire.
A few jambs occurred due to the projectiles being loose
in cartridge cases. The
projectile bells out the mouth of the cartridge case and
this
jambs on ramming. Although all ammunition is
inspected in the magazines
before being supplied, a close scrutiny is not possible
at any later stage, as
there is no time. S.5 left gun had a delay due to the
lever operating air blast
jambing the breech in the open position. This was
cleared by the crew. A report
on Form S.1148 (h) is being forwarded. All guns were in
action at the end of
the firing.
Total
Rounds
fired 1065
Average rate of fire 5.1 salvos per minute.
27.
…..
(n.b. top of page
chopped)…
28.
Several Kilroy’s turret danger signals and the
majority of
the range and deflection receivers got out of line due
to shock. A Report on
Form S. 1148 (h) is being forwarded.
29.
Ammunition Supply. Arrangements worked
satisfactorily. Magazine crews and supply parties worked
well. These ratings
are nearly all daymen. Endless chain hoists and
conveyors worked perfectly
throughout.
30.
Due
to the blast from “Y” turret, the starboard screen doors
to the after casemate
flat were blown open. This caused considerable
inconvenience to the supply
parties due to smoke, ….. and
blast, but did not seriously hinder the rate of supply.
This smoke could not be
cleared at once as leads to the fans were cut, but
eventually cleared itself
due to the draught coming in through ports in the
Admiral’s cabin which had
themselves been blown in. The blast also smashed the
multiphone to the
magazines and all communication had to be passed by the
“Teleflex” indicators
which worked satisfactorily. Main lighting was out and
secondary lighting had
to be rigged. Paraffin oil lamps in the vicinity of the
casements went out at
the first salvo, were relit, and at once went out again.
The lamps are not much
use and are being replaced with Oldman’s electric lamps.
31.
During
the action the order “Aircraft in Sight” came down the
disengaged side. One
hoist was at once put to H.E. to supply as necessary,
and this changeover
worked well. The stowage racks for ammunition cleared
from the hoists were
found inadequate. The hoist was subsequently put back to
S.A.P. The supply to
the engaged guns was not held up due to the above
change.
32.
It
was found that the empty cylinders were rapidly filling
the empty cylinder
compartment. Steps were taken to clear these
compartments during a lull.
Navigational
Record
During
the
Engagement Between H.M.S.
Renown
and Scharnhorst and Hipper on
9th
April
1940
0330
course
130 degrees 12 knots
0347
altered
course 080 degrees increased to 15 knots
0354
increased
to 20 knots
0359
alter
course 305 degrees
0413
ordered
full speed
0419
reduced
to 23 knots – half speed
0422
altered
course 000 degrees
0425
altered
course 345 degrees
0430
altered
course 012 degrees
0433
altered
course 018 degrees
0435
altered
course 021 degrees
0438
altered
course 000 degrees
0440
reduced
to 20 knots
0443
altered
course 022 degrees
0446
altered
course 020 degrees
0448
altered
course 010 degrees
0449
altered
course 020 degrees
0450
altered
course 010 degrees
0456
altered
course to starboard
0459
steady
on 090 degrees
0500
increased
to 25 knots
0506
altered
course 095 degrees
0516
altered
course 037 degrees
0520
altered
course 028 degrees
0523
altered
course 040 degrees
0524
altered
course 015 degrees
0527
altered
course 012 degrees
0528
altered
course 048 degrees
0530
altered
course 025 degrees
0532
altered
course 044 degrees
0535
altered
course 023 degrees
0538
altered
course 043 degrees
0539
altered
course 048 degrees
0540
altered
course 032 degrees
0541½
altered
course 013 degrees
0544
altered
course 017 degrees increased to 27 knots
0549
altered
course 015 degrees
0554
altered
course 020 degrees
0556
altered
course 027 degrees
0600
altered
course 016 degrees
0605
altered
course 025 degrees
0609
increased
to 29 knots
0613
altered
course 348 degrees
0617
altered
course 026 degrees
3rd
October,
1940
Letter
from S.H.
Phillips, Principal Assistant Secretary, on RENOWN’s
Displacement and Performance in High Seas.
