CHAPTER VII
GERMAN NAVAL POLICY, 1916‑1917
1
Although
the concessions to America
in April 1916 had been
much criticised in
Germany, the nation had,
on the whole, thought it
wise to make them. (See
Vol. III, p. 312.) Less
than a year later, the
country was resounding
with a clamour for
unrestricted warfare so
violent and unanimous that
no Government could have
resisted it. Ministers of
State changed their
opinions as radically as
the populace: those who,
at the beginning, had
favoured concession and
restraint, were quite
ready, at the close, to
support the policy of
attacking the commerce of
all nations, whether
neutral or belligerent.
The group of public men
who remained unconvinced
of anything but the risks
involved was very small;
they took little trouble
to put forward their views
in public, and when they
did so, their voices were
lost in the cry for
unrestricted submarine
warfare which rose from
every part of Germany.
This
change of opinion sprang,
no doubt, from many
causes, some of which are
too subtle and deeply
hidden to be traced here;
but among them we can
certainly name four of
importance. First, there
was the unswerving
conviction of the Naval
Staff that the submarine
fleet could end the war in
a German victory; second,
the reinstating, during
1916, of a campaign
against commerce so
successful that it seemed
very difficult to refuse
those who directed it the
additional freedom for
which they asked; third,
the failure of the peace
negotiations; and fourth,
the indefinite and
hesitating way in which
the few political
opponents of submarine war
expressed themselves.
The
decision to accede to
America's demands in April
1916 had only been taken
after an acute struggle
behind the scenes in which
the Chancellor and the
military leaders were
sharply opposed. When the
crisis passed, the
difference of outlook
between the two groups
only became more marked,
and the divisions of the
German Government more
sharply thrown up against
the darkening horizon.
The
Chancellor and his
assistant, Karl
Helfferich, were avowedly
the heads of a peace
party. (Erzberger, Erlebnisse
im Weltkriege, p. 219.)
They were supported by
Jagow, a strenuous
opponent of submarine
warfare, and by Count
Bernstorff, who knew, from
his residence in
Washington, that the
American nation could make
war effectively if ever it
chose to do so, a point
which the professional
soldiers of Germany, the
most highly trained in
Europe, could never grasp.
These four, then, Bethmann
Hollweg, Helfferich, Jagow
and Bernstorff, were
convinced that Germany's
interests would be best
served by negotiating an
early peace on a fairly
conciliatory basis, and
foresaw that a renewal of
unrestricted submarine
warfare would defeat their
policy, because it would
turn America from a
probable mediator into a
certain enemy.
General
von Falkenhayn was, at the
time, the Chancellor's
chief opponent. He was
still Chief of the General
Staff, and had a position
equal to the Chancellor's
in the Imperial Council;
but the campaign against
Verdun was bringing his
reputation to shipwreck.
It followed, therefore,
that although he continued
to advocate unrestricted
submarine warfare as the
only measure likely to
break down the military
deadlock, he could only
throw the weight of a
declining influence into
the controversy, and his
attitude can hardly have
affected the Government's
decision.
The
German public had not yet
definitely made up its
mind about the submarine
campaign. Certain very
powerful private
associations, such as the
Bund der Landwirte (League
of Landowners) and
the Zentral Verband
Deutscher Industrieller (Central
Association of German
Industrialists), supported
the clamour for resuming
submarine war without
restraint or concession.
Prince Salm, the President
of the Navy League, was
proclaiming that it would
be very greatly to
Germany's advantage if
America did enter the war
against her; and Admiral
von Tirpitz, now out of
office, was striving to
bring the Press and the
public to his own way of
thinking. His authority
with the general public
was very great; Erzberger
likens his influence over
the German masses to the
fatal charm of the piper
of Hamelin's music. (Erzberger,
pp. 210‑11.) This,
however, is a bitter
reflection from a man who
had been persistently
overruled and misinformed.
The vigorous campaign of
propaganda undertaken by
the navy throughout the
year proves that large
sections of the nation had
still to be convinced, and
that, in the meantime,
they were content that the
Government should hold
their hand.
1915-1916
THE CHANCELLOR'S DIFFICULTIES
The
two sides of the question
were never fairly
presented to the
unpersuaded mass of
Germans. The naval
censorship was originally
in the hands of the
Admiralty, and not of the
Naval Staff. So long as
this arrangement
continued, Admiral von
Tirpitz and his assistants
were free to spread their
views, and to suppress all
contrary opinions; and
they appear to have used
their advantage. During
1915, secret and official
memoranda, prepared by
Tirpitz, were frequently
communicated to private
persons; whilst a paper
written in good faith by
an industrial magnate, who
wished to warn the nation
about the dangers of
submarine war, was held up
until the first
declaration had been
issued. (Verhandlungen
des
Untersuchungsaussehusses,
pp. 362‑3.)
The
Chancellor succeeded in
transferring the naval
censorship from the
Admiralty to the Naval
Staff; but it was just as
unfairly exercised by its
new controllers as it had
been by the old. If there
was anybody in the German
Empire which ought to have
been informed of both
sides of the controversy,
it was the Bundesrat (The
Bundesrat is described
by a German
constitutional lawyer as
the "body which carries
the sovereign power of
the Empire"; another
describes it as a
"congress of ambassadors
of the federal kingdoms"
(Gebhardt, Verfassung
des Deutsches Reichs,
p. 94). Prussia sent to
it seventeen
representatives; Bavaria
six; Baden and Alsace
Lorraine three;
Mecklenburg and
Brunswick two; other
principalities one),
or Federal Council ‑ the
connecting link between
the Imperial Government
and the States of the
Union; yet the Naval Staff
injected their convictions
into every crevice of the
public structure with such
ruthlessness that the
naval representative who
reported on the position
to the Bundesrat, during
the summer of 1916,
produced figures so
inaccurate that the
Chancellor had to send
telegrams to every part of
Germany to contradict the
information supplied. (Bethmann
Hollweg,
Betrachtungen zum
Weltkriege, Vol. II.,
p.123.)
It
was the Chancellor's
peculiar misfortune that
the controversy seemed to
be straining and shaking
into incoherence all that
was loosely knit in the
construction of Imperial
Germany. Parliamentary
opinion was quite
uncertain, for in February
1916 the Prussian Lower
House had passed a
resolution in favour of
unrestricted submarine
warfare without consulting
or warning the Government;
and the Reichstag was
equally capable of
springing a surprise
motion beneath the feet of
the Executive. Apart from
this, the coming debate
could not fail to set up
the strain of an acute
constitutional quarrel.
Was the resumption of
submarine war a political
or a military question? In
the first case the
responsibility of advising
lay with the Chancellor;
in the second with the
Chief of the Staff. But
human affairs do not
always arrange themselves
according to the
departments of the German
administration, and it so
happened that the
submarine question was
both political and
military. The result was a
deadlock: the military
leaders claimed that the
question was exclusively
theirs, and Bethmann
Hollweg firmly insisted
that a matter affecting
the Empire's international
relations could not be
decided without the
Chancellor. It was
obviously impossible to
strike a compromise
between opinions which
were so radically opposed;
the deadlock could only be
ended by a personal
decision of the Emperor,
and we shall see presently
by what desperate device
this constitutional
necessity was evaded.
The
naval officers of the High
Command were agreed on the
general principle of
re‑starting the submarine
campaign as soon as they
could; but they by no
means saw eye to eye about
the best means of making
their views prevail.
As
he sailed to raid
Lowestoft (April 24,
1916), Admiral Scheer
recalled all submarines
from the trade routes, and
refused, from then
onwards, to allow them to
carry on commerce warfare
according to the rules of
international law; yet
those rules only were
sanctioned by the promise
which had been made to
Washington.
A
month later Jutland was
fought. The German
Commander‑in‑Chief at once
used the increased
prestige which his
leadership had gained for
him to press his views on
the Emperor. His "idea"
was that "the moral
impression which this
battle left on the neutral
nations created a most
favourable atmosphere for
us to carry on the war
against England by all
possible means, and to
resume the U‑boat campaign
in all its intensity."
No
more characteristic
judgment was pronounced
during the war ‑ it is an
extreme perversion of the
Bismarckian theory of
imponderabilia. The
atmosphere created by the
first reports of the
Battle of Jutland was not
only imponderable, it was
evanescent. When it
vanished, the true result
of the battle became as
clear as a well‑drawn
balance sheet. The High
Seas Fleet had inflicted
loss on a battle cruiser
squadron and had escaped
with its life from the
Grand Fleet; but the great
experiment was over, and
it had proved that the
control of the sea was
irrevocably in British
hands. No moral impression
‑ least of all a temporary
one ‑ could be of any
value in face of a reality
like this, a reality which
became every day plainer
to neutrals as well as to
enemies. Tirpitz showed
almost as faulty a
judgment: he notes that
"that engagement,
victorious, though not
fought to a finish, was
unable, after nearly two
years of the war, to
achieve any lasting
political result, in spite
of our advantages in the
battle itself; for in
June
1916
CONFLICTING OPINIONS
the
time that had elapsed, the
general position had
changed and settled too
much in England's favour,
and the countries that
were still neutral had
lost their belief in our
ultimate victory." This
estimate is more correct
than Scheer's, for it
marks the political result
of the German account of
Jutland as temporary and
ineffectual; but it shows
the Grand Admiral to be
equally unable to
distinguish words from the
realities of war. Nothing
in the two years had done
more to change and settle
the position in England's
favour than the Battle of
Jutland; for a superiority
which had before been only
demonstrable was there
actually demonstrated.
The
Naval Staff, however, had
a better reason for
demanding a renewal of the
U‑boat campaign, and this,
too, was a reason based
upon the result of
Jutland. The failure of
the High Seas Fleet left
them no other weapon but
the submarine. If the
unrestricted campaign
could not be risked, then
they begged to be allowed
a milder form of war, so
as to inflict at least
some injury on England.
Admiral Scheer objected to
any milder form, and the
Chief of the Naval
Cabinet, Mueller,
remonstrated with him in a
letter dated June 23,
1916, arguing against his
"everything or nothing"
point of view. "I can
fully sympathise with you,
but the matter is,
unfortunately, not so
simple. We were forced,
though with rage in our
hearts, to make
concessions to America,
and in so doing to the
neutrals in general; but,
on the other hand, we
cannot wholly renounce the
small interruptions of
trade .... still
possible in the
Mediterranean. It is the
thankless task of the
Chief of the Naval Staff
to try and find some way
of making this possible in
British waters as well."
What is necessary is "a
compromise between the
harsh professional
conception of the U‑boat
weapon and the general,
political and military
demands which the Chief of
the Staff has to satisfy."
The words "the harsh
professional conception"
are here strikingly apt,
but they are not to be
taken in a sympathetic
sense, for the use of the
weapon in question is only
given up "with rage in our
hearts."
This
letter was followed a week
later by a visit to
Admiral Scheer from the
Imperial Chancellor, who
informed him that he was
personally against an
unrestricted U‑boat
campaign, because it would
give rise to fresh
troublesome incidents and
"would place the fate of
the German Empire in the
hands of a U‑boat
commander." This made the
Admiral extremely bitter:
"So we did not wield our
U‑boat weapon as a sword
which was certain to bring
us victory, but (as my
Chief of the Staff,
Rear‑Admiral von Trotha,
put it) we used it as a
soporific for the feelings
of the nation, and
presented the blunt edge
to the enemy." The people
did not know that the
campaign was only big talk
and pretence; while
"America laughed because
she knew that it lay with
her to determine how far
we might go."
But
Admiral Scheer, though
short‑sighted and violent,
was shrewd enough to
realise that he could not
well remain in conflict
with the civilian and
naval elements of the
Government at one and the
same time. As he was
divided from his naval
colleagues only on a
professional question, but
from the Chancellor on a
matter of policy, it was
natural that he should
yield to Holtzendorff and
Mueller. He denies in his
book that he ever did
yield. Admiral von
Holtzendorff's plan of
restricted submarine
warfare was none the less
put into force in the
autumn of the year, and we
hear no more of Admiral
Scheer's opposition to it.
2
The
Chancellor decided that
the best issue from the
difficulties which were
encompassing both his
country and himself was to
press for American
mediation. The decision
was in a sense a wise one.
He knew quite well that
the Naval Staff and the
High Command were only
temporarily silenced; and
he foresaw that the
pressure they had already
exerted upon him would be
renewed before the year
was out. If the temporary
barrier which he had put
up against a decision in
favour of submarine war
were blown down ‑ he knew
the structure of it was
none too solid ‑ he
foresaw disaster and ruin.
He did not believe that a
"peace of victory" was any
longer possible; but he
did believe that a renewal
of unrestricted submarine
warfare would be the first
move towards a peace made
between a beaten Germany
and an enormous coalition
of victorious enemies; to
secure American mediation
was to secure the road to
a compounded peace and to
block the road to a new
submarine campaign against
neutral commerce. His
decision to press the
American Government to
make a regular diplomatic
move was thus outwardly a
wise one; but had he known
to what lengths the
American Government was
prepared to go to support
the Allies, had he guessed
what offers President
Wilson had already made to
the principal Allied
Governments, Bethmann
Hollweg would have
hesitated to invite
America's intervention,
and would probably have
withdrawn his opposition
to unrestricted submarine
warfare altogether; he
might even have advised
the military leaders that
nothing but a crushing
victory could end the war
satisfactorily. This
statement requires a
little explanation.
1915‑1916
AMERICAN POLICY
During
the year 1915, President
Wilson had apparently
realised that the war in
Europe which had already
involved rnany American
interests would do so in
an increasing degree, and
that he would not be able
to keep his country
neutral if the struggle
were much protracted. He
had grounds of complaint
against both groups of
belligerents, but he seems
to have made up his mind
that his difficulties with
Great Britain and the
Entente were not
comparable to his
differences with the
Central Powers, and that
if America ever intervened
it rnust be on the Allied
side. These, however, were
only his personal
convictions and those of
his most trusted adviser,
Colonel House: he felt it
his duty to keep them out
of all his public and most
of his private utterances,
and to set an example of
that neutral way of
thinking and acting which
he had invited his
countrymen to follow.
Probably most of the
American nation hoped that
the President would follow
no settled plan but that
of maintaining neutrality
and of dealing with
difficulties as they
arose; but President
Wilson, who had a more
intimate knowledge of what
those difficulties were
likely to be, and of the
passions they might
arouse, could not adopt
such a policy as this. Its
great and, to him,
decisive disadvantage was
that sooner or later it
would probably bring him
face to face with a
difficulty which could
only be settled by
intervention; and that if
he had previously made
neutrality the sole object
of his policy, America
would be taken by surprise
and be forced to enter the
war for no more inspiring
object than the settlement
of a diplomatic quarrel.
After
considerable hesitations
and misgivings, therefore,
he decided to try to
strike an arrangement with
the Entente Powers, and
sent Colonel House to
Europe on a special
mission. The Colonel was
instructed to prepare both
belligerent groups for an
American invitation to a
peace conference; but the
invitation was to be
presented to each group in
very different colours.
The Allies were to be
informed that if the
Germans refused reasonable
terms of peace, and so
broke up the conference to
which they would be
invited, America would at
once enter the war on the
Allied side and force the
Central Powers to agree.
The
reasonable terms were to
include the restoration of
Belgium and Serbia, the
cession of Alsace‑Lorraine
to France, of
Constantinople to Russia,
of the Italian‑speaking
section of Austria‑Hungary
to Italy, and the creation
of an independent Polish
State. Germany was to be
compensated for loss of
territory by concessions
outside Europe, and both
groups of belligerents
were to give guarantees
against undertaking
aggressive war by
disarming, and were also
to join a general league
for enforcing peace. This
offer, which in Colonel
House's view was
practically an offer of
American help to the
Allies, was communicated
to British and French
Ministers in January 1916.
Sir Edward Grey and
several other Ministers
received it well, Monsieur
Briand more guardedly; and
no answer was given.
This
proposed mediation could
obviously only be put
before the German
Ministers in a careful
disguise. When Colonel
House was in Berlin ‑
which he visited at the
end of January ‑ he
probably gave the German
Government to understand
that both groups of
belligerents would be
invited by America to meet
in conference and then
left to discuss
territorial questions and
indemnities between
themselves, and that the
American Government would
stand aside and concern
itself merely with a
conference upon
disarmament and the
creation of a league for
enforcing peace. This, at
all events, is what Count
Bernstorff understood by
American mediation.
Upon
this proposal the German
Ministers did not commit
themselves to any very
definite expression of
opinion; but the
Chancellor does not seem
to have suspected what the
American intentions really
were, and he discussed the
question of American
mediation with Colonel
House in a friendly way.
On the other hand,
Bethmann Hollweg,
Zimmermann and Jagow
satisfied Colonel House
that there was not the
slightest hope of the
Central Empires agreeing
to the terms of peace
which he and the President
considered reasonable. The
Colonel therefore returned
to London in February
quite convinced that
American mediation must be
followed by American
intervention.
He
was back in America early
in March, and after
consulting with the
President, he seems to
have asked Sir Edward Grey
whether the Allies were
ready to invite America to
mediate on the conditions
which he had recently
offered. Sir Edward Grey
replied that the British
Government could not take
the initiative in asking
the French to attend a
peace conference; and both
Colonel House and
President Wilson took this
answer to mean that the
American offer had been
refused. Anglo‑American
relations, thereupon,
became much less cordial;
Count Bernstorff was quick
to perceive this, but he
never suspected the real
reason.
Such
then was the position when
the German Foreign
Minister instructed the
Ambassador to press for
American mediation. In a
long telegram, sent on May
27, Count Bernstorff was
instructed in the tangled
and deceptive system he
was to follow.
July
1916
TORTUOUS INSTRUCTIONS
It
was taken for granted that
the President would strive
to arrange for a peace on
a status quo ante
basis. As this would not
be acceptable to Germany,
the Ambassador was to
prevent the American
Government from making a
positive proposal to the
Central Powers; but to do
so in a way which would
"attain the object without
endangering the relations
between America and
Germany." (Bernstorff,
My Three Years in
America, p. 237.) The
telegram shows the
confusion which still
reigned in high places in
Germany and the
extraordinary difficulties
with which the Chancellor
was faced. We have his own
assurance, and that of his
assistant, Karl
Helfferich, that he would
have been willing to
accept a peace on a status
quo ante basis (Helfferich,
Der Weltkrieg,
Vol. II., p. 299.);
but, as he did not dare to
express his views openly,
he was committing the
Ambassador to a policy
opposed to the one which
he really desired to
pursue.
Count
Bernstorff answered at
once that it was quite
impossible for him to
prevent the President from
mediating when and how he
liked; but his reply went
further. (Bernstorff,
p. 240.) He was
quick to see that some
unrevealed purpose lay
behind instructions so
badly drawn and
contradictory, and he
warned his Government in
the clearest possible
language against hoping to
get America's consent to a
renewal of the submarine
campaign if the Entente
Powers declined the
President's mediation
(July 13, 1916).
The
Chancellor's tortuous
instructions were evidence
of the very great
difficulties of his
position. Count Bernstorff
realised, at an early
period of the controversy,
that the whole matter was,
as he put it, a race
between peace negotiations
and unrestricted submarine
war. This was a frank view
and a clear‑sighted one;
it was, no doubt, a view
which would be shared by
the Chancellor. His last
instructions to Bernstorff
were thus, in a sense, a
step forward. He might
have made other such steps
had not an event occurred
which seriously weakened
his'position.
3
On
August 27, Rumania entered
the war against the
Central Powers. The
appearance of a new
opponent caused a deep
sensation in Germany.
Austria had already very
nearly succumbed under the
onslaughts of Brusilof's
armies in Galicia, and now
a new enemy was on her
flank. It was obvious that
the danger was pressing
and that a tremendous
effort was necessary to
avert it. The Government
acted promptly. Within two
days Field‑Marshall von
Hindenburg was appointed
Chief of the Great General
Staff, with his assistant,
Ludendorff, as
Quartermaster‑General; and
within a few weeks steps
were being taken to roll
back the Rumanian invasion
of Hungary.
We
shall see later the real
significance and
importance of this
appointment. Marshall von
Hindenburg was not made a
"military dictator," for
the duties of his office
were unchanged; nor did
his appointment imply a
victory for the
conservative parties in
the Reichstag or the
Prussian Landtag.
Nevertheless, the
consequences of his
assuming office did, in
the end, paralyse the
civil advisers of the
Emperor and reduce even
the Head of the State
himself to the mere
function of proclaiming
the decisions of his Chief
of Staff.
The
explanation of this
astonishing development
lies deep in the history
and character of the
German people. Their
traditions and their laws
all tended to make them
believe that salvation
from great danger can only
come from the effort of
one great man; and now
everything combined to
point out Hindenburg as
the man in whose power it
was to save the country
from the final danger. His
military talents might not
be greater than
Mackensen's or
Falkenhayn's, but it had
fallen to him to turn back
the tide of Russian
invasion in 1914; and the
utter defeat of the
Russian armies in the year
following was generally
attributed to him. He had
thus freed his countrymen
from a nightmare which had
been haunting them for a
whole generation, and,
rightly or wrongly, the
German people regarded him
as their only possible
deliverer from the
traditional Cossack
terror.
Bethmann
Hollweg fully understood
the significance of
Hindenburg's arrival at
Great Headquarters. It was
not, he said, that any new
powers were granted to the
new Chief of the General
Staff; but simply that no
Government which was known
to be opposing the views
of the new military chief
could have withstood the
popular indignation. (Verhandlungen
des
Untersuchungsaussehusses,
pp. 144, 148.)
The
effects of the appointment
upon parliamentary opinion
were equally deep.
Throughout the war, the
Government had relied
largely for support upon
the influence of the
Centre Party in the
Reichstag. Its help had
always been loyally given.
When the submarine
controversy had raged at
the time of the Sussex
crisis, the party chiefs
had seen to it that there
should be no majority in
favour of submarine war.
Aug.
1916
AN IMPERIAL CONFERENCE
Since
then, they had never
committed themselves to a
hard-and‑fast statement.
But when the new Chief of
Staff took office, the
Chancellor realised that
their attitude was no
longer so reliable: "The
Centre Party now renounced
their old tradition and
claimed a free hand."
As
soon as Hindenburg had
taken up his appointment,
a general conference of
ministers, army and navy
leaders assembled at
Pless. The first and, as
far as we know, the only
item on the agenda was the
question of resuming
unrestricted submarine
warfare. Should the German
navy, in fact, be allowed
to assist by every means
in its power in the
impending effort to avert
the new danger? There were
present Hindenburg;
Ludendorff, who was now
Quartermaster‑General;
General Wild von
Hobenborn, War Minister;
Admirals von Capelle
(Secretary of the Navy),
von Holtzendorff (Chief of
the Admiralty Staff), and
Koch; Bethmann Hollweg,
Imperial Chancellor;
Helfferich, Minister of
the Interior; and Jagow,
Minister for Foreign
Affairs; with Baron von
Gruenau as Secretary.
Admiral
von Holtzendorff opened
the discussion, and read
from a carefully prepared
paper. His main argument
was directed against those
who opposed unrestricted
submarine war on the
grounds that it would
involve war with the
United States. The
Government at Washington
might indeed declare war;
but what could they do as
a belligerent? They would
have no spare tonnage with
which to assist the
Entente, and their
attitude could hardly
affect other neutrals.
Holland would declare war
against the first Power
that violated her
territory, Denmark would
remain neutral; the South
American States could do
nothing against U‑boat
warfare, for they had not
enough shipping to carry
away their grain harvests.
In a few months, the last
vestiges of German
international commerce
would be gone. Could
Turkey, Bulgaria and
Austria‑Hungary bear
another winter of war? "I
do not see a finis
Germaniae in the use
of the weapon which
cripples Great Britain's
capacity to support her
Allies; but rather in the
neglect to employ it."
The
Foreign Minister, Jagow,
strove to prove the
wrongness of the Admiral's
political outlook. If the
United States entered the
war, the effect on
neutrals would be
incalculable. "Germany
will be treated like a mad
dog against which
everybody combines." When
unrestricted submarine war
had first been started,
neutrals had been
thoroughly disturbed.
There was no comparison
possible between English
and German pressure upon
neutral States. Great
Britain did not touch
individuals: she worked
upon associations and
trading combines, who
served her purposes by
freely electing to do so,
in return for special
advantages. The German
method destroyed ships and
took human life.
Karl
Helfferich, the Minister
of the Interior, continued
the argument, and attacked
the statistics upon which
Holtzendorff had based his
conclusions. Great Britain
had 12 1/2 million tons of
shipping at her disposal;
she employed a part of it
to supply herself, and the
remainder was engaged in
the world's trade.
Supposing that German
submarines succeeded in
reducing the 12 1/2
million tons available,
Great Britain would then
simply withdraw some of
her surplus shipping from
general trade; and her
destruction would be as
far off as ever. Had
Holtzendorff reflected, he
asked, that Germany had
supplied herself, and
absorbed a considerable
fraction of the world's
carrying trade, with only
5 million tons of
shipping? Why should not
England, by foresight and
economy, make a far
smaller tonnage than she
had hitherto disposed of
suffice for her needs? The
argument that America
could do no harm even if
she declared war was
utterly unsound. "Up to
the present, the Entente
has borrowed 1,250 million
dollars from the United
States. If she declares
war, America, with all her
reserves, will be at the
disposal of the Allies,
for their cause will be
hers." And finally, "I can
see in the employment of
the U‑boat weapon nothing
but catastrophe." Admiral
von Capelle, on the other
hand, proclaimed the
conviction of the navy
that nothing but the
unredricted U‑boat war
would lead to peace, and
added some weaker remarks
to the effect that in any
event it could do no harm,
even " failing full
success."
The
Imperial Chancellor now
intervened. He had had a
preliminary discussion
with Hindenburg, and he
agreed with him that a
decision was not possible
on this question while the
military position was so
uncertain. Also, he could
not promise that a sudden
declaration would not
cause a breach between
Denmark and the Central
Powers: unrestricted
U‑boat war would be
stamped from the start as
"an act of desperation."
He further proved his
superiority in judgment
over his naval colleagues
by affirming that the
expected result ‑ the
breaking of England ‑ was
merely an assumption,
which nobody could prove.
" We cannot lay an iron
ring round England. Also
our blockade can be broken
by warships accompanying
the transports." It seemed
to him, therefore, that
they could decide nothing
"till the military
situation had been
cleared."
Holtzendorff
replied ‑ it sounds an
impulsive reply: "I am
convinced ‑ I cannot
adduce any proof ‑ that a
fortnight's
Aug.
1916
DECISION POSTPONED
unrestricted
U‑boat war will have this
effect, that the neutrals
will keep aloof from
England." In this matter
the Norwegians were to
teach him a lesson in
psychology.
Capelle
spoke of the powers of the
large U‑boats, whose
number had been doubled.
Helfferich argued that the
only result would be
extreme exertion and
perfected organisation in
England. Holtzendorff
retorted: "We find
ourselves in a tight
position, to get out of
which we must act. We need
not threaten the neutrals,
but we can invite them to
behave towards us as they
behaved towards England" ‑
a line of thought adopted
already, as we have seen,
by Scheer and Tirpitz, but
controverted by Jagow and
unintelligible to any
reasonable mind.
The
Chancellor's warning that
Denmark and other neutrals
were unsteady, weighed
heavily with Hindenburg
and his
Quartermaster‑General.
"South of the
Carpathians," said
Ludendorff, "the Rumanians
are on the march. They are
bad soldiers; but the
Austrians are even worse.
The last man available
from the east or west must
be sent to Rumania. If
Holland and Denmark
declare war against us, we
shall not be able to
oppose them." Hindenburg,
too, was of opinion that
this risk must not be run
till the military position
had been settled. "A
decision is not possible
at present," he pronounced
autocratically, "I shall
make the time for it
known." For the moment,
then, Bethmann Hollweg had
succeeded in directing the
discussion. He was quite
clear that no decision
could be or ought to be
taken until the military
position had cleared and
the other members of the
Alliance had been
consulted. When Austria
was menaced with a danger
which seemed likely to
break her power of
resistance, it was hardly
reasonable to involve her
in a war with new enemies.
In a few weeks the
Reichstag would meet; he
proposed then to tell the
political leaders that
"the decision (with regard
to submarine warfare) had
been postponed; and that
Field‑Marshall von
Hindenburg had stated that
he must wait for the issue
of the Rumanian campaign
before he could form a
definite opinion."
The
outcome of the conference
was, therefore, that the
question was postponed.
The Chancellor had shown
that he was inclined to
accept Helfferich's
conclusions rather than
Holtzendorff's upon the
technical side of the
problem; but he had been
quite silent upon the
general principle of
submarine war. Only Jagow
had used language which
showed once more that the
thinking power of Germany
lay with her civilians
rather than with her
militarists. The neutrals,
he said, could not be
conciliated: they showed
tremendous unrest during
the previous U‑boat
campaign, and naturally
so. "The difference
between our method and
England's is, above all,
to be found in the fact
that we should be
destroying ships and human
life in order to exert
pressure, whereas by the
English method the
neutrals are only
restricted in the free
exercise of their
activity." This simple
discovery is significant,
as having been made by
each nation in its own
way. To the Dutch and
Scandinavian traders it
came as a practical matter
of business; to the Latin
mind it was laid bare by
the clear, quick light of
reason; to the Anglo‑Saxon
by the equally swift flash
of humour. The German
statesman reached it by
the long and serious
groping of a methodic
mind; the German Admirals
could never see it at all,
even when it was pointed
out to them.
4
The
conference left Admiral
von Holtzendorff's
existing plan of submarine
warfare untouched: he was
still free to carry on a
restricted campaign, and
he carried it on with
great energy and
persistence. His submarine
commanders did not pay any
great attention to the
promises made by the
German Government, for
ships were frequently
torpedoed without warning;
but the German naval
leaders were quite right
in assuming that the
American President would
find it difficult to
champion "the sacred
rights of humanity" unless
American lives and
property were destroyed.
They were thus able to
keep their submarine fleet
fairly active; and the
following table of British
losses, after the Sussex
crisis, gives an outline
picture of their
activities; and it must be
added that the attack, in
August, fell even more
heavily on Allied
shipping.
1916
|
Mined or Torpedoed.
|
Losses in European waters and the Atlantic.
|
Losses in the Mediterranean.
|
June
|
5
|
10
|
July
|
9
|
19
|
August
|
11
|
12
|
It
is noteworthy that the
losses in Home Waters
shows a steady increase;
and this suggests a point
which became very
important later on. It had
generally been supposed
that the concessions made
to America would make it
impossible to carry on
effective submarine
warfare except in the
Mediterranean.
Holtzendorff had now
proved that this
Sept.
10, 1916
LUDENDORFF'S VIEWS
was
not so, and that there was
still a means of attacking
British commerce at its
points of concentration
near home. His next step
was to try to bring the
new military chiefs to his
own point of view, and on
September 10, rather more
than a week after the
conference at Pless,
Captain von Buelow visited
General Ludendorff at
Great Headquarters on
behalf of the Naval Staff.
(Ludendorff, Urkunden
des obersten Heeresleitung,
p. 302.)
He
began the conversation by
saying that the Naval
Staff's information about
neutrals contradicted the
Chancellor's recent
statement, and added that
to renew the submarine war
would give an impression
of strength which would
act as a deterrent to
small neutrals
contemplating a rupture
with Germany. Ludendorff
answered that he must
accept the Chancellor's
view on political
questions, and that he had
not enough men to hold the
Danish and Dutch
frontiers, but added
significantly an
expression of his regret
that a question which was
"purely military" should
have been given a
political treatment. When
the interview ended, the
naval representative gave
the Quartermaster‑General
one of the memoranda which
were then being prepared
at naval headquarters by a
group of bankers and
scientists, and the
conversation was reopened
a few days later.
Ludendorff then admitted
outright that he was in
favour of beginning
unrestricted submarine
warfare as soon as the
military position on the
continent was secure. (Several
years later, a bitter
controversy raged round
these memoranda. Several
of the witnesses at the
Untersuchungsausschuss
accused the Naval Staff
of collecting a number
of men who had no
authority to speak on
economics, industry or
trade, and getting them
to prepare statistical
arguments in favour of
unrestricted submarine
war (pp. 407‑412).
Erzberger makes the same
charge (214). There
seems to have been a
great deal of force in
the accusation. Ballin,
the greatest shipping
magnate in Germany, was
never asked for his
opinion on submarine
warfare during the war.)
Captain
von Buelow drew up a
record of his interview in
duplicate, and sent one
copy to General
Ludendorff. To his own
copy he added some notes,
which were intended only
for himself and
Holtzendorff. (Beilagen
zu den stenographischen
Berichten des
Untersuchungsaussehusses,
Teil IV., p. 181.) "General
Ludendorff believes in a
successful issue to
submarine war ....
he has no faith in being
able to force a favourable
decision by means of war
on land alone. On the
authority of the
Chancellor, he believes in
the Danish danger. The
Chancellor stands firm on
this point, and he will
continue to do so because
he opposes submarine war
and can terrify General
Ludendorff with this
Danish spectre and cause
delay. ...
"We must, therefore (daher
Zweckmuessig)
"1. With regard to General Ludendorff:
(a) energetically represent the
disadvantage of delay;
(b) endeavour, by means of reports
from our Attaches and so
on, to weaken (the belief)
in this Danish and Dutch
danger.
"2. With regard to the Chancellor:
Strive to make him soften down his
verdict about the Danish
danger. I think that the
Kalkmann memorandum might
have effect upon the
Chancellor and such people
as Ballin: possibly it
might work upon the former
through the latter." (Ludendorff,
p. 305.)
The
Chancellor did not wait to
feel the effect of these
subtle influences.
Realising that the
resolutions taken at Pless
gave him only a limited
time in which to thwart
the movement in favour of
unrestricted submarine
war, he took the only step
which was still open to
him, and laid the real
points at issue before the
Emperor for decision.
His
memorandum went straight
to the point: the war
might be ended by an
unrestricted submarine
campaign or by diplomacy.
As the first method ought
not to be resorted to
until the second had
failed, the Chancellor
asked that Count
Bernstorff might be
allowed to reopen the
question with the American
President, and urge upon
him the need of making an
early move. Hoping,
doubtless, that when the
Emperor gave his decision
upon the points now
submitted to him, the
naval leaders would
co‑operate in the policy
adopted, the Chancellor
was careful to say that
the memorandum had been
written with
Holtzendorff's full
concurrence.
The
Emperor approved the
Chancellor's proposals,
and the necessary
instructions were sent to
Washington. Bethmann
Hollweg was thus still in
nominal charge of the
Empire's policy. Had he
been seconded by the
officers of State from
whom he looked for
support, his efforts to
open negotiations, backed
by American diplomacy,
might have been
successful. But in spite
of the appointment of
Hindenburg to an
overriding command, there
was still no unity of
purpose in the Government,
and the heads of the
departments of State and
the commanders in the
field continued to pursue
their own objects,
regardless of the general
policy to which the
Chancellor was committed.
Admiral
Scheer was the first to
set the example. At a
Sept.‑Nov.
1916
OPPOSING PURPOSES
date
between September 8 and
November 22 which cannot
be fixed exactly, he sent
his Chief of Staff,
Trotha, to Great
Headquarters to see
General Ludendorff. (Scheer,
p. 247.) If the
outcome of this second
interview between the
naval and military leaders
has been correctly
reported, no conclusion is
possible except one: that
the military leaders and
the naval command were
determined to obstruct the
Chancellor's diplomatic
action by every means in
their power. Several
points were agreed upon:
first, that there was no
possibility of ending the
war well (zum guten
Ende) except by
unrestricted submarine
war; secondly, that "a
half U‑boat war" should in
no circumstances be
adopted; thirdly, that all
special agreements with
the northern Powers ‑
Sweden, Norway and Denmark
should be cancelled as
soon as possible, in order
that there should be no
"gaps" in the submarine
operations; and, lastly,
that there should be no
"turning back."
Each
one of these conclusions
was a direct challenge to
the Chancellor's
negotiations: if only
submarine warfare could
end the war "well," it was
obvious that diplomacy
would end it badly; "a
half U‑boat warfare" was
exactly what the
Chancellor's concessions
were obliging the navy to
practise; and the only
result of cancelling
diplomatic agreements with
foreign Powers, in order
to give submarines a wider
target, would be to reduce
the Chancellor's
department and the Foreign
Office to sub‑sections of
the General Staff. These
remarkable resolutions
could not, of course,
alter the policy which the
Government had now
adopted; but they throw a
vivid light upon the
fierce dissensions which
were making co‑ordinated
action between its various
departments impossible.
The
Chancellor's instructions
to Count Bernstorff were
too late. When they
arrived, there was no
longer any hope that the
American Government would
approach the belligerents
before the winter; for,
after much hesitation,
President Wilson had
decided not to make any
move until he had been
re‑elected. A brief
retrospect of what had
taken place during the
summer in the American
capital is necessary if
the reasons for this
postponement are to be
understood. In July 1916,
the President had ordered
his Ambassador in London
to return to Washington.
The message did not
explain why his presence
was desired, but Sir
Edward Grey grasped that
it must be connected with
the diplomatic
intervention which Colonel
House had offered earlier
in the year. Since Sir
Edward Grey had replied to
the American Proposals,
several public utterances
by the President had made
Sir Edward Grey extremely
doubtful whether he
intended to intervene on
conditions as friendly to
the Allies as those which
he had offered in January,
possibly, indeed, doubtful
whether he had ever
intended to assist us on
the very points which we
considered essential to a
well‑regulated peace
treaty. (See Grey, Twenty‑five
Years, Vol. II., pp.
128‑30.)
On
May 27, 1916, President
Wilson had addressed the
American League of Peace
at its first annual
meeting. He knew that he
had to speak to an
audience which expected
him to mediate in Europe,
but which did not realise
that he had already
attempted to do so and
failed; and he knew that
those foreign statesmen
with whom he had attempted
to negotiate at the
beginning of the year
would scrutinise his
utterance critically. All
this made him extremely
cautious; but his speech,
analysed by those who
shared, or at least
thought they shared, his
most intimate thoughts,
seemed to go beyond what
mere caution demanded. In
his opening sentences the
President proclaimed that
the United States was not
concerned with the causes
or origins of the war.
"The obscure fountains,"
he said emphatically,
"from which its stupendous
flood has burst forth we
are not interested to
search for or explore."
Was this a mere form of
words deliberately chosen
to disguise the offer of
help which he had given to
the Allies earlier in the
year, or did the passage
mean that the offer had
lapsed and would not again
be renewed on such
favourable terms?
Sir
Edward Grey, at all
events, thought the
utterance was suspicious:
he interviewed Mr. Page
before his departure for
Washington, and was much
stiffer and more
unyielding on the question
of American mediation than
he had been, earlier in
the year, to Colonel
House. In the first place,
we knew the catch words
"Freedom of the Seas" to
be nothing but the outer
wrapping to a policy which
we had opposed for a long
time past: that of
endeavouring to make all
naval supremacy useless.
Secondly, Sir Edward Grey
made it quite clear that
the phrase in the
President's speech about
the obscure, untraceable
origins of the war, seemed
very unfair to us. In
conclusion, he warned Mr.
Page that we should never
agree to mediation unless
the French also consented:
"Least of all could the
English make or receive
any suggestion, at least
until her great new army
had done its best." In
other words, we were
hopeful of final victory,
and did not intend to be
turned aside from our
purpose so long as our
confidence in being able
to achieve it was
unshaken.
This
last remark must have
shown the American
Ambassador
May,
1916
DIVERGENT POLICIES
how
wide a gulf there was
between the President's
outlook and ours, and how
easily the difference
between us might grow into
an open antagonism. We
were hoping for a final,
decisive victory, and were
ready to make any effort
within our strength to get
it: the American
Government were convinced
that neither side would be
able to force a military
decision; and were basing
their own hopes of
mediating successfully on
the assumption that all
the Powers at war would
very soon admit the
deadlock. Obviously, then,
Great Britain's resolute
hopes were standing in the
way of an early
settlement. This, however,
was not all: Sir Edward
Grey's caveat about
maritime warfare and naval
power cut at the very
roots of the American
policy; for it was
President Wilson's avowed
wish to mediate between
the warring Powers in such
a way that they would be
left to settle their
territorial claims between
themselves, whilst he
presided over an
International Congress to
prevent future wars and to
ensure that the "Freedom
of the Seas" should be so
enforced that navies could
"only be used against each
other, and no longer
against commerce and for
purposes of blockade." (Bernstorff,
p. 249.)
The
President's detachment
from what were for us the
practical issues of the
war worked directly
against us. So long as the
German armies held Belgian
and French territories, it
would be very difficult
for us to get them back by
mere diplomatic
bargaining; practically
impossible to oblige the
enemy Powers to compensate
our Allies for the damage
they had done; and totally
impossible to arrange for
the return of
Alsace‑Lorraine to France.
Yet these were, to us, the
three absolutely essential
conditions for peace;
without them the balance
of power in Europe would
be so upset that a league
to enforce peace would be
impossible. It is quite
true that the President
had empowered Colonel
House to inform the Allies
that, in the last resort,
the United States would be
willing to enforce most of
our peace conditions by
armed intervention; and
that, in consequence, we
knew that the President
had more concern and
interest in the political
frontiers of Europe than
he pretended. There was,
none the less, a general
apprehension that he was
half‑hearted on these
points, and that his only
real concerns were a
general disarmament and a
league to enforce
peace‑measures which we
could not consider until
the territorial
readjustment of Europe was
complete. Even Sir Edward
Grey, who had been most
concerned with the secret
negotiations at the
beginning of the year, and
was probably better
informed of President
Wilson's intentions than
any other European
statesman, seems to have
feared that the American
peace plan could not be
ours, simply because
points which we thought
essential the American
President seemed to treat
as secondary.