M.010710/40
On
the
outside of the envelope as well as
In
the
text
SECRET
The
Commander
in Chief, Home Fleet
(Copy
to:
The Vice Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Squadron)
With
reference
to your submission No. 933/H.F. 1325 of the 29th May,
paragraph 6, I am to inform you that their Lordships
concur that the
displacement of RENOWN has increased some 5,000 tons
since the ship was
designed, the increase being approximately from 31,000
to 36,000 tons. The
freeboard forward has decreased from about 27 feet to
about 26 feet.
2.
The
increase in displacement and alteration of form by
bulging necessarily entail a
loss of speed, but compensating factors are the increase
in side, deck, and
under water protection, greatly improved H.A. and L.A.
armament, addition of catapult, etc.
3.
The
loss in speed amounts to about 2 knots in the deep
condition, i.e. from 32
knots to 30 knots, the latter figure being estimated
from runs on the Talland
Mile after the 1936-1939 reconstruction.
4.
There
is no precise information concerning the speed of
SCHARNHORST but it is thought
to be of the order of 30 knots in the deep condition.
5.
As
between the 2 ships, the bad weather operated against
RENOWN which was unable
to make full speed and at the same time keep her forward
15 inch guns in
action. In this connection, paragraph 6 of the
Commanding Officer’s Report No.
2022/061 and paragraph 18 of the Commanding Officer’s
record that much water
was shipped through a hatch on the fo’castle deck and
through the forward
turret; this water would still further reduce the
freeboard forward and the
speed.
6.
Their
Lordships concur that steps should be taken to get rid
of every ton of
unnecessary weight in the three battlecruisers. Separate
action is being taken
to reduce considerably the quantity of water carried as
water protection in
RENOWN where this can be done without appreciable loss
of protection. It is
understood that over 1,000 tons of water has been
carried for this purpose,
much of which it is now proposed to omit, it being
considered preferable to
maintain speed and freeboard in this ship at the expense
of some slight
reduction in under water protection. The question of
reducing weight of water
protection is also being considered for REPULSE; HOOD is
less effected.
7.
I am
to request that you will call for reports from
Commanding Officers, REPULSE and
RENOWN, concerning the items which can be surrendered,
with the approximate
weights and positions in the ship. Much was done in HOOD
during the recent
refit and it is doubted whether the Commanding Officer
of that ship can make
further recommendations.
BY
COMMAND
OF THEIR LORDSHIPS
(Sd.
S.H.
Phillips)
Vice
Admiral
Whitworth’s (B.C.S.) Report on the RENOWN
Engagement.
H.M.S.
RENOWN
29th April 1940
No.
B.C.S.
41/4A
Sir
I
have
the honour to forward the following report of the
engagement between H.M.S.
RENOWN and two enemy warships believed to be SCHARNHORST
and HIPPER on 9th
April 1940. The movements of the force under my command
before the engagement
are reported in B.C.S. 41/4 dated
29th April 1940.
2.
At
0330 on Tuesday, 9th April, H.M.S. RENOWN, (Captain
C.E.B. Simeon),
flying my flag was off the Lofoten Islands in
position 67-22 North, 9-34
East, steering 130 degrees,
speed 12 knots.
A
strong
northwesterly wind had prevailed until midnight but
since then had abated to force 5, and veered to N.N.W. A
resultant sea and
swell remained (44). The weather was overcast. There
were frequent snow storms
and the visibility was obscured except in some areas
where the horizon could be
seen clearly. Dawn was strengthening in the sky to the
eastward.
3.
The
following of His Majesty’s Ships were in company with
H.M.S. RENOWN:
HARDY (The late Captain
B.A.W.
Warburton-Lee, Captain (D) 2nd Destroyer Flotilla)
ESK (Captain J.G.
Bickford, D.S.C.,
Captain (D) 20th Destroyer Flotilla)
HOTSPUR (Commander
H.F.H. Layman)
GREYHOUND (Commander
W.R. Marshall-A’Deane)
IVANHOE (Commander P.H.
Hadow)
HAVOCK (Lieutenant
Commander R.E.
Courage)
ICARUS (Lieutenant
Commander C.D.
Maud)
IMPULSIVE (Lieutenant
Commander W.S.
Thomas)
HUNTER (Lieutenant
Commander L. de
Villiers)
There
destroyer
(except H.M.S. GREYHOUND) had carried out the minelaying
operation “WILFRED”
and were stationed astern because of the weather
conditions which had
prevailed.
4.
At
0337 a darkened ship was sighted silhouetted against the
light as it emerged
from a snow squall. The bearing was 070 degrees and
distance estimated at ten
miles. The enemy’s course was approximately northwest. A
second ship was
thought to have been seen about a mile astern of the
first. Snow storms
obscured the view, but it was established that one large
enemy ship was present
and an enemy report was made.
At
0347
course was altered to 080 degrees to close the enemy and
speed increased to 15
knots.
At
0354
speed was increased to 20 knots. The presence of two
enemy ships was confirmed and
course was altered at 0359 to 305 degrees, the
destroyers following astern.
5.
The
identification of the enemy ships proved exceedingly
hard. Both were known to
be either of the SCHARNHORST or the HIPPER class, but
throughout the action
observation of the details of the enemy was so difficult
that even direct
comparison with the silhouette cards failed to establish
the identity.
Evidence
taken
from control personnel after the action and fragments of
an eleven inch
shell was found on board RENOWN appear to confirm that
the leading ship was a
battle cruiser of the SCHARNHORST class and the second
ship a cruiser of the
HIPPER class, and they are so referred in the following
narrative.
6.
At
0405, fire was opened on the leading ship on a bearing
of 18 degrees and at a
range afterwards proved to be 18,600 yards.
The
enemy
did not reply for approximately three minutes. It was
doubtful whether he
sighted the RENOWN before the first salvo was fired.
7.
RENOWN
maintained a course of 305 degrees, keeping “A”
arcs just open. The enemy was straddled with the sixth
salvo, but appeared to
maintain his course.
Although
heavy
seas were breaking over the forecastle at 20 knots, it
was necessary to
gain bearing and at 0413 “full ahead” was ordered. The
working of the ship and
the seas breaking over the gun turrets made it
impossible to maintain this
speed and six minutes later speed was eased to 23 knots.
8.
The
leading enemy ship had opened fire about a thousand
yards short. His third
salvo appeared to straddle. Thereafter both ships fired
at RENOWN but the fall
of shot was ragged both for line and range and the
spread was very variable.
The
secondary
armament of RENOWN and the destroyers astern had also
opened fire. At
such range the fall of shot could not be observed and
such fire can hardly have
been effective.
In
the
heavy weather the destroyers soon had to drop back and
were detached to patrol
West Fiord.
9.
At
0415, with the fall of RENOWN’s sixteenth salvo, a
bright orange flash was
observed near the enemy’s fore superstructure.
At
0418,
when the twentieth salvo fell only one splash was seen
out of three shells
fired. About this time the SCHARNHORST made a large
alteration of course away
with the obvious intention of breaking off the action.
She was partially
obscured by smoke and her fire became spasmodic.
The
HIPPER
also altered away but drew across the stern of
SCHARNHORST, making smoke
and attempting to screen her. While shifting target to
HIPPER, RENOWN altered
course towards, sacrificing “A”
arcs in order to close
the range.
10.
During
this first phase of the action, the RENOWN was hit
twice. One shell
passed through the ship after without exploding; a
second passed through the
centre strut of the foremast. The time that these hits
occurred is not known,
but the inclination at which they penetrated the ship
proves that they occurred
during this phase.
11.
At
0429 a vertical column of smoke was seen to rise quickly
from the target ship amidships.
This had neither the appearance of
gunfire nor funnel
smoke and was considered to be a hit. (Note: The time at
which this incident
occurred is not definitely established).
12.
At
0434, target was shifted to SCHARNHORST. The records are
not clear as to the
reason for the change but it is believed that HIPPER
altered away making smoke
and thereby disclosed SCHARNHORST to windward.
Before
fire
on the SCHARNHORST could be opened HIPPER had again
become the better
target and at 0436 firing was resumed at her.
Both
enemy
ships were now retiring at high speed. The SCHARNHORST,
firing
occasionally from the after turret, was ahead. The
HIPPER following her turned
to port periodically and fired a broadside.
13.