It
was, perhaps, because the
President realised this,
that he was so distant and
depressed when Mr. Page
went to visit him. (Page,
Life and Letters,
p. 188.) And if
this realisation was, in
fact, weighing upon him,
it must certainly have
inclined him to postpone
his mediation; for no
American President could
lightly view the prospect
of entering a peace
conference in which his
principal antagonists
would be the democratic
Powers of western Europe.
The reason he gave to
Bernstorff involved a
temporary abandonment of
the theory of stalemate:
it was that Rumania had
entered the war, and that
the state of military
equilibrium on which he
had based his hopes of an
early peace had been
broken. (Bernstorff,
p. 243.)
The
reasons for the
postponement are, however,
less important than its
consequences, for in two
months the diplomatic
advantages which Bethmann
Hollweg and Bernstorff had
so laboriously acquired
were all lost.
American
public opinion had
undoubtedly for the moment
turned against us; but the
President saw, clearly
enough, that the friendly
and even cordial relations
which had sprung up
between the United States
and Germany rested on a
very insecure basis; and
in his Address on being
renominated to the
Presidency, he used
language which was little
else than a warning to the
German Government against
presuming too much upon
the new state of things. (President
Wilson was renominated
by the democratic
convention in September
1916, and re‑elected on
November 7, 1916.) "The
rights of our own citizens
became involved: that was
inevitable. Where they
did, this was our guiding
principle; that property
rights can be vindicated
by claims for damages when
the war is over, and no
modern nation can decline
to arbitrate such claims;
but the fundamental rights
of humanity cannot be so
vindicated. The loss of
life is irreparable. Neither
can direct violations of
a nation's sovereignty
await vindication in
suits for damages. The
nation that violates
these essential rights
must expect to be
checked and called to
account by direct
challenge and resistance."
(Scott, President
Wilson's Foreign Policy,
pp. 227‑8.)
Words
like these would have
warned Admiral von
Holtzendorff of the folly
of what he was proposing
to do if he had been
capable of thinking about
anything but submarines
and their radius of
action. Intent upon his
plan of reinstating
unrestricted warfare, he
had kept his U‑boats busy
during September; but they
had not attacked commerce
outside their usual
Oct.
1916
AN ACT OF FOLLY
areas.
Nineteen British vessels
had been sunk in the
Mediterranean, eleven in
the North Sea, and twelve
in the Western approaches,
in the Bay of Biscay and
off the coast of Portugal.
And, as in the previous
month, the neutrals
suffered still more
heavily ‑ Norway alone
lost twenty‑six vessels of
45,000 tons aggregate;
while in the Arctic Ocean
seven Norwegian ships and
one Russian were sunk, as
well as one British
vessel. In October the
zone of operations was
much extended: six vessels
were sunk in the White
Sea; and on October 9 the
citizens of the Eastern
States of America received
the sensational news that
a German submarine was
operating off Nantucket
light‑vessel. This boat
was U.53; she had
crossed the Atlantic under
the command of Hans Rose,
and he had been
courteously received, on
the day before the
announcement in the Press,
by the naval commandant at
Newport. Then, after a
brief exchange of visits,
the submarine left her
American harbour, and,
having sunk five vessels
off the outer
light‑vessel, returned
home to Germany.
The
exasperation caused by the
visit spread like a
prairie fire. Ever since
the war began, the
Americans had been
exceptionally touchy about
the exercise of
belligerent rights within
their waters. In 1914 our
watching cruisers had
shadowed certain steamers
on their way to New York
and Boston; the American
Government had at once
protested, notwithstanding
that our action was
admittedly legitimate.
During the election
campaign the same
apprehensive and angry
feeling about the
integrity of American
coastal waters again made
itself evident; and our
Admiral was warned that he
had better relax his watch
on New York and the
Chesapeake until the
agitation in the Press had
died down. It can,
therefore, be imagined
what feelings were aroused
when it was reported that
U.53 had actually
carried submarine war to
the American coasts, and
was sinking vessels with
the assistance of American
navigational marks and
under the eyes of American
light‑keepers. The
proceeding was defended on
the plea that the sinkings
had been made outside
territorial waters and
according to the rules of
cruiser warfare; but
popular indignation is not
easily subdued by
quotations from books of
maritime law. The
agitation continued, and
took a threatening shape.
The President himself took
note of it, and warned the
German Ambassador that the
incident must not be
repeated. (Bernstorff,
p. 227.)
That
such an act of folly
and so tactless an
insistence on bare legal
right should have been
perpetrated by a
Government with a high
reputation for unity and
cohesion, was surprising
enough; and it was natural
to ask how it could have
been allowed. If
Holtzendorff was so
reckless as to wish for
the experiment, was there
no one in Germany with the
sense and the power to
forbid it? The answer is,
no doubt, to be found in
the rigid departmental
divisions of the German
Government. So long as the
submarines carried out
their operations according
to the rules of cruiser
warfare, as the Emperor
had commanded them to do,
the choice of the theatre
for displaying their
exploits was a "purely
military" question. It is,
therefore, very doubtful
whether Admiral von
Holtzendorff ever
consulted the political
heads of the Government
about the cruise of the U.53;
and she was probably sent
out to give effect to the
crude, illusory notion
which Captain von Buelow
had urged on General
Ludendorff a month before:
that the more harshly
Germany acts at sea, the
more will neutrals respect
her.
This
clumsy attempt to be
impressive had, however,
less permanent ill effects
than might have been
expected. Indignation was
sharp, but short‑lived. In
a few days those sections
of the American Press
which had always advocated
the German cause were
expressing admiration for
the exploit , and an event
now occurred which
diverted public attention
to another matter.
On
October 12, the British
Ambassador presented a
Note replying to the
American protest about our
treatment of mails. The
contents of our Note were
soon published throughout
the American Press, and
their reception was
decidedly bad. A very
large number of Americans
believed, quite honestly,
that we were using
belligerent measures as a
cover for seizing unfair
advantages over American
traders; and when it was
seen that we did not mean
to yield on the point,
which was one of
importance to us, feeling
began to run high. The New
York World, a paper
which was supposed to be
closely in touch with the
Government, described our
Note as evasive and
impudent.
Fortunately
for the Allies, we too
were saved by a diversion.
The fight for the
Presidency was now in full
blast, and Americans gave
it their undivided
attention. The two
antagonists, Wilson and
Hughes, were equally
matched; each represented
a powerful group of
interests; and in the
turmoil foreign relations
were temporarily
forgotten. President
Wilson was returned to
office on November 7; and
when the American public
turned back once more to
the insistent questions of
peace by mediation, and of
British and German acts of
war, several events of
great importance took
place in quick succession.
Oct.‑Nov.
1916
PROMISES DISREGARDED
just
before the Presidential
campaign began, Mr. Grew,
the American Charge
d'Affaires in Berlin, had
reported that the German
Government intended
shortly to seize a large
number of Belgian workmen
and carry them by force to
Germany to work in the
mines and factories. (U.S.
Government publication,
European War, No.
4, pp. 357‑9.) The
rest of the month passed
in efforts to obtain
further information, and,
finally, Mr. Grew was
handed a written
memorandum stating that
the German Government
intended "to adopt
compulsory measures
against Belgian
unemployed, who are a
burden to charity, so that
friction arising therefrom
may be avoided." As the
"charity" which was thus
to be relieved of its
burdens was the
"Commission d'alimentation
et de secours" ‑ a purely
American concern ‑ the
excuse was clumsy in the
extreme. Mr. Grew answered
at once that the German
Government's action was a
breach of International
Law; and on November 29 he
was instructed by his
Government to hand in a
strongly worded note
verbale. A wave of
resentment at the German
deportation laws swept the
United States. Count
Bernstorff wired to his
Government saying that
opinion had "been
poisoned" against Germany;
and he stated that, but
for this unhappy measure,
President Wilson would
have mediated between the
nations at war as soon as
he was re‑elected. (Bernstorff,
p. 258.)
The
German Ambassador's views
on such a subject are
necessarily weighty. Count
Bernstorff had much to
explain to the German
nation. He had to find a
reason why President
Wilson should have altered
his views so completely in
rather less than three
months; and, looking back
over the events of the
autumn of 1916, it seemed
to him that the Belgian
deportations had caused
the change. The
explanation is not a
sufficient one: it is not
difficult to see that the
President had other and
graver reasons for
mistrusting the German
Government. The fact was
that the submarine war was
becoming more dangerous
every day. Admiral von
Holtzendorff was spreading
his submarines over a
wider and wider area, and
they were showing an
increasing disregard for
the promises upon which
American neutrality
depended.
During
the previous month, the
steamship Marina
of the Donaldson line had
been torpedoed, without
warning off Cork. (European
War, No. 4, p. 258, et
seq.) A heavy sea
was running at the time;
and of fifty‑one Americans
on board, six were
drowned. Investigation
showed that the vessel was
"on her owner's service,
running on her ordinary
berth, and entirely under
the orders of her
owners." She would, on her
return from America, have
carried a number of horses
for use in the British
army. This would,
admittedly, have made the
Government the consignees
of part of the cargo; but
it could not properly be
alleged, as the German
Foreign Office did, that
the Marina was a
"horse transport ship in
the service of the British
Government." Nor was this
all. Two days earlier, the
Rowanmore, with
American citizens on
board, had been shelled
off the Irish coast whilst
lowering her boats; on the
very day that the Marina
was sunk, the American
steamer Lanao was
sunk off Cape Vincent, in
spite of the fact that the
cargo was innocent; and on
November 8, the large
British liner Arabia
was sunk without warning
in the Mediterranean. As
had happened when the Marina
was torpedoed, the German
Government excused their
action by stating that the
Arabia was in
British Government
service. We had no
difficulty in proving that
the statement was false;
and when he took stock of
the position on returning
to office, President
Wilson must have been
painfully conscious that
the pledges which the
German Government had
given him in April were
being deliberately
violated.
But
more than a month was
needed to examine each
case and to receive the
German answers to the
questions raised; so that
it was not until the
middle of December that
all the facts were known.
By then very important
negotiations of another
kind were in progress, and
these cases, flagrant as
they were, did not receive
much attention. The
American Government did
not press their protests,
and Count Bernstorff
concluded, in consequence,
that what had occurred was
without importance; but
this was a very hazardous
assumption. (Bernstorff,
p. 262.) If the
President, in the
interests of his impending
effort at mediation,
decided to draw as little
attention as he could to
the incidents, it by no
means followed that he was
not deeply and painfully
impressed by the
unscrupulous policy which
had caused them.
The
steady spread of the
submarine campaign and its
increasing successes had
now brought on a fresh
internal struggle in the
German Government; and the
taking of American lives
in violation of promises
given was as much the
outcome of confusion,
uncertainty and diversity
of aim as of deliberate
bad faith.
Oct.
1‑4, 1916
THE CHANCELLOR'S PROTEST
On
October 1, only a week
after Bethmann Hollweg had
presented his memorandum
upon American mediation to
the tinperor, he received
a " very confidential "
report from Holtzendorff.
(Beilagen, Teil
IV., pp. 183, 184.) It
was to the effect that the
Great General Staff had
advised him to begin
unrestricted submarine
warfare on October 18, and
to issue the necessary
orders on the 10th. The
news amazed him; and his
reply went much further
than a mere protest
against a breach of
procedure. After
explaining the lamentable
effects of withdrawing all
diplomatic undertakings
without warning or
explanation, he attacked
the principle of submarine
war itself. It consisted
in striving for results
based on the merest
guesswork, at the cost of
a certain and definite
evil. "The effect of
submarine warfare upon
England is purely
speculative .... it
is impossible to impose an
unbreakable blockade upon
her." Apart from this,
Great Britain would
certainly not face the
danger passively. If she
introduced an effective
convoy system, the whole
basis upon which the Naval
Staff had built up its
arguments would be
withdrawn. Doubtless
intensified submarine war
would injure Great
Britain, but that was a
very different thing from
compelling her to make
peace, when that same act
of war would rally
America, Holland, Denmark
and Spain to her
assistance. "The
perspective which all this
opens up is so wide, and
of such general import,
that, quite apart from
American action, no final
decision can possibly be
come to until His Majesty
has had the matter set
before him in all its
aspects."
This
energetic protest was
presented to the
Field‑Marshall by Baron
von Gruenau, the
Chancellor's
representative at
Headquarters. His report
shows how completely the
military and civil
departments of Government
mistrusted one another.
Hindenburg and Ludendorff
wished him to tell the
Chancellor how much they
deplored the mistake.
Nothing was further from
their thoughts than to
take separate action.
"Both these gentlemen
assured me, several times
over, that no discord must
be allowed to disturb
their local co‑operation
with you." But having thus
discharged his duty,
Gruenau continued that he
had very good reason for
thinking that " General
Ludendorff is counting
upon an early beginning to
the line of action
mentioned " [intensified
submarine warfare].
Two
days later, however
(October 4), the General
Staff realised that their
manoeuvre had been
premature. On that day
Holtzendorff, whose
obstinate energy no
consideration seems ever
to have restrained, went
to press his views upon
the Emperor. He was told
curtly "that there could
be no question of
re‑starting intensified
submarine warfare for the
moment." (Beilagen,
Teil IV., p. 185.)
This
ended the attempt to force
the Government's hand; but
it only set on foot the
Great General Staff's
campaign against the
Chancellor's authority. We
may doubt whether
Hindenburg and Ludendorff
shared Holtzendorff's
anxiety to re‑start an
autumn campaign of
unrestricted submarine
warfare; but it is
absolutely certain that
they had determined to
constitute themselves the
deciding authority on the
whole question. What they
desired and aimed at was
that they might be in a
position to settle the
matter themselves, without
these interminable
discussions, in which the
Chancellor's
considerations of policy
had the same weight as
their own views on the
military position. For
this it was needful to set
up a new fence round the
Chancellor's field of
authority. The first move
in the new game was made
by Hindenburg. His letter
was written only a day
after the Emperor had
conveyed his decision to
Admiral von Holtzendorff.
It was not sent through
Gruenau, although it
appears, from previous
communications, that he
was the official
intermediary; it was
addressed direct to
Bethmann Hollweg, and ran
thus:
"At the meeting in Pless, at the end
of August or the beginning
of September ‑ I cannot
fix the date more closely
‑ I recollect that Your
Excellency said that the
decision whether submarine
warfare should be
intensified rested with
the High Military Command.
Your Excellency only
stipulated that you might
consult the Allies and
announce certain friendly
settlements with other
nations. Your Excellency
has also emphasised the
responsibility of the High
Command on the submarine
question to members of the
Reichstag, although the
actual expressions used
have not been communicated
to me. From numerous
statements that have come
into my possession, I am
of the opinion (which is
shared by wide political
circles) that
responsibility for the
submarine war rests solely
with the High Command.
From the telegram quoted
above, I conceive that
Your Excellency's views on
the question are not what
I had supposed. I
understand your point, but
in order that we may be
quite clear (tatsachlich
festzustellen) how
far responsibility for a
sharpened submarine war
rests with the High
Command, I should be
grateful for an expression
of your opinion."
It
is difficult, at first
sight, to understand how
Hindenburg found it
possible to put the
Chancellor's words in
question. The discussion
at Pless had been very
carefully recorded by
Oct.
1916
MILITARY PRESSURE
Gruenau,
and a copy of his minutes
was doubtless available at
Headquarters. They contain
no syllable which
suggests, even remotely,
that the Chancellor
resigned any part of his
responsibility for
deciding whether
intensified submarine
warfare should, or should
not, be re‑started. How
then could the
Field‑Marshall risk the
statement that he had done
so? The answer is, no
doubt, that the statement
was merely a brief and
convenient expression of
what he regarded as the
result of the debate. As
for the risk of
contradiction, he was not
likely to make much of
that. The minutes of the
Pless conference, however
accurate, could only be a
summary of the
proceedings, and not a
verbatim report of them.
It was, therefore, always
open to any person present
to maintain that more had
actually been said than
appeared on the documents.
The
Chancellor answered
sharply that he had never
said anything of the kind
attributed to him; but he
was less firm on the
challenge to state his
opinion with regard to
responsibility. If the
Emperor ordered
intensified submarine
warfare, doubtless he did
it by virtue of his
authority as military
Commander‑in‑Chief. This,
however, did not dispose
of the question. The
decision itself could not
be taken without first
examining the foreign
affairs of the Empire. "I
hope, therefore, Your
Excellency agrees with my
opinion that, apart from
the immediate
participation of the
Ministry for Foreign
Affairs, a measure of such
importance as that of
unrestricted submarine
warfare ought not to be
decided on without
consultation with the
Imperial Chancellor."
The
strength of the answer lay
in the reminder that only
the Emperor could issue
the necessary orders; but
it is clear that the
Chancellor felt his own
position to be shaken. The
Field‑Marshall was openly
interfering with the
politics of the Empire and
using the Reichstag
parties for his own ends.
Almost simultaneously with
Hindenburg's letter, the
Centre Party passed a
resolution about the
constitutional position of
the Imperial Chancellor in
war, and the connection
between the two was
patent. (Bethmann
Hollweg pp. 127‑8.) On
October
14, therefore, Bethmann
Hollweg telegraphed to
Washington, urging that
the President should be
asked to hasten his first
peace move, as the demand
for unrestricted submarine
warfare was rising. (Bernstorff,
p.
254.)
Four
days later, an Imperial
Council met at Pless. A
proclamation of Polish
independence was agreed
to; but beyond this we
know practically nothing
of what occurred. (Bethmann
Hollweg, p. 95.) If
submarine warfare were
discussed, evidently
nothing was done to bind
the Government to a
consistent line of action;
for after the meeting, as
before it, Holtzendorff
continued to press for
wider powers, regardless
of the diplomatic
situation and of the
Emperor's ruling. Whether
the Chancellor could have
held the military party in
check much longer may be
doubted. In any case, he
shortly became party to a
move which dominated
everything on the
international chess‑board.
6
Ever
since the summer, Baron
Burian, the Foreign
Minister of the
Austro‑Hungarian Empire,
had been warning Berlin
that Austria's war
machinery was running
down; and now, as the
winter was coming on,
bringing with it a
terrible prospect of want
and suffering, he renewed
his representations and
urged that every neutral
State in Europe should be
asked to make a joint move
in favour of peace. (German
Official Documents
relating to the World War
published by the
Carnegie Endowment, p.
1053.) A plan of
the kind had the advantage
that it in no way
obstructed President
Wilson; but rather
assisted him. On the other
hand, joint action between
Norway, Sweden, Holland,
Switzerland and Spain
would not be easily or
quickly arranged; so that,
if speed was what was
wanted, it was doubtful if
anything would be gained.
Bethmann
Hollweg has never given
his whole opinion on the
plan of making an
independent peace move. As
far as one can judge from
his very guarded answers
when he appeared before
the Reichstag Committee of
Inquiry, years later, he
was not averse to it,
though he did not approve
of the method finally
adopted. He was absolutely
certain that there was a
peace party in the British
Cabinet; and he thought,
by some misreading of
diplomatic events, that
Great Britain had made a
"peace feeler" during the
year. He was entirely
mistaken, but it was a
misunderstanding which was
quite widely shared; for
the same assertion is to
be found in Count
Bernstorff's evidence
before the Committee of
Inquiry and in
Hildebrand's Life of
Ballin. The
Chancellor had thus some
reason to think that the
Entente would not reject
peace proposals outright,
if made to them; and
probably on this ground
seconded Baron Burian's
proposal. It seems
strange, at first sight,
that the High Military
Command should have been
in favour of making peace
proposals, yet they
undoubtedly were; and
their motives, though
complex and disingenuous,
were not inconsistent. In
the first place, they
thought that a peace which
put their victories on
record might
Oct.
20, 1916
PEACE PROPOSALS
possibly
be arranged. The German
army had defended itself
successfully on the
Western Front, and
overpowered our latest
Ally, Rumania. If the
German negotiators could
come to the conference
table with such good cards
in their hands, it seemed
inconceivable that they
should not leave it with
most of the tricks to
their score. Behind this
there was another and more
powerful motive. They
completely mistrusted
American mediation. The
assurances that the
President would leave the
belligerents to settle
their claims against one
another, and preside over
an international congress
for preventing war, had
not persuaded them. To
Hindenburg and Ludendorff,
President Wilson seemed
the man who, before all
others, was likely to rob
them of the fruit of their
victories.
Thirdly,
there was the alternative
and much stronger hope
that a breakdown of the
negotiations would put the
Entente Powers in the
wrong and clear away the
last remaining argument
against unrestricted
submarine war. To this
hope the Emperor himself,
as we shall see presently,
was a party.
These
were roughly the sources
out of which the German
peace proposals sprang;
and by October 20 the
matter was settled; for on
that day the Emperor sent
Bethmann Hollweg a highly
sanctimonious letter
telling him to propose
peace to the Entente
Powers.
It
now remained to settle
what conditions of peace
the negotiators should
insist on. This was a very
difficult matter. The
terms desired by the
Austrian and German
Governments were
compatible; but the
demands of the German
Generals were very heavy,
and their attitude was
extremely threatening. (German
official
documents, p. 1053, et
seq.) Their
conditions included a
control of the Belgian
railway and heavy
indemnities both from
Belgium and France; and,
in order to show the
Chancellor that they
really intended to see
these terms enforced,
Hindenburg asked him, by
letter, to state what
minimum conditions he
would insist on at the
conference, even at the
cost of continuing the
war. In the end, agreement
was only reached by
leaving out all mention of
the very large number of
points in dispute and
drawing up the rest in the
vaguest possible language.
Bethmann Hollweg stated,
years later, that he
always looked upon this
list of conditions as a
compromise between the
conflicting views and
ambitions of the parties
in Germany, and that he
never attached any great
importance to them. This
agrees with his answer to
Hindenburg's challenge,
Which he met by saying
that the best terms to be
obtained at a future
conference depended upon
the progress of the
negotiations, and nothing
was to be gained by
binding the Govern. ment
to a particular set of
clauses.
When
finally settled, the
compromise ran thus:
Belgium was to be
evacuated, and was, in
return, to give certain
undefined securities to
Germany; France would be
given back her invaded
provinces, but was to pay
an indemnity, in addition
to which the Briey basin
was to be annexed as a
"frontier rectification."
The greater part of Serbia
was to be given as spoil
to Bulgaria, and the
nucleus which remained was
to be bound by close
economic ties to
Austria‑Hungary.
Montenegro was to
disappear, and be divided
between the dual monarchy
and an independent
Albania. Rumania was
apparently to be treated
less harshly; for no
demands against her are
mentioned except frontier
rectifications at the Iron
Gates and in the Bistritza
valley. Russia was to cede
all provinces occupied by
the German armies, which
were either to be annexed
or set up as independent
States, bound closely to
Germany; the limits of the
autonomous Poland, which
were to be set up, were
not defined even
approximately. The
captured German colonies
were to be returned, with
the exception of Kiao‑chao
and the Japanese
acquisitions in the
Pacific. In order to
compensate Germany for
these losses, Belgium was
to cede her the Congo. All
capitulations in the
Turkish Empire were to
terminate, and Russia was
to be given free passage
through the Straits.
Nothing was settled about
the Russian conquests
south of the Caucasus.
It
was decided that these
conditions should be
rigidly kept secret, and
that not a syllable of
them should be divulged
until a peace conference
had actually been
assembled.
November
was almost out when the
German Note had been
examined and approved by
Austria, Bulgaria and
Turkey. Even then Bethmann
Hollweg still kept it
back, and waited for the
moment when German
victories should have
seemed to reach their
zenith. All through the
month the Rumanian armies
retreated before the
Austro‑Germans, and on
December 6 Bucharest fell.
Two days later Bethmann
Hollweg received a letter
from Field‑Marshall von
Hindenburg telling him
that there was no longer
any objection to issuing
the Peace Note; always
providing that the war was
continued without respite
by land and sea; that
unrestricted submarine
warfare was to be begun at
the end of January; and
that the political leaders
could reckon on
negotiating the kind of
"peace that Germany
needed." This was all
fairly sweeping, but the
condition about submarine
warfare was positively
staggering. The Chancellor
was to negotiate a peace,
with American and neutral
co‑operation, whilst the
Nov.‑Dec.
1916
A LIMITED VIEW
Navy
and army commanders were
preparing for the sinking
of peaceful merchant ships
in violation of the most
solemn diplomatic
engagements; and finally,
at a moment when every
effort had been ostensibly
made to insinuate a
conciliatory feeling into
the affairs of nations,
the Naval High Command was
to be given a free hand to
provoke universal
exasperation and
bitterness. The fact was
that Hindenburg saw no
reason to delay
unrestricted submarine war
now that he had enough
troops to overrun Holland
and Denmark if they
protested against it. To
him the United States was
simply a country without
an army; and the enormous
assistance that she could
give the Entente, without
even landing a soldier in
Europe, was outside the
limits of his vision. He
had made up is mind that
the High Command was to
decide the question, and
his letter was a fresh
reminder of their
determination to take the
matter out of the
Chancellor's hands.
Bethmann Hollweg
understood it so, and
answered more firmly than
he had done before.
"Unrestricted submarine
war can only be started by
withdrawing our
undertakings to America,
Holland, Denmark and
Sweden. Whether such a
withdrawal is possible in
January 1917 can only be
settled after reviewing
the whole situation as it
then stands; no final
decision can be taken now.
If, however, our peace
proposal is rejected, our
attitude on the question
of armed merchant vessels
will be presented with the
greatest energy.
"I should have been grateful had the
High Military Command
presented their proposals
to the Emperor after
consultation with the
political sections of the
Government."
The
implication of these words
is clear: the military
leaders were simply
pressing their views on
the Emperor when they
could get him by himself,
and were doing their
utmost to supersede the
old system of general
discussions in which every
section of the Government
was represented.
The
militarists had to wait
until early in December
before the politicians put
forward "peace proposals."
But when the time came
they could not complain of
the methods adopted.
Bethnann Hollweg in his
speech to the Reichstag,
in which he announced the
opening of negotiations,
took the magnanimous,
imperial, innocent and
minatory tone which was as
like his master as it was
unlike himself. In the
Note to the neutral
intermediaries he dwelt on
the indestructible
strength of Germany and
her Allies, and their
unswerving "conviction
that respect for the
rights of other nations is
not in any degree
incompatible with their
own rights and legitimate
interests"; he added that
"they feel sure that the
propositions which they
would bring forward, and
which would aim at
assuring the existence,
honour and free
development of their
peoples, would be such as
to serve as a basis for
the restoration of a
lasting peace."
In
the Reichstag he repeated
these points, and added
two more, evidently for
the sake of their effect
at home. "In August 1914
our enemies challenged the
superiority of power in a
world war; to‑day we raise
the question of peace,
which is a question of
humanity. The answer which
will be given by our
enemies we await with that
sereneness of mind which
is guaranteed to us by our
external and internal
strength, and by our clear
conscience. If our enemies
decline and wish to take
upon themselves the
world's heavy burden of
all those terrors which
will follow thereupon,
then, even in the least
and humblest homes, every
German heart will burn in
sacred wrath against our
enemies, who are unwilling
to stop human slaughter
because they desire to
continue their plans of
conquest and annihilation.
In a fateful hour we took
a fateful decision. God
will be our judge."
This
voice of the "clear
conscience" is not the
voice of Bethmann Hollweg,
certainly not the voice of
that Bethmann Hollweg who
in August 1914 spoke
candidly of "the wrong
that we have done in
neutral Belgium." Nor
could it be considered a
tactful utterance, suited
to its ostensible purpose.
It invited the question
whether it was in any way
sincere, or only a move in
the game. In England there
were a few who asserted
that it was a genuine
offer, and that we were
bound both by religion and
by our hopeless military
position to accept it. But
here, as in every country
of the Entente, the
opposite view was held by
the great majority. It
was, of course, at that
time a matter of opinion,
or of instinct and the
fighting spirit: it can
now be examined as a
matter of fact. We know
now that the German
generals had pronounced
the military position
hopeless and the national
position desperate; the
admirals had declared that
Germany could only be
saved by a ruthless U‑boat
campaign, which the
politicians, on the other
hand, maintained to mean
"nothing but catastrophe."
We know also that the
naval and military chiefs
had agreed to force on the
U‑boat campaign and in no
circumstances to admit any
yielding. Was Bethmann
Hollweg sincere, though
inconsistent? Was he
trying ‑ was he allowed to
try ‑ by a real offer of
peace, to save Germany
from the deadly dilemma
which he had so clearly
explained to the Kaiser
and his less capable
advisers?
To
begin with the offer
itself: we have already
seen that neither note nor
speech gave any real
offer; what the proposals
were to be was not stated,
nor even hinted at. The
Dec.
1916
DOUBTFUL INTENTIONS
Entente
by responding would accept
the German claims as to
the origin of the war and
the indestructible
strength of the Central
Powers, and they would be
exposed to the risks
involved in refusing the
terms when offered,
however impossible they
proved to be. We know,
however, that Bethmann
Hollweg did think the bait
might take. He
telegraphed, on December
19, to Hindenburg: "I do
not consider it impossible
that our adversaries may
express their readiness to
enter into peace
negotiations with certain
reservations." He goes on
to ask "whether it is
thinkable to make our
consent to an armistice
dependent on such
conditions that the
disadvantage should not be
ours but our enemies'." It
is extraordinary that such
a bait should have seemed
to him sufficiently
attractive; on the
contrary, there was the
remarkable assertion that
the Germans had never
swerved from the
conviction that the rights
of other nations were not
in any degree incompatible
with their own rights and
legitimate interests: to
the friends of Belgium and
Serbia surely not a
convincing statement.
The
explanation is that
Bethmann Hollweg was only
considering possibilities:
it was necessary for him
to be ready to meet any
answer, but the answer for
which he had been
commanded to scheme was,
beyond doubt, a refusal,
and his object, or the
object of the All‑Highest
whom he obeyed, was the
resumption of the U‑boat
war. This statement may
appear to assume an
astonishing inconsistency
in the Kaiser and his
Chancellor, but its truth
is not to be questioned.
In a telegram dated
October 1, 1916, Bethmann
Hollweg protested to
Gruenau against a decision
reported to have been
taken without an agreement
with himself and the
sanction of His Majesty,
and set out the existing
situation. "We have, as
everybody knows, promised
Arnerica to wage the
U‑boat war only in
accordance with the Prize
Regulations. By personal
command of His Majesty,
Count Bernstorff has been
instructed to induce
President Wilson to issue
an appeal for peace.
Provided that Wilson can
be so induced, the
probable rejection of the
appeal by England and her
Allies, while we accept
it, is intended to afford
us a basis upon which we
can morally justify the
withdrawal of our promise
to America before all the
world, and above all
before the European
neutrals, and thus
influence their probable
attitude in the future."
He adds that "before the
situation has been cleared
in that respect," and His
Majesty's commands
received, no U‑boat
campaign can be announced.
In
the face of this document,
can it be doubted that the
German peace offer, as
well as the American one
to be procured by
Bernstorff, was
deliberately planned as a
preliminary to the
ruthless U‑boat campaign?
We
have other evidence, and
it all points in the same
direction. On December 19
Mr. Gerard, the American
Ambassador, arrived in
Copenhagen and saw the
Austrian Ambassador.
Gerard foreshadowed a
peace move from the
American President, the
Pope, and possibly the
King of Spain. He then ‑
and this must clearly have
been in answer to a
question or hint from the
Austrian Ambassador ‑
"laid stress on his
apprehension at the
possible resumption of the
unrestricted submarine
war. In his opinion even
the unconditional
rejection of the peace
offer on the part of the
Entente would not be
sufficient ground for
disregarding on principle
the fundamental
international laws as
hitherto recognised." The
United States, if
provoked, would enter the
war. At the moment when
Mr. Gerard spoke,
President Wilson's Note
had already been received
by the British Government.
It was "in no way prompted
by the recent overtures of
the Central Powers";
indeed, it could not have
been expressed better if
it had been designed to
show up their principal
defect. The President "is
not proposing peace: he is
not even offering
mediation": he is seeking
"to call out from all the
nations now at war an
avowal of their respective
views as to the terms upon
which the war might be
concluded."
Such
an avowal could well be
made by the Entente
Powers: they had only to
ask for restitution
(including
Alsace‑Lorraine),
reparation and guarantees.
But Germany could not avow
her aims, for either they
were incompatible with
these and proved her
guilt, or they were not
incompatible, and
therefore admitted her
guilt. This dilemma had
been perceived by the
Germans as soon as they
received from the Papal
Nuncio the first news of
President Wilson's action.
On December 18 Count
Wedel, the Ambassador at
Vienna, telegraphed to the
Berlin Foreign Office:
"Baron Burian agrees with
Your Excellency, and
considers it probable that
we shall be compelled to
reject. Our reply should,
in his opinion, be so
worded that our tactical
position shall not become
worse, and that the
possibility shall not be
precluded of continuing to
spin the thread." It is
quite clear that what
Germany will be compelled
to reject is the statement
of any proposed terms, the
only thing which the Pope
or the President had
suggested, and the
conclusion is therefore
unavoidable that such a
statement of terms being
impossible for Germany,
her peace offer could not
have been intended to
bring peace - in other
words, it was a tactical
move, an offer made to
clear the situation for
the militarists. The
action
Dec.
1916
THE ALLIES UNANIMOUS
of
the naval and military
chiefs irresistibly
enforces this view.
7
Whilst
the German Note was being
drawn up and settled,
Great Britain had passed
through a political
crisis. On December 4 Mr.
Asquith's Government had
fallen, and Mr. Lloyd
George had formed a new
Cabinet. The "War
Cominittee" (formed on
November 3, 1915) had held
their last meeting on
December 1, 1916; and the
new "War Cabinet" met for
the first time on December
9. It consisted of the new
premier, Lord Curzon, Lord
Milner, Mr. Henderson and
Mr. Bonar Law, and was
given the powers of an
executive council for
prosecuting the war. It
was by this body that
Bethmann Hollweg's Peace
Note was discussed.
Nobody
could guess what concrete
proposals lay behind the
Note; but it was obvious
that the German Government
had no intention of
agreeing to the terms
which we still hoped to
enforce. The War Cabinet
was, indeed, so unanimous
for rejecting the peace
offer that no suggestion
of any other procedure was
even uttered. The only
point upon which opinion
was divided was the method
of rejection. As it was
thought that the Note was
a mere manoeuvre to
influence neutrals, and to
throw the responsibility
for continuing the war
upon the Entente Powers,
the Foreign Office had
been very busy in
obtaining opinions from
the neutral chancelleries
during the week preceding
the discussion in the War
Cabinet.
The
inquiries showed that
there was a very general
feeling in neutral
countries against
rejecting the German offer
outright. The Swedish
Foreign Minister and
Cardinal Gasparri of the
Vatican were specially
emphatic that Germany
ought, at least, to be
asked to state her terms.
In the end it was decided
that a common Allied Note
should be drawn up and
issued from Paris. It was
thought best that France,
who had suffered so
terribly, should be, in
some sort, the Allied
spokesman. Nothing but
rejection was possible;
for since December 12,
when Bethmann Hollweg had
made his announcement in
the Reichstag, Allied
opinion had been
expressing itself in a
very decided fashion. On
December 13 Monsieur
Briand had been cheered
loudly in the French
Chamber when he denounced
the German Peace Note as a
subtle, cunning manoeuvre
to divide the Allies; two
days later M. Pokrovsky,
the Russian Foreign
Minister, made a speech to
the Duma announcing the
Tsar's determination to
fight on and remain
faithful to his Allies;
and apart from these
official declarations,
public feeling was very
decided. One has only to
glance at the daily papers
of that date to realise
the torrent of indignation
which would have
overwhelmed any attempt to
compromise and give the
German offer a further
hearing.
If
Bethmann Hollweg had been
sincere when he said that
he had only agreed to
issue a separate Peace
Note because he distrusted
President Wilson's
procrastinating methods,
he must have regretted his
own impatience. It was
exactly a week after he
had made his speech in the
Reichstag, and only three
days after the British War
Cabinet had seriously
discussed the German Peace
Offer, that the American
proposals were handed in.
For this trivial
anticipation the Imperial
Chancellor had sacrificed
the active collaboration
of the greatest neutral
Power in the world, and
had bitterly disappointed
its President. (Bernstorff,
p.
270.)
His
regret at the bad
manceuvring into which he
had been forced by his
master must have been the
keener in that, at home,
these same violent
influences were passing
out of his control. Some
days after the German
Peace Note had been sent
out, and almost
simultaneously with the
American offer to mediate,
the military authorities
decided to force the
Chancellor's hand finally,
and re‑start unrestricted
submarine warfare
regardless of every other
consideration. What
prompted their decision
has never been
ascertained. It may very
possibly have been the
shortage of food in
Germany and even of
rations at the front
caused by our blockade,
and the dread of the
terrible winter which lay
before them. But when
afterwards
cross‑questioned by the
Reichstag Committee,
Ludendorff said that it
was the French attack at
Verdun on December 15
which decided him. (German
official domments, p.
887.)
The
statement does not stand
examination. The documents
now published show quite
clearly that the High
Command decided, early in
December, to press for
unrestricted submarine war
regardless of peace notes
and diplomatic
negotiations. Now the
second battle of Verdun,
which Ludendorff alleges
was the deciding factor,
began on October 24, and
ended on December 18. Its
results were quite clear
before December began; so
that Ludendorff's
explanation may be an
explanation, but the dates
by which he strove to
support it are wrong. In
order to cover himself he
stated that the French
attack at Verdun began on
December 15, which was
practically the date on
which it ended.
The
available documents throw
no light upon the
question; but they do show
that some exceptionally
severe shock took effect
upon General Headquarters
in the first
Dec.
1916
CIVILIAN MINISTERS YIELDING
part
of December. During the
previous month Hindenburg
and Ludendorff had
discussed conditions of
peace in a way which
showed a complete
confidence in the army's
power to enforce the harsh
terms they desired to see
imposed. In January the
Field‑Marshall stated that
the military position
could "hardly be worse
than it is now." (German
official documents, p.
1319.) The French
victory at Verdun is no
explanation for such a
change of outlook.
Doubtless it came as a
painful blow to German
Headquarters to see their
troops hurled in confusion
from the heights which
they had gained at such
awful cost in the earlier
part of the year; but they
must have known perfectly
well that the French
victory was local and
without any large
strategical significance.
It does not explain the
FieldMarshall's new
attitude; and nobody can
read through the mass of
materials now published
without getting a strong
impression that some set
of facts, probably the
facts of our blockade and
the rapidly growing
destitution of the central
nations, came before
Ludendorff's notice in the
early part of December
with a force which
impressed upon him the
urgent conviction that he
must lose no time.
On
December 20, when the
Imperial Chancellor was
carefully watching the
effects of his Peace Note
upon neutral opinion and
waiting for the next move
in the diplomatic game,
the Foreign Office
representative at Pless,
Lersner, transmitted a
telegram from Ludendorff
to Zimmermann and Bethmann
Hollweg. The message was
singularly brief, and
stated simply that the
Quartermaster‑General
considered that Mr. Lloyd
George's speech in the
House of Commons was
equivalent to a rejection
of the German proposals,
and that "as a result of
the impressions I have
received on the Western
Front, I am of opinion
that submarine warfare
should now be launched
with the greatest vigour."
(Ibid., p. 1199,
et seq.) Zimmermann
saw that the message was
serious, and answered it
at once. He begged Lersner
to keep a "steady pulse
and a cool head," and to
inform Ludendorff that the
whole question must stand
over until a formal answer
to the German peace
proposals had been
received. It was clear,
however, that the civilian
ministers were giving way;
for, as a sop to the
military leaders, a
promise was given that the
American Government was
shortly to be told that
armed merchantmen would be
torpedoed at sight. The
undertaking must have
caused the utmost
misgiving to Zimmermann
and Bethmann Hollweg, for
Count Bernstorff had
already told his
Government that such a
measure would be almost
fatal; and when he got the
message, he repeated his
warning.
Lersner
strove conscientiously to
do his duty . He pointed
out "the extraordinary
responsibility which the
Supreme Command was taking
upon itself with regard to
the Emperor, the people
and the Army, by this
precipitate insistence";
and made a last effort to
show what war with America
would mean. No compromise
or concession satisfied
the generals; they were
determined now to give the
Entente no time to reply
to the Peace Note in
either sense. On December
22 Holtzendorff had once
more, in a detailed
memorandum to Hindenburg,
given urgent reasons for
adopting the unrestricted
U‑boat campaign. Without
this method, he said,
England would not be
effectively starved, and,
"further, the
psychological elements of
fear and panic would be
lacking." Hindenburg
accordingly telegraphed
next day to the
Chancellor. "The
diplomatic and military
reparations for the
unrestricted submarine war
should be begun now, so
that it may for certain
set in at the end of
January."
Bethmann
Hollweg himself replied to
this, pointing out once
more that the position
must first be made clear
with regard to America.
This could not be done
until the Entente had
given a formal reply to
the German peace offer.
"At present nobody can
foresee what it will be.
In all probability it will
be negative, but might
nevertheless leave a
loophole. We must not
close this. This would
happen should we begin
action .... before
the receipt of the reply.
Thereby the political
success we have achieved
through our peace
offer .... would be
seriously impaired. Even
now, we meet with the
assumption that we got up
the whole peace action mala
fide and merely as a
way of working up to the
unrestricted submarine
war." A bad impression had
also been produced by the
German Press, which, like
Ludendorff, had replied to
Lloyd George's speech and
Wilson's Note with an
immediate "cry for the
submarines."
On
December 26, after
Ludendorfl had revived the
old falsehood about the
decision come to on August
31, Hindenburg sent
Bethmann Hollweg his
ultimatum. It was simply
to let the Chancellor know
that he intended to get
his own way. Bethmann
Hollweg probably saw that
the end had come; but as
the necessary orders could
only be sent out by the
Emperor, the final step
could not be taken until a
conference had been
assembled. He therefore
promised to go to Pless in
a few days.
In
the meantime, he had
received two urgent
communlcations. One was a
memorandum from
Falkenhayn, which
Dec.