The
wind had freshened and veered and was now blowing from
the N.N.E., force 7, and
the seas sweeping over the forecastle broke on the
forward turrets. It was
necessary to keep the guns in action and speed was
reduced at 0440 to 20 knots.
14.
The
chase continued. Conditions for gunfire were exceedingly
difficult and the fire
of both sides was ineffective.
15.
At
0455, the enemy disappeared into a rain squall. RENOWN
at this moment was
steering 010 degrees and the sea was running from 25
degrees on the starboard
bow. I decided to alter course to bring the sea on the
other bow and endeavour
to make more speed. Course was therefore altered at 0456
to 095 degrees to 25
knots.
16.
The
rain squall was of some duration and did not clear until
0513 when the enemy
was sighted bearing 023 degrees.
Course
was
altered towards and fire reopened at 0515. Fire
continued to be ineffective,
both sides altering course to avoid the fall of shot.
17.
The
chase continued at gradually increasing range. At 0544,
when the enemy was
again obscured the turrets were turned away from the sea
and speed increased to
27 knots and later to 29 knots. This strained the ship
to the maximum but
failed to reduce the range for at 0615 the enemy
appeared for a short period
far ahead and out of range. Contact was then lost and
the enemy disappeared by
the time RENOWN finally drew out of the squalls.
18.
In
an action fought at dawn in bad weather it is natural
that different
impressions were formed and it will be found that the
preliminary report from
the Commanding Officer H.M.S. RENOWN (No. 2022/061,
dated 22nd April
1940) differs in detail from the foregoing. In preparing
this report all
available records have been used, namely:
The Admiral’s Secretary
Diary
The Plot Narrative
The
Navigating
Officer’s Notebook.
The Engine Room Register
The
Gunnery
Records.
19.
(n.b. shown as 14.)
The names of officers
and men whose services I consider are worthy of special
mention are being
forwarded separately.
I
have
the honour to be
Sir,
Your
Obedient
Servant
(sgd)
W.J. Whitworth
VICE
ADMIRAL
COMMANDING,
BATTLE
CRUISER
SQUADRON
Enclosures:
(1).
Navigational
Record
(2).
Track
Chart
Admiral
Forbes’
Report of Proceedings on RENOWN
engagement.
No.
933/H.F.
132529th
May 1940
SUBJECT
H.M.S. RENOWN – REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS AND ACTION
(1).
Vice
Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Squadron’s No 41/4A
of
29th April 1940
(with
enclosures)
(2).
RENOWN’s
No. 2022/061 of 22nd
April 1940
(3).
RENOWN’s
No. 2056/65 of 23rd
April 1940
The Secretary of the Admiralty
(Copy
to:
The Vice Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Squadron)
Forwarded
for
information
2.
It
was satisfactory that the RENOWN opened fire 3 minutes
before the enemy and was
able to obtain hits on each of the enemy ships in very
difficult conditions.
3.
The
large expenditure of 4.5 inch ammunition was not
justified and in the
circumstances was a waste of valuable ammunition.
4.
The
action confirms the experience of that off the River
Plate, namely, that the
enemy has little liking for close action and his morale
deteriorates rapidly if
the ship is hit.
5.
Other
points of general interest that arise from the action
are:
(a).
The
great difficulty in distinguishing between the different
classes of German
ships is once more shown. This must always be borne in
mind when the enemy
reports are received.
(b). The ships appear to
be capable
of high speed in bad weather, though there is no
evidence of course to show
that they did not in fact damaged themselves thereby.
(c). The
shell that hit the RENOWN aft did not detonate or even
explode.
6.
(a). It is apparent that
we have no
ships that can catch the SCHARNHORST or GNEISENAU, which
is not to wondered at
as our battlecruisers are 20 to 24 years old and 3,000
to 5,000 tons above the displacement
for which they were designed.
(b). This
action also shows clearly that the freeboard of our
battlecruisers is too small
to fight efficiently in a head sea.
(c). For both the above
reasons
drastic steps should be taken to get rid of every ton of
unnecessary weight in
all three ships, starting with the sheet anchor and
cable, catapult, hanger and
aircraft, stern anchor were fitted, etc, etc.
7.
The
dispositions that led to this action will be dealt with
in my despatch covering
the operations on which the fleet was engaged at the
time.
(sgd)
C. M. Forbes
H.M.S.
RODNEY,
Admiral of the Fleet
Letters from various Naval
Departments
commenting on the RENOWN during the Engagement with
the German ships
9th April 1940.
RENOWN
did
well to straddle both SCHARNHORST and HIPPER very early
under very severe
weather conditions, and hits were observed on the former
at 18,600 yards.
2.
In
general, the experience gained with the main armament
confirms the lessons
learnt from the River Plate battle and in particular the
difficulty of
maintaining line at fine inclinations.
3.
With
regard to the secondary armament fire, the C in C’s
para. 3 is
concurred in.
4.
It
was found necessary to increase the 15 inch cordite
supply numbers by 7, and
RENOWN strongly recommends that this increase should be
approved generally.
Will D.N.O. remark?
5.
The C
in C’s paras 6 (b) and (c) are concurred in, except for
the catapult, aircraft,
and hanger. Although aircraft could not be used on this
occasion, they form an
integral part of modern fire control equipment under
suitable weather
conditions. At other times, valuable information can be
obtained from
reconnaissance as for example by WARSPITE’s aircraft in
the Second Battle of
Narvik.
(Sgd). J.W. Rivett-Carnac
DIRECTOR
OF
TRAINING AND STAFF DUTIES DIVISION
RENOWN
has
not at present got an aircraft, as her catapult is not
complete.
2.
Had
she had one, and used it, it is improbable that the
difficulty of hitting an
end on target would have remained; and the outcome of
this engagement would
then have been a resounding success.
3.
D.N.A.D.
does not concur in the removal of RENOWN’s hanger and
crane; aircraft
will be allotted to her just as soon as the catapult is
ready for use.
(Sgd)
DIRECTOR
NAVAL
AIR DIVISION
23.6.40
Noted
2.
With
reference to para 6 of C in C 29.5.40 concur that
displacement of RENOWN has
increased some 5,000 tons since the ship was designed,
the increase being
approximately from 31,000 to 36,000 tons. The freeboard
forward has decreased
from about 27 feet to about 26 feet.
3.
The
increase in displacement and alteration of form by
bulging necessarily entails
a loss of speed, but compensating factors are the
increase in side, deck, and
underwater protection, greatly improved H.A. and L.A.
armament, addition of catapult, etc.
4.
With
regard to the loss of speed this amounts to about 2
knots in the deep
condition, i.e. from 32 knots to 30 knots, the latter
figure being estimated
from runs on the Talland mile after the 1936-1939
reconstruction.
5.
There
is no precise information concerning the speed of
SCHARNHORST, but it is
thought to be on the order of 30 knots in the deep
condition.
6.
As
between the 2 ships, the bad weather operated against
RENOWN which was unable
to make full speed and at the same time keep her forward
15 inch guns in
action. In this connection, para 6,
of C.O.’s
2022/061 and para. 18 of C.O.’s
No. 2056/65
record that much water was shipped through a hatch on
the fo’castle deck and
through the forward turret; the water would still
further reduce and freeboard
forward and the speed.
7.
D.N.C.
concurs that steps should be taken to get rid of every
ton of
unnecessary weight in the 3 battlecruisers. Separate
action is being taken to
reduce considerably, the quantity of water carried as
water protection in
RENOWN, where this can be done without appreciable loss
of protection. It is
understood that over 1,000 tons of water has been
carried for this purpose,
much of which it is now proposed to omit, it being
considered preferable to
maintain speed and freeboard in this ship at the expense
of some slight
reduction in underwater protection.
The
question
of reducing the weight of water protection is also being
considered in
REPULSE; HOOD is less affected.
8.
Propose
to inform C in C in the sense of the above remarks and
request him to
call for reports from C.O.s
HOOD, REPULSE, and
RENOWN, concerning the items which can be surrendered,
with the approximate
weights and positions in the ship. Much was done in HOOD
during the recent
refit and it is doubted whether C.O. of that ship can
make further
recommendations.
(Sgd)
S.V.
Goodall
D.N.C.
12
Jul 1940
Noted
and
concur in the action proposed by D.N.C.
(Sgd)
J.W.S.
Dorling
D.N.E.