26, 1916-Jan. 7, 1917
REAL GERMAN AIMS
throws
a glaring light on the
untrustworthiness of the
German peace terms as
drawn up, but not even yet
divulged. England, it is
argued, is as much bound
as Germany to carry on the
war to the bitter end: the
fear that she will be
"driven to extremes" lacks
all substance. "Just as
for us the war must be
declared lost if the entry
of Belgium into our
'concern' is not enforced,
England loses it if she
has to allow such a
transfer." This point is
made doubly plain. "No
doubt can exist that the
country must remain at our
disposal as a strategical
area for protection of the
most important German
industrial district and as
Hinterland for our
position on the Flanders
coast, which is
indispensable to our
maritime importance." The
Kaiser was of the same
opinion, but for a
different and very
characteristic reason. On
January 2 he declared to
Gruenau that "after
rejecting our efforts for
the third time, King
Albert could not be
allowed to return to
Belgium; the coast of
Flanders must become
ours."
The
other correspondent was
Admiral von Holtzendorff,
who at Hindenburg's
request had circulated a
written statement of his
views, to which he
attached a memorandum
showing the facts upon
which they were based. It
may be said that this
document was drawn up by
persons not competent to
judge of the matter; but
it was in form a closely
reasoned statement, based
on an enormous array of
statistics. Bethmann
Hollweg, it would seem,
had not read it before,
and the time at his
disposal was too short to
allow him to have it
thoroughly examined by
experts. He did what he
could to get an
independent opinion, by
passing it on to
Helfferich; but it was not
until January 9 that the
Minister of the Interior
gave his views. They were
a repetition of what he
had said at Pless in
August: Admiral von
Holtzendorff's forecast
about bringing Great
Britain to her knees by
destroying four million
tons of shipping in five
months was pure
speculation, and any
method of calculation
which left American
resources out of the
reckoning was radically
unsound.
Between
December 26, when the
Chancellor promised to
come to Pless, and the
date of the final
decision, the German
Government received a
formal notification that
the Entente Powers had
rejected their Peace Note.
The Austrian Government
now made a desperate
effort to keep the
negotiations alive, and on
January 2 the Emperor Karl
sent a personal appeal to
his Ally. The reply to it
was not encouraging; but
the Austrian Government
persevered; and, four days
later, Count Czernin had a
conference with Prince
Hohenlohe, Bethmann
Hollweg, Zimmermann and
the Under-Secretary of
State, von Stumm. (Baron
Burian resigned his post
as Minister for Foreign
Affairs on December 22,
1916, and Count Czernin
was appointed in his
stead.)
He
probably saw that it was
useless to press for fresh
negotiations, and so,
beyond recording his
opinion that the war must
end in a compromise, he
confined himself to the
matter immediately in
debate, which was simply
how the Entente's last
Note could best be
answered. It was agreed
that a reply should be
sent to the United States
and to all the neutral
Powers of Europe, and a
draft was accordingly
drawn up. There the matter
rested; and three days
later, on January 8, the
Chancellor travelled to
Pless for the final
discussion on the future
conduct of the war. Just
before he arrived, the
military leaders and
Admiral von Holtzendorff
met for a preliminary
conference. Determined as
they had always been to
have their own way, they
seem to have been appalled
at what they now intended
to do. The notes of the
meeting, rough and laconic
as they are, read like the
records of a conspiracy.
Those present had made up
their minds; but they were
deeply moved. Holtzendorff
read out the orders to the
submarine fleet and the
notification to the
American Government, and
went on to say that the
Emperor had "no real
conception of the
position." The meeting
then came to the real
point: would the
Chancellor agree? The
minutes of proceedings
show best how the
discussion proceeded: (German
official
documents, p. 1317.)
Holtzendorff: The Chancellor arrives
here to‑morrow.
Hindenburg: What are his troubles?
Holtzendorff: The Chancellor wishes to
keep in his own hands the
diplomatic preparation of
the unrestricted U‑boat
war in order to keep the
United States out of it.
The Chancellor had
characterised the Note
with regard to armed
steamships as a U‑boat
trap which would bring on
the conflict with the
United States.
Ludendorff: But the Chancellor knew
all that.
Holtzendorff: The Foreign Office
thinks that if the United
States came in, South
America would come into
the war too. And, besides
this, they are thinking
about the times which will
follow the conclusion of
peace.
Hindenburg: We must conquer first.
Ludendorff: To characterise the Note
concerning firing on armed
steamers as a U‑boat trap
is just another attempt to
put the matter off.
Holtzendorff: What shall we do if the
Chancellor does not join
us?
Hindenburg: That is just what I am
racking my brain about.
Jan.
8‑9, 1917
THE LAST CONFERENCE
Holtzendorff: Then you must become
Chancellor.
Hindenburg: No, I cannot do that and I
will not do it; cannot
deal with the Reichstag.
Holtzendorff: In my opinion, Buelow
and Tirpitz are out of the
question on account of
their relations with the
Emperor.
Ludendorff: I would not try to
persuade Hindenburg.
Hindenburg: I cannot talk in the
Reichstag. I refuse. What
about Dallwitz?
Ludendorff: You mean whether he wants
the U‑boat war at all?
Holtzendorff: The Chancellor has the
confidence of foreign
nations to a great extent.
Hindenburg: Well, we shall hold
together, anyway. It
simply must be. We are
counting on the
possibility of war with
the United States, and
have made all preparations
to meet it. Things cannot
be worse than they are
now. The war must be
brought to an end by the
use of all means as soon
as possible.
Holtzendorff: Again, His Majesty has
no real conception of the
situation or of the
feeling among his own
people.
Ludendorff: That is true.
Holtzendorff: People and the army are
crying for the
unrestricted U‑boat war.
Ludendorff: That is true.
Holtzendorff: Secretary of State
Helfferich said to me:
"Your method leads to
ruin." I answered him:
"You are letting us run
headlong into ruin."
Early
next day the Chancellor
arrived. What happened is
best told in his own
words. (Bethmann
Hollweg, Vol. II., p.
137.) "With all
these thoughts in my mind,
I came to the general
conference. It was held in
the Emperor's presence on
the evening of the 9th,
and the atmosphere was
just as charged as it had
been during the forenoon
when I discussed the
matter, by myself, with
the High Command. I felt
that I was dealing with
men who no longer intended
to discuss the decisions
they had made. I certainly
thought the help which
America could give to our
enemies was higher than
the High Command imagined
it to be; but after the
Entente's answer to our
Peace Note, I could not
suggest fresh
negotiations .... I
thought of resigning; but
that would have altered
nothing. The Supreme
Command were now my
political and personal
opponents .... and
within his heart the
Emperor was on their side.
Had I opposed the
decision, the crisis of
July 1917 would have
occurred six months
earlier. A submarine
war‑chancellor would have
been found all the
earlier, in that he would
have taken office at the
desire of the great
majority of the nation, of
its representatives, of
the army and the navy. I
had no thought of saving
myself; my only duty was
not to obstruct a decision
which could not be
avoided; It was just
because I feared to do so
by resigning on January 9,
that I remained In
office." These words sound
like the man himself, and
they agree with what the
reporter to the conference
noted down:
"Chancellor:
The prospects for
unrestricted submarine
warfare are, doubtless,
very favourable ....
but it must be admitted
that they cannot be
demonstrated by proof. Submarine
warfare is the last card.
We are making a very
serious‑decision; but if
the military authorities
consider it essential, I
am not in a position to
contradict them." In this
manner the last step was
taken. Fatal as the
decision was, it had been
inevitable from the very
beginning of the debate.
This is made clear by
every document now
available. By December 26
the last hope of common
sense had disappeared.
Hindenburg had changed his
tactics: he no longer
asserted that the
Chancellor agreed with
him, he simply accepted
his disagreement and
telegraphed his intention
of disregarding it. "I
must state that although
Your Excellency in your
capacity as Imperial
Chancellor certainly
claims the exclusive
responsibility, in full
consciousness of my
responsibility for a
victorious issue of the
war, I shall naturally use
all my endeavour to see
that all I consider proper
will be done from the
military side."
He
followed this on December
31 with a rebuke on the
subject of the peace
terms. "Your Excellency's
statement on the 29th that
it might not be possible
for us to retain the
mining districts of Briey
has filled me with doubt
as to Your Excellency's
fundamental standpoint."
This latter and the
reasonable reply which it
drew from the Chancellor
confirm the view that
Bethmann Hollweg stood
contrasted with the imperators
real or titular as
the one mind whose lines
of thought were such as to
be intelligible to those
of non-Germanic birth and
education.
But
he, a mere civilian, could
not face army, navy and
Kaiser acting in concert.
Admiral Scheer was now
moving: in great anxiety
lest the same concession
as before should be made
to America, he was sending
a representative ‑ Captain
von Leventzow ‑ to Berlin
to convey an urgent
warning against "such a
middle course." This
emissary saw Bethmann
Hollweg on January 8, and
the same date stands at
the head of a telegram to
the Chancellor from
Hindenburg at
Jan.
1917
A STRANGE PROCEEDING
Pless.
"I have the honour to
inform Your Excellency
that, according to the
military situation, the
intensified submarine war
can and therefore should,
begin on February 1." Next
day Holtzendorff, Admiral
Scheer tells us, convinced
His Majesty also. This
formality covered the
actual decision which had
been made by Hindenburg:
the procedure was
completed by a telegraphic
order "sent by the
All‑Highest to the Chief
of the Naval Staff " ‑ who
either had or had not just
left his presence. "I
command that the
unrestricted U‑boat
campaign shall begin on
February 1, in full
force .... the
fundamental plans of
operation are to be
submitted to me."
It
is more than probable that
the Kaiser's histrionic
powers enabled him to
believe in this command as
the issue of his own will;
and there can be no doubt
that it was in no way
discordant with his own
wishes. But the method of
staging is illuminated by
the following telegram
sent by Lersner, the
Secretary at Pless
(Headquarters), and marked
as "only for the Imperial
Chancellor and the
Secretary of State! "
"His
Majesty has received a
large number of telegrams
of assent and devotion in
reply to his proclamation,
to the German people. In
strict confidence, I hear
that Field-Marshall von
Hindenburg and General
Ludendorff are responsible
for a great number of
these, in order to show
the world how unanimous
all Germany is in its
loyalty to the Emperor.
His Majesty has expressed
himself highly pleased at
these marks of homage.
Their widest publication
in the Press would, in my
humble opinion, cause His
Majesty much pleasure."
On
the very day when the
decision was taken at
Pless, the British
Government replied to the
American Peace Note.
President
Wilson had not offered his
mediation in the way that
Colonel House had
foreshadowed at the
beginning of the year;
indeed, he had not offered
mediation at all, but had
simply suggested that both
parties at war should let
him know what terms of
peace they would be ready
to accept, and left it to
be understood that he
would see whether the
conditions of each side
could not, after all, be
reconciled. (Note
Communicated by the United
States Ambassador,
December 20, 1916. [Cd.
8431.] MiscelIaneous.
No. 39 (1916).)
The
War Cabinet were evidently
quite convinced that
President Wilson's real
intentions had completely
changed since Colonel
House's visit in January.
The President had then
offered his assistance on
conditions; in December
the British Cabinet's
chief anxiety was to
decide whether, if the
Allied Powers declined the
invitation and said that
the time to publish their
peace terms had not
arrived, the President
would then undertake to
coerce us, and, if so,
what measures would h
etake? It was a very
serious question. The
Federal Reserve Board had
recently stepped in and
stopped the raising of a
further Allied Loan, and
the President had been
given powers to retaliate
against those blockade
measures which had caused
most irritation. By virtue
of a resolution passed by
Congress early in the
year, he could refuse
clearance to Allied
vessels in American ports
as a reprisal against our
"Black List" measures.
Similar measures with
regard to munitions and
materials for our munition
factories would leave us
in a very serious
position. So far as we
could tell, the American
public would support the
President if he decided to
compel us to come to terms
with the Central Powers.
The danger was, if
anything, greater than we
knew. For whilst the
British Government were
discussing the Note, Mr.
Gerard, the American
Ambassador at Berlin, was
assuring Baron Burian, in
an official interview,
that the United States
Government were quite
prepared to "force the
peace" by preventing the
Entente Powers from
obtaining munitions and
food, if their terms of
peace obstructed the
President's negotiations.
(German official
documents, p. 1084.)
Lord
Robert Cecil laid his
views before the
Government in a written
memorandum. As Minister of
Blockade he had
exceptional facilities for
gauging neutral opinion.
He advised complying with
the American Note and
giving the President no
excuse at all for applying
compulsion. Whether he
would take the drastic
steps which Congress had
authorised was doubtful;
but, if he was
disappointed in our reply,
he might quite well
combine with other
neutrals in questioning
the legality of our
blockade. "Very little
encouragement from America
would make the Governments
of Sweden and Holland
impossible to deal with.
When an atmosphere of
irritation had been caused
by measures of this
description, the President
would feel himself strong
enough to proceed to much
more drastic measures."
Lord Robert Cecil's views
prevailed; but the details
of our answer still
remained to be settled.
How should our war aims be
defined? To draw up a list
of the conditions of peace
which each of the Entente
Powers desired was
obviously undesirable, and
it would require very
skilful draughtsmanship to
state them definitely
enough to meet the
President's request, and,
at the same time, to avoid
any controversial details
which might possibly
excite disagreement
Jan.
10, 1917
THE ALLIED REPLY
between
the Allies. This very
difficult task was under
taken by Monsieur Briand,
the French Premier, Mr.
Balfour, the British
Foreign Minister under the
new Government, and by
Monsieur Berthelot, a high
permanent official at the
Quai d'Orsay. It was not
until January 10 that the
answer was delivered. (Reply
of
the Allied Governments to
the Note communicated by
the United States
Ambassador on December 20,
1916. [Cd. 8486.]
Miscellaneous. No. 5
(1917), and Despatch
to His Majesty's
Ambassador at Washington
respecting the Allied Note
of January 10, 1917. [Col.
8439.] Miscellaneous.
No. 3 (1917).) After
expressing
gratitude for the
President's good offices,
the Allied Governments
objected, with some
energy, to the sentences
in the American Note which
stated that "the objects
which the Statesmen of the
belligerents on both sides
have in mind in this war
are virtually the same,"
and then stated their
terms. Belgium, Serbia and
Montenegro were to be
returned; France was to
receive back her invaded
districts; and "provinces
formerly won from the
Allies by force, against
the wishes of the
inhabitants," were to be
restored; Italians,
Czechs, Rumanians, and
Slavs under foreign
domination were to be
freed from it; and the
"bloody tyranny" of the
Turks expelled from
Europe.
In
order to make our
standpoint perfectly
clear, our official answer
was supplemented by a
special note from Mr.
Balfour to the American
President. With striking
lucidity and power the
British Foreign Minister
explained the real
difference between the
American attitude and
ours. To us the
territorial rearrangements
foreshadowed in our Note
were the essential basis
of peace, and President
Wilson's scheme of general
pacification must come
after they had been
imposed on the Central
Powers. The weakness of
both Notes was that
nothing in the actual
military situation
suggested that the Entente
would be able to enforce
such terms within a
calculable time. The
position in Russia was
getting steadily worse.
Transport was breaking
down, large masses of the
army were starving, and
provisions in the capital
were becoming as scarce as
though the town were
besieged. Similar signs of
weakness were showing
themselves in Italy. If,
with the Alliance at its
full strength, we had
failed to protect France,
Belgium, Serbia,
Montenegro and Rumania
from invasion, it was
hardly likely that we
should succeed in
extending their frontiers
when our military strength
was declining. If it was
hoped that our answer
would impress America with
our confidence in the
justice of our cause and
our determination to fight
the war to a victorious
finish, the Note failed.
Colonel House told Count
Bernstorff that President
Wilson called it "a piece
of bluff" which he did not
take seriously. (Bernstorff,
p. 319.)
It
had been decided, at
Pless, that unrestricted
submarine war was to begin
on February 1; there were
thus three weeks left to
clear the board for the
last phase of the game. On
January 16 Count
Bernstorff received his
instructions. He was to
keep silent about what the
German Government intended
to do until January 31,
and then announce that
unrestricted submarine
warfare was to begin on
the following day. The
German Ambassador knew
that the President did not
think that the Entente's
Note debarred him from
continuing his attempt at
mediation; he therefore
strove to mitigate what he
could no longer prevent,
and urged that neutral
vessels should be given a
month to get out of the
danger zone without fear
of being attacked. (German
official documents, pp.
1108, et seq.)
He proposed also that the
submarine campaign should
be postponed until the
President's negotiations
had gone a little further.
Both his suggestions were
rejected without
discussion.
During
the whole month President
Wilson strove untiringly
to clear away the
obstacles which still
obstructed his mediation.
As the Entente had
announced their peace
conditions, and the German
Government had kept theirs
secret, he endeavoured to
clear the matter up, and
pressed for the German
terms to be communicated.
The authorities at Berlin
were very reluctant to
comply with this request,
for they feared that by
doing so they would give
him an opportunity of
acting as a sort of
arbitrator between the
belligerents. Realising,
however, that this was
rather a fine point, as
they reckoned to be at war
with America in a few
weeks, the terms were
eventually sent to Count
Bernstorff, with
instructions to
communicate them to the
President confidentially.
(Ibid., P. 1048.) The
concession had no effect,
for the telegram was only
sent to Washington two
days before the German
Ambassador announced that
the new submarine campaign
was going to begin at
once.
On
January 22 President
Wilson addressed the
Senate about his peace
negotiations. (Scott,
President Wilson's
Foreign Policy, p.
250.) He still
hoped that they could be
continued, and spoke in
his vague, guarded way
about guarantees for
future peace, whilst, at
the same time, disclaiming
any wish to intervene
directly between the
Powers at war. Certain
passages were much
discussed in Germany at a
later time, but the points
in debate seem of no
importance at all in view
of what actually happened
a week
Feb.-
April 1917
AMERICA AT WAR
later.
At five o'clock in the
afternoon of January 31
Count Bernstorff carried
out his orders. The
announcement was received
so quietly by Mr. Lansing,
the Secretary of State,
that it is almost certain
he had guessed what was
coming. On February 3
President Wilson told
Congress that he had
severed diplomatic
relations with Germany,
and on the evening of the
same day, Count Bernstorff
received his passports. (Bernstorff,
p. 324.) The
American President was at
the time uncertain whether
public opinion required
more of him than this; he
still hoped to get out of
declaring war by
proclaiming an "armed
neutrality which we shall
know how to maintain, and
for which there is
abundant precedent."
(Scott, President
Wilson's Foreign Policy,
p. 260, et seq.) On
April 3, when he saw from
the progress of the
submarine campaign that
what he proposed was quite
inadequate, he asked
Congress to declare war.
CHAPTER VIII
THE MEDITERRANEAN. JANUARY TO AUGUST 1917
1
Submarine Warfare, January to May 1917
THE
difficulties and
disadvantages which beset
a mixed command at sea
have been repeatedly
exemplified in Naval
History: it was not likely
that they could be
altogether eliminated from
our campaign against the
German submarines in the
Mediterranean. Three
Allies were necessarily
involved, and by the
system adopted the whole
sea was divided between
them in zones of control,
co‑ordinated but
independent. Around the
coasts of Algeria and
Tunis was a French zone,
and the patrol of the
areas west and south of
Greece was also under
French orders; for the
protection of the routes
between Malta and Egypt
and in the whole of the
Aegean Great Britain was
in command; in the waters
east, west and south of
Italy the Italians were
responsible.
Plan - The Patrol Zones in the
Mediterranean
The
hazards involved in this
arrangement were not
overlooked. Even in Home
Waters the division of the
coast patrol into separate
commands had already in
some cases led to
difficulties; in the
Mediterranean the
differences of
nationality, language and
outlook would all
interfere with a perfect
co‑operation, but the
protection of each part of
the coastal lines of
traffic could not be
easily managed otherwise
than by the nation to whom
that portion of the coast
belonged, and gaps in such
protection should occur,
if at all, only at the
frontier between one
country and another. For
the wide stretches of sea
which vessels on ocean
voyages must cross ‑ such,
for instance, as those
between Messina and Egypt
or between Marseilles and
Salonica ‑ protection
could be afforded only by
patrolling a fixed route
or attaching a direct
escort, provided by the
countries through whose
zones the vessel passed.
Here another difficulty
must be faced. The number
of patrol craft capable of
accompanying merchant
vessels on long ocean
voyages was manifestly too
small to provide an escort
for every steamer, and all
that
Feb.
1917
DANTON TORPEDOED
could
be done would be to make
such use of them as seemed
fron, time to time most
advantageous.
In
the result, vessels of the
highest importance, such
as troop transports and
ammunition ships, were
directly escorted by
destroyers for their whole
voyage when arrangements
could be made; but
occasionally, when such
vessels crossed from one
zone to another, the
arrangements broke down.
In February an Italian
troop transport, the Minas,
proceeding from Italy for
Salonica, was lost as the
result of an international
misunderstanding. She was
escorted by an Italian
destroyer as far as the
limit of the British zone;
there, in the expectation
that the transport would
be met by British
destroyers sent out from
Malta, her escort turned
back. But Admiral Ballard
at Malta had not been
given to understand that
she would need British
escort; he sent none, and
the transport went on
alone, to be torpedoed and
sunk by a submarine, with
the loss of 870 lives.
This
disastrous failure in
co‑operation brought to a
head the feeling that the
arrangements for escort
and patrol throughout the
Mediterranean should be
centralised under one
command. This could only
be done by consent of the
three Powers concerned,
and steps were taken to
secure an international
conference of the naval
authorities in the
Mediterranean which should
discuss this and the other
related questions of
routes and anti‑submarine
measures. To fix the time
and place for a meeting of
men so strenuously
occupied as the Allied
Admirals was naturally a
long affair; but
ultimately it was arranged
that the conference should
take place at Corfu at the
end of April.
Meanwhile,
the sinkings of Allied
shipping in the
Mediterranean continued to
be heavy. In February
fifty ships, amounting to
a total of 101,000 tons,
were lost. In March the
destruction was a little
less ‑ thirty‑six ships of
72,000 tons; but among
them was the French
battleship Danton,
sunk by U.64,
under Commander Morath.
The Danton was
zigzagging and was under
escort of one destroyer;
nevertheless, the
submarine was able to put
two torpedoes into her,
and the great battleship
sank in three‑quarters of
an hour. The escorting
destroyer caught sight of
U.64's periscope,
gave chase and dropped
depth charges; but the
submarine dived deeply and
escaped unhurt. For the
remainder of her
fortnight's cruise U.64
passed to the western
basin of the
Mediterranean, where,
close to the shores of
Sicily, she sank two
defensively armed British
merchantmen and three
Italian sailing vessels
before returning to
Cattaro.
Apart
from the question of
zones, the actual method
of traffic protection in
force in the Mediterranean
‑ a fixed patrolled route
between the major ports ‑
had early in the year been
discredited by the
Admiralty, and they had
approached the French
Ministry of Marine with a
view to substituting for
it the principle of
dispersal where wide
stretches of open sea must
unavoidably be crossed. By
the scheme now proposed
each vessel would have a
track of its own, which
would not be patrolled,
and the patrols would be
concentrated in those
narrow waters where focal
points could not be
avoided. While the matter
was still under
consideration by the
French, the Admiralty
decided to make trial of
the scheme by putting it
into force with British
ships in the eastern basin
of the Mediterranean. From
January 15 onward our
ships did not follow the
fixed patrolled routes
between Egypt and Salonica
or Malta, but sailed
independently each on a
track prescribed for it by
the British naval
authorities. The fixed
route was still patrolled
by British forces, though
it was used only by
non‑British vessels.
Dispersal on unpatrolled
routes was not followed by
large losses; in fact, in
the first six weeks of its
adoption only four British
vessels were lost in the
Mediterranean east of
Malta, all of them
torpedoed without warning,
a fate from which the
presence of the patrols
would probably have been
unable to save them.
In
the latter half of
February and the first few
days of March losses had
been particularly heavy on
the route along the coast
of Algeria, which was
patrolled by French small
craft; in fact, it was
only on that route that
any steamships were lost
in the western basin. The
principle at that time was
for vessels, not
defensively armed, to
navigate close to the
shore; and, if a submarine
was known to be on the
route, they were to be
under way at night only,
anchoring in some port of
refuge from dawn till
dusk. The rule was
certainly effective in
saving unarmed ships, but
between February 20 and
March 3 seven defensively
armed vessels were
torpedoed without warning
while under way in the
daytime. The six
successful encounters
between submarines and
armed merchant vessels
which took place on the
same route during that
interval were also fought
in daylight.
The
Admiralty now decided to
abandon the Algerian coast
route and to try the
system of routes dispersed
over the whole
Mediterranean. From March
7 onward British merchant
vessels leaving Gibraltar
for Malta Channel hugged
the Spanish coast in
daylight as far as Cape
San Antonio, whence,
making their offing at
dusk, they proceeded on
Feb.‑Apr.
1917
DISPERSING TRAFFIC
varying
courses prescribed for
them by the naval
authorities at Gibraltar.
The same principle was
enforced by the Senior
Naval Officer, Malta, on
west‑bound traffic. Each
ship had its own track,
and each track was a large
zigzag. so arranged that
the ship was never less
than thirty miles from the
African coast till south
of Sardinia. The object of
giving each ship a
different zigzag track was
that if one were met by a
submarine the enemy would
have to wait a long time
before another vessel came
up to him. Formerly, when
all ships followed the
same track, a submarine
had often several vessels
in sight, and the finding
of one endangered all on
the route. The new method,
although it applied to
British armed vessels
only, seemed to be proving
effective, and no more of
them were sunk in the
western basin during
March. That there were
still submarines on the
Algerian coast route was
proved by the loss of a
tug, three encounters
between French patrol
vessels and submarines,
and a duel in which a
French armed merchantman
drove her assailant off.
On
the dispersed routes east
of Malta three British
vessels were sunk in
March, all torpedoed
without warning, and there
were other losses in the
focal area off Alexandria,
which after a peaceful
interval of sixty‑eight
days was once more raided
by the enemy. The
submarine was U.63.
From Cattaro she seems to
have gone directly south
to communicate with the
disaffected tribes on the
west border of Egypt, and
she was sighted off
Alexandria first on March
24. In the course of the
following week she
torpedoed without warning
two British ships within
fifteen miles of
Alexandria, and destroyed
an Egyptian sailing vessel
by gunfire. The second of
the two British ships was
a collier on passage from
Alexandria for Port Said,
and was under escort of
four auxiliary patrol
vessels. Neither she nor
they saw anything of the
submarine. The other
patrol vessels based on
Alexandria were engaged in
guarding the French fixed
route between Alexandria
and the east point of
Crete.
Whatever
effort the German
submarine service had made
in February and March, it
was intensified in April,
when every boat that could
be got to sea went out to
the attack. At least
twenty‑four separate
cruises can be traced in
the Mediterranean,
amounting altogether to
twice as many hours as in
March. Whereas in Home
Waters the number of
steamers destroyed in
April was practically the
same as in March, (One
hundred and fifteen in
March, 119 in April.)
in the Mediterranean it
was increased threefold,
and the tonnage sunk in
that sea represented a
quarter of the losses for
the month throughout the
whole world.
Two
cruises are worth
examining in some detail.
Lieut.-Commander Walter
Hans in U.52
proceeded from Cattaro at
the end of March for
Germany. To the westward
of Malta he destroyed two
Italian sailing vessels,
and then on April 4
appeared off Genoa. The
Italian liner Ravenna,
with 180 passengers on
board, found herself
torpedoed without warning,
and a few hours later the
United States steamship Missourian
saw and avoided the
track of an approaching
torpedo. The submarine
came to the surface and
fired a round, whereupon
the Missourian was
surrendered, to be sunk by
a few shells at close
range.
Proceeding
westward along the coast
route, Lieut.‑Commander
Hans shortly before
midnight observed a large
vessel steaming towards
Marseilles: she had all
lights out, but was
clearly visible in the
light of the full moon.
She was the Ellerman liner
City of Paris
with a general cargo from
India and thirteen
passengers on board, and
she had been following the
prescribed route along the
Italian coast. In
accordance with the
regulations for navigation
in the Mediterranean, any
vessel sighting a
submarine made a wireless
report, with the code word
"Allo" as a prefix; the
message was repeated by
all shore stations near,
and any vessel taking it
in had to sheer out to sea
so as to avoid the area in
which the submarine had
been seen. The City of
Paris took in
several "Allo" messages,
and by successive
alterations of course was
now some fifty miles south
of Nice. Unfortunately,
her manoeuvres, instead of
saving her, had brought
her to the enemy, who
stopped her with a
torpedo. The crew and
passengers boarded the
boats in good order. The
submarine then came up to
them, and Lieut.‑Commander
Hans demanded the captain
as his prisoner. Unable to
find him, he fired four
shells into the still
floating steamer, and
finally sank her with
another torpedo. The City
of Paris
several times before
sinking had signalled her
position; but no help came
for thirty‑six hours. The
French patrols at last
found three boats; in them
were twenty‑nine of the
crew, lascars, dead from
cold. Another boat, with
twelve on board, all dead,
drifted ashore after four
days, and two more boats
were never found. Out of
the crew and passengers in
the City of Paris
122 perished.
Meanwhile,
Lieut.‑Commander Hans had
gone in towards Cannes;
there in the offing he
sank an Italian sailing
vessel. Continuing
westward along the coast,
he cruised between April 7
and 10 off the shores of
Catalonia. Here he sank
three steamers ‑ one
American, one Italian, one
French ‑
March‑April,
1917
CRUISE OF U.35
stopped
and released a Greek
steamer, was fired on by a
French patrol boat, and
missed with a torpedo a
British armed merchant
vessel. On the 11th he
made a wireless signal
which enabled the
direction‑finding stations
to fix his position at
that moment. He did not
remain off Catalonia, but
proceeded southward on his
journey towards Gibraltar.
Before he reached the
Straits on the 13th he
sank two more steamers,
one Danish, and one a
defensively armed British
vessel, torpedoed without
warning. One other of this
class engaged the
submarine; but the ancient
gun with which she was
armed broke down at the
first round, and she
escaped only under cover
of the screen formed by
the smoke‑producing boxes
with which merchant
vessels were now
frequently supplied. U.52
passed the Straits of
Gibraltar during the night
of April 13‑14, and was
back in Germany a
fortnight later. Outside
Lisbon she sank a Greek
steamer, and off
Finisterre torpedoed a
british armed merchant
vessel without warning.
These with some sailing
vessels gave her a total
for the voyage of 33,172
tons destroyed in the
Mediterranean and 7,792
tons in the Atlantic.
The
other cruise to be
examined is that of
Lieut.-Commander von
Arnauld in U.35.
He also left Cattaro at
the end of March, and his
voyage was to prove the
longest and most
successful yet undertaken
by a Mediterranean
submarine solely for
commerce destruction. He
first appeared close to
the south coast of Sicily,
where he sank a British
defensively armed steamer
without warning.
Proceeding westward to the
south of Sardinia, he
engaged another British
steamer with gunfire, and
though she replied with
her gun and used her
smoke‑producing apparatus,
she was forced to
surrender and give up her
captain as prisoner. A
cinematograph operator on
board the submarine took a
record of the scene. Next
evening U.35 sank
an American sailing ship;
and two days later, in the
same district, engaged for
three hours the British
armed steamer Maplewood,
securing her surrender
after the expenditure of
over one hundred rounds.
The steamer's gun was
never within range, and
though she fired two
hundred shells, none of
them reached the
submarine. Her captain
also was made prisoner.
Lieut.-Commander
von Arnauld now crossed to
the Algerian coast route.
There he would not find
any British armed vessels,
since by the latest orders
they were spread on
dispersed routes in the
open sea. Off Algiers he
attempted to torpedo a
French steamer, but
missed; and another French
vessel on which he opened
fire escaped, in spite of
sixty shells, by stopping
and starting again, thus
throwing out the range of
the German gunner. Though
U.35 followed the
Algiers route westward she
found no more prey on it,
but in the open sea she
sank a British sailing
vessel and a Greek
steamer. Late on April 12
she passed through the
Straits of Gibraltar, not,
like U.52, to go
home, but to cruise in the
western approach to the
Mediterranean, an area
which had so far been
unvisited except by
submarines definitely on
passage to or from
Germany.
For
the passage through the
Mediterranean British
ships were defensively
armed; but there were
still not enough guns for
all vessels approaching
the United Kingdom, and on
the very day that
Lieut.‑Commander von
Arnauld passed unseen out
through the Straits an
Admiralty order came to
Gibraltar to the effect
that any armed vessel
bound for the United
States or Canada was to
dismount her gun at
Gibraltar for transference
to a ship proceeding to
England or Egypt. The
order took effect next
morning on the steamer Patagonier,
bound for America. She
gave up her gun and
proceeded west.
Arnauld's
first three victims in his
new cruising area were all
from America, bound for
Mediterranean ports ‑ two
Italians and a Greek. One
of the Italian steamers
was armed; but such
defence as she put up was
useless, and she was soon
surrendered. The two
others could not resist,
being unarmed. So also was
now the Patagonier,
which unfortunately met
the submarine early next
morning 105 miles west of
Cape Spartel. She made a
fruitless effort to
escape, which Arnauld
punished by taking
prisoner the Patagonier's
master. He then crossed
over to the Spanish side
of the Mediterranean
entrance. By that time the
crews of the sunken ships
had landed, and their
reports led to the issue
of a wireless warning from
Gibraltar that a submarine
was active near Cape
Spartel. It was, however,
from the Spanish shore
that the next message
came, reporting that a
Portuguese vessel had been
sunk off Huelva. This was
not the work of Arnauld,
but of Lieut.‑Commander
Hans of U.52, who
had passed the Straits of
Gibraltar the evening
after U.35 and was
taking the direct route
for Germany.
For
protection of shipping in
the area west of Gibraltar
the French Morocco
Division was nominally
responsible. The division
consisted only of two or
three old light cruisers,
more dangerous than useful
to employ in
submarine‑hunting, which,
in fact, they had never
attempted. But seeing that
submarines ‑ it was not
known how many ‑ were
certainly operating in
this rich and unprotected
area, the Admiralty
ordered Admiral Currey at
Gibraltar to use his light
craft to
April
15‑20, 1917
CRUISE OF U.52
drive
them away, and also asked
the French to assist. They
were setting Admiral
Currey no easy task. The
force at his disposal
consisted of four armed
boarding steamers, ten
torpedo boats, five
sloops, nine trawlers, and
seven armed yachts ‑ a
total of thirty‑five small
craft, of which a third
were always under repair.
With this force he had to
maintain the patrol of
Gibraltar Straits and of
Mediterranean Zone 1,
which extended eastward to
the meridian of Cape Palos
and contained trade routes
each 250 miles in length,
along the shores of Spain
and Africa. His sloops
were almost always engaged
in the close escort of
transports or other
important ships bound for
Salonica or Egypt. One of
these sloops, the Acacia,
returned from escort at
this juncture and was sent
to patrol towards Huelva;
all other armed vessels
available at Gibraltar
also went out to the
westward.
For
patrolling the area west
of the Straits, the French
kept some submarines at
Gibraltar. A German
submarine had been
expected to arrive off
Gibraltar on the 15th from
the west, and arrangements
were made for three French
submarines to lie in wait
across its probable track.
But at the last moment
these orders were
cancelled by the French
Senior Naval Officer, and
the submarines for the
patrol were still in
harbour, when the
undoubted presence of an
enemy boat on their patrol
line became known. One
French submarine left at
once with a trawler.
The
Acacia soon found
evidence of the work of a
submarine: she picked up
boats containing the crew
of a Greek steamer, bound
from Huelva to the United
States and sunk by
Lieut.‑Commander von
Arnauld on the 15th; but
although the sloop
remained out till the
17th, she saw no more of
the submarine. Arnauld was
back again on the route
due west from Gibraltar.
There on the 17th he sank
a Russian and three
British steamers. One of
them was bound to Genoa
from the United States,
and was therefore unarmed;
the two others, in ballast
from Mediterranean Ports
for Baltimore, had given
up their guns at Gibraltar
under the new order. In
the early dawn of the 18th
the submarine opened fire
on another British
steamer, the Hurst;
but this one was armed,
and replied, though all
she could see of her
assailant was the flash of
its gun. Her resistance
seemed effectual, for
after a short time the
enemy abandoned the
pursuit of the Hurst
in favour of a steamer to
the westward, which she
torpedoed without warning,
taking prisoner the
captain to add to the five
masters she already had on
board. This was the
furthest westerly point of
her cruise -180 miles from
Cape Spartel. Next day,
April 20, she attacked
five ships.
One
was a British collier for
Tunis and another was on
her way from Dakar to
Gibraltar; both of these
were unarmed and were sunk
by gunfire. Another,
armed, escaped after half
an hour's engagement.
Still another, this time a
French vessel, escaped by
forcing the submarine to
chase head on to the heavy
seas. A British transport,
the Leasowe Castle,
was now approaching
Gibraltar, and Admiral
Currey had been ordered to
escort her in. Before her
escort had made contact
with her, the transport,
still 100 miles from
Gibraltar, reported that
she had been torpedoed in
the rudder. She had been
firing on the submarine
which attacked her; but
the explosion of the
torpedo dismounted her gun
and she was left
defenceless. Luckily the
submarine commander did
not press his attack; he
disappeared to westward;
and since the Leasowe
Castle's propeller
had not been damaged, she
was able to complete her
voyage to Gibraltar
without further incident.
On
April 22 the order as to
disarming ships bound from
Gibraltar to America was
rescinded on a
representation from
Admiral Currey. To meet
the danger to shipping, he
now began diverting
west‑bound traffic along
the coast of Africa well
to the southward, and for
a day or two he suspended
the sailing of British and
Allied ships as a
temporary measure. All he
could manage in the way of
patrol was to send out an
armed boarding steamer and
three trawlers along the
British track, and four
torpedo boats to the coast
of Spain. Even these
patrols could not be
relieved and were only
supplied by depleting the
forces in the
Mediterranean zone under
his charge. He asked for
destroyers, since the
French could supply no
fast craft; but he
received the usual answer
that he must do his best
with his present
resources, there being no
possibility of
reinforcement.
Lieut.‑Commander
von Arnauld had therefore
little to fear in the
western approach to
Gibraltar. He remained
there till the 24th,
sinking in his last three
days two Italians, a Dane
and two Norwegians, the
last four of these vessels
all close to Sagres Point.
Two French vessels, both
armed, succeeded in
discouraging him from
close attack, and a
British steamer used her
smoke‑producing apparatus
to such good effect that
she also escaped. Arnauld
passed Gibraltar on April
25, having sunk to the
westward of the Straits
seventeen vessels
totalling 46,854 tons. His
operations on the Atlantic
side of Gibraltar,
disturbing enough at any
time, were doubly so at
the period he chose. It
had just then been decided
to experiment with a
convoy homeward from
Gibraltar. For the safety
of the first part
April
25‑30,
1917
U.35 AGAIN AT WORK
of
the voyage Admiral Currey
was to be responsible;
and, since with such
resources as he had he
could not hope to protect
the Mediterranean part of
his station as well, he
was given permission on
the 26th to abandon the
patrol of Zone I
temporarily, sending ships
along the Spanish coast in
territorial waters where
they should be exempt from
submarine attack.
Arnauld,
when once again he was in
the Mediterranean, at
first followed the track
of shipping along the
coast of Spain; but by
April 30 he was back on
the southern coast route
by Algeria. After a
month's trial of the
system of dispersed routes
for British armed vessels
the Admiralty had reverted
to the former arrangement,
and ships now crossed over
to Algeria from near Cape
Palos. The U‑boat
commander made no further
attempts on armed vessels;
probably his ammunition
was nearly exhausted. His
one victim on his return
journey was a Greek
steamer on passage from
Tunis to England. When he
opened fire on her the
noise attracted a French
patrol boat, which engaged
the submarine at long
range, causing it to
submerge. But Arnauld had
one torpedo left; with
this he sank the
unfortunate Greek. It was
his last exploit on that
cruise. A patrolling
seaplane attempted to bomb
him a few hours later; but
he made good his return to
Cattaro. In his five
weeks' cruise he had sunk
altogether nearly 65,000
tons of shipping; he had
raided the hitherto
comparatively safe area
west of Gibraltar; and, as
a further disquieting
innovation, he had engaged
armed merchant vessels
with gunfire and in some
cases had compelled them
to surrender after long
resistance. Not only, it
would seem, did the
armament of the steamers
expose them to be
torpedoed without warning,
but it could not be relied
on to save them from a
determined assailant.
Even
a destroyer escort could
not guarantee a ship
against disaster. Of all
the mercantile vessels at
sea those for which the
greatest anxiety was felt
were the transports
carrying troop; these,
therefore, in addition to
being armed with the the
best guns available, had
always a direct escort of
destroyers. Yet on April
15 two of them were lost.
The Arcadian,
carrying over 1,000 troops
in addition to a crew of
200 or more, was in the
southern Aegean on the way
from Salonica to
Alexandria when she was
torpedoed by an unseen
submarine, and sank in six
minutes. Only a quarter of
an hour before she was
struck the men on board
had completed boat drill,
which circumstance
contributed to the perfect
discipline which prevailed
and to the saving of 1,050
men by the boats and the
escorting destroyer.
Unfortunately, as the
transport was sinking she
turned over, carrying down
wreckage and spars, which,
when released, shot up
like arrows and mortally
injured men swimming in
the water. From this cause
and from the sudden
capsizing of the ship 277
men were found to be
missing when the roll was
called. The transport was
in the French zone round
the south of Greece, and,
three hours after she had
sunk, a French destroyer
and some French trawlers
arrived to assist in the
work of rescue. While the
Arcadian was
sinking, a still larger
transport, the Cameronia,
carrying 2,630 officers
and men from Marseilles to
Egypt, was struck by a
torpedo when half‑way
between Sicily and Greece.