20.7.40
Read
with
interest
Encl. 3, para: 4
Allowance
of
motor desiccators was increased from 1 to 2 per ship
(with turret
rangefinders) in G.05674/40
A
method
of desiccation with compressed air from turret air
bottles in under trial in
HOOD and NELSON. This may possibly prove to be a
prevention as opposed to the
cure which is all that the normal desiccator
provides; but it is doubtful that any R/F will stand up
to the treatment
RENOWN’s must have got.
Window
cleaning
gear is under trial in NAIAD which should keep the
D.C.T. R/F windows
free from spray but it is doubtful whether we can hope
to compete with such
very bad conditions.
Encl.3, para: 5
KENT
clear
view screens are fitted in font of the Director
telescopes in all D.C.T.s
of modern cruisers, capital ships, and destroyers.
The question of an A. & A to fit RENOWN, VALIANT,
etc, whose D.C.T.s are
similar will be raised separately.
Encl. 3, para: 16
The
absence
of misfires under these severe conditions is very
satisfactory.
C.I.N.O. and D.E.E. referred
Encl. 3, para: 17
and D.T.S.D.’s para: 4
The
question
of increasing each of the Handing Room and Magazine
Crews in all 15
inch gun capital ships by 2 ratings is being dealt with
on G.0574/39, (charged
to D.P.S. 4/3/39), consequent on the report from
WARSPITE in T.S.D. 531/38/G on
the 15 inch prolonged firing using ¾ charges.
2.
On
G.0574/39, D.N.O. recommended for consideration that
these additional ratings
should be allowed and that they should be reserves borne
in War only.
3. In view of the remarks in para: 17 of
enclosure No. 3, it
is proposed that each of the Handing Room and Magazine
crews should be
increased by 2 and 4 ratings respectively (reserves
borne in War only), in all
15 inch capital ships as soon as possible.
4. If D.P.S. concurs, it is requested that this
……(n.b. page
chopped)
Para
15.
The air
blast could not normally be expected to deal with green
seas. The 15 inch guns
were inspected on 27.4.40 and found serviceable.
Para
26.
The
tortuous course of the 4.5 inch ammunition to the guns
must be expected to
cause some failures of this nature.
(Sgd)
For
Chief
Inspector of Naval Ordnance
23/8/40
Encl.3
Para
9, 16,
25 (Functioning of L.P. Circuits).
Noted
Encl.3
(Range and Deflection Receivers out of step).
Action
has been taken on other papers
Para
28.
(N.S.
16021/40) to improve this.
Encl.3
(Primary lighting in A and Y Turrets).
Insufficient information is contained in the report to
enable this department
to comment on the failure of the electrical lightging,
in “A” and “Y” turrets.
(Sgd)
J.S.
Pringle
DIRECTOR
OF
ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING
5
September 1940
With
reference
to “A” of D.N.O. (11.8.40), there was a shortage of
Reserve Seaman on
Mobilisation and it was
consequently not possible to
implement D.N.O.’s
recommendation on G.0574/39
(attached).
2.
In
view of increasing commitments (including notably, the
U.S. Destroyers), it is
still not possible to meet this requirement, which now
totals 276 men (24 for
each ten 4-turret ships) and 18 for each of the two
3-turret ships). Unless
further unforeseen commitments arise, however, d.P.S.
hopes to be able to allocate Ordinary Seaman (H.O.) for
this purpose early in
1941.
3.
D.P.S.
accordingly concurs in principle in para 3 of D.N.O.’s
remarks at “A” but would prefer that the formal quarter
bill amendments should
not be issued until there is a definite prospect of
providing the personnel. It
is proposed that this matter be brought forward on
1st November 1940,
for reciew of the position.
(Sgd). P.B.R.W. William-Powlett
DIRECTOR
OF
PERSONAL SERVICES
8
SEPTEMBER 1940
In
view
of the remarks of D.P.S. concur that this paper be
brought forward on
1st November 1940.
(Sgd)
N.G.
Garnons-Williams
For D.N.O.
Referring
to
para 3 of D.P.S. (8/9/40), the
quarter bills of 15 inch capital ships have now been
amended by C.A.F.O.
1990/41 and their complements by A.L. N.19379/40 of
3/10/41.
(Sgd)
For D.P.S. 2/12