There were two destroyers
escorting the Cameronia;
though they had not
preserved her from
submarine attack, they and
some destroyers and other
craft sent out from Malta
were able to save all but
200 of the crew and
troops.
The
destruction in one hour of
these two large vessels,
with the loss of so many
lives, was the heaviest
blow struck by the U‑boats
at the transport service
since the sinking of the Royal
Edward in the Aegean
in the autumn of 1915. (see
Vol. III., p. 112.) It
was a vivid demonstration
of what had already been
clearly perceived ‑ the
menace of the submarine to
the expeditions overseas.
The First Sea Lord felt
compelled to inform the
Cabinet that the Admiralty
was no longer able to
safeguard adequately the
communications of the
armies in Salonica and
Egypt, and he strongly
urged that the British
contingent at Salonica
should be entirely
withdrawn. But the Allied
policy in force at the
time did not permit such a
solution of the
difficulty, and the base
at Salonica continued to
be a serious drain on our
naval and merchant
shipping resources.
There
was one feature of the
submarine campaign in the
Mediterranean which
differentiated it from
that in Home Waters. The
wide spaces and great
depths of the
Mediterranean were not
favourable to minelaying
by submarines, and it is
not surprising that losses
by mines were but a small
proportion of the whole.
In March two fields were
laid off Naples, but
neither secured a victim.
In April a field laid off
Alexandria by U.73,
shortly after U.63
had withdrawn from that
area, was discovered and
avoided without loss.
Attempts were made to foul
the track along the north
coast of Africa, and six
separate fields were
deposited between Cape Bon
and Oran. Four large
vessels were sunk by these
mines. A curious phase of
submarine activity at this
tiffle was the bombardment
of two villages on the
Tripolitan coast,
April‑June,
1917
BRITISH MINEFIELDS
possibly
with the intention of
affecting the native mind
in sorne way.
Although
most of the submarines
came from and returned to
the Adriatic, it was known
that there were some at
Constantinople, whence
they could pass out
through the Dardanelles
into the Mediterranean.
After the evacuation of
the Gallipoli peninsula a
series of shallow
minefields was laid to
blockade the exit and to
catch submarines and other
ships attempting to
emerge. In December, 1916,
UB.46, while
endeavouring to return
through the Dardanelles,
had struck one of these
mines and sunk; but this
was the only certain
success of the fields. By
the end of the year the
winter gales had set most
of the mines adrift;
others had been swept up
by the Turks; and early in
1917 it was decided that
the mined area must be
reinforced. In the
Mediterranean command
there was an opinion that
large nets, if moored,
would prove a sufficient
obstacle to the passage of
submarines. But in the
Admiralty this form of
barrier was already
discredited; submarines
were known to carry a
cutter by the action of
which they could easily
pass through heavy nets;
these, therefore, unless
studded with mines, were
practically useless.
Moreover, it was
impossible at the time to
supply the quantity of
nets that would be
required.
The
decision taken was for
another series of
minefields, some shallow
to catch vessels
navigating on the surface,
others deep to strike
submarines submerged. The
first of the 1917 fields
was laid off Suvla Bay
during the night of April
18, mainly at a depth of
60 feet, though some of
the mines were
intentionally set to be
nearer the surface. Early
in May a fresh supply of
mines arrived from
England, and the
reinforcement of the
Dardanelles barrage was
vigorously continued.
Fields were laid on eight
nights in May and six
nights in June. The enemy
appeared to be unaware of
what was being done; at
any rate, there were no
signs of any attempt to
prevent the minelayers
from reaching their
objectives or to sweep up
the mines when laid.
During the summer months
the minelayers were
employed elsewhere; but
two motor launches had
been fitted to lay four
mines each, and on several
occasions they went close
in to the shore, to
complete the barrier;
they, like the other
minelayers, met with no
interference frorn the
Turks. In the autumn the
large minelayers resumed
work and by the end of
1917 as many as 2,500
mines had been placed in a
barrage extending round
the exit from the
Dardanelles from Suvla Bay
on the north shore of the
Gallipoli peninsula to
Bashika Bay in Asia Minor.
Though
this considerable effort
was made to prevent
submarines from entering
the Mediterranean by way
of the Dardanelles, little
or nothing was done to
blockade the far more
important submarine base
at Cattaro. This was in
the Italian zone, where
the authorities were
content to rely on the
British drifter flotilla
as the principal means of
hindering the almost daily
passages of submarines in
and out of the Adriatic.
The flotilla consisted of
thirty motor launches and
120 net drifters, supplied
with depth charges for
dropping on submarines
which might run into the
nets. Each vessel mounted
a gun drawn from the
reserves of one or other
of the Allies, but in no
case was the weapon of
sufficient size to permit
reply to the fire of a
submarine which might
prefer to fight at the
range of its own gun. The
flotilla was based at
Taranto and had for parent
ship the battleship Queen,
sole remnant of the battle
squadron formerly lent to
the Italian Government.
The rest of the squadron
had gone home to be paid
off, so that the crews
hitherto employed in the
ships might be released
for service in the rapidly
increasing anti‑submarine
forces in Home Waters.
Even the Queen's
crew had gone home,
leaving her in charge of a
care and maintenance
party. The empty ship
formed an excellent depot
for the personnel of the
net barrage.
The
flotilla was under the
general orders of the
Italian
Commander‑in‑Chief, though
directly in charge of
Captain A. W. Heneage, who
was Commodore of the
Adriatic Patrols. By the
instructions in force
during April the drifters
maintained a line of nets
from the Italian shore to
Fano Island, a distance of
forty‑four miles, leaving
by day a passage ten miles
wide along the Otranto
coast for ordinary
mercantile traffic. At
first the motor launches
had not been permitted by
the Italian authorities to
be out at night, owing to
their resemblance to
submarines on the surface;
so that the drifters had
to do without protection
in the dark hours. But now
a scheme of grey‑and‑white
diagonal painting had been
adopted for the motor
launches; it made them
sufficiently unlike
submarines to save them
from attack by any Italian
patrols which might happen
to be at sea, but it had
the disadvantage of making
them conspicuous and
robbing them of any chance
of surprising submarines.
To the north of the net
line there was from time
to time a group of Italian
submarines operating in
the middle section of the
Strait, and to the
southward a few French
boats from Corfu patrolled
across the Strait. In
England, wherever a net
line had been operated it
was considered that an
integral part of the
barrage must consist of
destroyers constantly
present with the double
object of forcing
submarines to dive and of
engaging
Jan.‑May
1917
THE OTRANTO NET
them
if they should be caught
in the nets. But the
Italian destroyers
nominally appropriated to
the Otranto net remained,
as a rule, at anchor in
harbour, the idea being
that if signals for
assistance should be
received from the drifters
the destroyers would then
get up their anchors and
proceed to sea.
In
spite of these
arrangements, submarines
going from and to Cattaro,
which lay some 150 miles
north of the net line,
seemed to find little
difficulty in passing
through its area without
revealing their presence.
During 1916 there had been
nine occasions when
disturbances in the nets
indicated the presence of
submarines. The action
then taken accounted for
certainly two submarines
and in all probability two
more. The first was the
Austrian submarine U.6,
which on May 13 fouled the
nets of the two drifters Calistoga
and Dulcie Doris
and, coming to the
surface, was sunk by their
gunfire; the second was a
German boat, UB.44,
sunk on July 30 by depth
charges while still
struggling in the net. Two
other Austrian submarines
were thought at the time
to have been sunk by the
depth charges dropped on
July 8 and 10 over
disturbances in the nets,
though in neither of these
cases did any part of a
submarine or its crew come
to the surface. Thus the
net drifters of the
Otranto barrage succeeded
in getting rid of at least
two submarines before the
end of July 1916. From
that time onward the enemy
became more wary, and the
nets caught nothing till
December; even then the
chase, whatever it was,
got away.
The
first three months of 1917
passed without any sign
that the submarines based
in the Adriatic found the
Otranto net an obstacle.
On April 10, however,
something fouled the nets
of two drifters in the
centre of the Straits;
yet, although five depth
charges were dropped,
nothing came to the
surface which could
support the idea that a
submarine had been
destroyed.
Just
outside the Straits of
Otranto was Corfu, the
headquarters of the French
fleet. This was to be the
meeting place of the
Allied admirals who were
to discuss in conference
the Measures to be adopted
to secure a more efficient
protection for shipping in
the Mediterranean. By
April 27 all the admirals
and officers called to the
conference had assembled
at Corfu, and the first
meeting took place next
morning on board the
French flagship Provence.
Admiral
Gauchet, the French
Commander‑in‑Chief, who
presided, reminded those
present that the Malta
Conference of March 1916
had adopted the system of
patrolled routes, whereas
the London Conference of
January 1917 had proposed
a simultaneous trial of
the fixed patrolled routes
and of the unpatrolled
dispersed routes for
separate ships; the object
of the present conference
at Corfu was to compare
the two methods and
recommend a system for the
future. The discussion
showed a sharp divergence
of opinion, French
authorities inclining
towards fixed routes,
while the British thought
more of the dispersing
system. The final decision
was a compromise. Where
coastal routes could be
used, ships were to follow
them, navigating only at
night and anchoring at
dawn in one or other of
the series of protected
harbours; the coast routes
and narrow channels
elsewhere would be
patrolled. Whenever it was
necessary to cross the
open sea ‑ for example,
between Malta and
Alexandria, vessels were
to be dispersed on
individual routes.
Important ships were to be
escorted for their whole
voyage, and advantage of
the escort could be taken
to the extent of sending
with it two additional
vessels, but the
protection of a convoy of
more than three was
considered beyond the
power of a single escort.
Only those craft incapable
of acting as escorts were
to be used for patrolling,
and so little value was
attached by the British to
the patrolled routes that
Admiral Thursby obtained
assent to a proposal that
troop transports should
not approach the coast,
but should rely for
protection solely on their
escorts.
To
reduce the number of
vessels traversing the
Mediterranean the
conference recommended
that all traffic between
the Atlantic and ports
east of Aden should go by
the Cape of Good Hope,
except where military
operations would be
hampered by the enforcing
of the longer voyage.
Material and troops for
Salonica and Egypt were to
come by rail to Taranto
and be embarked there.
The
recommendations implied an
alteration in the method
of using the flotillas.
This was next discussed.
Admiral Mark Kerr,
commanding the British
Adriatic Squadron,
proposed a drastic
experiment. He pointed out
that the three systems in
force ‑ the net barrage,
the escorts and the
patrols ‑ were each too
weak in numbers to be
efficient. There were 120
net drifters at Taranto,
of which seventy were at
sea at a time. Each
drifter covered half a
mile, and therefore the
maximum barrage that could
be maintained was a single
line of nets over
thirty‑five out of the
forty‑four miles of the
Strait. His proposal was
that for a definite time
the whole of the 120 net
drifters of the barrage
should be withdrawn from
the Straits of Otranto and
distributed on the
patrolled lines. At the
end of that time, should
the experiment be deemed a
failure, the drifters
could be sent
April
27,
1917
THE NAVAL CONFERENCE
back
to Otranto, reinforced
with vessels from the
patrols to rnake a barrage
which would have more hope
of efficiency. in effect,
his suggestion was to try
first a patrol made
efficient at the expense
of the barrage, and, if
that failed to stem the
tide of destruction, then
to try a barrage made
efficient at the expense
of the patrolled routes.
The proposal was too
drastic for the
conference, and a majority
of the members voted
against it.
For
a month or more the French
and Italian authorities
had been examining the
question of the erection
of a fixed barrage across
the Straits of Otranto.
This was now brought
forward for discussion,
and was debated so
hopefully that the actual
site of the obstruction
was settled, and
recommendations were even
passed for similar
barrages off the
Dardanelles, in the Gulf
of Smyrna and at
Gibraltar. In fact, all
that was left to be done
was the building; and
this, as our own
experience with the
Folkestone‑Gris Nez boom
had shown, was easier to
project than to complete.
Offensive
measures in the Adriatic
had not been actively
pushed, and the conference
proceeded to consider what
might be done. Operations
by large ships had already
been dismissed as
impracticable while the
Austrian fleet remained in
harbour; but something
could be attempted by
other forces. Submarines,
for instance, could be
constantly on watch in
those places where enemy
boats were known to pass;
off Saseno at the east end
of the net line seemed a
specially favourable
place. It appeared that
the Italians had refrained
from air raids on the
submarine bases and
torpedo factory in
expectation of the arrival
of a fast seaplane
carrier; as, however, the
enemy bases were within
striking distance of the
Italian coast, the carrier
was not indispensable, and
the conference recommended
that air raids should be
carried out as frequently
as possible.
It
was obvious that unless
the conference could
devise some method of
improvement, the situation
was extremely grave, for
the Italians had already
announced that, owing to
their peculiar dependence
upon imports, unless their
demands for shippig could
be satisfied they must
cease offensive action
from March 1, and even
their defensive operations
would be very seriously
embarrassed. Using this as
a text the Italian
representative urged the
special need of Italy for
protection on her routes
for merchant traffic and,
in fact, demanded the
allocation of more patrol
vessels to the routes to
and from Italy. This was
scarcely possible. By
pooling the total
resources of the Allies in
the Mediterranean,
including eight Japanese
destroyers which had just
arrived, and deducting the
vessels necessary for
blockade, sweeping, and
guarding bases, it was
found possible to keep at
sea 112 escorts and
eighty‑nine patrols. These
numbers included the
Italian navy. It was
difficult to arrive at an
accurate estimate of the
number of merchant vessels
in the Mediterranean; but
it was considered that the
figure 300 would be
approximately correct. Of
these 100 would be on the
coastal routes and 200 on
the high seas. If the
vessels on the high seas
sailed in convoys of
three, a total of 140
escorts would be required
against the 112 actually
maintainable.
The
shortage was even more
apparent on the coastal
routes. They were 2,030
miles long, and as it was
necessary to have an armed
vessel for every ten miles
of route, to obtain an
effective patrol, 203
boats would be required.
But only eighty‑nine were
available, and even these
were not always employed
to the best advantage,
owing to the variations in
command in the different
zones. The conference
therefore decided to
recommend the creation of
a central authority at
Malta to have charge of
all arrangements regarding
routes, escorts, and
patrols throughout the
whole Mediterranean. With
this final decision the
conference concluded its
work.
During
the four days it had
lasted, April 28 to May 1,
the movements of eight
different submarines could
be traced in various parts
of the Mediterranean.
Between them they sank six
large steamers and eight
Italian sailing vessels, a
total destruction of
27,000 tons of shipping.
One of these submarines
remained throughout the
daylight hours of April 28
off Taormina, on the east
coast of Sicily. She began
by blowing in half the
British armed steamer Karonga
and taking prisoner her
captain. During the rest
of that day she raided the
fishing fleet, sinking
five of the little craft
within sight of the shore.
She appears to have been
left unmolested by the
Italian patrol service,
although she was close to
the important trade route
focus at Messina. On the
same day the British armed
steamer Pontiac,
on passage from Port Said
to Spezzia with maize, was
torpedoed without warning
and sunk when half‑way
between Egypt and Sicily;
and the British steamer Teakwood,
also armed, was torpedoed
in the dusk without
warning about thirty miles
west of Cape Matapan. A
small Italian sailing
vessel was destroyed west
of Corsica by U.33,
which concluded with this
success her three weeks'
cruise in the Gulf of
Lyons. In the western
Mediterranean a Spanish
steamer was stopped and
released by
Lieut.‑Commander von
Arnauld who had by this
date re-entered the
Mediterranean after his
destructive operations
April
29‑30, 1917
MINELAYING SUBMARINES
west
of Gibraltar, and within
sight of the houses on the
northern shore of Malta an
Italian sailing vessel was
sunk by the gunfire of the
minelaying submarine UC.37.
Thus o nApril 28 there
were enemy boats at work
in six different districts
- Taormina, south of
Crete, west of Cape
Matapan, west of Corsica,
north of Malta and off
Andalusia. Further, mines
were discovered by the
blowing up of a French
fishing‑boat off
Mostaganem, with the
result that that port and
Arzeu had to be closed to
navigation till they could
be swept.
The
second day of the
conference, April 29, was
marked by rather better
news. One of the Adriatic
drifters dropped depth
charges on a submarine
entangled in the nets and
claimed success. Off Marsala
at the western point of
Sicily one of our
submarines, E.2,
which had been patrolling
the south coast of Sicily
for three days, sighted an
enemy boat engaged in
inspecting an Italian
sailing vessel which she
had fired on and caused to
be abandoned. E.2
approached within 400
yards and fired a torpedo.
After wavering a little in
its course it passed right
under the enemy's
conning‑tower, but
unfortunately too deep to
hit. It was some time
before E.2 was
again in a position to
fire. Strangely enough,
the enemy did not move.
The reason was soon
apparent; just as E.2
was about to fire her
second torpedo, two naked
men could be seen to swarm
up the conning‑tower and
disappear into the German
boat; presumably they were
two of the crew who had
swum over to examine the
Italian sailing ship. As
soon as she had recovered
her men the enemy dived,
and E.2's second
torpedo had no better luck
than her first. The Q‑ship
Saros was cruising
in the neighbourhood of
Pantellaria hoping to be
accosted; but the enemy
made no further appearance
and returned safely to the
Adriatic. Another Italian
sailing vessel was sunk by
the minelayer UC.37,
which had reached the
vicinity of Cape Bon. In
the course of the night
she laid a minefield off
Cape Rosa, the eastern
headland of the Gulf of
Bona.
After
finishing her minelaying,
UC.37, early on
April 30, torpedoed the
French transport Colbert,
which was proceeding from
Marseilles to Salonica
with 150 troops and 950
mules on board and was
then passing fifteen miles
from Cape Rosa. The
transport was in convoy
with another armed
steamer, but was not under
escort. No one on board
saw anything of her
assailant till the
submarine broke surface
half an hour after the
vessel sank. The enemy was
then fired on by a French
trawler, and disappeared.
The only other loss on
this day was a Greek
steamer, in the French
coal trade, returning from
Tunis to the Tees. She was
stopped by Arnauld and
attacked with gunfire. She
was only two miles from
the Algerian shore, and a
French patrol boat was
soon on the scene. She did
not succeed in saving the
Greek, for though Arnauld
dived out of danger, he
expended his last torpedo
in sinking the merchant
ship. A little later a
French seaplane saw him
come to the surface and
dropped some bombs in his
neighbourhood; they did
him no harm, and he
regained Cattaro without
further incident.
The
discovery of UC.37's
mines off Cape Rosa on May
1 caused the suspension of
all navigation between
Algiers and Bizerta for a
whole day. Several
minefields were now known
to exist on the French
African coast. They were
proving none too easy to
sweep, and Admiral Ballard
obtained Admiralty
permission to abandon at
his discretion the
Algerian coast route for
merchant ships bound to
Gibraltar and to disperse
them as before. Yet even
in the open sea under
escort they could not be
considered safe. The British
Sun, with 7,000 tons
of oil on board, was on
passage from Port Said to
Malta and, as befitted so
important a vessel, she
had an escort of three
trawlers, stationed one
ahead and one on each
beam. Unfortunately they
were slow, and the speed
of the escorted vessel had
to be reduced to 6 1/2
knots to enable her
protectors to keep up with
her. Though they saw no
submarine, a torpedo
struck the oiler on the
port quarter, and set part
of her cargo on fire. A
quarter of an hour later
one of the escorting
trawlers saw a periscope,
gave chase and dropped a
depth charge, with no
ascertainable result. By
this time all hope of
saving the oiler was gone;
she was fiercely ablaze
aft, and her captain
decided to abandon her.
All her crew boarded their
boats in good order,
taking with them the
Japanese quarter‑master,
who could not be persuaded
to surrender the wheel
except by force. They
transhipped to the
trawlers and watched their
vessel sink. The oil
spread over the sea in a
burning sheet, and her
last plunge sent up a
volcanic eruption of
flames.
Some
idea of the immensity of
the Mediterranean and of
the difficulties of
protecting ships over its
enormous stretches of sea
may be gathered from the
fact that this lurid scene
was being enacted 210
miles from Malta, 660
miles from Alexandria, and
282 miles from Corfu,
where the Allied Admirals
were debating the methods
of overcoming those
difficulties. As we have
seen, they had just
decided to put all the
arrangements for merchant
ship routes and all the
escort and patrol services
under one supreme
authority.
The
Admiralty concurred in all
the conclusions of the
conference, and requested
the Allied Ministries of
Marine to
May
1917
PROBLEMS OF COMMAND
put
them into force at once.
Although opinion in
Whitehall was inclined to
doubt the possibility of
erecting successful fixed
barrages in any of the
places suggested, it was
decided that technical
officers should visit the
proposed sites and report
on the feasibility of
carrying out the work, on
the material required, and
on the order of precedence
in which the barrages
should be begun.
As
regards the appointment of
an officer who should have
supreme control of the
direction of the routes of
merchant vessels and of
the escorting and patrol
forces, there was some
divergence of opinion. The
French Commander‑in‑Chief
naturally wished that the
new director should be of
his own nationality and
under his general control
in the matter of
principles and the main
outlines of the scheme of
direction. But as the
large majority of merchant
ships and of patrol and
escort vessels were
British, the Admiralty
could not consent to the
appointment over them of a
French officer, nor did
they feel inclined to
agree to the limitations
of the initiative of the
new officer which seemed
to be implied by the
insistence of the French
Commander‑in‑Chief on the
ultimate control of the
work of the office. When,
however, Admiral Gauchet
urged that at times of
emergency he must be in a
position to dispose of the
whole of the patrol force
as required for operations
without having to
negotiate with a co‑equal
authority, the Admiralty
saw the reasonableness of
his demand and gave way on
that point. The French
made a corresponding
concession, and it was
agreed that a British
Vice‑Admiral should be
appointed as
Commander‑in‑Chief of the
British Naval Forces in
the Mediterranean and head
of the organisation at
Malta for the general
direction of routes, which
should be entrusted with
initiative of every kind.
But in order that there
should be no doubt as to
the supremacy of Admiral
Gauchet in the conduct of
operations, it was decreed
by the Admiralty that the
British Commander‑in‑Chief
should fly his flag
ashore.
Scarcely
had the officers who had
assembled at Corfu
returned to their stations
than the submarines struck
down another important
ship in circumstances
which threw further doubt
on the possibility of
securing safety even when
the maximum of protection
was given. The large
transport Transylvania,
with 3,000 soldiers on
board, left Marseilles for
Alexandria in the evening
of May 3. In accordance
with the usual routine,
she was accompanied by two
destroyers; they were both
Japanese vessels, the Matsu
and Sakaki.
When
the Japanese Government
decided in February to
send eight destroyers to
work in the Mediterranean,
they specially arranged
that the boats should not
be under British or French
orders, and despatched
with them Rear‑Admiral K.
Sato, flying his flag in
the light cruiser Akashi,
to take command of them.
Though he was not to take
orders from any of the
Admirals in the
Mediterranean, he was
instructed to work in
co‑operation with the
British authorities and to
help in any way desirable.
The most obvious need was
for more escorts; and
convoy work, since it
seemed to offer the best
chance of contact with
enemy submarines,
naturally commended itself
to the Japanese naval
officers. Since the
arrival of Admiral Sato's
destroyers in mid‑April
they had been acting as
escorts, the Transylvania
being so far the most
important vessel of which
they had taken charge.
She
followed the coast route
south of France, and in
the evening of May 3
passed the Franco‑Italian
border line. About a day
ahead of her was a convoy
of four ships bound for
Italy, under the escort of
an Italian cruiser. The
cruiser went in to Genoa
in the afternoon of May 8
with one of the ships,
leaving the others to
continue their voyage
unescorted. One of them,
the British steamer Washington,
was shortly afterwards
torpedoed and sunk by an
unseen submarine. This
disturbing fact was
presumably reported to the
Transylvania, which
was steaming towards the
same area.
The
transport was zigzagging
at 14 knots, and was about
forty miles from the
position of the loss of
the Washington,
when she also was struck
by a torpedo, which holed
her in the port
engine‑room. She was
immediately headed for the
land, little more than two
miles distant. One of the
Japanese destroyers, the Matsu,
went alongside to take off
the people on board, while
the other circled round to
look for the submarine.
Twenty minutes later a
torpedo was observed
approaching the Matsu.
She backed at full speed,
and the torpedo struck the
Transylvania, which
now began to sink. In less
than an hour she was gone.
Of her passengers and crew
all but 270 were saved by
her own boats, the
Japanese destroyers, and
Italian patrol vessels
which arrived on the scene
as she sank.
Before
leaving the neighbourhood
of Genoa this submarine
torpedoed three more
vessels, all British and
all armed. Luckily they
were all close inshore,
and managed to beach
themselves. She appears to
have gone south on the
8th. Her raid had the
effect of stopping all
departures from Genoa for
several days. Among the
vessels held up there was
a transport with
Australian troops.
March‑May
1917
THE OTRANTO BARRAGE
2
Attack on the Otranto barrage. Action in the
Adriatic
One
of the points discussed at
the Corfu Conference had
been the possibility of
further Allied operations
in the Adriatic, and it
had been decided that
little more could be done
until the Austrians showed
more activity with their
surface ships. This, as it
happened, was what the
enemy were actually
contemplating, and a
fortnight later the
barrage and the Italian
communications across the
Straits of Otranto had to
endure the first serious
attack of the war.
The
drifter barrage had now
become a serious
embarrassment to the
submarines passing in and
out of the Adriatic. By
the end of April seven
submarines had reported
themselves incommoded by
either the motor launches,
the drifters or the
aircraft acting in
connection with it.
Already four small
attempts to damage it had
been made: on March 11
four Austrian destroyers
came out to explore it,
but were seen only by a
French submarine on watch;
a reconnaissance on April
21 ended in the sinking of
an Italian steamer outside
Valona Bay; and two other
destroyer cruises were
made on April 25 and May
5, but failed to find any
craft to attack. At last
the inconvenience to the
submarines decided the
Austrian
Commander‑in‑Chief,
Admiral Njegovan, to make
an expedition in greater
force, and deliver a
double attack, on the
drifter line and on the
Italian transports which
were now passing every
night between Italy and
Valona.
As
both the proposed
objectives lay to the
south of Brindisi, the
forces employed would run
the obvious risk of being
cut off from Cattaro by an
Anglo‑ltalian
counter‑attack. The
Austrian admiral therefore
took every precaution that
could ensure their return.
On May 14 he sent out
three submarines ‑ U.4
to lie off Valona, UC
25 to mine the exits
from Brindisi, and U.27
to cruise on the line
between Brindisi and
Cattaro. These were to
strike at any forces which
might be drawn out from
Brindisi by the main
attack. The raid on the
drifter line was to be
made by the three cruisers
Novara, Saida,
and Helgoland (3444
tons, 9‑3.9" guns, 27
knots.) under the
command of Captain Horthy
of the Novara, and
that on the transports
near Valona by the
destroyers Czepel
and Balaton. The
two attacks were to be
approximately
simultaneous. Afterwards,
the raiding forces were to
return to Cattaro, the
destroyers leading by
about twenty miles. By
this time it would be
light, and aircraft from
Durazzo and Cattaro, were
to scout for and attack
any forces coming out from
Brindisi.
By
the ordinary routine in
force, the drifters had no
protection, and the only
regular patrols were
carried out by submarines.
On the night of May 14
there were two of them on
watch‑the Italian F.10,
south of Cattaro, and the
French Bernouilli,
north of Durazzo. Admiral
Alfredo Acton, the Italian
Commander‑in‑Chief, knew
or guessed that a move by
the Austrians was
imminent, but he does not
appear to have been sure
of their objective. He had
therefore to make such
dispositions as would
cover the unprotected
coastline and its exposed
railway near Brindisi, and
would also meet a blow
aimed at Valona or at the
barrage. To do this, so
far as it could be done,
he sent out at 9.0 p.m. on
May 14 a group of four
French destroyers, the Commandant
Riviere, the Bisson,
the Cimeterre, and
the Boutefeu,
under the command of
Captain Vicuna in the
Italian flotilla‑leader
the Mirabello.
Their orders were to steam
south‑east at about ten
miles from the coast, and
to cross the Straits at
midnight; when eight miles
to west‑south‑west of Cape
Linguetta they were to
turn north and make for
Cape Rodoni, which they
should reach at about
half‑past four; then to
come south again and reach
a point on the latitude of
Valona at about seven in
the morning. This position
proved, in the event, to
be ten miles to the
north‑east of the actual
rendezvous for the
Austrian light cruisers,
so that the Admiral's
dispositions were
successful in ensuring
that contact should be
made with the enemy early
in the morning, and that
the bulk of his own forces
should be placed between
the enemy and their base
by daylight.
As
he could not hope for
anything like a decisive
action in any other
conditions, he felt bound
to make this the cardinal
point of his policy. The
other alternative open to
him, that of keeping the Mirabello's
division patrolling the
drifter line all night,
would not have afforded an
adequate protection, and
would have left open the
Austrian line of retreat
after their cruisers had
struck their blow. It
would also have made
Admiral Acton dependent
upon the scanty and
confused reports of a
night action when he moved
out from Brindisi to cut
off the enemy. Whether by
chance, or as a result of
accurate intelligence, the
Austrian Admiral's plan
for an attack on the
Valona supply ships was
equally well designed. A
convoy of three Italian
steamships escorted by the
Italian destroyer Borea
had left Gallipoli at ten
o'clock in the forenoon of
the 14th, and was under
orders to be at the
entrance to the Valona
swept channel at a
quarter‑past seven on the
following
May
15, 1917
THE CONVOY ATTACKED
morning.
The strait was to be
crossed by the usual
transport route which made
the Albanian coast at
Strade Bianche, a
conspicuous white patch on
the mountains about twenty
miles south of the
entrance into Valona Bay.
The
convoy, in line ahead,
with the Borea
leading, reached this
point by 3 a.m. on May 15.
(See Map 10.) It
was a calm night with
scarcely a ripple on the
water. As they turned to a
north-north‑westerly
course the moon, which had
just risen above the
mountains, was on the
convoy's starboard
quarter. It was still very
dark and shadowy under the
land, when suddenly
Commander Franceschi in
the Borea became
aware that there was a
considerable volume of
smoke on his starboard
bow, moving past him at
high speed. In reply to
his challenge the two
enemy destroyers, Czepel
and Balaton,
switched on searchlights
and opened fire. Commander
Franceschi swung his ship
round to starboard to get
between the Austrians and
his convoy, but the
enemy's first round had
severed the Borea's
main steam‑pipe, and she
could not complete the
turn. In a very short time
she was disabled and
sinking. Of the
transports, one carrying
munitions caught fire and
blew up, another was soon
blazing fiercely, and the
third had been hit. For
some reason the Austrians
did not sink her, but
steamed away northward. (The
fire on the second
transport was
extinguished, and she
was towed in; the third
reached Valona under her
own power.)
By
this time the three
Austrian cruisers had
found and passed through
the line of net drifters.
Admiral Acton, if indeed
he had suspected any
immediate raid by the
enemy in this direction,
had given no warning to
the officer in command of
the barrage, and the
drifters, in consequence,
took the Austrian cruisers
to be friendly ships. The
nets at the moment were
being managed by seven
groups of drifters, each
group averaging seven
vessels, the groups evenly
spaced between Fano Island
and Santa Maria di Leuca.
It was not till the sound
of the attack on the
Italian convoy was heard
by the easternmost group
that they had any
suspicion that the enemy
were out. Even then they
stubbornly determined to
keep their stations and
continued to shoot their
nets for two hours after
the sounds of gunfire had
ceased. Then they had
their own danger to face.
The three cruisers had
turned and now began a
systematic destruction of
the barrage. Each took a
third part of the line,
and steaming slowly along
it called on the crews of
the drifters to abandon
their ships. In some cases
the men, feeling their
position to be hopeless,
obeyed the order and were
taken as prisoners on
board the Austrian
cruisers, which then sank
the empty drifters by
gunfire. But others, in
spite of the heavy odds,
would not give in so
tamely.
Skipper
Joseph Watt of the Gowan
Lea had been in
action before, on December
22, when his little craft
was riddled by an Austrian
destroyer. When now the
cruiser, which was
attacking the western
section, loomed up at 100
yards distance and ordered
him to surrender, he
called on his men to give
three cheers and fight to
a finish. Putting on full
speed, the tiny Gowan
Lea charged for the
enemy, firing her one
small gun (57 mm. (2
1/2 in.)) till a
shell disabled it, and her
only chance of offence or
defence was gone. The
gun's crew, continuously
under heavy fire, still
tried to make it work even
after a box of ammunition
had exploded and smashed
the leg of one of the
crew. It never seems to
have occurred to Skipper
Watt or his men that they
should surrender; they
applied themselves to the
task of getting their gun
into action; and when the
cruiser passed on,
thinking probably that the
vessel's crew could not
have survived such a fire
as she had poured upon
them, they were still at
work on the dislocated
breech‑block.
The
drifter next to the Gowan
Lea was called the Admirable:
A shell exploded her
boiler and her crew jumped
overboard. But one man,
seeing her still afloat,
scrambled back on board
and ran towards the gun.
It was clearly his
intention to fight the
Austrian cruiser
single‑handed; but a shell
from her struck him dead
before he could fire a
round. At the other end of
the line were similar
scenes of gallantry.
The
Floandi was a group
leader, and bound to set a
bold example. To the heavy
fire of the Novara,
Skipper D. J. Nicholls
replied with his
six‑pounder gun; a wound,
a second wound, even a
third could not move him
from his place of command.
His enginemen were as
resolute as he; one of
them was killed at his
post and the other
wounded. At last the
cruiser moved on, leaving
the little Floandi
maimed but undefeated.
These encounters recall
the immortal fight of "the
one and the fifty‑three";
but even the odds against
Sir Richard Grenville can
scarcely have reached such
a height as in the action
between the Austrian
cruiser and Skipper Watt
of the Gowan Lea.
(Skipper Watt was
awarded the V.C.)
When the cruisers had
finished their work and
steamed away northward, of
the forty‑seven drifters,
fourteen had been sunk;
three others, seriously
damaged, were still afloat
on the calm moonlit sea.
The
two groups of drifters in
the middle of the line
suffered little. The
cruiser detailed for this
central section
May
15, 1917
ADMIRAL ACTON SAILS
was
slow in arriving, and the
group commanders, alarmed
by the firing to east and
west of them, had ordered
their drifters to slip
nets and scatter. The only
vessel caught by the
cruiser was one which had
steamed off eastward
instead of north‑westerly
like her consorts. Though
the group leaders whose
boats carried wireless
apparatus sent out warning
signals, no one at
Brindisi took them in, and
Admiral Acton's first news
of either part of the
double attack came from
the lookouts on Saseno
Island at the mouth of
Valona Bay, who, hearing
firing, guessed that the
convoy expected at dawn
was in danger. Their
report reached Brindisi at
3.50 a.m. Italian time, (One
hour fast on G.M.T.) and,
being
in Italian code, was not
understood by the British
and French officers there.
But Admiral Acton, before
an hour passed, had
ordered the Mirabello
to steer southward, as
there were enemy ships in
Otranto Strait. ("0435.
Units
nemiche in canals
Otranto dirigete per
sud.") The Mirabello
and her detachment were
then north of Durazzo.
They turned due south and
steamed past Durazzo Bay
at about twenty miles
distance from the land.
There were now only three
French destroyers with the
Mirabello, since
one, the Boutefeu,
had been compelled by
condenser trouble to
return.
Of
the Brindisi squadron
under Admiral Acton the Bristol
and four Italian
destroyers were at half an
hour's notice for sea, and
the Dartmouth was
to come to the same state
of readiness at 5.30. The
third British light
cruiser, Liverpool,
was at six hours' notice,
and her engineers were at
work on her boilers. The
state of the Italian
vessels is not known.
Admiral Acton embarked
with his staff in the Dartmouth,
and ordered the readier
part of his squadron to
sea as soon as possible.
The Bristol with
the Italian destroyers Mosto
and Pilo was first
away; she left harbour
shortly after five
o'clock, the Italian
admiral following some
twenty minutes later in
the Dartmouth,
with the Italian
destroyers Schiaffino
and Giovanni Acerbi.
He had ordered his light
cruiser Marsala,
the two destroyer leaders
Aquila and Racchia
and the destroyer Insidioso
to join him as soon as
they were ready. The Aquila
left soon after the
Admiral sailed. It was now
some three hours since the
transports had been
attacked, but as Brindisi
is forty miles nearer to
Cattaro than either the
drifter line or the spot
where the transport had
sunk, there was some
chance of his being able
to bring the enemy to
action. By a quarter to
seven the Brindisi
detachment was
concentrated and was
steaming to the north
eastwards at 24 knots on a
roughly formed line
abreast. During the
concentration Admiral
Acton received a message
from Captain Vicuna in the
Mirabello to say
that he was in contact
with three ships of the
Spaun type.
The
position at seven o'clock
was thus a rather curious
one. The Brindisi force
under Admiral Acton was on
a north‑easterly course
between Brindisi and Cape
Rodoni; twenty‑five miles
to the south‑eastward of
him were the Czepel
and the Balaton,
of whose presence he was
still ignorant; and
forty‑six miles to the
south‑south‑castward were
the three Austrian light
cruisers with the Mirabello's
detachment on their heels.
The enemy forces nearest
to him were, therefore,
those of which he knew
least at the moment.
Captain
Horthy was also still
ignorant of the position.
His destroyers, having
turned south to close him
at a quarter-past six, had
not seen anything of the
Brindisi forces under
Admiral Acton; and, though
the aeroplanes from
Cattaro were rapidly
getting a picture of the
situation, they had not
yet got a signal through
to him. So far as he knew,
therefore, the Mirabello's
detachment was the only
Allied force with which he
would have to deal. He
opened fire on them at ten
minutes past seven; but
the action never became
close, as the Mirabello's
captain made a complete
circle a few moments later
to avoid a submarine. (Probably
U.4, which had been
watching Valona.) Shortly
after half‑past seven
Captain Horthy received
messages from the Czepel,
the Balaton and
the Cattaro aeroplanes
that there was a force of
seven light cruisers and
destroyers to the north of
him.
The
two destroyers had at last
come into touch with the
Brindisi force. It was
not, however, till twenty
minutes later that Admiral
Acton attempted to attack
the two Austrians. The
Italian destroyers, led by
the Aquila, then
closed in and opened fire
when they were at a range
of 12,500 yards.
In
the action which followed,
the Austrians were helped
by two aeroplanes from
Cattaro, which managed to
report the fall of their
shot. At half‑past eight
the Czepel hit one
of the Aquila's
boilers and brought her to
a standstill. Having
inflicted this damage on
the Italians and suffered
little themselves, the two
Austrian destroyers made
good their escape into
shelter behind the
batteries of Durazzo.
Admiral Acton did not know
that the Austrian
destroyers he had just
engaged were leading the Novara
group of cruisers; the Mirabello,
he knew, was in touch with
these, and from her
signals he thought they
would be found to
northward of him.
The
Mirabello's
positions as signalled,
however, were wrong; the
Austrian cruisers were
astern of him, and were,
in fact, rapidly closing
the immobilised Aquila,
which he had left
May
15, 1917
THE AUSTRIANS SUFFER
behind.
At nine o'clock the Bristol
reported smoke astern, and
soon the three cruisers
could be made out. Admiral
Acton turned at once. By
9.30 he was within range
and was covering the Aquila,
which also joined in the
firing. Captain Horthy had
thus two British light
cruisers and some Italian
destroyers ahead of him,
and the Mirabello
and three French
destroyers following him
astern. Seven or eight
Austrian aeroplanes were
overhead menacing the
British ships. One,
indeed, dropped two bombs
close to the Dartmouth.
Italian aeroplanes from
Brindisi attacked them
obstinately, but appeared
to get the worst of the
air combat.
On
the sea the action went
against the Austrians. The
opening range was about
12,000 yards, and in the
first few minutes one of
the Dartmouth's
six‑inch shells hit the Novara
near the fore‑bridge, and
killed Commander
Szuboritz, the second in
command. Captain Horthy,
who had formed his
cruisers in line ahead and
taken the head of the
line, at once ordered
smoke screens to be sent
up, and boldly closed the
range in order to use his
3.9‑inch guns with better
effect. In this he was
partially successful; for
the Dartmouth,
which was hit three times
in all, suffered a certain
amount of damage In the
first part of the action.
Also, the Bristol,
whose bottom was very
foul, began to drop
behind, and the three
Austrian cruisers
concentrated their fire
upon Admiral Acton's
flagship. Captain Horthy
was, indeed, very near
scoring a success; but
just as he was getting the
Dartmouth's range,
he seems to have feared
that the French destroyers
to the south of him were
likely to be dangerous; so
he turned back to his
north‑westerly course and
opened the range again. He
need have feared nothing
from the division with the
Mirabello. She
herself had just
discovered that water was
leaking into her oil
tanks, and had been
obliged to stop. Almost
simultaneously condenser
trouble brought another of
the French destroyers to a
standstill. The remaining
two French destroyers
stayed behind to guard
their consorts against
submarine attack; so that
the Mirabello's
division was out of the
reckoning. Admiral Acton
felt obliged to leave two
of his destroyers with the
Aquila; and thus
the Dartmouth was
left with only two Italian
destroyers to continue the
action, the Bristol
some way astern doing her
best to keep up.
It
was now ten o'clock.
Reinforcements were coming
out from both Brindisi and
Cattaro. At the beginning
of the action Captain
Horthy had signalled for
help, and in less than an
hour a heavy cruiser and
five torpedo craft were on
their way to join him. The
Marsala, a flotilla
leader and two Italian
destroyers had left
Brindisi at half‑past
eight. They had first
steamed towards Valona,
but were now steering
northward to join Admiral
Acton. Further, the French
Commander‑in‑Chief at
Corfu, though he had
received from Brindisi no
direct information of the
Austrian raid, guessed
from intercepted messages
that an action was in
progress, and sent three
French destroyers to
assist. These were now
north of Valona Bay.
During
the next quarter of an
hour the firing increased
in intensity, and at ten
minutes past ten Captain
Horthy was struck by a
splinter; he tried for a
few minutes to keep
command, but fainted, and
Lieutenant Witkorocski
took charge. At a
quarter‑past ten the Bristol
checked her fire, as she
had by then fallen some
way behind; and for some
twenty minutes the Dartmouth
continued the engagement
alone. When the Bristol
began firing again, she
was between 14,000 and
12,000 yards from the last
ship in the enemy's line,
so that throughout the
fighting the brunt of it
fell upon the Dartmouth.
The
action seems to have been
at its height between
half-past ten and eleven
o'clock. It was then that
Admiral Acton opened out
the range and slowed down
in order to allow the Bristol
to close; and it was then,
also, that a shot from the
Dartmouth damaged
the Novara's
engines. Just before
eleven the Austrian's
speed was rapidly falling
off; but Admiral Acton was
no longer in a position to
press his advantage: in
spite of the damage to the
Novara the
Austrians had drawn ahead,
and whilst the Dartmouth
had slowed down for the Bristol
they had increased their
lead. There was, of
course, nothing to tell
him that the Novara
was in serious and
increasing difficulties,
and he decided that he
would gain nothing by
continuing a running fight
towards Cattaro in which
the Austrians had the
heels of him. The Saida
had trailed behind the
other two cruisers and was
some way astern; the Marsala's
division
was to the southward.
Admiral Acton therefore
turned sharply to port
just before eleven
o'clock, hoping to cut off
the straggler and force
her down upon the Marsala
and her consorts. He was
too far off to succeed in
this, but the Dartmouth
and Bristol
crossed under the Saida's
stern at a fairly close
range and straddled her.
The manoeuvre seemed
promising, in that the Saida
sent out a distress signal
as the two cruisers closed
on her; but it does not
appear that she was badly
hit during the last
outburst of rapid fire.
Austrian aircraft at this
time made a strong attack
on the two British
cruisers, dropping bombs
and sweeping their decks
with maxims. No damage was
done either by bullets or
bombs.
May
15, 1917
DARTMOUTH TORPEDOED
As
Admiral Acton turned to
the south‑west he sighted
smoke to the northward,
and realised that
reinforcements had come
out of Cattaro and were
approaching. He therefore
continued southward to
close the Marsala's
division, and joined up
with them at about
half‑past eleven. Then
turning northward again he
followed the Novara.
In
the meanwhile things had
not gone well with the
Austrians. The shot from
the Dartmouth
which had done most damage
had put one of the Novara's
main feed pumps out of
action, and perforated the
auxiliary steam‑pipe to
the starboard turbine.
Some time after eleven she
stopped altogether, and
Lieutenant Witkorocski had
to signal to the Saida
to close and take her in
tow.
This
was observed from the
British ships. But the
heavy cruiser from Cattaro
was also in sight, and not
wishing to attack a force
which included such a
formidable vessel, Admiral
Acton at noon turned
towards Brindisi. To the
south of him was the Aquila
in tow by the Schiaffino,
with the Mosto
escorting them. The Mirabello
had joined up with one of
the Corfu destroyers, and
was towing the French
destroyer which had broken
down. These detachments
reached Brindisi without
any further accidents; but
the cruisers still had to
suffer the most serious
blow of the day.
They
were in line abreast with
destroyers ahead and on
the flanks. Shortly before
two o'clock, while still
forty miles from Brindisi,
the Dartmouth was
hit on the port side by a
torpedo fired by a
submarine, and for a time
seemed about to sink. Two
of the Corfu destroyers
hunted the submarine and
kept her down while the
other two cruisers steamed
on at full speed for
Brindisi. The torpedo had
come from UC.25.
She had seen nothing of
the various forces which
had come out of Brindisi
that day, but found
herself by chance on the
track of the returning
cruisers and made a lucky
shot. For a time the water
gained in the Dartmouth,
and Captain Addison, after
putting the crew into the
Italian and French
destroyers, returned on
board with a special party
of officers and men, who
succeeded in partially
righting the ship and
re‑raising steam. A tug
arrived late in the
evening, and the Dartmouth
and her escort got into
Brindisi at three on the
following morning. Even
this did not end the list
of successes which the
Austrians could count to
their score: during the
afternoon the destroyer Boutefeu,
which had been ordered out
to assist the Dartmouth,
struck one of the mines
laid off the harbour by UC.25
and sank rapidly.
The
raid on the Otranto
barrage demonstrated with
painful emphasis the
defencelessness of the
drifters against a night
attack from the north. Yet
it seemed hardly likely
that the raid would be
repeated except at night;
the light hours could be
reckoned as fairly safe;
and the drifters continued
to maintain the barrage,
though until some sort of
protection could be
arranged for them they
were ordered to operate
only in the daytime. Not
until July were the
Italians able to provide
any man‑of‑war cover:
throughout June the
barrage drifters returned
at dusk to port either at
the east or west ends of
the net line.
(Note: Newbolt heads one of the pages "The Austrians Suffer", but in
the series of actions:
Italian destroyer Borea was sunk, one transport blew up, two damaged,
14 British drifters sunk, 3 seriously damaged,
Italian destroyer Aquila damaged.
British cruiser Dartmouth damaged, then torpedoed,
French destroyer Boutefeu mined and sunk.
against
Austrian cruisers Novara and Saida damaged)
3
Submarine Warfare, May to August 1917
The
other attempt to obstruct
the emergence of
submarines from the
Adriatic ‑ the Allied
submarine patrol off
Cattaro and in other
likely places ‑ which had
been maintained by the
force of Allied submarines
based on Brindisi, at last
bore fruit. The first
success fell to the French
submarine, Circe,
watching outside Cattaro
on May 24. She observed a
submarine on passage
outwards, escorted by
destroyers and aircraft.
Being in a good position
for firing she sank it by
two torpedoes, and managed
to escape unseen. The boat
she had destroyed proved
to be UC.24. This
success caused an
intensification of the
enemy precautions and
rendered remote the chance
of repeating the stroke.
In fact ‑ perhaps in
consequence of the raising
of the net barrage every
night - submarine activity
showed some slight
increase in June; even so
it was possible to doubt
whether the nets, when in
place, were any real
obstacle to the passage of
U‑boats. Twenty‑four
separate cruises of
submarines can be traced
in that month; five of
them began in May, and
seven, commencing late in
June, continued into July.
Though the number of
vessels destroyed,
ninety‑four in all, was
the same as that for
April, less than half were
steamers, and the
mercantile tonnage
sinkings decreased from
218,000 in April, the
worst month, to 133,000 in
June:
Mercantile tonnage destroyed by submarines in the Mediterranean.
|
1917.
|
No. of Steamers.
|
No. of Sailing Vessels.
|
Total Tonnage.
|
Percentage of World Total.
|
Jan.
|
12
|
2
|
58,800
|
22
|
Feb.
|
27
|
21
|
100,000
|
21
|
Mar.
|
17
|
18
|
54,000
|
11
|
Apr.
|
51
|
43
|
218,000
|
26
|
May
|
38
|
43
|
146,700
|
26
|
June
|
41
|
53
|
133,700
|
21
|
June
4, 1917
UNBREAKABLE COURAGE
Among
the innumerable examples
of heroism shown by the
men of the merchant
service the action of the
Manchester Trader
falls to be recorded here.
She was an Admiralty
collier on her way home
after being cleared at
Mudros, and was a few
miles from Pantellaria
early on June 4 when a
submarine began to fire on
her from a range of about
five miles. The master,
Captain F. D. Struss, sent
out wireless calls for
assistance, and replied to
the fire with his own gun,
not so much with the idea
of hitting his assailant,
for he was outranged, but
to make the submarine keep
its distance.
Nevertheless, the German
made several hits on the Manchester
Trader, till Captain
Struss conceived the idea
of swerving every time he
saw the flash of the
enemy's gun. He then
found, as he afterwards
wrote to his owners, that
he "need take on board
only one out of three or
four shells, the others
either just striking
sliding blows on her sides
or missing altogether."
After
two and a half hours of
this duel he found that he
had only seven shells
left. One of these was
loaded into the gun, and
he was waiting for a good
chance to fire, when a
shot from the submarine
burst so close to the gun
that it caused the
precious shell to explode,
killed the leading gunner,
and put the gun out of
action. The enemy soon
discovered that the Manchester
Trader was
defenceless, and quickly
overhauled her, firing
rapidly as she approached.
All the crew, mostly
aliens, were under cover;
the only people exposed to
this shelling were Captain
Struss and an apprentice
named Sutcliffe, a lad of
seventeen years old, who
was at the wheel when the
action commenced and
remained there throughout
the four and a half hours
of its duration. At length
Captain Struss admitted
the hopelessness of his
position and abandoned his
battered ship. Knowing
that submarines made
prisoners of the masters
of vessels which offered
resistance, he had changed
into a suit of dungarees.
He thus escaped
recognition; and further,
when the submarine
commander came up and
asked for the master, the
crew all shouted that he
had been killed. The
answer was so extremely
probable that it satisfied
the German. He took away
instead the second mate,
who by silently accepting
captivity showed a fine
loyalty to his skipper.
The submarine then began
again to shell the
abandoned steamer.
At
this point help arrived. A
trawler, forty miles away
when she received the
S.O.S. call from the Manchester
Trader, reached her
while the submarine was
still firing. After a few
shots from the trawler the
enemy drew off at fast
speed and eventually
disappeared. In spite of
what the crew had endured
only one man, the gunner,
had been killed. Among the
awards which so gallant a
fight deserved, Sutcliffe,
the lad at the wheel,
received the medal for
Distinguished Service.
The
most destructive cruise of
any submarine in June was
one by Lieut.-Commander
von Arnauld in U.35.
As before, he chose the
western approach to the
Straits of Gibraltar,
where he had had such
success in April. Since
his return the area had
been visited only by UC.73
coming out from Germany
for the Adriatic. She
spent the last half of May
outside Gibraltar, but did
not succeed in rivalling
Lieut.‑Commander von
Arnauld's previous cruise,
partly because west‑bound
shipping was twice held up
for periods of several
days. A French submarine
watching near Cape St
Vincent saw UC.73
and discharged two
torpedoes; but the
circumstances were not
entirely favourable, and
the German boat was not
hit. She entered the
Mediterranean at the end
of May, and reached
Cattaro after a six‑weeks'
voyage.
Lieut.‑Commander
von Arnauld passed
westward through the
Straits a week later. The
first notice of his
presence on this former
cruising ground of his was
received at Gibraltar on
June 9 from the Tregarthen,
which escaped after attack
about ninety miles west of
Cape Spartel. As soon as
this news reached the
Admiralty they ordered all
west‑bound vessels at
Gibraltar to be held up.
It soon appeared that the
Tregarthen was not
the first vessel attacked:
early on the 8th Arnauld
had sunk a British
Vessel, which,
though armed, was unable
to contend with the
submarine's gun, and being
without wireless
apparatus, could not send
out warning signals or
calls for assistance.
However, the sound of the
firing was heard at Cape
Spartel, and three sloops
and a torpedo boat from
Gibraltar went out to
investigate. They found
much wreckage. Two French
submarines accompanied by
British trawlers cruised
off Cape St Vincent, and
armed yachts, torpedo
boats, and motor launches
patrolled as far to the
westward as they could
get. These patrols,
combined with the warnings
sent out to shipping by
wireless from Gibraltar
and with the fact that all
vessels of any size were
now defensively armed, may
have tended to reduce
Arnauld's chances of
fruitful attack. His
operations in the
Mediterranean approach
lasted a little more than
a fortnight. He sank
eleven ships, totalling
nearly 31,000 tons; eight
armed vessels kept him at
a distance till he either
broke off the engagement
of his own accord or
departed on the arrival of
a patrol; three others,
torpedoed without warning,
made their way into port.
The
Admiralty's instructions
that west bound shipping
June,
1917
HOSPITAL SHIPS IN DANGER
was
to be held up at Gibraltar
soon produced congestion.
By the evening of June 14
there were forty‑two ships
awaiting permission to
sail westward, and
although there were then
only two sloops available
to patrol to westward, the
traffic had to be released
with instructions to reach
Cape Spartel at or soon
after dusk and follow the
African coast as far as
the parallel of 35û. On
the 16th fifteen ships
sailed. Only one was
attacked. A torpedo passed
along her side without
exploding. Looking in the
direction from which it
had come she saw the
submarine breaking
surface. She fired three
rounds at it and thought
she hit it; the submarine
did not reply, but dived
rapidly and made off.
While
Lieut.‑Commander von
Arnauld's cruise was in
progress, the German
submarine UC.52,
on passage from Germany,
put into Cadiz for
repairs. Since the damage
to her was in the nature
of machinery breakdown due
to the action of the
weather, the Spanish
authorities permitted it
to be put right on
condition that the
submarine when she left
should refrain from
attacking any vessel
during her voyage to the
Adriatic. The progress of
the repair was carefully
watched by our agents at
Cadiz, and when on the
27th they reported that
she was ready to sail, our
own submarine E.38
went out and lay off the
port to catch her. The
U‑boat slipped out two
nights later when it was
very dark and managed to
get past E.38
without being sighted. A
sweep by four torpedo
boats and four motor
launches from Gibraltar
also failed to locate her,
and she reached the
Adriatic safely, having
carefully refrained from
attacking any merchant
ships. After this episode,
the Spanish Government
announced that any
submarine taking refuge in
Spanish ports would be
interned.
At
the end of March the
Germans had announced
their intention to sink
hospital ships in the
Mediterranean, alleging as
their reason for this
callous breach of
international law that the
vessels were being used
for the transport of
troops and ammunition. The
allegation was totally
unfounded, but it seemed
possible that the threat
might be carried out, and
the hospital ships were
held in harbour till some
arrangements for their
protection could be made.
Four British destroyers
had just been allocated to
work on the Otranto
barrage under Admiral
Kerr; they were now kept
back to act as escorts for
the threatened vessels. By
April 15, after the
hospital ships had been
kept in harbour for a
week, they were allowed to
resume sailings, each to
have an escort of two
destroyers when carrying
sick and wounded. They
were to zigzag and to be
darkened at night; in
fact, they were to take
the same precautions as if
they were troop‑ships.
Further, they were to take
precedence over
troop‑ships as regards the
supply of escorts, the
consequent delay in the
movement of troops being
accepted as necessary.
From that time onwards
hospital ships surrendered
their immunity from
attack.
There
was no long delay: on May
26 at 7 p.m. the two
hospital ships, Dover
Castle and Karapara,
both clearly painted as
such, were steaming in
company eastward along the
Algerian coast under the
escort of the destroyers Cameleon
and Nemesis, two
of those intended for the
Otranto barrage, but
allocated, after the
German announcement, to
the defence of hospital
ships. Suddenly there was
an explosion; the Dover
Castle had been
torpedoed by an unseen
submarine. She immediately
manned and lowered all her
boats, and by 8 p.m. all
the patients were clear of
the ship. The Karapara
had been ordered to
proceed into Bona, the
nearest port, her
attendant destroyer
putting up a smoke screen
which effectively hid the
hospital ship from view.
Both arrived safely at
Bona. Meanwhile the Cameleon
picked up the patients
from the Dover Castle's
boats, went alongside to
take on board the
remainder, and departed
also for Bona, her
commander considering the
safety of the 950 lives on
board his destroyer more
important than the
possible saving of a
damaged ship. There still
remained in the Dover
Castle her captain
and a volunteer party
preparing her for being
towed if that should prove
feasible. Before the Cameleon
passed completely out of
their sight another
torpedo hit the Dover
Castle; this one was
fatal, and she sank in 2
1/2 minutes. The party
boarded a boat, and were
picked up six hours later
by a French patrol. Owing
to the calm and clear
weather, and to the
perfect discipline which
had prevailed throughout,
the loss of life was
small: out of the 841 on
board the hospital ship,
patients and crew, only
six stokers were killed or
drowned, probably at the
time of the explosions.
There
were now so many vessels
being torpedoed while
under what had been
thought was a strong
escort that the actual
disposition of the
destroyers in this
instance was specially
investigated. The practice
adopted by the senior of
the two escorting officers
was to station a destroyer
on each side abaft the
beam of the convoy. This
arrangement was the result
of careful thought and of
discussion with other
patrol officers. It was
generally recognised that
a submarine's best chance
of hitting a ship was to
fire from a position off
her bow; and to frustrate
this method of attack it
had been usual to place
the escort ahead of the
beam. But it was now known
that the transport Transylvania
and other ships had been
torpedoed by submarines
firing from
May‑June,
1917
ESCORT PROBLEMS
astern
of the escort; and as in
such cases the destroyers
had to turn before they
could get into position
for dropping depth
charges, the result was
that the submarine
escaped. The new idea was
that, if the escorting
destroyers were stationed
abaft the beam, an
attacking submarine would
be ahead of them, and
therefore liable to
instant attack when
sighted. Unfortunately, on
this occasion, the enemy
was not sighted, and the
destroyers had no chance
to attack. The Admiralty
disapproved the
innovation; they
considered it was framed
to utilise the convoy as a
decoy rather than to
prevent the submarine from
firing from her most
favourable position. After
this, therefore, the
former practice was
restored, and escorts were
always stationed on the
bows of their convoys.
The
necessity for escorting
hospital ships continued
for several months in
spite of negotiations with
the German Government to
secure their safety. In
June the Berlin Admiralty
staff agreed to refrain
from attack on hospital
ships provided they were
under the constant
supervision of neutral
commissioners who would
remain permanently on
board; only those ships
which carried such
commissioners were to wear
the Red Cross or special
markings, and none of them
was to be escorted by
armed vessels; a special
route was not obligatory.
Here the King of Spain
lent his assistance, and
Spanish officers were
appointed to embark as
commissioners. Some months
elapsed before the new
arrangement was in working
order; but by undertaking
to guarantee to the
satisfaction of the German
Admiralty the employment
of hospital ships for no
other purpose than the
conveyance of sick and
wounded, the Spanish
Government ended a
particularly revolting
phase of submarine war as
conducted by Germany, and
rendered a memorable
service to humanity.
The
submarine which had sunk
the Dover Castle
appears to have been a
UC‑boat. Coming out of the
Adriatic about May 23, she
torpedoed and sank the
British steamer Elmmoor
close to the south point
of Sicily, and then,
proceeding along the
French African coast,
where she sank the Dover
Castle, mined
Algiers about the 27th.
The minefield, though it
hindered navigation,
caused no losses. The
submarine continued her
cruise until about June 9,
and it was most probably
this boat which fought the
gallant Manchester
Trader.
The
losses in June included
two transports, the Cameronian
and the Cestrian.
Each was accompanied by a
pair of escorting ships,
and each was torpedoed by
an unseen submarine. The Cameronian
was on passage to Egypt
with mules, and when still
some fifty miles short of
Alexandria was sunk in the
dark hours before dawn on
June 2. The soldiers on
board her were only those
in charge of the mules.
She sank five minutes
after being struck, but
the loss of life would
have been small if the
explosion had not
instantly flooded a deck
on which were forty men
sleeping in hammocks. The
loss in the Cestrian
was fortunately lighter
still. She was in the
Aegean, carrying horses,
but had on board also more
than 800 soldiers. She was
torpedoed at 9.30 a.m. on
the 24th, but did not sink
till 2 p.m. Perfect
discipline was maintained,
and the loss of life was
confined to three members
of the crew killed by the
explosion of the torpedo.
The torpedoing of the Cestrian
was one of the rare
successes of the
Constantinople submarines,
which since the
declaration of
unrestricted warfare had
been operating
intermittently in the
Aegean. It was the work of
UB.42, then
commanded by Lieutenant
Schwartz. This boat had
been out in February and
again early in April, and
had sunk a few sailing
vessels. On her second
cruise she had also
torpedoed the sloop Veronica
not far from Alexandria
and had put her out of
action for some months.
The other Constantinople
boat operating in the
Aegean was the submarine
minelayer UC.23,
which in May and June
mined the approaches to
Salonica, and also on her
second cruise had the
fortune to sink two
steamers (Der
Krieg zur See. Die
Mittelmeer Division.
Kap 25.); but
UB.42's destruction
of the Cestrian
was so far the greatest
achievement of the
Constantinople flotilla.
The loss caused us a good
deal of anxiety, for she
was taking part in a
considerable transference
of British troops from
Salonica to Egypt.
Possibly
as a result of the Allied
blockade of the mainland
of Greece, which had begun
in December 1916, (See
ante, p. 171.) anti-Royalist
feeling had by this time
begun to make progress.
The islands, one by one,
declared for the
Provisional Government
conducted by M. Venizelos
under the aegis of France,
and trade from them was
permitted to non‑blockaded
ports. At Crete, the
headquarters of the
Provisional Government, a
Venizelist army was
drilling. Its preparations
had so far advanced that
from May 17 onwards a
division was transferred
to Salonica to relieve
British troops. These
Greek troops were carried
in Greek vessels, each
being given an escort of
two ships provided from
the British First Detached
Squadron, which was based
on Candia and was
responsible for all
escorts in the Aegean.
There were only enough
escorts available for two
transports a day, but at
the actual rate of
embarkation this number
proved sufficient
June,
1917
PRESSURE ON GREECE
to
enable the movement of
Greek troops to proceed
smoothly. Mines were
reported off Candia on the
22nd; but a channel was
swept in time for the
transports to proceed in
accordance with their
programme. The British
troops moved from Salonica
to Egypt consisted of the
Sixtieth Division and the
Seventh and Eighth Mounted
Brigades ‑ in all some
21,000 officers and men
and 8,500 animals. These
were conveyed in sixteen
voyages, each transport
having an escort of two
destroyers and returning
for another load as soon
as it had disembarked at
Alexandria the troops and
animals that had come on
board at Salonica. The
voyage took from three to
four days. The move began
on June 1, and continued
throughout the month,
coming to an end on June
30, when the headquarters
Staff left Salonica for
Alexandria. Throughout the
sixteen voyages, the only
transport to meet a
submarine was the Cestrian,
torpedoed and sunk on June
24. It was her third
voyage during the move,
and she had already safely
transported 1,600 men of
the Sixtieth Division.
The
fear of mines at Salonica,
aroused by the report that
a submarine had been
sighted near the harbour,
caused all sailings to be
suspended from June 7 to
9. When they were resumed,
a fresh movement of French
troops threw an additional
burden on the transport
and escort services; the
move of the Sixtieth
Division went on, but
until the French troops
had all been despatched to
their new destination the
Venizelists in Crete were
held up for lack of
escort. This French force
had been ordered to the
mainland of Greece to
ensure a favourable
termination of the
political crisis which was
rapidly approaching in
that country. On June 5 a
French plenipotentiary,
Monsieur Jonnart, arrived
at Athens, with
instructions to assume the
direction of Allied
affairs and policy in
Greece. He was also to
intimate to King
Constantine the desire of
the Allies that he should
abdicate until the war was
over. This demand was to
be backed up by a show of
force sufficient to
overawe any resistance
that the Royalist party
might wish to offer; and
it was for this purpose
that French troops were
now being moved from
Salonica to the Piraeus. A
French naval squadron
arrived there on the 5th,
and in the evening of the
10th a number of
transports came in to the
Piraeus. During the
forenoon of June 12 the
troops in them, about
8,000 French and 3,000
Russians, landed,
nominally for purposes of
health; but they
disembarked under the guns
of the French squadron,
which included the
battleships Justice and
Verite, the latter
flying the flag of
Vice‑Admiral de Gueydon.
That
morning, June 12, King
Constantine abdicated in
favour of his second son,
Prince Alexander. All was
quiet in Athens, and
Admiral Hayes‑Sadler, who,
in the Implacable
was watching events,
reported that this was
"due chiefly to the
powerful influence of the
King, who proclaimed to
the people that his
departure was provisional
only, and that as it was
the only method of saving
the dynasty, any attempt
to prevent it would have
the effect of destroying
the monarchy and the
nation." Two days later
the blockade of Greece was
raised. Its enforcement
had been carried out
mainly by the French, in
whose zone western and
southern Greece lay, and
by the British Third
Detached Squadron based on
Salonica. Its cessation
freed a certain number of
small craft for other
duties; and the situation
rapidly cleared. Before
the end of June Monsieur
Venizelos became Prime
Minister; on June 27
Greece definitely joined
the Allies and declared
war on the Central Powers.
Venizelos then requested
France to return the Greek
fleet to Greece; he
announced his intention of
defensively arming Greek
shipping, and asked that
Greece might be
responsible for the
defence of one of the
patrol zones. (It was
not till February 25,
1918, that French
opposition to this last
request could be
overcome. Greece was
then permitted to patrol
a small zone including
the Piraeus.) Thus
the political problem in
the Mediterranean, the
dubious position of
Greece, was at last
solved, with the Allies,
represented by France, in
control.
There
remained, however, the
naval problem ‑ the
submarine campaign ‑ and
no final solution of this
was at present in sight,
though a favourable change
had, in fact, begun. The
losses from submarine
action certainly showed a
marked and progressive
reduction after April of
this year. In that month
fifty‑one steamers were
sunk and the total was
218,000 tons; in July the
number of steamers sunk
was twenty‑two and the
total tonnage 85,000. The
convoy system was now in
full operation in the
Eastern Mediterranean for
vessels other than those
important enough to
receive a special escort.
But, as has been noted
before, this special
escort did not always
succeed in baffling
attack. For instance, the
Eloby, on Admiralty
charter conveying
munitions and some
hundreds of soldiers from
Marseilles to Salonica,
was torpedoed when in
convoy with one other ship
and under the escort of a
French destroyer. The
shock of the explosion set
off the ammunition, and a
terrible destruction of
life resulted. There were
several other losses in
convoys of this type,
among them the large P.
and O. liner, Mooltan,
which with another vessel
was under escort by two
Japanese destroyers. She
had
July,
1917
CONVOYS ORGANISED
554
souls on board, but by the
skilful handling of the
destroyers, who promptly
put up a smoke screen, all
except one were saved.
A
striking example of the
impunity with which
subrnarines could attack
vessels presumably well
protected and in patrolled
areas was the fate of the
Mongara, a P. and
O. liner, on passage from
Port Said. In the
afternoon of July 3 she
was approaching Messina in
company with an Italian
mail boat, and was
escorted by an Italian
destroyer ahead and an
Italian armed trawler
astern. Already, when off
Catania, she had seen a
torpedo coming for her,
and had avoided it by
putting her helm over. She
had a line of men on the
lookout all round the
ship, and a particularly
keen watcher in the crow's
nest. When Messina
breakwater came in sight
the destroyer went on
ahead into port, and in
view of the narrowness of
the strait and the
necessities of navigation,
the Mongara ceased
zigzagging and steadied on
to a course for entering
harbour. She was still a
mile from the breakwater
when a torpedo from an
unseen submarine struck
her, and she sank in a few
minutes. This was
presumably the work of a
UC‑boat, which, after
mining Malta and Syracuse,
had penetrated into these
narrow waters. The
minefield at Malta also
cost us a ship. It was not
laid in the swept channel
maintained by the
minesweepers of the port,
and no damage could well
have been done by it so
long as ships followed the
prescribed route. But,
unfortunately, a hospital
ship under escort of the
two sloops Aster
and Azalea took a
wrong course right over
the minefield. The
hospital ship herself
escaped unhurt; but the Aster
struck a mine and sank,
and the Azalea was
so damaged as to need
extensive repair.
The
British type of large
convoy, five or six
vessels in close formation
escorted by four trawlers,
came into force on the
Malta‑Alexandria route
about the end of May.
Until then ships had been
escorted singly to Suda
Bay and taken on from
there by a fresh escort,
but Admiral Ballard now
organised a system of
through convoys whereby
ships went the whole
distance without calling
anywhere or changing
escorts. The first convoy
of this type ‑ four ships
with four trawlers
escorting ‑ left Malta on
May 22, and a similar
convoy proceeded from
Malta either for Bizerta
or Alexandria practically
day thenceforward. From
Alexandria westbound a
similar convoy proceeded
every other day with the
escort which had brought a
convoy from Malta. In the
Western Mediterranean
between Bizerta and
Gibraltar ships followed
the coast route under the
protection of French
patrols, very important
vessels being given a
special escort and
following a devious route
in the open sea.
The
first loss among the Malta
convoys occurred oil June
20, when the Ruperra,
one of a convoy of six
ships for Bizerta,
escorted by four trawlers,
was torpedoed by an unseen
submarine. A month passed
before there was another
loss. On July 16, a convoy
of six vessels in two
lines was on its way from
Malta to Alexandria with
four trawlers escorting,
when the Khephren,
a large British vessel
leading the port line,
sighted a periscope close
on her starboard beam,
between her and the leader
of the starboard line. The
Khephren turned and
opened fire, but at the
same time observed a
torpedo so close that it
was impossible to avoid
it. It struck her, and she
sank in four minutes. In
spite of the rapidity of
the accident, every one of
her crew was saved, only
one man being injured by
fragments from the shell
of the other convoyed
ships, which, being in
close order, were within
range of the periscope,
and instantly opened fire
on it. These two, the Khephren
and the Ruperra,
were the only losses among
the 275 vessels escorted
in the Malta convoys from
their inception on May 22
to the loss of the Khephren
on July 16.
Although
the anti‑submarine forces
could not claim a definite
success in July, they had
certainly succeeded in
making the enemy's
operations more difficult.
Among the numerous
comparatively fruitless
cruises of submarines was
that of a boat which left
Cattaro at the end of
June. On July I she was
sighted by French aircraft
from Corfu, and hunted by
them and by Italian
torpedo boats. Three days
later she was seen south
of Sicily by a French
gunboat, which headed for
her and forced her to
dive. There was a convoy
within sight, but it did
not alter course and was
not attacked. Proceeding
westward, the submarine
came upon a pair of ships
escorted by another French
gunboat. She torpedoed one
of the ships, but was at
once forced to dive by the
gunboat, which had seen
her periscope and dropped
depth charges on her.
These had no fatal effect,
for on July 6 she was off
the west point of Sicily,
and there destroyed a
small Italian sailing
vessel, the Roma.
Since the one boat of this
craft was so smashed as to
be unseaworthy, the
submarine took the Roma's
crew on board, while she
cruised for two days in
the area between Cape Bon
and Sicily. During that
time she made no attacks.
At noon on July 8 the crew
of the Roma were
called on deck and ordered
to embark in the boat of
another small Italian
sailing vessel which the
submarine had arrested and
blown up with a bomb. She
then apparently cruised in
the neighbourhood of
July,
1917
PERIODICAL CONVOYS
Cape
Bon, for another fruitless
three days, after which
she was sighted, out of
range, by a French
destroyer off Bizerta, and
again by an armed French
merchantman, also out of
range next day. On the
13th a P. and O. liner
sighted her periscope
right astern. The liner
fired one round, and the
periscope disappeared; it
had not been seen by the
escorting destroyer.
Another steamer was in
sight, heading in the
opposite direction; this
vessel saw nothing of the
submarine and was not
attacked. The U‑boat
continued cruising in the
neighbourhood of Bizerta,
where on the 14th she was
twice seen, once by a
French tug and once by a
French patrol vessel,
which fired on her and
made her dive. Still
cruising fruitlessly, she
was sighted the following
evening by a French
destroyer escorting a
couple of vessels. The
French boat had a torpedo
at the ready in her tube;
she discharged it at once,
but the submarine was
quicker and dived. When
the torpedo reached her
she was deep enough for it
to pass right over her.
The destroyer had followed
her torpedo, and passing
over the submarine's wake,
saw the submarine itself
below the surface,
outlined in phosphorescent
light. She dropped a depth
charge on it. When the
turmoil due to the
explosion had subsided no
more could be seen of the
enemy boat, and nothing
came to the surface to
give evidence of a hit.
Although the submarine
seemed to have escaped
damage, she now abandoned
the busy area off Bizerta
and started for home. On
her way she fired on a
small Italian sailing
vessel and sank a Greek
steamer outside the
Adriatic. In her three
weeks' cruise she had been
bombed by aircraft and
fired on several times by
patrol boats and
defensively armed
merchantmen; she had twice
been depth‑charged and
once had narrowly escaped
a torpedo. Her cruise,
too, from the point of
view of warfare on
merchant shipping, was
ineffective: she had sunk
one steamer of 2,358 tons
and four sailing vessels
whose united tonnage made
up an equal amount.
Another
system of periodical
convoys was organised by
the Italians for the
supply ships coming to
Italy from Gibraltar.
Vessels with speeds of
over 12 knots were allowed
to proceed alone; but
slower ships were
collected in convoys of
four, each convoy being
escorted by one armed
merchant cruiser. By this
means an average of 190
ships a month sailed from
Gibraltar for Italian
ports. Although one
cruiser and eleven armed
merchant cruisers were
allocated by the Italian
Admiralty specially to
work this convoy system,
there was sometimes
difficulty in arranging an
escort, and some convoys
left with no further
protection than could be
expected from one
well‑armed consort.
Nevertheless, Admiral
Heathcoat Grant, who
succeeded Admiral Currey
at Gibraltar on July 5,
was able to report that
the system was successful
and showed the advantage
of convoy over single
ships on passage,
Actually, the only steamer
lost in July on the coast
route between Gibraltar
and Naples was an Italian
vessel torpedoed without
warning at night between
Genoa and Spezzia.
Towards
the end of July the
British ocean system of
large convoys was
introduced for the passage
from Gibraltar to England.
It did not apply to ships
faster than 11 knots, and
consequently excluded all
the more important
vessels, such as liners,
transports, and ships with
specially valuable
Government cargoes; but in
the convoys were collected
the tramp steamers,
returning colliers, iron
ore ships, and others
without which neither the
war nor the trade of the
Allies could continue. The
most dangerous parts of
the voyage for these
Gibraltar convoys were the
beginning and end. The
vessels were met on
approaching England by
destroyers and screened
in; but for the danger
zone between Gibraltar and
Cape St Vincent they had
to rely on such protection
as could be provided from
Admiral Heathcoat Grant's
forces. In addition to his
own auxiliary patrol
vessels, the Admiral had
four French submarines and
a few trawlers from the
French Morocco Division.
To
these last he delegated
the patrol of the trade
route between Cape St.
Mary and Cape Trafalgar, a
stretch which included
Cadiz and the iron‑ore
port of Huelva. The
British patrol vessels
under his command he
distributed at four
principal stations ‑ one
to the westward of Cape
Spartel, which was the
converging point of all
shipping bound in or out
of the Mediterranean, one
between Cape Spartel and
Gibraltar, one across the
strait off Gibraltar
itself, and one east from
Gibraltar along the coast
of Spain, which was the
route for all east‑bound
traffic. When a convoy had
to be screened out, these
patrols were necessarily
depleted, and the Admiral
therefore asked for large
reinforcements. These, as
it happened, had been
arranged, and on August 1
he learned that before
October the French Morocco
Division and a flotilla of
United States gunboats
would arrive to swell his
anti‑submarine forces. But
to protect the July
convoys he had nothing
beyond his original
resources, fifty-four
armed craft of all kinds
for all purposes; even of
these he had constantly to
employ the best in the
escort of important single
ships bound to and from
Malta.
The
first of the convoys left
Gibraltar at 8 p.m. on
July 26, containing
thirteen ships of various
Allied nationalities, the
largest being an Italian
of 4,500 tons, bound to
Wales for coal. The convoy
had an ocean escort of one
Q‑ship; from
July,
1917
CONVOY ORGANISATION
Gibraltar
to the meridian of Cape St
Vincent it was accompanied
by two sloops, an armed
boarding vessel and two
torpedo boats, all from
Gibraltar. A submarine was
known to be operating off
Cape Finisterre, but this
was not on the route, and
when the convoy started,
no submarine was known to
be in the Gibraltar danger
zone. But shortly after
its departure a report
came in from a French
armed trawler that she had
engaged a U‑boat about
twenty miles north‑west
from Cape Spartel,
uncomfortably near the
track which the convoy
would follow. Several more
reports of this submarine
were received before the
convoy was clear of the
danger zone, but nothing
was seen of the enemy, and
the only loss sustained
was from a collision in
which a French vessel
rammed one of the
escorting sloops and so
badly damaged herself that
she sank.
As
yet, no convoy system for
outward‑bound vessels from
home had been introduced.
One of these, the Manchester
Commerce, with 6,000
tons of Welsh coal for
Toulon, was the first
victim of the submarine
waiting off Cape Spartel.
The collier was torpedoed
before she saw anything of
the enemy, the explosion
wrecking her wireless and
preventing the despatch of
an Allo message. But this
area off Cape Spartel was
patrolled by Gibraltar
torpedo-boats, and one of
them, hearing the
explosion, came up within
twenty minutes after the
ship had sunk, and rescued
the crew in their boats.
Three large merchant
vessels left Gibraltar
that day, July 29; but the
second convoy, which
should have sailed on the
30th, was held back when
news came in that morning
of the sinking of two more
large east‑bound colliers
in the same area. This
time the submarine was
sighted by a torpedo-boat,
which dropped three depth
charges on her, but
without any apparent
effect. The Implacable,
the last of the fully
commissioned British
battleships in the
Mediterranean, was then at
Gibraltar ready to sail
for home, and two
destroyers were with her
as escort. She was
detained until the moon,
which was nearly full,
should have waned. But
although the convoy was
kept back, a large Clan
liner and a hospital ship
sailed from Gibraltar for
home on the 30th.
The
submarine news on July 31
was more reassuring. Oil
was still rising from the
spot in the Spartel area
where the three depth
charges had been dropped,
and the natural inference
was that the U‑boat was
there on the bottom
disabled; the only enemy
reported in the
Mediterranean approach was
off Cape Trafalgar in the
forenoon. The convoy,
eight ships, sailed at 8
p.m. with a powerful
escort of destroyers and
sloops; it would be well
clear of the Cape Spartel
area before dawn. It was
accompanied through the
danger zone by five
vessels bound for the
United States; they were
to separate from it at the
meridian thirty miles west
of Cape St Vincent.
Although there was still
submarine activity in the
waters through which the
convoy passed, it was not
molested, and it reached
England safely. The U‑boat
had apparently crossed
over to the line of
approach from the south to
Cape Spartel. There on
August 1 she fired a
torpedo at and missed a
British steamer whose
master in return
attempted, though
unsuccessfully, to ram
her. An hour later another
British steamer in the
same area was fired on
until a Gibraltar sloop
came up and drove the
submarine away.
The
next convoy was due to
leave on August 4. The
small numbers in the
previous convoys, eight
and thirteen respectively,
surprised the Admiralty.
During the first six
months of 1917 ships had
left Gibraltar westward
for English and French
ports at the average rate
of six a day. Now, in the
last ten days of July only
twenty‑one had left. The
Admiralty had expected
many more. As a matter of
fact the low numbers were
purely accidental: all
vessels approaching from
the east had been called
in to Gibraltar, and those
of suitable speeds were
not allowed to leave
except in the convoys. On
August 4 the third convoy
sailed with more normal
numbers; there were twenty
vessels in five columns;
and three ships bound for
America left with them, to
part company as before
when beyond the danger
zone. The U‑boat had now
gone back to the coast of
Spain, where in the
afternoon of the 3rd she
destroyed by gunfire a
Norwegian steamer off
Huelva. An unusual
incident marked the
passage of the convoy. By
10 a.m. on August 5 it was
about ninety miles west of
Gibraltar. At this point
the Ryton, the
second ship in the port
wing column, struck some
submerged object, and a
few seconds later struck
it again. The force of
impact was enough to crush
in the hull of the steamer
so badly that she sank
shortly afterwards. It
seemed most probable that
what had been struck was
the U‑boat, and that it
could scarcely have
survived two such shocks.
But here again the
vitality of the submarine
was under‑estimated. It
must certainly have been
dangerously injured; but
it managed nevertheless to
travel 1,800 miles and to
reach a German port in
safety.
From
this time onward convoys
left at regular four‑day
intervals without any
noteworthy incident;
altogether seven proceeded
in August, with a total of
110 ships. The
Mediterranean‑bound
vessels continued to
arrive singly even after
July‑Aug.
1917
COMMANDS REORGANISED
mid‑August,
when a system of out‑bound
convoys from home was
introduced. At the
parallel of Cape
Finisterre, these
out‑bound convoys
dispersed, the ships then
proceeding independently
to their destinations. It
is significant that the
losses in the
Mediterranean approach now
occurred only among these
dispersed and independent
ships.
By
this time the discussions
with the French as to the
nationality of the officer
who was to be in supreme
control of routes and
patrols in the
Mediterranean had been
settled. On June 9 the
French had accepted the
principle that a British
Admiral should take charge
of this important branch
of anti‑submarine warfare.
The officer first selected
for the new post, which
was to include that of
Commander‑in‑Chief of all
British forces in the
Mediterranean, was Admiral
Wemyss. He was relieved as
Commander‑in‑Chief, East
Indies, on July 21 by
Rear‑Admiral Ernest F. A.
Gaunt, who had been
serving as a Rear‑Admiral
in the Grand Fleet. The
opportunity was taken for
separating Egypt from the
East Indies command, and
Rear‑Admiral Thomas
Jackson took over as
Senior Naval Officer,
Egypt, the next day, his
command including the Red
Sea as far as the Straits
of Bab‑el‑Mandeb. By these
two changes ‑ the
appointment of a
Commander‑in‑Chief of the
British Naval Forces and
the removal of Egypt and
the Red Sea from the East
Indies command ‑ the
Mediterranean as a British
Naval Station was restored
to the position of
importance it had held
before the convention of
August 6, 1914, when the
French assumed supreme
command and the British
Mediterranean forces were
reduced to a cruiser
squadron. The new
arrangement had not been
necessitated by any
pressure by the enemy's
surface ships, to which
the French alone showed an
overwhelming numerical
superiority; it was the
submarines that by their
activity in these waters
had brought back a British
Commander‑in‑Chief to the
Mediterranean.
Although
Admiral Wemyss was the
first choice, it was not
he who actually arrived to
take up the restored
command. As soon as he
reached home, he was
appointed to the Admiralty
as Deputy First Sea Lord
to Admiral Jellicoe, whom
he afterwards succeeded;
and Vice‑Admiral Sir
Somerset Gough Calthorpe
was sent out as British
Commander‑in‑Chief in the
Mediterranean. The terms
of this officer's
appointment, dated August
6, made him head of the
organisation to be set up
at Malta for the general
direction of routes,
including escort and
patrol duties, and made
him also director within
his command of the
anti‑submarine operations
of the British and French
naval forces. The Italians
had not consented to put
their patrol and escort
services under the general
command preferring to
manage their
anti‑submarine operations
themselves in their own
zones. But subject to the
general authority of the
French Commander‑in‑Chief,
Admiral Calthorpe was to
lay down the principles to
be observed in the
control, escort, and
navigation of all
mercantile traffic in the
Mediterranean. He hoisted
his flag on August 26.
Simultaneously, the
outlying squadrons
suffered a reduction in
status. Vice‑Admiral
Thursby was relieved by
Rear-Admiral Sydney R.
Fremantle, and the Eastern
Mediterranean Squadron
over which the latter
hoisted his flag on August
25 became the British
Aegean Squadron. Admiral
Mark Kerr went home,
leaving Commodore Heneage
in command of the British
Adriatic Squadron; and
Admiral Ballard at Malta
ceased to direct
operations.
CHAPTER IX
UNRESTRICTED SUBMARINE WARFARE
1
February to April 1917
We
have already noted that
the battle of Jutland, in
spite of the fact that it
was not fought to a
finish, had in reality
ended one stage of the
naval war and defined the
form and method of the
final struggle. That our
enemies were the first to
recognise this and frame
their action accordingly,
is not to be wondered at:
they were driven by a
necessity which, though
ruinous, was unavoidable.
The British navy might
still cherish confident
hopes of a second and more
decisive general action;
the German Naval Chiefs
had been instantly
compelled to realise that
if Great Britain was to be
overthrown at sea, the
blow must be struck, not
by the High Seas Fleet,
but by the submarines;
there remained no
alternative but
unrestricted U‑boat war.
The moment of decision
could not be foreseen by
the British Admiralty or
the War Cabinet, but they
knew that it could not be
long delayed: they were
not privileged to follow
in detail the struggle
which was going on at
Pless between the
counsellors of violence
and the counsellors of
prudence and moderation,
but the diplomatic strain
between Germany and
America was visible to all
the world. In Great
Britain there was probably
no one in any responsible
position who had not for
some months past realised
and gravely weighed the
coming danger.
Late
in October, 1916, Admiral
Jellicoe wrote to the
Admiralty that there
appeared to be "a serious
danger that our losses in
merchant ships, combined
with the losses in neutral
merchant ships, may, by
the early summer of 1917,
have such a serious effect
upon the import of food
and other necessaries into
the Allied countries as to
force us into accepting
peace terms which the
military position on the
Continent would not
justify, and which would
fall short of our
desires." Admiral Beatty
was still more emphatic:
he spoke of the danger as
"jeopardising the fate of
the nation and seriously
interfering with the
successful prosecution of
the war." What followed
was a complete recognition
of a very disturbing
situation. The Government
had replied to Admiral
Jellicoe's letter by
inviting him to confer
with them in person, and
this he did on November 2
in London. The serious
feature of the campaign
was, as he pointed out,
that the submarine attack
was being extended
steadily westwards into
the open waters at the
outer end of the English
Channel. The Admiralty, in
an official memorandum to
the Government, took the
same view as Admiral
Jellicoe, and added a
still more discouraging
comment. "Of all the
problems which the
Admiralty have to
consider," they wrote, "no
doubt the most formidable
and the most embarrassing
is that raised by
submarine attack upon
merchant vessels. No
conclusive answer has as
yet been found to this
form of warfare; perhaps
no conclusive answer
ever will be found. We
must for the present be
content with palliation."
The
consultation between the
Government and Admiral
Jellicoe was followed by a
conference at the
Admiralty, which further
emphasised the perplexity
of the situation. This
conference was, by its
composition,
representative of the
highest naval opinion, yet
it only seems to have been
unanimously agreed upon
one single point: the need
for appointing an officer
of high rank to
co‑ordinate and control
all anti‑submarine
operations. This result
accurately represented the
general state of naval
opinion, which was at the
time very undecided. The
prevailing anxiety had
called out a large number
of suggestions from naval
officers of all ranks. The
remedies they proposed
differed widely. A
powerful body of opinion
was in favour of an attack
upon the German coasts.
Admiral Bayly at
Queenstown had suggested
this long before, and
during the autumn of the
year Captain Percy Royds
sent in a strongly‑worded
paper advising an attack
on Zeebrugge. Commodore
Tyrwhitt pressed for an
attack on the Zeebrugge
locks; but after a
conference between him and
Admirals Jellicoe, Bacon
and Oliver, the Admiralty
decided that the scheme
should not be proceeded
with.
A
number of other naval
officers put forward plans
for intensive mining as
the desired cure; and
there was certainly a
group of far‑sighted men
who realised that if the
merchant service was to be
protected, it would have
to be placed under escort.
Those who at this stage
foresaw the measure which
was in the end to save the
situation deserve to be
honourably and gratefully
remembered.
For
the present, however,
there appeared to be only
one
Jan.
1917
ADMIRALTY VIEWS
point
on which there was
anything like a general
measure of agreement ‑ it
was evident that many
naval officers considered
the command of the
anti‑submarine forces to
be too much decentralised
and divided. As a result
of the conference,
therefore, it was decided
to create a special
division of the Admiralty
for controlling and
co‑ordinating the
operations of our
anti‑submarine forces, and
to place a Flag Officer in
charge of it. Admiral Duff
was the officer selected;
he had been Second in
Command of the 4th Battle
Squadron of the Grand
Fleet, and possessed the
confidence of Admiral
Jellicoe in a high degree.
Both these officers left
the Grand Fleet to take up
their new duties at
Whitehall in the first
days' of December. (For
Admiral Jellicoe's
appointment to the post
of First Sea, Lord, see
ante, p. 71.)
2
The Admiralty's Appreciation
Shortly
after Admiral Duff took
office, the Admiralty made
an exhaustive survey of
all the methods and
devices of anti-submarine
warfare then in force, and
outlined their future
policy with regard to
them. These measures fall
roughly into two classes:
those which were items in
the general plan of
attacking U‑boats wherever
they could be found; and
those which were intended
to give better protection
to merchant shipping.
1.
It was proposed that, as
soon as possible,
detachments of destroyers
and "P" boats should be
based at Portsmouth and
Devonport for the sole
purpose of hunting
submarines. As a general
rule, destroyers and "P"
boats at the principal
bases had either been
detached from their
escorting or patrolling
duties to undertake a
hunt, if the Admiralty or
the local
Commander‑in‑Chief thought
it advisable; or else they
had turned automatically
from their ordinary duties
to attack a submarine if
it was known to be
operating within striking
distance. It was therefore
now suggested that special
"hunting patrols" should
be formed in order to
leave the remaining patrol
forces free to carry out
their ordinary work. It
would follow that these
hunting patrols, in the
course of their duties,
would acquire a
specialised knowledge of
antisubmarine tactics.
The
Admiralty were also
pressing forward certain
other measures, which,
though they were
classified separately in
the general appreciation
or survey of the position,
were really complementary
to the plan of
constituting these special
hunting flotillas. The
most important of these
complementary measures was
the organisation of air
patrols at various points
on the south coast;
attempts were also being
made to organise ships
fitted with hydrophones
into special detachments
which should always
operate together. These
hydrophone patrols became
immensely important later
on; but at the time a
suitable hydrophone had
still to be designed, and
the Admiralty remarked,
with regard to this new
measure, that experiments
were being carried out in
the Solent "with a certain
measure of success."
2.
A variety of special
measures with regard to
mining were being
considered. The Admiralty
attached very great
importance to a project
that had recently been put
forward for laying deep
minefields on the tracks
that German U‑boats were
known to be using, and for
stationing so many patrol
craft near the fields that
the U‑boats would be
compelled to dive into the
danger zone. In addition
to this, it had been
suggested that a fleet of
motor launches should lay
mines in shallow waters
close up to the mouths of
the German rivers, and
should mine the submarine
tracks off the German
harbours. The Admiralty
had recently decided to
lay a mine barrage across
the Heligoland bight; the
fields which composed it
would be of various sizes,
and laid at varying
depths, so that the
different projects in the
Admiralty summary of
anti‑submarine warfare
were little but
suggestions on points of
detail in this larger and
more comprehensive plan.
3.
The Admiralty were
considering a number of
plans for constituting
special submarine patrols
at the northern exit to
the North Sea. There was
nothing that was
absolutely new in any of
these plans, and their
exact significance can
only be understood by
reviewing the strategical
and tactical employment of
the British submarine
flotillas since the war
began.
The
original war orders to the
fleet divided the
available British
submarines into a number
of local defence flotillas
and a striking force. The
local defence flotillas,
which were largely made up
of the older "A," "B," and
"C" boats, were allocated
to the defended ports in
the Channel and the east
coast. The striking or
overseas force was based
on Harwich, and was
composed of the newer "D"
and "E" boats. The
original war orders stated
that this overseas force
was to be used offensively
towards the German coast
and for reinforcing
Cruiser Force C, which
would be employed with the
first and third flotillas
in the eastern approaches
to the Channel and the
southern part of the North
Sea. From
Jan.
1917
DUTIES OF SUBMARINES
the
beginning of the war,
therefore, a considerable
number of older submarines
were allocated to coast
defence duties. On the
other hand, the submarines
patrolling in the German
bight had collected a
large amount of
information with regard to
the local German patrols,
and had torpedoed five
German warships between
August 1914 and July 1915;
so that during the first
year of the war the
submarines had proved of
more utility as an outpost
than as a coast defence
force. The German staff,
it would seem, were
conscious that we had
pushed out patrols too
close to their bases; for
their defensive minelaying
during the first year of
the war was evidently
intended to force our
submarine patrols to move
further out.
In
the summer and autumn of
the year 1915, the
Commander‑in‑Chief asked
that three submarine
units, each consisting of
a destroyer and three
submarines, should be
attached to the Grand
Fleet. They were to be
based on the Tyne, and
were apparently to act as
an outpost to the Grand
Fleet during operations
against the High Seas
Fleet. In October 1915 the
Titania and the
11th Overseas Flotilla
were attached to the Grand
Fleet and based on Blyth.
In their general
instructions two duties
were assigned to them: to
act as a coast defence and
anti‑invasion force if the
Germans raided the British
coast north of Flamborough
Head, and to patrol north
of the line bounding the
zone watched by the
Harwich flotilla. (The
line of division was
from Flamborough Head to
Lyngvig.)
Although
from the beginning of the
war our older submarines
had been intended to act
as a coast defence force,
they were not so used when
the need arose. When, in
April 1916, Admiral
Boedicker bombarded
Yarmouth and Lowestoft,
the defence of the
south‑eastern coast and of
the Flanders bight fell
entirely upon Commodore
Tyrwhitt's destroyers and
the overseas submarine
flotillas. The Admiralty's
instructions to station a
force of submarines "at
gun range" off Yarmouth
and Lowestoft were not
carried out by the local
commander, and the result
was that the submarines
were not put to a
practical test as a coast
defence force during the
war. None the less, the
idea persisted that this
was one of their most
important strategical
uses; and when it was
recognised and admitted
that the Grand Fleet ought
only to come south of the
Dogger Bank in quite
exceptional circumstances
(See p. 49.), an
additional importance and
emphasis were given to the
anti-invasion duties of
the submarine fleet. In
August 1916 a balance was
struck between the old
duty of maintaining
offensive patrols in
waters where German forces
were likely to be found,
and the equally old, but
now more exacting, duty of
protecting the east coast
against raids or invasion.
An additional flotilla was
allotted to the Grand
Fleet, all the submarine
forces on the east coast
were strengthened, and the
North Sea was divided into
four submarine patrols:
The Maas patrol (1 submarine) and the
Terschelling patrol (5
submarines) were to be
maintained from Harwich,
and the Horn Reefs and
Skagerrak patrol (4
submarines) from the Tyne
and Tees.
This
distribution of force and
this allocation of duties
lasted, without much
alteration, until the end
of the year 1916. The idea
of using British
submarines against the
German U‑boats, and of
incorporating our
submarine flotillas in the
anti‑submarine forces,
dates from the early
autumn of 1916, when the
Commander‑in‑Chief
appointed a Grand Fleet
committee to inquire into
the matter. They did not
report until February
1917, and in the meantime
the new
Commander‑in‑Chief,
Admiral Beatty, sent in a
forcible criticism of the
existing organisation. Ten
submarines out of the
eighty‑six which were
available were patrolling
in the enemy's waters; the
remainder were kept ready
to meet an imaginary
danger of invasion. Even
those submarines which
were out on patrol worked
in an isolated,
unco‑ordinated way, and
had achieved nothing
commensurate with the
losses they had incurred.
The existing system of
sending out submarines to
patrol and cruise within
special areas, without
specified objects or
objectives, was radically
at fault, and must be
changed. As a provisional
remedy the
Commander‑inChief urged
that the submarine
flotillas should be
re‑grouped and
reorganised. Forty boats
of the newer types should
be attached to the Grand
Fleet and employed in
continuous specially
devised operations. The
defensive coast patrols
should be maintained
entirely by the older "C"
boats.
The
Admiralty could not agree
outright with Admiral
Beatty's drastic
proposals; they replied
that "submarines now
constitute our principal
defence against raids of
all kinds." They were,
none the less, most
anxious that our flotillas
should be employed to the
best advantage in the
campaign against the
German U‑boats: the point
still unascertained was
what distribution of our
submarine forces would be
the best adapted to the
purpose in view. British
submarines might, as the
Commander‑in‑Chief
suggested, be concentrated
in the North Sea, to be
used offensively against
German U‑boats entering or
leaving the Bight; or they
might be distributed over
the bases in the western
approach area, for the
defence of trade. Expert
naval opinion had not
decided which of these two
solutions was the better.
Since the first
Jan.
1917
NEW USES FOR SUBMARINES
days
of the war, our submarines
on patrol had been on the
lookout for enemy
submarines, and had
attacked them whenever
they could. The results
did not suggest that our
submarines would be very
successful if they were
organised to act
exclusively as an
attacking force against
the enemy's U‑boats. Since
the beginning of the war,
British submarines on
patrol had established
contact with the enemy's
boats on fifty‑six
occasions; they had only
attacked them six times,
and out of those six
attacks three had been
successful. Figures like
these showed that if used
in anti‑submarine warfare,
submarines would probably
be more useful for
watching and locating
enemy boats than for
attacking and destroying
them. Whether submarines
could be used with any
success for the defence of
trade was equally
doubtful. It was not
seriously held that
submarines could act as a
direct cover and escort
for merchantmen; but some
naval officers thought
that submarines might be
used for patrolling the
outer approach routes to
the west of Ireland and
the Scillies. Their power
to keep the sea for long
periods gave them an
ability to move
successively from one
threatened zone to another
which was not possessed by
the types of surface ships
ordinarily used in patrol
operations.
When
the Admiralty drew up
their appreciation of the
state of things at sea at
the beginning of the year
1917, they were keenly
aware that our own
submarine flotillas might
be used to greater
advantage; but they had
not committed themselves
to any one of the
conflicting opinions
before them, nor had they
devised a means of
reconciling their own
views with those expressed
by the Commander‑in‑Chief.
The proper strategical and
tactical use of submarines
in submarine warfare was
still undecided.
4.
In addition to this, the
Admiralty were considering
a suggestion which
involved a new tactical
employment for our
submarines: that of acting
as a sort of long‑distance
escort to merchantmen.
Even when a German
submarine attacked and
torpedoed a merchantman
without warning, the
commander had to remain on
the spot for some time to
be sure that the torpedoed
ship was actually sinking;
as a rule, he examined the
ship's boats, and
occasionally took the
master prisoner. This took
time, and if the
merchantman were followed
at a distance of five or
six miles by one of our
own submarines, there was
a good chance that the
German U‑boat would be
attacked and torpedoed
whilst she was still
hovering about the sinking
merchantman. As a tactical
experiment the plan was
interesting; and if the
suggestion had been made
when the Admiralty were
instituting their convoy
system, it might have led
to the larger experiment
of using submarines to
cover groups of
merchantmen steaming in
formation. But the plan,
as put forward, could
never be widely applied,
as it was only intended
that one submarine should
be detached from its
ordinary duties to
experiment with a Q‑ship
in the central part of the
Channel.
5.
The list of measures
for attacking U‑boats
included a large number of
unimportant suggestions,
which mostly turned upon
some new mechanical
device: it was suggested
inter alia that mines
should be coloured with a
special paint which should
make them invisible to
aircraft patrols, that
indicator nets should be
fitted with wireless
telegraphy
conmmunications, and that
decoy ships should be
supplied with motor
lifeboats carrying
torpedoes.
The
Admiralty's general view
upon these numerous
suggestions was that no
measure, taken by itself,
was likely to turn the
campaign in our favour,
and that the urgent need
of the moment was more
anti‑submarine material.
The depth charge bomb
which was exploded below
the surface by the action
of a hydrostatic
pistol‑was the principal
weapon used against
submerged U‑boats. Large
orders for depth charges
and the appropriate
releasing gear had already
been placed with the
armament firms, and the
Admiralty expected that
deliveries during the
coming year would be at
the rate of about 1,500
depth charges per month.
This would make it
possible to supply every
vessel engaged in
submarine hunting with the
means of attacking
submarines whenever they
were met; and the
Admiralty hoped,
doubtless, that the added
vigour and the greater
scope which would thereby
be given to our
anti‑submarine offensive
would in the end defeat
U‑boat operations
completely, or at least
hamper and cripple them so
much that they would cease
to be dangerous.
The
other measures enumerated
in the Admiralty survey of
anti‑submarine warfare
were, as has already been
explained, those which
were intended to give
better protection to
merchantmen.
(i)
A large number merely
dealt with the supply of
additional material: every
effort was being made to
supply merchantmen with
more guns, more appliances
for disguising their
movements behind clouds of
smoke, and with the
protective device against
mines known as a paravane.
Naval opinion of all
grades seems to have been
entirely in favour of
arming more and more ships
with four‑inch and
six‑inch guns. It was not
unnatural, perhaps, that a
fighting method should be
so much favoured; but the
existing statistics were
sufficient to show that
this method was, in fact,
rapidly losing its
efficacy. During the
campaign of 1915
Jan.
1917
THE DOVER BARRAGE
no
merchant ships with a
defensive armament had
been sunk by German
submarines; and, up to
August 1916, the number
destroyed, though steady,
was quite small. In the
autumn of the year figures
showed that the U‑boat
commanders were beginning
to overcome the
difficulties: twelve
defensively armed
merchantmen were sunk in
December 1916, and in
January 1917 the number
had risen to twenty. It
was true that of the
merchantmen which escaped
nine out of ten did so by
virtue of their gunfire;
but it was also to be
remembered that if the
U‑boat commanders could
overcome twenty armed
merchantmen in a month,
under conditions of
restricted warfare, when
once the restrictions were
removed and they were free
to attack without warning,
the number was sure to
rise enormously; and this
is, in fact, what happened
when the time came. So
long as our merchant ships
were going on their way
unescorted and alone, they
could never have been
saved from the assassin's
blow, even by the
astonishing courage and
skill of the men who
manned their guns.
(ii)
The Admiralty were also
contemplating a complete
reorganisation of the
barrage across the Straits
of Dover. The project of
barring the Dover Straits
to submarines originated
in the early days of the
war. For several months
before the war began in
1914, the Admiralty's
expert advisers had been
investigating the question
of defence against
submarines. The device
which the experts had most
strongly recommended was a
net constructed of light
material and suspended
from a steel hawser strung
along a number of floats.
The net was either laid
along the bottom or towed
by a drifter, and a
submarine which fouled it
soon revealed its presence
by the disturbance it
caused to the upper
floats. Admiral Hood, who
had operated off the
Belgian coast in 1914, had
pushed forward a plan for
maintaining a line of
drifters with indicator
nets in the Straits of
Dover, and by February
1915 thirty drifters were
actually employed. (See
Vol. II., p. 271.)
In
addition to maintaining
this semi‑mobile net
defence, the Admiralty
sanctioned a plan for
placing a permanent boom
across the straits. An
enormous arnount of
material and labour was
expended upon this
project, which proved a
complete failure, and was
abandoned shortly after
Admiral Bacon took command
at Dover. During the
Winter of 1915 the straits
were defended only by the
mobile defence forces at
Dover, Calais, Boulogne
and Dunkirk and by the
drifters and their
indicator nets. Admiral
Bacon was, however, most
anxious that the straits
should be blocked by some
form of permanent barrage.
He laid a line of
explosive nets along the
Belgian coast in April
1916. (See Vol. III.,
p. 299.)
By
a curious coincidence, the
German Government
temporarily abandoned
their submarine operations
against merchantmen whilst
the nets were being laid
along the Belgian coast,
and this relaxation in the
submarine campaign,
coinciding as it did with
the establishment of the
new barrage, misled
Admiral Bacon into
thinking that it had been
very effective. He,
therefore determined to
place a similar barrage
across the Straits of
Dover, from the South
Goodwins to the Ruytingen
shoal, and in December
1916 a line of indicator
mine nets, suspended from
buoys 500 yards from each
other and marked by
lightbuoys, ran from the
South Goodwins to the West
Dyck. The freedom with
which the Zeebrugge
flotillas had operated in
the Channel during the
autumn months, and the
ease with which the
British and German
destroyers had crossed the
barrage during the raids
on the Dover Straits, had
shown, however, that the
new barrage could not have
been a serious obstacle to
German submarines. The
problem of closing the
straits, for which the
Admiralty had striven to
find a solution since the
early days of the war,
was, therefore, still
unsolved when unrestricted
submarine war began; and
the Admiralty were giving
close attention to the
various schemes and
projects which were still
being placed before them.
(iii)
Convoys are mentioned
almost at the end of the
Admiralty's summary of
defensive measures. Their
position on the list would
suffice to show that they
were not regarded as of
particular importance; and
in any case the remarks
which follow show that the
Admiralty did not, in
fact, contemplate anything
beyond convoying the coal
trade between France and
Great Britain. Indeed, Sir
Henry Jackson, when First
Sea Lord, had indicated
his opinion that any form
of ocean convoy was
impossible, by committing
himself to the statement
that "neither the Allies
nor the neutrals can
actually protect by escort
even a small proportion of
the sailings." And to this
must be added the Naval
Staff's objection to any
system of ocean escort, on
the technical ground that
ships under convoy would
offer a larger target than
single vessels.
It
is clear, however, that
dicta such as these could
not have any finality
about them: they were of
the nature of
appreciations, which
correctly indicated the
perplexities of the
moment. An unparalleled
crisis may well demand an
effort without precedent;
and we have already seen
that Admiral Jellicoe
himself was fully alive to
the danger of the present
crisis. Faced with the
possible stoppage of our
food
Sept.
1916
A UNIQUE PROBLEM
imports
and the consequent
necessity of accepting the
enemy's terms of peace,
the Admiralty had no
choice but to continue
their search for a reply
to the U‑boats. The actual
position must be minutely
and unflinchingly
re‑examined: if the evil
should be proved to be
indisputably beyond cure
by the methods hitherto
tried or proposed, then
all possible remedies must
also be re‑examined, and
no opinion, no accepted
premise, must be regarded
as beyond revision.
3
The Problems of Submarine Warfare
The
unique difficulty of the
situation and the novelty
of the problem involved
cannot be fully understood
without a close inspection
of the actual incidents of
the campaign. For this
purpose a typical set of
movements must be
selected; for to review in
full the searches
conducted by our
destroyers and patrols
during this period would
be to write an
encyclopaedia of submarine
war. Fortunately it is not
difficult to choose a
special case out of a
large number which closely
resemble each other; and
this will show, with
sufficient cogency, why
our operations against
enemy submarines were, up
to a certain date, so
unsuccessful, and how
inevitably a frank
realisation of the facts
enforced a revolutionary
change of methods, even in
the teeth of reasoned and
generally admitted
principles.
On
September 3, 1916, between
eleven o'clock and noon,
the Admiralty learned that
a submarine was at work
between Beachy Head and
Cape d'Antifer. At the
time the 3rd Battle
Squadron was at Portland
with the Beaver,
Druid, Forester, Hind and
Hornet of the 1st
Destroyer Flotilla, and
the Manly, Mansfield,
Melpomene, and Miranda
of the 10th (Harwich); the
Lark and the Laurel,
of the 9th (Harwich) were
at Sheerness. The first
step, therefore, was to
stop all traffic inside
the affected area, and
this the Admiralty did
early in the afternoon by
telegram: "No traffic is
to proceed through area
between lines drawn south
(true) from Dungeness and
St. Alban's Head. All
vessels bound for, or
proceeding through, this
area should be detained in
port or ordered to the
nearest port forthwith."
Escorted transports were,
however, allowed to sail
from Portsmouth; and later
in the day the Admiralty
modified their original
order by allowing all
west‑bound traffic to
proceed under escort; the
Admiral at Dover was to
provide escort as far as
Beachy Head; the
Commander‑in‑Chief at
Portsmouth was to arrange
for traffic to be convoyed
from there to St. Alban's
Head.
At
a quarter to four in the
afternoon a fresh report
came in. Torpedo boat No.
5 of the Newhaven
detachment had fallen in
with the submarine at a
quarter‑past one and
attacked her. At the time,
the torpedo boat was on
escort duty between Havre
and Newhaven, and her
captain was just in time
to ward off an attack on
the s.s. John Swan,
which he was then
escorting. This last
report, with those which
had come earlier in the
day, showed that the
German was moving
westward.
At
twenty‑past five the Chief
of the War Staff,
Vice-Admiral Sir Henry
Oliver, began to set the
available destroyers in
motion. He had previously
directed Commodore
Tyrwhitt to detach two
destroyers to Portsmouth
for temporary escort duty.
He therefore wired to
Harwich telling the
Commodore to send them off
at once, and gave him the
position of the late
encounter. At half ast
seven the Lark and
Laurel were ordered
to proceed down Channel
and hunt. Their search
was, however, limited by
the order to arrive at
Portsmouth by 4.0 p.m. on
the 4th. They sailed
independently, and the Laurel
reached Portsmouth towards
noon, the Lark at
a quarter‑past two.
Neither of them sighted
anything.
As
no further reports had
come in by eleven o'clock
on the 4th, the Admiralty
felt free to re‑start
traffic, defensively armed
vessels and coasters were
allowed to proceed to the
eastward, whilst, as has
been said, all west‑bound
ships were moving forward
under escort. The only
vessels still held up were
the unarmed, east‑bound
ships.
September
4 was wild and stormy, and
no further reports came in
all day. The Admiralty's
main preoccupation was to
see that the Princess
Victoria, which lay
at Cherbourg with a cargo
of French bullion,
intended for America,
should sail on the
following day, and that
the Laurel and Lark
should be there to escort
her.
At
Queenstown Admiral Bayly
ordered Q.5 and Q.7
to put to sea. The first
was to cruise in the
Western Channel from
September 5 to 11; the
second was to patrol the
route between Ushant and
Finisterre between
September 7 and 18. At
about 9.0 p.m. Q.3,
which was then at
Portland, also sailed.
At
twenty minutes past nine
on the morning of the 5th,
the Admiralty were still
without news of any
further sinkings, and they
approved Admiral de
Robeck's request to leave
Portland with the 3rd
Battle Squadron at six
o'clock that evening. (The
3rd Battle Squadron had
gone to Portland for
gunnery and torpedo
exercises on August 24;
it was still stationed
in the Thames.) As
soon as permission was
given,
Sept.
3‑7,
1916
SUBMARINE HUNTING
fresh
reports came in. The first
showed that there was now
a submarine at work in
mid‑Channel, due south of
St. Alban's Head; the
second indicated the
presence of a new U‑boat
on the French side,
between Cape Barfleur and
Havre. Later messages
showed that the one in
mid‑Channel had moved
north‑west and had arrived
near Portland Bill in the
early afternoon. An order
was at once sent to
Admiral de Robeck telling
him to remain in harbour
and send out his
destroyers to search,
whilst Commodore Tyrwhitt
was directed to detach
four destroyers and a
leader to hunt for
submarines "towards
Portland." Fresh traffic
orders were now issued: no
vessel was allowed to pass
through an area bounded by
lines drawn due south from
Start Point and Beachy
Head. By a later message
the usual freedom was
given to escorted
transports, whilst the Lark
and Laurel were to
be detached to reinforce
the Newhaven escorts.
Effect
was given to these orders
as quickly as possible by
Six o'clock in the evening
the nine destroyers
working with the 3rd
Battle Squadron had put to
sea, and just before 4.30
a.m. on the following day
the Commodore ordered the
Lightfoot and four
"L" class destroyers to
sea. By noon on September
6, therefore, thirteen
destroyers were in the
Channel.
The
situation was further
complicated by the mining
of the traffic route in
the Bristol Channel on the
previous day. The news of
this, with the various
reports received during
the morning and afternoon
of the 6th, seemed to show
that there were then two
submarines in the English
Channel making westwards
towards Ushant, and a
third, off the north coast
of Cornwall. There was
nothing to be done but to
let the large searching
forces already detached
continue their pursuit.
Very little more was heard
of the submarines for the
moment, although it was
clear that the one on the
French coast was keeping
her station in the
approaches to Havre.
Towards seven o'clock in
the evening she was
sighted off Cape Barfleur
by the destroyer Spiteful
of the Portsmouth
Flotilla, and compelled to
dive. No further operation
orders were issued, but
unescorted traffic was
held up all day; later the
prohibition was much
extended, and all vessels
intending to sail from the
Clyde, Irish Sea and
Bristol Channel for ports
south of Ushant were kept
in port. The Lightfoot
and her destroyers
assembled off Cape la
Hague at five o'clock in
the morning of the 7th and
then swept westward. The
general westerly movement
of the submarines was
confirmed by the report
from the s.s. Bengali,
of her escape from a
submarine on the Previous
day after a chase which
began to the south of the
Eddystone, and by the loss
of the Heathdene
nearly forty miles to the
southward of the Lizard.
It
now seemed probable that
the submarine on the
French side had crossed
towards England during the
night; for, early in the
forenoon, St. Catherine's
reported a submarine to
the southward of the Isle
of Wight. She must then
have moved westward during
the day and afterwards
back on her tracks; for
late that evening a
submarine was reported to
the southward of Portland
Bill on an easterly
course. Three more Q ships
(Nos. 4, 8, 10)
were sent out from
Queenstown during the day,
with orders to cruise in
the Channel. The
destroyers from Portland
and Harwich cruised at
high speed all day; but
sighted nothing.
Early
on the 8th a report came
in from the Commodore at
Falmouth that the armed
brig Helgoland
(Lieutenant A. D. Blair,
R.N.R.) had engaged two
submarines off the Lizard
on the afternoon of the
previous day, whilst on
passage from Falmouth to
Milford Haven, and that, a
little earlier, a U-boat
had been located to the
north‑west of Ushant. It
thus seemed that, of the
submarines which had been
attacking shipping for the
past three days, one was
on her way to the
Mediterranean; but that at
least one, and possibly
two, others were still
operating in the Channel
itself. Orders were
therefore sent to
Portland, telling the
Vice‑Admiral of the 3rd
Battle Squadron to keep
his destroyers on the
search. At 6.0 p.m. the
cross‑channel service was
resumed; but all east‑ and
west‑bound traffic was
still held up. Late in the
evening it was quite
certain that there were
two submarines in the
western channel: one about
thirty miles to the
southwest of Portland
Bill, the other off the
Bishop.
During
the afternoon, Q.4,
which had been sent out
from Queenstown on the
previous day, got into
action with a submarine
about fifty miles to the
north‑westward of Ushant.
There was a fierce
struggle, in which the
Q‑ship was worsted. This
located a third submarine
operating in the Channel
and made it doubtful
whether one of them was
bound for the
Mediterranean, as had
previously seemed likely.
As there was now a
reasonable chance that,
within a few days, at
least two, and possibly
three U‑boats would be
going back through the
Straits of Dover, the
Admiralty ordered four
destroyers from the 4th
Flotilla to move down from
the Humber and assist in
the search. There were now
a destroyer leader,
seventeen destroyers and
six Q‑ships engaged in the
operation.
Sinkings
continued until the 18th,
and to the end our
searching forces kept
picking up the enemy
submarines and
endeavouring to bring them
to action. On the 12th the
Sept.
13‑27,
1916
INEFFECTIVE MEASURES
Spitfire,
Unity and Porpoise
sighted a U‑boat to the
northwest of Ushant, and
dropped depth charges over
her, though without
result. The diversion of
destroyers from their
proper bases continued
long after the raid was
over. The Lightfoot
division, it is true, was
recalled to Portsmouth on
the 11th to escort the Repulse
through the Channel; but
they returned to the chase
on the 14th, and only got
back to Harwich on the
20th. The destroyers of
the 4th Flotilla did not
get back to Immingham
until the 27th; those
attached to the 3rd Battle
Squadron continued their
search until the 17th; on
the following day they
escorted the battleships
back to the Swin.
If
the warships engaged in
defending and attacking
commerce during these
operations are enumerated
in parallel columns, there
appears at once a very
remarkable inequality in
effective force. For seven
days, two, or at the most
three German submarines
had operated within an
area which was watched by
forty‑nine destroyers and
forty‑eight torpedo boats
divided into six local
defence flotillas, and by
four hundred and
sixty‑eight armed
auxiliaries:
(i)
Auxiliaries. The
actual figures
were:
|
Area
number X1
(Dover)
|
238
|
Area
number XII
(Portsmouth)
|
81
|
Area
number XI11
(Portland)
|
62
|
Area
number XIV
(Falmouth)
|
87
|
Total
|
468
|
|
(ii)
Local defence
flotillas:
|
Destroyers.
|
Torpedo boats.
|
Dover
|
17
|
3
|
Nore
|
8
|
13
|
Portsmouth
|
12
|
18
|
Devonport
|
11
|
6
|
Newhaven
|
‑
|
3
|
Portland
|
1
|
5
|
Totals
|
49
|
48
|
During
this time they had been
actively hunted by
thirteen destroyers and
seven Q‑boats, each one of
which had a surface
fighting power about
double that of any of the
submarines. Yet in spite
of this immense disparity
of numbers the three
U‑boat commanders had sunk
more than thirty British
and neutral vessels
without suffering any loss
themselves. Data of this
kind had now for some
weeks been under the
observation of naval
commanders and of the
Naval Staff: the lines of
thought which they
suggested were probably
numerous, but there can be
little doubt that the more
scientific minds must all
have been struck with one
aspect of the problem. In
such cases as the one
given, our effort, whether
considered as attack or
defence, had been not only
inadequate, but wholly
ineffective. The first
consideration must be to
determine whether this was
inevitably so ‑ in which
case the measures taken
must be immediately
abandoned ‑ or whether the
existing methods could be
so improved as to achieve
success. The case must be
reduced to its simplest
terms, so that the
question would become one
of principle and not of
chance or of detail.
If
an enemy is reported to
have been at a point A at
a certain moment, then he
must, after any definite
space of time, be
somewhere within a circle
drawn with A as centre and
with a radius equal to his
speed of movement
multiplied by the time
which has elapsed since he
was observed at A; and if
he is to be found and
brought to action, the
whole of that circle must
be effectively covered by
the forces opposed to him.
It follows that the
chances of finding him
will vary inversely with
the area of the circle to
be occupied. Now in
practice, as soon as a
U‑boat began to operate in
our waters her presence
and her position were
known, as a rule, first
vaguely by wireless or
other information, and
then in some detail a day
or two later when attacks
were reported or when
survivors from sunk ships
had been landed and
questioned.
In
the typical case above
given, reports that enemy
submarines were at work
were transmitted to the
Admiralty from shore
stations with great
rapidity; but a good deal
of time had necessarily to
elapse before these
reports could be verified
and positive orders given
to the searching forces.
If the signal logs of the
destroyers engaged in the
search are compared with
the reports received at
the Admiralty, it will be
found that the pursuers
could not possibly reach
the spot where the
submarine was last
reported before their
information was at least
twelve hours old, and it
was, in fact, generally
much older. They would now
be at point A and ready to
begin hunting; but if the
submarine be allowed an
average speed of 8 1/2
knots, all that they would
have to guide them would
be the knowledge that she
must be somewhere within a
circle whose radius was by
this time 100 miles, and
whose area was therefore
over 30,000 square miles.
This figure, it is true,
holds good only for the
open sea: in restricted
waters, such as the
eastern and central
Channel, the area of
search would not be quite
so large or so
symmetrical. But when all
allowances have been made,
the problem of making a
reasonable and successful
disposition of forces for
such a pursuit remains
formidable in the extreme.
Nevertheless
it was courageously and
energetically attacked.
There were evidently two
possible ways of lessening
the disadvantages under
which the counter‑attack
was working. The first and
most important was to
obtain and transmit more
speedy information of what
the enemy was
Jan.
1917
ATTEMPTS AT PRECISION
doing;
the second was to mass
still larger and better
organised forces in the
necessarily wide areas
where U‑boats might at any
moment be found. Of the
two the more essential was
to secure earlier
information of an enemy's
presence, because this
meant lessening his
possible radius of
movements, and thereby
diminishing the area of
search. The aim here would
be to give to our
anti‑submarine campaign
something of the precision
and effectiveness of our
operations against the
High Seas Fleet.
Throughout the war we had
generally been able to
detect premonitory signs
of the movement when the
German fleet was about to
sail, and it was upon this
that the success of our
intercepting and
countering measures in the
North Sea had mainly
depended. Experience
showed that where this
very early knowledge of
the enemy's intention
failed, his force was
either not met at all, or
was met in circumstances
so different from those
anticipated that the
outcome was largely a
matter of chance. In other
words, it was the time
factor that was our
difficulty.
The
ease with which the
Germans had passed their
raiders into the Atlantic
in spite of Admiral
Jellicoe's intercepting
dispositions, the freedom
with which they could raid
the Straits of Dover in
the teeth of a more
numerous and more daring
flotilla, showed how
uncertain and even
fruitless operations were
likely to be whenever the
Admiralty or a local
commander was obliged to
act merely upon reports of
what the enemy had been
doing; and our operations
against the German
submarines were now adding
an extreme example of
tactics based necessarily
on guesswork, and not upon
any kind of certain
knowledge. But it was not
easy to see any line of
progress on this side. It
was not our intelligence
system that was at fault:
it could show that U‑boats
were at sea; at times it
showed exactly where they
had been operating at a
particular moment; but
further than this it could
not go.
The
time handicap could
perhaps be reduced, and
there was the possibility
that scientific invention
might succeed in
providing us with a new
detective method. Men of
science believed that
apparatus could be devised
which would reveal a
submarine's presence in a
given area to ships at a
considerable distance. If
their hopes were justified
and if they could perfect
the apparatus before it
was too late, officers in
command of anti‑submarine
forces would be in a less
hopeless position on
arriving at their point of
search: they would have
ears as well as eyes, and
would no longer be
ploughing a vast expanse
of sea in the hope of
sighting an invisible
enemy who was possibly
just beneath them and
possibly a hundred miles
away.
The
second question, that of a
method of massing more and
more forces in the areas
where submarines were
known to be operating, was
one which must affect the
whole of our existing
system of defence. When
the Commander‑in‑Chief had
called for opinions upon
the conduct of the
submarine campaign from
all the officers in the
Grand Fleet, Admiral
Beatty had sent in a
far‑sighted paper upon
this subject. "The call
for suggestions," he
wrote, "will doubtless
produce some suggestions
and devices of value
.... but the measure of
their success will depend
upon how they are used."
Statistics showed first
that the submarines were
located about sixteen
times as often as they
were engaged; and,
secondly, that after
searches had been ordered,
the number of vessels
actually employed never
amounted to more than one
in five of those available
on each occasion. His
figures were:
|
September.
|
October.
|
Ships
sunk
|
61
|
45
|
Occasions
when enemy
submarines were
located
|
138
|
161
|
Occasions
when enemy
submarines were
attacked by us
|
8
|
10
|
|
He
added the
following
figures,
covering the
same period, to
show the results
of the localised
defence system.
|
|
Two areas where submarines are busy.
|
Eight areas where submarines are not busy.
|
Ships
sunk
|
46
|
3
|
Occasions
when submarines
were located
|
101
|
10
|
Total
craft available
for offensive
work
|
89
|
348
|
Figures
like these amounted to
proof positive that the
existing system, which
consisted "in the
employment of a number of
localised forces, each
employed on purely
defensive duties, in a
prescribed area, each
under a different chief,
each working on different
lines," was inherently
vicious. The proper remedy
was to put one single
officer in control of all
anti-submarine operations;
to give him sole charge of
all the forces employed in
anti‑submarine warfare,
and so enable him to mass
them in overwhelming
numbers at the threatened
points. As we have already
seen, this suggestion was
unanimously adopted by the
conference at the
Admiralty and was carried
out by the appointment of
Admiral Duff.
Jan.
1917
CONTROL OF TRAFFIC
4
The German Estimate of British Endurance at Sea
When
Admiral Duff took charge
of the Anti‑Submarine
Division the traffic round
the British Isles was
controlled by a set of
orders of which the
general principle was that
vessels should be kept
inside the coastal zone as
much as possible.
Admiralty
control over merchant
shipping was, however,
more rigorously exercised
over outgoing than over
incoming traffic, as ships
leaving ports in the
United Kingdom could be
given more detailed
instructions than vessels
sailing from distant
foreign ports. When a
vessel was sailing from
Great Britain, the local
shipping control officers
knew from the Admiralty
where submarines were
operating, and could, in
consequence, issue orders
and route instructions
which might carry her
clear of the danger. The
case of an incoming vessel
was absolutely different.
The situation in Home
Waters changed from day to
day, and an approach route
which was tolerably safe
when a vessel left America
might be highly dangerous
when she approached the
British Isles. For this
reason, the incoming
traffic was at once more
vulnerable and less easy
to protect than the
outgoing stream of ships.
As far as practicable,
Atlantic shipping bound
for the Channel was made
to approach the European
coast to the south of
Ushant, then to cross over
to the coast of Cornwall
and to keep along the
inshore route. Ships bound
to the Irish Sea and the
Clyde made the Irish coast
near the Skelligs and then
hugged the south coast of
Ireland. Vessels bound to
the Bristol Channel also
kept to the south coast of
Ireland as far as the
Tuskar, after which they
crossed to the Welsh coast
and made for their
destination.
Traffic
leaving the British Isles
was distributed over four
principal routes: one ran
from Land's End past
Ushant to the southward;
another went due west from
the Scillies; a third went
along the south coast of
Ireland to the Skelligs
and thence westward; the
fourth went through
Rathlin Sound to Tory
Island on the north coast
of Ireland and then due
west. The traffic bound to
the Skelligs was passed
along the Bristol Channel
and the Welsh coast and
thence to the Tuskar. The
system was elaborated by a
large number of
alternative tracks to the
four main routes, and of
connecting tracks along
which shipping might be
diverted from one of the
main arteries to another.
The general effect of this
system of control was to
concentrate a very great
number of ingoing and
outgoing ships on the
patrolled routes off the
south coast of Ireland and
in the Bristol Channel.
Admiral
Duff decided to work upon
the existing lines, and he
gave his views upon the
future of the campaign in
a minute upon one of the
numerous suggestions which
the Admiralty were then
considering. "From Dover
to Land's End we are
forced to rely mainly upon
trawler protection
..... and the use of a
single trade route as
close to the salient
points along the coast as
circumstances will admit,
will, I believe, allow of
such a patrol being made
effective as trawlers
become available
.... it may reasonably be
hoped that, with a
carefully distributed
trawler patrol backed and
strengthened at intervals
by the fastest and best
armed yachts available,
some 'P' craft and
destroyers, together with
an organised system of
seaplane scouting, enemy
submarines will find
attack on the surface too
risky a business to be
ventured upon." Admiral
Duff was, however, quite
clear that the problem of
submarine attack at the
entrance to the Channel
still had to be dealt
with; for the minute
continued, "A far more
important route, and one
for which an efficient
patrol must be provided
before the spring, is that
from the Lizard to
Ushant."
The
Admiralty's first measure
was an attempt to bring
all Channel traffic on to
one continually patrolled
track running as close
inshore as possible from
the Scilly Islands to the
mouth of the Thames. They
expected that the effect
upon the enemy would be to
make him "turn his
attention to a determined
attack on the patrol
service, as in mid-channel
there will be no shipping
other than sailing vessels
for him to attack, and lay
mines indiscriminately
along the route and on a
larger scale at the
salient points." These
dangers would be met by
keeping the larger
trawlers, fitted with
wireless installations,
patrolling off the points
where minelaying was most
likely to occur, and by
creating a separate
minesweeping organisation
to deal with every
obstruction as soon as it
was reported. The project
was sent to most of the
senior naval officers on
the south coast, and they
all pronounced favourably
upon it. This measure with
regard to the traffic in
the Channel was, in fact,
one of the principal items
in our plan of campaign
when unrestricted
submarine warfare began.
A
further measure, and one
to which the
Commander‑in-Chief
attached great importance,
was the mining of the
Heligoland Bight. Early in
January he urged the
Admiralty to lay a
complete semicircle of
shallow and deep mines
round the bight from the
Rote Kliff bank to
Ameland. The barrage,
Jan.
1917
MINING THE BIGHT
he
suggested, should be
watched "by light cruiser
and destroyer sweeps at
varying intervals with
submarine patrols." This
very ambitious programme
was impossible: to give
effect to it 54,000 mines
and 1,000 ground mines
would have been required,
and the Admiralty had not
anything like that number
available. The plan
finally adopted was that
of laying independent
minefields along the
semicircle between Ameland
and the Schleswig coast.
The initial results were
not promising. Three
minefields were laid
during the first part of
the month: one off Borkum,
the two others to the
west‑north‑westward of
Heligoland. On the night
of January 25, the
minelayers Princess
Margaret and
Wahine mined a very
large area in the central
part of the Bight, some
seventy miles to the
west‑north‑west of
Heligoland;
simultaneously, submarine E.45
mined
the northern exit from the
Bight, near Lister Deep.
On the last night of the
month, the Abdiel
laid another field to the
north‑north‑west of E.45's,
in a position about
fifteen miles to the south
of the Horn Reefs. These
fields accounted for some
half‑dozen enemy trawlers;
they did not cause the
loss of a single outgoing
or incoming submarine, and
were always discovered
after fairly short
intervals.
The
plan of using submarines
against submarines was
deemed to be most
practicable in the
enclosed waters of the
Flanders Bight. During the
last months of the year,
the enemy's minelaying
campaign had grown in
intensity, and Harwich,
which was just opposite
the enemy's base at
Zeebrugge, was
particularly menaced. At
the end of January 1917,
therefore, the Admiralty
decided to form a special
submarine patrol of eight
"C" boats at Harwich, to
"intercept the enemy
minelayers from
Zeebrugge." In addition to
this, the
Commander‑in‑Chief
redistributed the
submarines under his
immediate orders so as to
maintain a continuous
patrol between the Long
Forties and the Skagerrak,
right across the tracks of
the outgoing and incoming
U‑boats.
In
the last week of January,
just on the eve of the
German declaration, an
Allied naval conference
assembled in Whitehall. "I
think it highly essential
that we should meet," said
the British Premier in his
opening address, "and meet
at the earliest possible
opportunity, to discuss
certain matters, for
undoubtedly the situation
is grave, and is becoming
increasingly so. We have
had complete command of
the sea for two years and
a half, in spite of all
the efforts of the German
navy; but there is no
doubt that the challenge
to the Allies' supremacy
is becoming more serious
month by month and week by
week. The Germans have
discovered what a
formidable weapon the
submarine is from the
point of view of
destroying the shipping of
the Allied and neutral
countries, and the tonnage
which is being sunk month
by month is alarmingly
great, and I am afraid it
is going to be increased."
No terms of reference
could be clearer than
this; and indeed the
discussions of the next
two days (January 23 and
24) were entirely focussed
upon the submarine
campaign and its
implications.
After
long discussion it was
decided that all British
battleships in the
Mediterranean, with the
exception of the Lord
Nelson and the
Agamemnon, should be
called home to provide
crews for the destroyers
and light cruisers which
would be completed during
the year. The French
delegates undertook to
keep a battle squadron
permanently stationed at
Corfu to compensate the
Italians for the loss of
the old battleships of the
"Queen" class, which were
stationed at Taranto. This
was, perhaps, the most
drastic and far-reaching
decision taken; all other
resolutions seem merely to
have modified the existing
system of trade defence in
the Mediterranean in
points of detail. The
zones of control were
again altered slightly,
and after an exchange of
views between the French
and British staffs, it was
agreed that traffic should
be concentrated on the
coastal routes in the
western basin of the
Mediterranean, and that,
in the eastern, a
combination of the French
and British systems should
be adopted. Traffic to and
from Salonica and the
Aegean was to be ordered
to proceed along fixed
routes, changed
frequently; British and
Allied traffic between
Cape Bon and Port Said was
to be dispersed according
to the British system. As
the losses in the western
approaches to the English
Channel had been severe
during the month, the
British Admiralty promised
the French a reinforcement
of twelve trawlers for the
Ushant patrol. (The
other resolutions of the
conference were
concerned with shipping,
supplies of raw
materials, etc.) These
were the last decisions
taken before the German
declaration of
unrestricted submarine
war.
The
German Government issued
their declaration on
January 31, and it took
effect on the following
day. It has already been
shown that the mistake of
those who made it was that
they limited their range
of vision to what they
called "purely military
considerations." This was,
of course, a limitation
forced upon them by what,
in their view, was now a
desperate position. They
refused to take account of
the moral and political
implications of their
decision, because they saw
a possible chance of
victory in one direction
Jan.‑Feb.
1917
HOLTZENDORFF'S CALCULATION
and
no hope of it in the
other. For them moral
results were negligible,
and political results
could only be felt after a
certain time, and then
only in a certain degree.
Tonnage destruction,
U‑boat building programmes
and the statistics of
British seaborne trade
were the only data upon
which the naval and
military commands could
now base decision. Their
decision was wrong,
because it was the product
of reasoning in which the
essential premises had
been misstated or
deliberately ruled out;
but it resulted
necessarily from a logic
which to the German
military leaders seemed
flawless, and no one can
fairly judge their error
without first realising
the effect upon minds such
as theirs of
Holtzendorff's memorandum
upon the certain success
of the campaign, and then
comparing the results
actually obtained with the
figures promised. If
Holtzendorff was risking
defeat, so were we; if we
were capable of a supreme
effort, so were our
enemies. On these two
points Holtzendorff was
not so far wrong. His
calculation ran thus:
statistics showed that
about 6 3/4 million tons
of British and 3 million
tons of neutral shipping
had entered and cleared
from British harbours
during the year 1916, and
Great Britain was known to
have some 900,000 tons of
captured enemy shipping at
its disposal. England was,
therefore, fed and
supplied by about 10 3/4
million tons of British
and neutral shipping. The
German U‑boats, working
without restrictions and
torpedoing at sight, could
be counted upon to destroy
600,000 tons of shipping a
month, and at least
two‑fifths of the neutral
shipping engaged in
carrying supplies to
Britain would be
frightened away from the
service.
At
the end of five months,
therefore, Great Britain
would lose 39 per cent. of
the tonnage employed in
carrying her essential
supplies, and the loss
would be final and
irreplaceable. This, in
itself, would be more than
the country could bear,
and the loss of tonnage
from U‑boat sinkings might
be aggravated by
subsidiary losses from
special causes. A failure
of the American and
Canadian harvests, for
instance, would drive at
least 750,000 tons of
shipping to the Australian
route; the laying up of
neutral shipping would
partially close the
Scandinavian routes to
England, and severely
restrict British supplies
of margarine and fats. And
the shortage of foodstuffs
could not, he argued, be
combated by a rationing
system, because there were
not enough officials in
England to enforce it.
After much more reasoning
and marshallling of
figures, Admiral von
Holtzendorff ended his
memorandum thus: "I
arrive, therefore, at the
conclusion that an
unrestricted U‑boat war,
started at the proper
time, will bring about
peace before the
harvesting period of the
1917 summer, that is,
before August 1; the break
with America must be
accepted; we have no
choice but to do so. In
spite of the danger of a
breach with America,
unrestricted submarine
war, started soon, is the
proper, and indeed the
only way to end the war
with victory.
The
faulty bases upon which
the Admiral had built up
his structure of argument,
his wrong premises and
wrong deductions, were
mercilessly exposed,
months later, by
Erzberger. We may pass
from them to make a brief
survey of the known,
admitted facts of
submarine warfare; for it
was upon their knowledge
of those facts that
Holtzendorff, Scheer and
Ludendorff had founded
their confidence in final
victory.
5
The Achievements of Submarine Warfare, 1914‑1917
In
February 1917 the German
Government had 111 boats
available for active
operations, of which
forty‑nine were based on
the North Sea ports,
thirty‑three on Zeebrugge
and Ostend, twenty‑four on
Pola in the Adriatic, two
on Constantinople, and
three in the Baltic. (Michelsen,
Der U‑bootskrieg
1914‑1918, p. 183.) Of
this total, about a third
(thirty‑five to forty)
were at work at any
particular moment. The
building programme of the
German Admiralty had
suffered from the
political uncertainties
with which this campaign
was surrounded. From
September 1915 to May 1916
only mining submarines of
the smaller type had been
laid down; but in May the
naval authorities appear
to have decided upon a
programme of intensive
construction. Thirty-four
submarines of the larger
type (800 to 1,500 tons)
were then put on order;
and in February 1917, when
the decision to wage
unrestricted war was
taken, a new and very
comprehensive programme
was settled in
collaboration with the
magnates of the
shipbuilding industry. The
German Government had
every reason to suppose
that deliveries would be
far in excess of losses;
for the British naval
forces had only been
destroying from one to two
submarines a month during
the previous year.
Since
the beginning of the war
the achievements of the
German submarines had
certainly not been such as
to discourage hopes of
their ultimate success.
Since August 1914 they had
destroyed twenty‑four
warships and armed
auxiliaries, and they had
compelled wide changes in
the existing rules of
naval tactics. The Grand
Fleet could only put to
1916‑1917
AN EFFECTIVE WEAPON
sea
with an escort of nearly
one hundred destroyers, no
capital ship could leave
its base without an escort
of small craft, and the
German U‑boats had
hampered our squadrons to
an extent which the most
expert and far‑sighted
naval officer had never
foreseen. After the
operation of August 19
Admiral Jellicoe had
decided that it was not
safe for his enormous
fleet of
super‑Dreadnoughts ‑ each
one of which could steam
for thousands of miles
without refuelling - to
undertake prolonged
operations to the south of
the Dogger Bank. The
Admiralty, with the full
facts before them, had
agreed that the Grand
Fleet ought not to enter
the southern end of the
North Sea, unless the
German command should
commit the High Seas Fleet
to some new kind of
operation wholly different
in scope and character
from those upon which they
had hitherto ventured.
Even with this vital
reservation they were
accepting a certain
limitation of our control
of the sea, and this was
due solely to the U‑boats
and their captains. Had
Admiral Jellicoe been
confronted only by Admiral
Scheer and his battle
squadrons, it is
inconceivable that he
should ever have deemed
any part of the North Sea
a danger area into which
he could only penetrate in
quite exceptional
circumstances.
This
novel success of the
German submarine must be
judged as much by their
incidental as by their
direct influence upon
naval warfare. Amongst
these casual effects,
their power to force
unwieldy and
disproportionate
concentrations of ships
may be counted the most
extraordinary. If what may
be called the routine
operations of naval war
were put into lists and
classified, it would be
found that, just as the
operations which began in
the Channel on September 6
compelled us to use some
thirteen vessels to hunt
for two or at the most
three submarines, so week
by week and month by month
we were continually driven
to the same absorbing
detachment of force.
Another
striking proof of the
effectiveness of the
U‑boats was the enormous
mass of military forces
which they had compelled
us to divert wholly or
partially from other
purposes to the
anti‑submarine campaign.
In February 1917 about
two‑thirds of our
destroyer strength, and
all our submarines,
minesweepers and
auxiliaries, were engaged
in some branch of
submarine warfare. The
statement must be reduced
to figures and statistics
before its significance
can be fully grasped.
In
Home waters and the
Mediterranean about three
thousand destroyers and
auxiliary patrol vessels
were engaged in combating
the submarine menace,
either directly or
indirectly; so that every
German submarine was
diverting some
twenty‑seven craft and
their crews from other
duties by pinning them to
patrol areas and forcing
them to spend their time
in screening, searching
and hunting operations
which very rarely ended in
success. In spite of its
enormous numbers, the
Auxiliary Patrol had only
accounted for seven enemy
submarines since January
1916. During the year
there had been about one
hundred engagements
between the U‑boats and
the British auxiliary
forces; so that when an
encounter took place, the
U‑boat captain's chances
of escaping were about
fourteen to one.
One
of these fights suggested
that the chances would be
even better as time went
on. Late in the afternoon
of July 11 three trawlers,
Onward, Era and
Nellie Nutten, were
patrolling together about
one hundred and twenty
miles east of Girdleness,
when they sighted a
submarine and chased her.
They had hardly opened
fire before three other
submarines appeared. The
fight went completely
against the trawlers, and
all three were sunk or
disabled. The action
showed that patrol boats
with three‑pounders could
no longer hope to defeat
well‑armed and controlled
German submarines, and a
large plan of re‑arming
the trawlers was set on
foot. It was, however,
quite evident that any
measures we took could be
little more than
palliatives. It was beyond
our power to provide our
auxiliary craft with an
armament which would put
each one of them on an
equality with the latest
German submarine; and
that, after all, would
have been the only remedy.
The
engagement had, indeed,
emphasised one of the most
serious aspects of this
new form of warfare:
improvements were sure to
be made in the
construction and armament
of U‑boats which might at
any moment render a great
part of our anti‑submarine
material obsolete and
useless. Not only our
trawlers, but the
minefields and
obstructions upon which we
were so largely depending
might be found one day to
have become suddenly
ineffectual.
Seldom
during the war had we been
so forcibly reminded of
the limitations which the
German submarine fleet
imposed upon our squadrons
as we were in the autumn
of the year 1916. In
October the Danish
Government, fearing that
the Germans might seek to
compensate themselves for
the pressure of the
blockade by invading
Jutland and carrying off
the cattle and the
agricultural stocks, had
been giving serious
attention to their defence
problems; and the British
Government had ordered the
Admiralty and the General
Staff to see what
assistance could be given
to the Danes in a crisis.
In their joint staff
appreciation the
Government's
1916‑1917
PAST AND PRESENT
naval
and military advisers had
said, that for naval
reasons it would be almost
impossible to support the
Danes at all. "The route
to be followed by
transports proceeding to
Denmark," ran the staff
appreciation, "passes
within 200 miles of the
German principal naval
base, from which the
German fleet can emerge at
full strength at any time
it may select. The British
fleet would have to be
kept constantly at sea to
protect the line of
communications, and at a
strength superior to that
of the whole German navy.
The enemy may be expected
to make full use of his
submarines ‑ of which he
can always keep twenty in
the North Sea to attack
our covering fleet and
transports; and we should
incur heavy losses from
submarine attack without
necessarily being given
any opportunity of making
a corresponding attack
upon the enemy ... Seeing
that the British fleet had
held together the most
inaccessible states of the
coalition against the
Directory and the Empire,
and that during the long
peace of the Victorian era
it had sufficed to keep
distant countries within
the British sphere of
influence in politics, the
conclusion of the joint
staff conference was a
striking illustration of
the contrast between past
and present, and there can
be no doubt that the
submarine was practically
the sole cause of the
difference. In the
Peninsular War the line of
communications between
Great Britain and Spain
ran closer to Brest than
the line between Great
Britain and Denmark did to
Kiel and Wilhelmshaven.
The
results of the last eight
months of submarine
warfare must, however,
have seemed highly
promising to the German
military leaders. Since
the Sussex crisis
the submarine commanders
had been operating against
shipping under
considerable restrictions.
Their official apologist,
Captain Michelsen, speaks
of it as a dead period;
but, in point of fact, it
was an extremely important
one. Admiral von
Holtzendorff overcame
Admiral Scheer's
opposition to compromise,
and resumed restricted
submarine warfare at some
time in the early autumn
of 1916, and before the
year was out the U~boats
were causing us very
considerable losses. The
actual events of this
phase in the submarine
campaign must be reviewed,
for they are definitely
connected with the
decision to wage
unrestricted warfare. The
total destruction of
shipping had risen
steadily: in June 1916 the
losses, British and
foreign, were 108,885
tons, and in January 1917,
368,521 tons; and these
results had been obtained
by intensifying the
warfare in the English
Channel and the western
approaches to the British
Isles. (See Fayle, Seaborne
Trade, Vol. III., p.
465.) Here they had
operated with considerable
immunity from attack. The
actions between U‑boats
and British and French
patrol craft in the
Channel area were as
follows:‑
September. ‑ Three actions: two off
the Lizard, one off Start
Point.
October. - Seven actions: two off the
Lizard, two off S. and W.
coasts of Ireland; three
in the Channel.
November ‑ Three actions: all in the
Channel.
December ‑ Eight actions: four in the
triangle Lizard‑Ushant,
the Scillies; two between
the Casquets and Portland;
one in the Bristol
Channel; one in St.
George's Channel.
The
success of the campaign in
the Channel and to the
west of it was, however,
very marked and highly
important; for it was
there that shipping was at
its greatest
concentration. For several
months the German
submarine commanders had
established and maintained
themselves there, and had
inflicted heavy losses
upon British and French
shipping, without
torpedoing them at sight.
The German Naval Staff
therefore had this strong
argument in favour of
unrestricted warfare: If
the submarines could sink
350,000 tons a month,
working under
restrictions, was it not
reasonable to suppose that
when freed from
restrictions they would
succeed in bringing the
rate up to 600,000 a month
‑ a rate which would
certainly be fatal to
Great Britain? Admiral von
Holtzendorff's calculation
of victory was simply an
elaboration of this
statement of probable
chances. The autumn
campaign proved, moreover,
that the obstructions in
the Straits of Dover, from
which we had hoped so
much, were not effectively
stopping the submarines of
the Flanders flotilla. All
the sinkings in the
eastern, and a
considerable part of those
in the western part of the
Channel were done by the
UB and UC boats from
Zeebrugee. In October some
70,000 tons of shipping
were lost in the Channel,
and though the rate fell
slightly in the next two
months, it was well above
50,000 tons a month during
the last quarter of the
year. The increase of
submarine minelayingy.
which was practically
always carried out from
Flanders, told the same
story. The curve
representing vessels sunk
by mines rose throughout
the autumn of the year,
until in October it stood
at the high mark of 37,525
tons.
The
order to wage unrestricted
submarine warfare was,
moreover, given at a time
when the overseas
commitments of the western
Allies were very high.
Great Britain and France
were then maintaining
770,000 men in Salonica,
Egypt and in East Africa.
All these forces were
being supplied along
routes which passed
through the area of German
submarine operations, and
the drafts and
reinforcements of our
colonial troops in France
were carried through
1916‑1917
U‑BOAT IMMUNITY
the
Bay of Biscay and the
Western Channel. The
diversion of commercial
tonnage to purely military
services was already
making a serious freight
shortage; if the military
shipping could be
seriously attacked and
damaged, the enemy's
chances of crippling one
of our overseas
expeditions were, at
least, hopeful. The
Germans had, moreover,
reason to believe that the
U‑boat's method of attack
had definitely outstripped
all means of defence
against it. To fight the
submarine danger we were
using depth charges, mined
nets, deep minefields,
hunting patrols of
destroyers and P. boats,
fixed and floating
obstructions, armed ships
disguised as merchantmen,
and special patrols of
submarines ‑ all the
coastal routes along which
merchant ships had to pass
were patrolled by large
numbers of trawlers and
drifters. Yet the list of
losses inflicted during
the previous year of war
proved that all our
measures taken together
were not adequately
meeting the danger, and
that no one weapon or
method of attack had yet
shown exceptional promise.
On
the other side of the
account, the Germans had
lost twenty‑five boats
during the year; but this
rate of destruction was
quite insufficient even to
check the campaign.
Moreover, of these
twenty‑five, five had been
sunk by accident or
ordinary shipwreck and
four more had been
destroyed either by
Russian minefields in the
Black Sea or by Russian
destroyers and drifters.
The actual figures,
compiled from Admiralty
returns and the tables
given in Andreas
Michelsen's U‑bootskrieg,
are as follows:
Accident and unknown causes.
|
Destroyers and auxiliary patrols.
|
Q‑boats.
|
Submarines.
|
Minefields.
|
UC.12
|
UB.26
|
(bombs).
|
U.68
|
U.61
|
U.10
|
UB.7
|
UC.3
|
(mine
net).
|
UB.19
|
UC.10
|
UB.46
|
U.20
|
UB.3
|
(bombs).
|
|
|
UB.45
|
UB.16
|
U.74
|
(gunfire).
|
|
|
UC.15
|
UC.5
|
UB.44
|
(nets
and bombs).
|
|
|
|
|
U.56
|
(Russian
destroyers and
patrols).
|
|
|
|
|
UC.13
|
(")
|
|
|
|
|
UC.19
|
(")
|
|
|
|
|
UB.29
|
(")
|
|
|
|
|
UB.13
|
(indicator
nets and bombs).
|
|
|
|
|
U.77
|
(gunfire).
|
|
|
|
|
UC.7
|
(depth
charge from
motor boat).
|
|
|
|
The
British navy, therefore,
could only reckon on
destroying with their
existing methods some
eighteen to twenty U‑boats
a year, or between three
and four every two months.
The counter‑attack, in
short, was not yet
sufficiently developed to
affect the progress of the
campaign.
6
Unrestricted
Submarine Warfare begins
- Attacks on the Dover
Straits
From
the German point of view
the unrestricted submarine
war opened most
successfully. In the first
week of February
thirty‑five vessels,
British and foreign, were
sunk in the Channel and
the western approaches. (See
Map 11.) The
Admiralty reinforced
Queenstown with four Grand
Fleet destroyers and the
10th Sloop Flotilla from
the Humber:
Grand Fleet Destroyers
Magic, 34 knots, 1,042 tons, 11th
Flotilla.
Peyton, " , 1,021 tons, 14th Flotilla.
Parthian, " , 1,025 tons, 15th Flotilla.
Narwhal, " , 1,032 tons, 12th Flotilla.
10th Sloop Flotilla, under orders of
Admiral of Minesweepers
Alyssum, Buttercup, Gladiolus, Mignonette, Poppy,
Rosemary
Azalea-class, 17 knots, 1,250 tons,
two 4‑inch guns.
The
destroyers were soon
absorbed in escorting
ships to the protected
coastal route, and Admiral
Bayly was left, as before,
with only his Q‑boats to
operate against
submarines. There could be
no thought for the moment
of detaching more
destroyers and small craft
to the western area. At a
conference held at Rosyth
on February 15 the
Commander‑in‑Chief urged
strongly that a further
depletion of his flotillas
would be most dangerous.
Admiral Beatty was,
indeed, most anxious lest
the Admiralty should be
tempted into diverting a
proportion of the light
squadrons of the Grand
Fleet for special
operations in the southern
part of the North Sea. The
First Lord, Sir Edward
Carson, seems to have
agreed, and the Admiralty
pressed on their policy of
concentrating traffic
round the British Isles on
the patrolled coastal
routes. At a conference
held at the Admiralty on
February 19 it was decided
that the war channel which
had been established in
the early days of the war
between the Thames and the
Humber should be extended
to the Tyne. Measures were
also taken to improve the
buoying of the channel and
to keep merchant traffic
to it more rigidly.
Plan - The British and German
Dispositions in the Dover
Straits, February 25‑26,
1917
Towards
the end of the month the
Germans decided to attempt
a fresh attack on the
Dover Straits from
Zeebrugge. The forces
under Admiral Bacon's
command had been
considerably increased
since the first raid in
October, and the method of
disposing and employing
them had been modified. On
the night of February 25
two light cruisers, two
flotilla leaders, twelve
"L," four "H" and one "I"
class destroyers, the Viking
and two monitors were
stationed on the Dover
side of the straits.
Admiral Bacon had, in
addition, a number
Feb.
25, 1917
THE DOVER STRAITS
of
old destroyers and patrol
boats, which were employed
in escort duties and
traffic control, and could
not therefore be treated
as part of his striking
force. The light cruisers
Conquest and Active,
with the destroyers Porpoise,
Paragon, Unity
and Ambuscade,
were anchored off Deal, in
the Downs, which were
guarded, at their northern
and southern entrances, by
the monitors Erebus
and Terror
respectively. The flotilla
leaders Broke and
Faulknor and nine
destroyers were at Dover,
and five "L" class
destroyers ‑ the Lance,
Landrail, Lochinvar,
Laverock and Laurel
‑ were patrolling in
the straits. The method of
patrol had been
considerably modified: the
barrage was now marked by
five large light‑buoys
(Nos. 5A, 7A, 9A, 11A and
18A), and a destroyer was
stationed off each with
orders to keep on a patrol
line running five miles
southwest from each
light‑buoy.'
(The Germans appear to have numbered
these buoys 1, 2, 3, 4 and
5 respectively. The
British dispositions on
the night of February 25
were: the Lance
patrolling from 5A buoy;
the Landrail
patrolling from 7A buoy;
the Lochinvar
patrolling from 9A buoy;
the Laverock
patrolling from 11A buoy;
the Laurel
patrolling from 13A buoy.)
The
German plan of attack
differed on this occasion
from previous ones, in
that the forces allotted
to its execution were very
much dispersed. The
traffic route between
England and the Hook, the
Downs anchorage, and the
outpost forces on the
Channel barrage, were all
to be attacked during the
night. The second "Z" or
Zeebrugge Half Flotilla
was to operate in the
first zone near the Maas
lightship; the first "Z"
Half Flotilla ‑ G.95,
G.96, V.67, V.68 and
V.47 ‑ under
Commander Konrad Albrecht,
was to operate against the
Downs, whilst the 6th
Flotilla – S.49
(leader), V.46, V.45,
G.37, V.44 and
G.86 ‑ under
Commander Tillessen, were
to attack the barrage.
These detachments left
harbour between six and
seven o'clock on February
25th.
The
weather was fine but
overcast; the moon, which
was four days old, was
hidden by clouds, and the
night was, in consequence,
very dark. At half‑past
ten the Captain of the Laverock,
which was then about three
and a half miles to the
south‑west of 11A buoy on
a north‑easterly course,
sighted a destroyer on his
port bow, steering
south‑west. A moment or so
later she burned a red
flare; she was evidently
the leading destroyer of
Commander Tillessen's
flotilla, which had just
crossed the central part
of the barrage. The
Germans had detected the
British destroyer a few
moments earlier, and
withheld their fire until
they were very near. They
opened upon the Laverock
at close range, and
smothered her with shell;
but Lieutenant Binmore,
who was quite determined
to maintain contact, put
his helm over, passed
through the rear of the
German line and steadied
upon the same course as
the Germans. The
consequences of this
manoeuvre are an
extraordinary illustration
of the hazards and
uncertainties of a night
action. Commander
Tillessen was satisfied
that he had passed the Laverock
on an opposite course.
When he sighted her again
on his starboard quarter,
and on the same southerly
course as himself, she
seemed to him to be not
one destroyer but three,
and he was convinced that
he was now in action with
a whole detachment.
The
fire from the Laverock's
guns must have been
extraordinarily rapid and
well sustained, for
Commander Tillessen never
discovered his mistake,
and turned to a northerly
course at about 10.40.
Lieutenant Binmore saw the
enemy turn and made after
them; but his impressions
and those of his opponent
were quite different. It
seemed to Commander
Tillessen that the German
flotilla was following a
detachment of British
destroyers, which was
altering course gradually
towards the French shore:
Lieutenant Binmore was
quite certain that he was
following the German
flotilla. The two forces
lost contact a few minutes
before eleven and
Commander Tillessen
re‑crossed the barrage at
about eleven o'clock. He
intercepted a signal from
the Laverock,
reporting the engagement,
and upon this decided that
a surprise attack upon
Dover ‑ which he had
originally intended to
deliver ‑ was no longer
practicable, and he held
straight on for his base.
The other British
destroyers kept to their
patrol stations. Admiral
Bacon at Dover got news of
the Laverock's encounter
at about eleven o'clock,
and at once ordered out
the destroyers in harbour.
Before they could get to
sea, however, the German
force under Commander
Konrad Albrecht had struck
at the second point of
attack, the Downs
anchorage.
A
line of armed drifters was
spread every night across
the northern entrance to
the Downs from the North
Foreland to the North
Goodwin light‑vessel. At
eleven o'clock the John
Lincoln, at the
inshore end of this line,
near the North Foreland,
sighted a line of
destroyers, about a mile
to seaward of her, on a
northerly course. She
watched them and sent up
an alarm rocket when they
opened fire a few minutes
later. The German
destroyers sent down a
number of shells in the
fields near the wireless
station at the North
Foreland and then
bombarded Margate and
Westgate for a few
minutes. By twenty minutes
past eleven they had fired
their last rounds and were
making off to the
north‑eastward. As soon as
the commanding officer of
the Porpoise
division saw the green
rocket and sighted the
firing he ordered his
division
Feb.
25‑27, 1917
A FALSE IMPRESSION
to
weigh. The light cruisers
and destroyers passed the
Gull at about 11.17 and
were off the Elbow
light‑buoy at twenty
minutes to twelve. They
sighted nothing; but they
must, at times, have been
quite near to a small
detachment of two boats ‑
V.47 and V.67
‑ which Commander Albrecht
very imprudently sent
towards the Gull, and
which remained on patrol
between the Gull and the
Elbow buoy for the next
hour. The Dover destroyers
under Captain Percy
Withers in the Viking
cleared the harbour at
about twenty minutes past
eleven with orders to
spread on a patrol between
the South Foreland and
Calais. Just after
half‑past eleven Captain
Withers was ordered to
take his division towards
Ramsgate. He was recalled
at midnight; for none of
our forces had detected
the presence of the two
German destroyers between
the Gull and the Elbow
buoy and Admiral Bacon was
under the impression that
the whole German force had
retired.
The
Admiralty received Admiral
Bacon's report of the
night's work without
comment. From the
shortness of the
bombardment and the
rapidity with which the
Germans withdrew it was
clear that they knew quite
well that we were
defending the straits with
forces far too powerful
and numerous for them to
oppose in any serious
encounter. They had, it is
true, every freedom to
repeat these harassing
night operations when they
chose; but the attack had
been so entirely fruitless
that the risk was no
longer worth taking: the
Straits and the Downs
seemed to be sufficiently
safe under the existing
dispositions.
It
was satisfactory to know
that this vital point in
our sea communications was
well covered; but the
month of February ‑ the
first month of
unrestricted submarine war
‑ ended gloomily. The
first effect of the German
declaration apparently
promised to justify
Admiral von Holtzendorff's
prophecy. Neutral shipping
was abandoning the North
Sea; Norwegian, Danish,
Dutch and Swedish ships
suspended their voyages,
and neutral ships in
British harbours refused
to clear. (For full
details, see Fayle, Vol.
III., Chap. III.)
In
its purely military
aspects the campaign was
equally serious. It was
evident from the outset
that the western
approaches to the British
Isles would be the
decisive theatre in the
campaign against shipping.
It was here that the
oceanic routes converged,
and as approaching and
outgoing shipping was very
much concentrated and
obliged to follow certain
routes, it could not
possibly be defended by
the method of dispersion.
The western approach was,
in fact, a sort of focal
area, which could not be
avoided and which was too
large to be thoroughly
patrolled and watched. On
February 1, when the
campaign began, five
German submarines were at
work in the area, and
their disposition showed
that the German naval
staff was thoroughly
acquainted with our
existing traffic routes. A
large U‑boat was stationed
to the west of Mizen Head,
and was attacking ships as
they approached the
patrolled route along the
south coast of Ireland.
Another was cruising
between Mizen Head and the
Scillies to pick up ships
which avoided the coastal
zone. A third was
operating to the west of
the Scillies; and a fourth
was at work off Trevose
Head, right on the
patrolled route which ran
round the Bristol Channel,
and on which a large
proportion of the Atlantic
shipping was concentrated.
The fifth, a boat of the
UC type, was in the
Channel between Portsmouth
and Havre.
These
dispositions were, as a
whole, maintained
throughout the month,
although the proportion of
U‑boats to UC‑boats
varied; and the total
number of operating
submarines was sometimes
increased to eight, when
boats passed through the
area on their way to the
Mediterranean. The
campaign was in many ways
disquieting for us.
Throughout the month the
UC‑boats from Belgium
passed into the Channel
through the Dover barrage,
which seemed hardly to
impede them. The
obstruction, which had
been begun in September
1916, now stretched right
across the entrance to the
Straits from the South
Calliper to the West Dyck,
and it seemed as though
the enormous amount of
material and labour
expended upon it had been
almost wasted. It was even
more serious that the
German submarine
commanders were proving
that they could operate
with impunity quite close
to those patrolled and
defended routes which were
the basis of our whole
system of defence.
A
large submarine on the
Bristol Channel route was
not attacked or even
disturbed by the auxiliary
patrol vessels in the
area. Half‑way through the
month, (February 11 and
12) a UC‑boat cruised
right along the outer edge
of the patrolled route in
the Channel, which Admiral
Duff had recently
reorganised and
reinforced, and sank
merchant shipping as she
went. The inference was
thus irresistible that the
mosquito craft of the
auxiliary patrol could not
adequately protect
shipping on the routes
they were watching, or
even drive submarines away
from them; and if that was
so, then the whole system
of massing shipping along
special routes must be
considered unsound. It was
even more ominous that the
German submarines were
operating with small risk
of being brought to
action, and in any case
with very little danger of
destruction. During the
month there were thirty‑
Feb.
5, 1917
Q.5 OFF IRELAND
nine
encounters between German
submarines and British
patrol and destroyer
forces in Home Waters, and
on only three occasions
was a German submarine
sunk. It was therefore not
only very difficult to
find and engage a U‑boat,
but even when this was
achieved the chances of
escape were thirteen to
one in the German's
favour. Of the sunken
submarines two had been
destroyed in the North
Sea, and only one in the
western approach area. The
German losses for the
month were:
UC.39 on February 8 by H.M.S. Thrasher,
near Flamborough Head.
UC.46 on February 8 by H.M.S. Liberty,
in the northern entrance
to the Straits of Dover.
U.83 on February 17 by H.M.S. Q.5,
off the south‑west of
Ireland.
UC.32 on February 23 on a mine off
Sunderland.
Such
a rate of destruction was
quite insufficient to
check the campaign; but
the one successful action
in the western area
deserves to be placed on
record, for it shows not
only what strenuous and
highly disciplined efforts
were necessary, and what
risks must be accepted, in
order to engage and defeat
a single Uboat, but also
to what degree these risks
and difficulties had been
increased by the change
from restricted to
unrestricted submarine
war.
On
February 9, 1917, Admiral
Bayly reported to the
Admiralty that he intended
to station one "Q"‑ship
off the north coast of
Ireland, one inside the
triangle formed by the
Scilly Isles, the Tuskar
and the Blaskets, and all
the remainder of these
vessels to the south and
west of Ireland. Amongst
those whom he sent to the
south‑western approaches
was Commander Gordon
Campbell, whose name has
not yet been mentioned in
this work, but who had
already earned a high
reputation in the Q‑ship
service. His method of
operating was a bold and
simple one. His ship, Q.5,
which had been an old
collier named the Farnborough,
was manned by a crew
mainly drawn from the
Mercantile Marine and the
R.N.R., and trained by
their commander to a high
point of intelligence and
self‑control. The ship's
part on falling in with a
U‑boat was to behave in
every way as a common
tramp, to misunderstand
the enemy's signals, and
finally to lie to, as if
helpless, when fired upon.
The crew would then
abandon ship with
well‑acted panic, leaving
on board only the
commander and a few
concealed gunners with the
masked battery. Commander
Campbell during the
earlier months of 1916 had
by these means on two
occasions induced a U‑boat
to come to the surface
within easy range of him,
with the intention of
sinking the supposed tramp
by gunfire; but in both
cases it was the Farnborough's
gunners
who had sunk their enemy.
Commander
Campbell had run up the
white ensign at exactly
the right moment, the
shutter which concealed
the battery had been
simultaneously dropped,
and some twenty rounds had
ended the engagement. It
was soon known, however,
that the German submarine
officers had received
orders to be more cautious
in approaching their prey,
even when apparently
helpless; and when the
unrestricted campaign
began, the Farnborough's
method appeared to be no
longer a possible one, for
even a genuine tramp was
now to be treated on the
same footing as a warship,
and torpedoed at sight
without warning. Commander
Campbell determined to
accept the new danger and
outbid it: in order to
perfect his disguise and
secure his action at close
range, he ordered his
officers on watch to
manoeuvre deliberately so
as to get the ship
torpedoed. The most
cunning or apprehensive
U‑boat commander would
hardly suspect a sinking
vessel; and before she
sank she might well get
her chance.
The
Q.5 was one of the
largest and best armed of
the vessels employed in
submarine decoying: she
was of 3,000 tons, and had
an armament of five
12‑pounders, two
6‑pounders and a maxim.
She sailed from Queenstown
on February 9, and cruised
for over a week without
sighting anything, or
hearing anything but the
distress calls of vessels
all around her. The
weather was extremely bad,
but on February 17 it
moderated, and at a
quarter to ten Q.5
was about thirty‑five
miles to the
west‑south‑west of the
Great Skellig, on an
easterly course. No one on
watch was aware that a
submarine was about until
a torpedo was reported
coming straight for the
ship from the starboard
side. The torpedo being so
well aimed, no manceuvring
was necessary to ensure
being hit; Commander
Campbell merely put his
helm over to try and save
the engine‑room. In this
he was only partly
successful, for the
torpedo crashed into the
foremost part of number 3
hold, and burst the after
engine‑room bulkhead. The
chief engineer at once
reported that the
engine‑room was filling,
and received in reply the
order to "hold on for as
long as he could and then
hide."
"Action"
was then sounded and all
hands went quietly
to stations previously
arranged. Every man except
those required on board
for the fight then
abandoned ship in two
lifeboats and one dinghy
‑a fourth boat was partly
lowered, with carefully
acted confusion. Commander
Campbell lay concealed on
the bridge and watched the
submarine's periscope
about a cable's length
away. She was the U.83,
one of the Germans' newest
boats, under the charge of
Lieutenant-Commander Bruno
Hoppe. He had been out of
Germany for
FEB.
17, 1917
U.83 DESTROYED
three
weeks, which he had spent
in raiding the Scillies
area. Captain Hoppe was
entirely deceived as to
the real state of affairs;
he approached Q.5
slowly, with his vessel
still submerged, and
Commander Campbell saw U.83
pass down his starboard
side under water about ten
yards away. The temptation
to open fire was almost
unbearable; but Commander
Campbell resisted it,
thinking it better to wait
until the enemy had broken
surface and exposed
himself. He did so when
about 300 yards on the
Q‑ship's port bow, and
again moved slowly past
her. A minute or so later
he was on a bearing from
which all our guns could
bear, and was enveloped in
a hurricane of bursting
shell. There was no
missing at such a range,
and all was over in a few
minutes. "He finally
sank," wrote Commander
Campbell, "with his
conning‑tower opened and
shattered, and with the
crew pouring out." The
"cease fire" was sounded,
and one of the lifeboats
was sent to their
assistance; but of the
whole crew one officer ‑ a
sub-lieutenant named
Boenicke and a seaman,
were the only ones who
could be saved: the rest
had perished in the
explosion of the U‑boat
and in the dense oil from
her which covered the
surface.
Commander
Campbell had now to look
to his own ship: the
engine‑room and two
boiler‑rooms were filling
rapidly, and she appeared
to be sinking. In response
to a signal, the Narwhal,
Buttercup and
Laburnum arrived
early in the afternoon. Q.5 was taken in tow and the four ships
made slowly for Buncrana,
at times almost in
desperate conditions. When
they reached harbour at
half‑past nine on the
following day Q.5
had a list of nearly
twenty degrees and her
stern was "nearly eight
feet under water."
The
venture, then, was
completely successful, and
it was not the last of
Commander Campbell's
successes; but it could
not be held to have solved
our problem, for it could
not be repeated with
sufficient frequency or
certainty. It proved only
that a large and specially
equipped ship, with a
highly trained crew under
fine leadership, might
with exceptional good
fortune strike a U‑boat
off the list and yet
escape destruction
herself. But the stake was
a heavy one, both in men
and material, and the
output of the German
submarine yards could not
be kept down by rare
successes, however
brilliantly won. The sky
was lightened by a
momentary flash: the
darkness remained and
deepened. During February
540,000 tons of shipping,
British, Allied and
neutral, was sunk. Twelve
vessels had been destroyed
in the North Sea,
twenty‑five in the
Channel, seven in the
Irish Sea, fourteen in the
Bristol Channel, eleven in
the approaches to the
Scillies and eighteen in
the approaches to the
Fastnet. There was nothing
yet in sight to show that
Admiral von Holtzendorff's
forecast was an
over‑sanguine estimate.
7
Further
Attacks on the Dover
Straits
There
were now clear indications
that the submarine
campaign was diverting to
itself the main resources
and energies of both
sides. Admiral Scheer
speaks of a sacrifice of
personnel and of material
by the High Seas Fleet to
the U‑boats, and he adds
that it affected the
efficiency of his battle
squadrons. The British
Admiralty had also become
aware of a change: they
had good reason to believe
that in the months which
had elapsed since the
battle of Jutland the
increased superiority of
the Grand Fleet had been
tacitly recognised, and
that in the present
circumstances the High
Seas Fleet was not likely
to be employed in any
serious movement. On March
11 they wired to the
Commander‑in-Chief that he
should use his destroyer
flotillas freely for
hunting the enemy's
submarines.
Plan - The British and German
Dispositions in the Dover
Straits, March 17‑18, 1917
The
message reached him three
days after a successful
and not unimportant
experiment. On March 2 he
had ordered the submarine
commander at the Tees to
send two G‑boats north to
patrol between Scapa and
Norway. (The "G" class
were submarines of 695
tons surface
displacement; they were
armed with one 3‑inch
gun and five torpedo
tubes.) The order
was evidently given in
pursuance of his new
policy of keeping a
submarine patrol at work
across the track of the
U‑boats which used the
north‑about route. The
boats sent on this duty
were G.13 and E.49,
and their experiment was
successfully carried out,
though their fate was
widely different. E.49
was lost on a mine in
Balta Sound on March 12;
but four days earlier
Lieutenant Bradshaw in G.13
torpedoed and sank UC.43
off Muckle Flugga, and
thereby proved that it was
not impossible to waylay a
U‑boat on the passage to
its hunting ground. The
Commander‑in-Chief decided
that it was worth while to
strengthen the attack upon
these routes; he therefore
called up two more
submarines from the Tees (G.7
and G.8), and
ordered the Scapa
submarines to watch an
area west of the Fair
Island channel and to the
south‑west of the Orkneys.
After receiving the
Admiralty telegram to use
his destroyers more
freely, he also made
arrangements for keeping a
division of destroyers in
the Fair Island channel
whenever submarines were
reported.
March
17, 1917
A DESTROYER RAID
These
were the first steps of a
policy which later became
the essence of our
offensive anti‑submarine
campaign: that of using
concentrated specially
composed forces in
operations thought out
beforehand with the same
degree of precision as
coastal bombardments,
landings and cruiser
sweeps. It was, in fact,
the beginning of the
transition from the
patrolling or watching
system, which had hitherto
held the field, to the new
system of concerted
operations. The alteration
in our plan of war seems
not to have been based
upon theory or discussion,
but to have been suggested
by experience and
instinct, as an opening
may be suggested in the
heat of conflict to a
swordsman of the
aggressive temperament.
Soon
after these decisions had
been taken, the guerrilla
warfare in the Flanders
Bight blazed up afresh. On
Saturday March 17 the
Admiralty received warning
that some movement was
impending in the southern
part of the North Sea, and
a warning was accordingly
sent to all local
commanders. Admiral Bacon
did not alter his
dispositions for the
night, which were
substantially the same as
those in force at the time
of the previous raid. Four
destroyers were
maintaining the barrage
patrol: the Laertes
(senior officer) was off
5A buoy; the Laforey
off 7A; the Llewellyn
off 9A; and the Paragon
off 11A. In the small
Downs, off Deal, were the
light cruiser Canterbury,
the flotilla leader Faulknor
and the destroyers Saracen,
Viking, Mentor
and Ambuscade. The
monitors Erebus
and Prince Eugene
were anchored off Ramsgate
at the northern entrance
to the Downs. The flotilla
leader Broke and
the destroyers Myngs,
Lucifer, Linnet,
Lochinvar and Morris
were in reserve at Dover.
The Admiralty had
correctly assumed that the
German forces were moving;
for the flotillas at
Zeebrugge were about to
raid the straits.
This
time the forces allotted
to the attack were more
concentrated than in the
previous raid. The half
flotilla which in February
had been ordered to
operate against the Dutch
traffic route had cruised
fruitlessly off the Hook
for three and a half hours
and had returned to
harbour with nothing to
report. Such quarry as was
to be found was evidently
in the Dover Straits and
its northern approaches;
it was, in consequence, in
this area alone that the
available German forces
were ordered to operate.
Commander Tillessen, who
was in charge of the
operation, divided the
area to be attacked into
three zones.
The
first was to the west of a
line joining buoy number
7A on the barrage to light
buoy number 9. He himself
was to operate in this
area with the 6th Flotilla
‑ (S.49 leader; G.86,
G.87 ‑ 11th Half
Flotilla under
Lieutenant‑Commander
Rilmann ‑ and V.43,
V.45, G.37, V.46 ‑
the 12th Half Flotilla
under Lieutenant‑Commander
Lahs). The second zone of
operation was to the east
of the line joining the
two buoys; it was allotted
to Commander Konrad
Albrecht, who commanded
the first Z half flotilla
‑ V.67, V.68, G.95,
G.96 ‑ from the
leader, V.47. The
third zone ‑ the Downs
anchorage was allotted to
Lieutenant‑Commander
Zander who led the second
Z half flotilla (S.15
leader; S.18, S.20 and
S.24). The
peculiarity of this
allocation of force was
that the attack upon our
most important position ‑
the Downs ‑ was entrusted
to the weakest of the
three operating
detachments. Commander
Tillessen took great
precautions that the
German advantage of being
able to open fire at
sight, and without
challenge, should not be
prejudiced by any possible
confusion between the
operating forces. Not only
were the areas allotted to
each detachment most
strictly defined: their
lines of approach were
kept distinct. Commander
Tillessen was to approach
the barrage from the north
and west of the Sandettie;
Commander Konrad Albrecht
was to keep the bank on
his starboard hand, and
cross the barrage near
buoy 11A.
The
German flotillas left
harbour between 6 and 8
p.m.; Commander Tillessen
crossed the barrage at
about 10.35; Commander
Konrad Albrecht was about
a quarter of an hour
behind him on the other
side of the Sandettie, and
the 6th Flotilla first
came into contact with our
destroyers. The Paragon
was just completing her
run to the south‑westward
when Commander Tillessen
was crossing the barrage
considerably to the
eastward of the track
assigned to him in his
orders. At 10.50, whilst
the Paragon was on
a northeasterly course
towards number 11A buoy,
the look‑out men sighted
the leading destroyers of
the 6th Flotilla, steaming
across her bows. The
commanding officer
challenged, and they
replied with torpedoes and
gun‑fire. Before his
signalmen had completed
the challenge a torpedo
struck the engineroom, and
his destroyer was in a
heavy shell fire. In a few
moments all was over, the
depth charges on board
exploded and the Paragon
broke in two and sank.
There were only ten
survivors.
But
in spite of all his
precautions Commander
Tillessen was not able to
secure himself against the
hazards and uncertainties
of a night action. When
the German destroyers
opened fire,
Lieutenant‑Commander Lahs
commanding the 12th Half
Flotilla saw, or thought
he saw, the leading boat
of the flotilla turning to
starboard. He therefore
led his half flotilla
round to starboard, and by
so doing lost touch with
the rest of the force.
Realising that if he
followed and regained
contact, Commander
Tillessen would probably
open
March
17, 1917
SUCCESSIVE DISASTERS
fire
upon him ‑ for the essence
of the German plan was
evidently that all who
were fallen in with should
be treated as enemies ‑ he
steered straight back
across the barrage and
made for home. When the Paragon
was sunk, Commander Konrad
Albrecht was just leading
his half flotilla across
the barrage; he saw the
explosion on his starboard
bow but for the moment he
kept to his course.
The
explosion was sighted by
most of our destroyers on
patrol; but they did not
all account for it in the
same way. The Llewellyn,
the next on patrol,
reported to Dover that
there was "heavy firing in
the direction of Calais,"
the Laforey
concluded from the
explosion that one of the
destroyers on patrol had
been mined, left her
station and came into a
mass of wreckage at about
eleven o'clock. She then
turned on her searchlight
and signalled by visual to
the Llewellyn that
a ship had blown up, and
that she required her
assistance to pick up
survivors. The Llewellyn
was by then on her way;
and Commander Tillessen
was also returning to the
position.
For
a few minutes after his
action with the Paragon,
he held his flotilla to
its south‑westerly course;
then he turned, and
steered back. He passed
the wreck of the Paragon
at about eleven o'clock,
and about ten minutes
later sighted the Laforey's
searchlight astern of him,
playing upon another
destroyer. He at once
turned into the straits
again, and in a few
minutes came up with the Llewellyn.
The Germans kept their
guns silent; but G.87
and S.49 each
fired a torpedo; one of
them struck the fore part
of the Llewellyn
and brought her up.
Commander Tillessen
steamed on to the
south‑west, and five
minutes later established
contact with Commander
Konrad Albrecht, who on
sighting a second
detonation, and seeing
searchlights, had decided
to leave his zone of
operations and concentrate
upon the 6th Flotilla. The
two forces turned
north‑eastwards in company
and passed the barrage
without incident at about
half‑past eleven.
Commander
Tillessen's decision to
deliver his second attack
with torpedoes only, may
have been due to sound
judgment or to mere
hazard: it certainly
turned to his advantage.
The Laforey and Llewellyn
were in company when the Llewellyn
was struck; neither
commanding officer sighted
another destroyer, and the
Laforey's captain
was convinced that both
the Paragon and
the Llewellyn had
been attacked by a
submarine.
These
successive disasters left
only the Laertes
on the regular patrol; for
her commanding officer
heard no sound when he
sighted the explosion, and
concluded that what he saw
was the flare of an iron
foundry near Calais. Soon
after, however, he took in
a detailed message
reporting to Dover that
the Paragon and Llewellyn
had both been torpedoed
off 11A buoy. He then
steamed towards the
eastern end of the
barrage. When he arrived
near the buoy he fell in
with the Llewellyn,
which was still able to
steam stern first. The
German boats were nowhere
to be seen, and the Laforey
had made off to the
north‑eastward to search
for the submarine which
the commanding officer
believed had done the
damage.
The
Admiral at Dover was
hampered by uncertainty as
to what was actually
happening in the straits.
He received the report
from the Llewellyn
that there was heavy
firing in the direction of
Calais, and almost
simultaneously Calais
reported that firing had
been observed. Soon after,
he received a signal from
the Laforey that
she was picking up
survivors, and on this he
ordered his reserve force
into the straits (11.20
p.m.). Just after he had
done so he received a
further report from the Laforey
which ran: "Paragon
and Llewellyn
torpedoed two miles S.W,
of 11A buoy - Paragon
10.50, Llewellyn
11.15. Llewellyn
while picking up
survivors." This confirmed
his assumption that an
enemy force was in the
straits, and he signalled
to the commanding officer
of the Broke to
"keep his boats together
and look out for the
enemy."
Although
half an hour had gone by
since the Germans had
first appeared, there was
still a chance that they
would be brought to action
if they came westward.
Just after he had issued
his last instructions to
the Broke, another
message came in from the Laforey.
The commanding officer now
reported that the Paragon
and Llewellyn had
been attacked by
submarines, and this
obviously altered the
whole position. It was
useless to send more
destroyers into a
submarine trap which had
already ensnared two
boats; so Admiral Bacon
cancelled his first order,
told two "P" boats (The
"P" or patrol boats were
vessels of between 600
and 700 tons
displacement, armed,
generally, with one
4‑inch and one or two
12‑pounders.)
(numbers 11 and 21)
to go to the patrol line
and hunt for a submarine
between 11A buoy and the
French coast, and ordered
the Laforey and Laertes
to retire five miles
westward and keep up the
patrol at high speed
(11.50 to 11.55 p.m.). The
Broke was just
clear of the harbour when
she received this second
signal: she turned back at
once and anchored in Dover
harbour at midnight. No
further news came through
for three‑quarters of an
hour; but the enemy had
not yet struck their last
blow.
At
about eleven o'clock
Lieutenant‑Commander
Zander with his small
detachment had sighted the
lights of the
March
18, 1917
ADVANTAGES OF OPPORTUNITY
British
coast near the North
Foreland. As he had been
ordered to turn back at
one o'clock, he was rather
ahead of time, so for the
next hour and a half he
cruised to and fro on an
east and west course, at
slow speed. Towards 12.30
a.m. he closed the
northern opening of the
anchorage.
The
northern entrance to the
Downs was guarded, as
usual, by a line of
drifters spread out
between the Broadstairs
Knoll and the North Sand
Head; a torpedo boat (No.
4) cruised to the
south of them. Normally no
merchantmen were allowed
to anchor north of the
Gull; but on March 15 the
s.s. Greypoint had
been forced by engine
trouble to anchor about a
mile east of Broadstairs
Knoll buoy; she was still
there on the night of the
raid.
Just
after half‑past twelve
(March 18) the drifter Paramount
sighted three
destroyers approaching
from the north-eastward;
she was then, apparently,
somewhere near the
Broadstairs Knoll buoy.
They replied to her green
rocket with an outburst of
gun‑fire, directed against
all the drifters in the
neighbourhood, sank the Greypoint
with a torpedo, and passed
out of sight on a
south‑westerly course. A
few minutes later they
turned and opened fire on
Ramsgate and Broadstairs.
Meanwhile, the Canterbury's
division slipped their
cables and got under way
(12.42 a.m.); but almost
as they did so, the
bombardment ceased, and
Lieutenant-Commander
Zander withdrew. Torpedo
boat No. 4 was
then near the Gull, and at
ten minutes to one her
commanding officer sighted
three enemy destroyers to
the west of him, firing
towards the land. He
reported this to the Canterbury
and strove to keep touch;
but the Germans had the
heels of him. Soon after
one o'clock he lost sight
of them near the Elbow
buoy, steering eastwards
at high speed. Admiral
Bacon knew from several
messages that the shore
was being bombarded, and
just after one o'clock he
received a further message
from the Laforey
to say that it was
destroyers and not
submarines which had
attacked the barrage
patrol. He recalled the
"P" boats at once, and
waited for news from the
Downs division, which he
knew was under way. The Canterbury,
Faulknor and the
destroyers reached the
North Goodwin light‑vessel
at a quarter‑past one; but
by then the enemy had
disappeared and the raid
was over.
This
was the second occasion on
which the German
destroyers had attacked
the straits and inflicted
loss upon our defending
forces. They must have
known the difficulties of
our position and their own
advantages of opportunity
so that there seemed every
reason to suppose they
would go on and turn these
raids upon the straits
into a regular destroyer
war of attrition. "The
enemy," wrote Admiral
Bacon in his report, "need
only keep a rigid lookout,
when close to the straits,
for one hour, and fire a
torpedo at everything he
sees and run away. The
enemy can vary the time of
attack at will and choose
their night. They can
predetermine whether to
'shoot and scoo ' or to
carry out a more or less
prolonged attack. The best
disposition of my
destroyers differs in each
of these two forms of
attack."
Some
days after the raid
Admiral Bacon discussed
the whole question at the
Admiralty, and altered his
dispositions for the
defence of the barrage.
His revised orders, issued
five days after the raid
was over, divided the
barrage into an eastern
(7A light buoy to Calais)
and a western (5A light
buoy to the South
Goodwins) patrol. Each was
to be watched by a
flotilla leader and a
detachment of destroyers,
steaming parallel to the
barrage instead of at
right angles to it as
hitherto. These new
dispositions were
apparently only to be put
into force "when the enemy
showed a desire to raid
the straits," that is,
presumably when Admiral
Bacon had some warning of
impending activity.
His
standing or normal
dispositions for guarding
the straits are easier to
understand from diagrams
than from detailed
descriptions.
Plans
- Dover Straits
Dispositions
It
seemed to the Admiralty
that the enemy intended to
follow up their success
rapidly and energetically;
for on March 23 news came
into Whitehall that a new
destroyer flotilla had
reached Belgium from
Germany. Commodore
Tyrwhitt was at once
ordered to move his
available forces into the
Swin, and the
Commander‑in‑Chief was
directed to send six
destroyers to Harwich. For
three nights special
precautions were taken in
the whole Thames and Dover
Straits area. It then
became evident that the
new German flotilla did
not intend to act as
rapidly as had been
expected, and Commodore
Tyrwhitt was directed to
take his force back to
Harwich.
For
many weeks past the
Admiralty had been
considering a set of
proposals from the
Commander‑in‑Chief, who
wished to assemble a
powerful submarine
flotilla in the northern
part of the North Sea.
They had not agreed to his
principal suggestions; but
had decided to use
submarines as a trade
route patrol in the
western approaches. The
submarine flotillas were
accordingly re‑arranged
and redistributed round
the bases of the British
Isles, in a plan of
re‑organisation which came
into force at about the
end of March. The
Queenstown flotilla was
increased to seven units
(3 D. and 4 E.), and six
boats (3 D. and 8 E.) were
stationed at Lough
March
1917
RISING LOSSES
Swilly;
the remaining changes were
not so important. (See
Appendix B.) As the
Admiralty had not felt
able to give the
Commander‑in-Chief the
additional submarine
flotilla for which he had
asked, he called up the
entire 10th Flotilla from
the Tees and based it at
Scapa. When it arrived, he
organised it into three
patrols: the Muckle
Flugga, the Bergen‑Lerwick
and the St. Kilda. By this
means he hoped to keep the
submarine routes to and
from the Atlantic, and the
Scandinavian traffic
routes, under continuous
observation. It was too
early to say whether this
re‑organisation of our
submarine flotillas would
affect the course of the
campaign.
When
the month of March opened
there was a slight lull in
the enemy's attack upon
the western trade routes;
but it was soon ended. On
March 5, a U‑boat of the
larger type settled on the
track between the Start
and the Lizard, and five
other boats were in the
Irish Sea: one well out to
sea, three others closer
in and one other ‑ a
UC‑boat ‑ between the
Nymphe Bank and the
Scillies. They held these
positions for roughly four
days; but on the 9th the
attack shifted to the
eastward, and eight
submarines were reported
between the Channel and
western Ireland. Three
submarines ‑ each of a
large type were then
settled on the patrolled
track of incoming
shipping. One worked
between the Tuskar and
Queenstown, the second off
the north coast of
Cornwall, and the third
off the south Devon coast
near the Start. This
attack upon the areas
where our defensive forces
were strongest and most
concentrated lasted for a
whole week, and it was not
until the 17th that it was
relaxed.
On
that day we located three
submarines between the
south coast of Ireland and
the Great Sole Bank to the
west of Ushant. A UC‑boat
had relieved the large
U‑boat to the south of the
Start, and another UC-boat
was cruising in
mid‑Channel between Ushant
and Portland. The inshore
attack had, however, been
carried to the French
coast with telling effect,
and from the 17th a
UC-boat operated against
shipping in the Ushant
area. The French patrols
were as little able to
dislodge or disturb her as
our own further north, and
by the end of the month
twenty‑seven more steamers
and sailing vessels had
gone to the bottom between
Abervrach and La Rochelle.
In our own waters the
pressure off the west
coast of Ireland became
slightly less severe after
the 20th; but two UC‑boats
were then located in the
Start area, where they
operated without let or
hindrance until the 24th.
On the 21st another
UC-boat opened operations
in the St. George's
Channel off the Smalls;
she then moved north into
the Irish Sea and remained
there, sinking ships
rapidly until the end of
the month. Like her
consorts in other areas,
she was practically
undisturbed by our counter
measures.
Between
March I and 31 the German
submarines sank 353,478
tons of British and
220,363 tons of Allied and
neutral shipping at the
cost of four boats, three
of which were lost in the
North Sea. In the western
approaches and the
Mediterranean the enemy
lost only one submarine,
and the distribution of
sinkings showed that the
attack upon the western
approaches was rising in
severity. When we came to
examine the situation at
the end of the month, it
was found that
twenty‑three vessels had
been sunk in the North Sea
and on the East coast,
thirty‑one in the Channel,
nineteen in the Irish Sea,
thirty‑eight in the
western approaches between
Ireland and Ushant,
nineteen in the Bay of
Biscay south of the
Penmarc'h, and seventeen
in the Mediterranean.
The
High Naval Command did not
attempt to conceal that
the situation was getting
out of hand. A "review of
the naval situation,"
presented to the
Government at the end of
March, contained passages
which deserve close
attention. "The blockade
[i.e., the German
submarine blockade] has
now been in operation for
some weeks, and the
experience gained of it is
sufficient to demonstrate
the serious nature of the
menace. Even if we could
rely upon the average
number of the enemy
submarines operating
during the next six months
as not exceeding that of
the last month, it must be
recognised that, with the
advent of longer days and
finer weather, the
offensive capacity of the
submarine will greatly
increase. As a matter of
fact, we are faced with
the certainty of an
increase, month by month,
in the number of hostile
submarines." This was an
outspoken admission that
our counter measures were
insufficient even to hold
the danger at bay. It is
true that the Admiralty
referred later to new
methods of war ‑ which
were not then in force and
could not be tried for
several months yet ‑ but
they drew no conclusion
that they would turn the
scale; all that they felt
justified in saying was
that these new methods of
war must be "put against"
the "certain increase" in
the enemy's activity.
The British and German Dispositions in
the Dover Straits, April
20‑21, 1917
After
reviewing the losses
already caused, the
Admiralty paper continued:
"As regards probable
losses in the near future,
a not unreasonable
estimate is considered to
be 500,000 tons (Allied
and neutral) during March,
increasing possibly to
700,000 tons in June. From
that month onwards some
amelioration of the
situation may be
expected." It required but
little foresight to see
that if the Government
March
7, 1917
THE DEFENCE OUTSTRIPPED
agreed
that this rate of loss was
inevitable and beyond
remedy, they were
admitting that defeat was
in sight: the "ameliorated
situation" towards which
the Admiralty was looking
as a possibility was not
one which would save the
country from disaster and
famine. The paper
admitted, in the plainest
terms, that the attack had
outstripped the defence,
and the third month of
unrestricted submarine
warfare opened gloomily.
Meanwhile
Admiral Bacon had thought
out a plan for retaliating
upon the German flotilla
at Zeebrugge. The Air
Service reported to him
that a certain number of
the destroyers in the
canal always slipped and
went outside during an air
raid. This, in Admiral
Bacon's opinion, gave him
an excellent chance of
using some of the coastal
motor boats which had been
attached to his command
for months past. An air
raid was planned for the
night of the 7th, and four
coastal motor boats and
the destroyer Falcon
were ordered to co‑operate
in it and attack any
German destroyers that
they might find outside
the harbour when the raid
was over. Falcon was
attached as a supporting
vessel. She left at dark
and anchored at the
eastern end of the banks
off Dunkirk, ready to give
assistance to the motor
boats if they required it.
The motor boats left
Dunkirk at a quarter‑past
nine in the evening, so as
to be off Zeebrugge two
hours later, when the air
raid began. (CMB No.
4, Lieutenant W. N. T.
Beckett, RN, in charge
of the detachment; No.
5, Acting Lieutenant F.
C. Harrison, RN; No.
6, Lieutenant A. Swann,
R.N.V.R.; No. 9,
Lieutenant A. Dayrell
Reed, R.N.R.)
The
weather was not
particularly good; but
they were not in
difficulties until they
cleared the banks of the
Zuidcoote pass. The seas
then washed them down
continuously, and the
labouring of the boats put
a severe strain on the
engines. Just after eleven
o'clock they arrived at a
light‑buoy which the
Germans had laid out to
mark a minefield to the
north of Zeebrugge.
Lieutenant Beckett now
turned to the south, with
his boats behind him in
the order 4, 9, 5, 6,
and made for the Wielingen
channel, where he hoped to
find the enemy. He was not
disappointed: on
approaching the channel he
found four destroyers at
anchor, with their heads
to the westward, as the
tide was then flooding
into the Scheldt. The
boats now attacked in
order. Lieutenant Beckett
approached to within about
three cables of the
western destroyers and
fired. He missed, and at
once turned to the
northward to watch. The
others were luckier.
"After a pause of two or
three minutes," wrote
Lieutenant Beckett, a
terrific explosion
occurred and a destroyer
was observed to be
enveloped in smoke and
water." (The torpedoed
destroyer was G.88.
(Sunk – Conway's))
The
boats had all delivered
their attack in a few
minutes, but some of them
were in great danger.
Lieutenant Beckett had
ordered all his colleagues
to retire to the
north‑north‑west across
the German minefield when
they had fired their
torpedoes. His own boat
was filled with fumes and
gas owing to the breakdown
of one of his exhausts,
and Lieutenant Harrison's
boat had completely broken
down, and lay under heavy
fire in the beam of a
destroyer's searchlight.
For a whole five minutes
she lay helpless, but
thanks to the skill and
energy of the motor
mechanic the engines were
re‑started and Lieutenant
Harrison escaped to the
northward at 20 knots. The
Germans, it seems, were
completely taken by
surprise, and there was no
pursuit: the motor boats
reached Dunkirk between 4
and 5 in the morning with
their crews utterly
exhausted. (All the
officers and men were
decorated. Lieutenants
Harrison and Dayrell
Reed received the
D.S.O.; Lieutenants
Beckett and Swann
received the D.S.C.; the
remainder were given
D.S.C.'s and D.S.M.'s.)
We
have seen that a new
German destroyer force had
gone to Flanders during
the last week in March. It
was the third flotilla,
composed of the fifth and
sixth half flotillas. For
nearly a month it remained
at its bases, and was not
ready for its first
enterprise against the
Dover Straits until April
20. Its operation orders
were signed and issued on
the previous day by
Commander Kahle. They were
based upon the same
division of the Straits of
Dover into zones, allotted
to specified detachments
of the operating forces;
but they differed in
certain important details.
First, no force was to be
sent to the Downs: the
straits alone were to be
raided; secondly, the
senior officer of the
flotilla ‑ Commander Kahle
- was to control the
operation from ashore.
Experience
of previous raids had
shown that it was best to
exercise command from the
place where all British
reports and orders were
collected and deciphered.
This place was the general
headquarters of the Naval
Corps, at Bruges; it was
from here, therefore, that
Commander Kahle, the
senior officer of the
flotilla, was ordered to
take charge.
This
was a new method of
exercising command. We had
certainly never
centralised the control of
offensive operations in
the Flanders Bight, in
anything like the same
degree. During raids
Admiral Bacon did, it is
true, control the
movements of our
destroyers from ashore;
but this was very
different from what the
Germans were doing.
Admiral Bacon commanded
from ashore when he was
taking counter measures
April
20,
1917
MORE DESTROYER RAIDS
against
a surprise attack:
Commander Kahle was
ordered to control a
deliberately planned
operation from an office,
many miles away. The
Admiralty frequently
ordered forces at sea to
return to their bases,
when they learned that the
enemy were taking counter
measures; equally
frequently they had
ordered that operations
should be postponed, if
the situation demanded it;
but when once our forces
had sailed the senior
officer had always been in
absolute control. The
intelligence upon which
Commander Kahle was to
rely for controlling an
entire operation was, by
us, always transmitted to
officers commanding at
sea, as advisory
information.
For
the rest, the operation
orders were drafted upon
previous models. Commander
Gautier, in charge of the
5th Half Flotilla, and one
boat from the 6th Half
Flotilla - V.71, V.73,
V.81, S.53, G.85 and
G.42 ‑ was to
operate in the part of the
straits which lies to the
north and west of a line
joining the Sandettie Bank
and the Colbart; he was to
attack all outpost forces
found within his zone of
operations, and was to
bombard Dover in so far as
our counter measures left
him the opportunity to do
so. Commander Konrad
Albrecht in V.47,
with a "Z" Half Flotilla,
and two boats from the 6th
Half Flotilla ‑ G.95,
V.68, G.96, G.91 and
V.70 ‑ was to
operate on the southern
and eastern side of the
Sandettie-Colbart line,
and was to bombard Calais
if he thought it feasible.
The
Admiralty had no
indications of a coming
raid, and Admiral Bacon
had not, in consequence,
been given any special
warning. His chief anxiety
was still the shipping in
the Downs, which had just
been raided by aeroplanes
carrying torpedoes. His
dispositions in the
straits were normal. At
8.30 a.m. on April 20
Commander E. L. Cardale in
the Nugent sailed
with the Matchless,
Morris and Amazon
for the daylight patrol,
and spread them across the
straits from west to east
in this order as soon as
they reached the barrage.
At dusk the last‑named
three destroyers closed
the Nugent and
patrolled the eastern side
of the barrage in company
between 7A buoy and
Calais. Shortly afterwards
(7.45 p.m.) the destroyer
leaders Broke and
Swift left harbour
to patrol "as a division"
between the South Goodwin
light vessel and buoy No.
5A. As guns had recently
been mounted at the North
Foreland and Foreness, the
Downs division was not so
powerful as it had been
before. On the night of
the 20th the light cruiser
Carysfort, the
flotilla cruiser Active
and the destroyers Laertes,
Laverock and Afridi
were at anchor in the
small Downs; the monitor Marshall
Ney was anchored off
Ramsgate. During the
morning the Vice‑Admiral
had ordered the Falcon,
the Racehorse,
torpedo boat No. 15,
the Crane and "P"
boat No. 50 to
maintain the coastal
patrols between Margate
and the western limit of
his command for the next
twenty‑four hours. The
reserve, or striking
force, known as the first
division, consisted on
this night of the
destroyers Myngs,
Miranda, Saracen
(1st Sub‑Division); Mentor,
Lydiard, Lucifer
(2nd Sub‑Division).
Although
the Admiral had provided
as well as he could
against any contingency
that might arise at sea,
he was anxiously aware
that the enemy's raids
upon the straits might at
any moment create an
awkward situation. He kept
his reserve of destroyers
at Dover as much for the
protection of the town and
anchorage as for the
reinforcement of the outer
patrols, and he calculated
that if any German
destroyers ever attacked
Dover his own forces would
be in action with them a
quarter of an hour after
they opened fire. If,
then, the shore defences
opened at once upon the
flashes of the enemy's
guns, there would be a
danger that our own
destroyers might be in the
line of fire. He therefore
proposed that the General
Commanding ashore should
not open fire upon
bombarding forces until
the Vice‑Admiral told him
it was safe to do so. To
this the General could not
agree, and the Admiralty,
realising that the matter
ought to be settled as
quickly as possible,
arranged that the local
naval and military
authorities should confer
together at Whitehall; but
the meeting had not taken
place, and the point was
consequently still
unsettled, when the raid
occurred.
Between
a quarter‑past six and
seven on this night
Commanders Gautier and
Konrad Albrecht left
harbour to raid the
straits; Commander
Albrecht struck the first
blow at Calais: at about
ten minutes past eleven
his detachment appeared
off the town and shelled
the surrounding country
for about five minutes.
The Nugent,
patrolling with her
division to the westward
of her patrol line,
sighted the flashes and
steered towards them for a
few minutes. The gun‑fire
then ceased, and Commander
Cardale at once returned
to his patrol station. The
Swift and the Broke,
at the western end of the
barrage, also sighted the
gun‑fire, and thinking
that the Nugent's
division might be in
action, steamed eastwards
to support Commander
Cardale. About a quarter
of an hour later they
intercepted a signal from
the Nugent to the
Vice-Admiral at Dover,
saying that there were gun
flashes to the S.S.E. This
proved that the Nugent
was not engaged, so the Swift
and Broke at once
turned back for their
ordinary patrol (about
11.30 p.m.). No more was
heard of the Calais
April
20‑21, 1917
WILD SHOOTING
detachment
for the rest of the night;
but a few minutes later
Dover was attacked.
The
Sabreur, a trawler
on the coastal patrol, was
the first to sight the
German destroyers. Just
before half‑past eleven
skipper Robert Scott,
whose trawler was then off
a wreck‑marking vessel to
the south‑east of Dover,
sighted a group of
destroyers to the
southward. They opened
fire on him, and hit his
ship once or twice; but he
put out his lights and
managed to get away to the
westward. The Germans at
once opened on the town,
and the shore batteries
replied: it was now about
11.30. The German fire was
extremely wild, "a
considerable number of
shells were fired blindly
into the county of Kent";
but Admiral Bacon did not
apparently feel free to
send out his first
division until the
bombardment was over. At a
quarter to twelve he
ordered it to go outside,
but not to proceed further
without orders. He
cancelled this order a few
moments later, and it was
not until five minutes to
twelve that he sent out
the six destroyers of that
division.
(The destroyers of the reserve
division did not all leave
harbour at the same time.
The first sub‑division (Myngs,
Miranda, Saracen)
sailed at once; the second
sub‑division (Mentor,
Lydiard, Lucifer)
was not clear of the
entrance until nearly half
an hour later.)
By
then firing had ceased and
the Germans were well on
their way back to the
barrage.
When
the Myngs left
harbour all the destroyers
in the Straits were at
their regular stations.
The Swift and the
Broke had both
sighted the gun‑fire off
Dover, but did not know
what had occasioned it.
Shortly after midnight the
senior officer of the
first division signalled
to the Broke that
he was approaching with
six destroyers; as our
boats had so frequently
been handicapped by the
difficulty of
distinguishing between
friend and foe this was a
wise precaution. In order
to secure himself further
against any possible
confusion or
misunderstanding, the
senior officer decided to
patrol between the South
Goodwin and the eastern
entrance to Dover harbour,
and signalled his
intentions to Commander A.
M. Peck in the Swift
(12.19). This line of
patrol only touched the
area being watched by the
Swift and Broke
at one point ‑ the South
Goodwin ‑ so that there
was now little chance of
any mistake or delay in
opening fire if strange
destroyers appeared
suddenly in the zone
covered by one of the
three British detachments
in the straits.
They
did appear, and for a
somewhat curious reason.
Commander Gautier reached
the barrage at about a
quarterpast twelve; he had
seen nothing of our
outpost forces except the
Sabreur and was
indeed ahead of the forces
we had sent out against
him. He was well ahead of
time, and he seems to have
decided that he ought not
to return to harbour
without making some
attempt to attack the
forces which had been put
down in his operation
orders as his first
objectives; he therefore
turned westward towards
the southern entrance of
the Downs. Although this
new move was in fact
taking his flotilla
straight into our
concentration, some of the
German commanders seem to
have thought themselves
safe, and to have relaxed
their precautions.
Commander von Arnim of G.42,
at all events, gave orders
that the crews of the guns
and torpedo tubes could
"fall out."
Meanwhile
Admiral Bacon, who knew of
nothing which could hold
the Germans back, had
practically given up all
hope of intercepting or of
bringing them to action.
At midnight he asked
Commander Peck in the Swift
if he had seen anything of
the enemy's destroyers,
and was told in reply that
they had not been sighted.
(The flotilla leaders,
it would seem, had not
previously been told
definitely that there
were enemy destroyers in
the straits.) Shortly
after receiving this
answer from the Swift
Admiral Bacon recalled the
first division (12.25
a.m.). The second
sub‑division, which was
then only just clear of
the harbour entrance, at
once returned; the first
sub‑division, which was
now patrolling between the
South Goodwin and Dover,
turned to obey the recall;
but in a few minutes the
whole situation changed.
On
learning that the reserve
destroyers were at sea,
Commander Peck of the Swift
shifted his line of patrol
slightly to the eastward,
and at a quarter to one he
was on a westerly course,
about three miles to the
east of the light vessel;
the Broke was in
station astern of him. He
was just about to turn to
the eastward when the
lookout reported
destroyers on his port
bow. At the same moment
his ship came under fire,
and ten seconds later he
could make out flares from
the funnels of five or six
boats, steaming on an
opposite course to
himself. They were
Commander Gautier's
division which was now
steaming eastward towards
the centre of the barrage.
Commander Peck at once
gave orders to open fire,
and put his helm hard a
starboard to ram the
nearest destroyer. He
missed her, for the Swift
passed through the enemy's
line and was hit several
times in the next few
minutes; but, as she
passed through, one of her
torpedoes seemed to hit a
German destroyer, and her
lyddite shell fire was
very telling. Commander
Peck was blinded by the
flash of his fo'c'sle gun,
and when he recovered his
sight he was told that his
wireless was out of
action, and that there
were four feet of water on
the stokers' mess deck.
The
April
21,
1917
TWO DESTROYERS SUNK
German
destroyers were to the
east of him and he
followed in chase.
Commander
E. R. G. R. Evans, who was
in charge of the Broke,
sighted the German
destroyers at the same
instant as his colleague
and acted in the same way.
He put his helm hard over
to ram the nearest boat;
but at the same moment his
torpedo gunner fired a
torpedo which seemed to
hit. Thinking that it
would be useless to ram an
enemy already so badly
damaged, Commander Evans
steadied his ship again
for a few moments, and
then put his helm hard a
starboard for a second
time, to ram a destroyer
further down in the
enemy's line. The Broke
crashed into her abreast
the after funnel, and for
a few minutes was
incapable of any further
manoeuvre. The rammed
destroyer was G.42;
there were apparently two
boats astern of her, and
as they steamed up to the
Broke, which was
still lying helpless with
a mass of wreckage upon
her stem, they poured a
heavy and destructive
shell fire into her. It
was some minutes before
Commander Evans got clear,
and then, finding that his
ship was "going ahead
still with a fair turn of
speed," he followed after
the Swift, which
was to the eastward,
chasing the retreating
Germans. Behind him he
could see the wreck of a
German destroyer which was
blazing fiercely.
A
minute or so later reports
from his subordinates
showed him that his ship
was so damaged that he
could not possibly join in
the pursuit. One of the
boiler‑rooms was badly
injured, and steam was
falling rapidly; the
enemy's shells had
exploded a number of
cartridges on the deck,
and the starboard side of
his bridge was burning. He
therefore put his helm
over, and turned towards
the scene of the action.
When he reached it, he
found that the German
destroyer which he had
rammed was sinking by the
stern, and that, near by,
another German destroyer (G.85)
was lying helpless and in
flames. Desperate as their
position was the Germans
gave no signs of
surrender, and opened fire
on the Broke as
she came near. Commander
Evans replied, and
silenced them; but
simultaneously his engines
stopped, and his ship
drifted helplessly towards
the burning destroyer.
"After we had silenced
her, she blazed even more
furiously, and I feared
that the foremost magazine
would blow up before she
sank. By this time my stem
was nearly touching her,
and the engineer sent up
to say that he could not
move the engines more. I
replied that we must go
astern if possible or we
might blow up." It was now
about twenty minutes past
one.
Help
was not far off. The
firing which began at a
quarter to one, when the Swift
and Broke first
fell in with the German
destroyers, was sighted
from all parts of the
straits. The Nugent's
division heard it, and
Commander Cardale very
properly decided to remain
where he was; the second
sub-division, which, as we
have seen, had just
returned to harbour,
slipped for the second
time during the night, and
made towards the gun
flashes. On clearing the
harbour
Lieutenant-Commander A. J.
Landon signalled to the
senior officer of the
first division that he was
taking his sub‑division
towards the firing. At
about a quarter‑past one
he came up to the Broke,
which was then drifting
helplessly about near the
blazing destroyer: he took
her in tow at once and
sent a message through to
Dover asking for tugs. The
rest of the night was
spent in getting the Broke
back to harbour, in
sinking the two German
destroyers and picking up
survivors.
We
had not destroyed two
German destroyers without
loss to ourselves: the Broke
had forty killed and
wounded aboard her when
she returned to harbour;
the Swift one
killed and four wounded.
Both ships were in
dockyard hands for several
weeks. But the success of
the night's work was in a
sense decisive. It warned
the German High Command
that if they continued to
raid the straits they
could no longer count upon
inflicting greater losses
then they suffered
themselves. After a
certain amount of
experimenting Admiral
Bacon had worked out a set
of dispositions which
provided adequately for
all contingencies, and
made it fairly certain
that if enemy destroyers
ever entered the straits
again they would not leave
them without being
seriously engaged.
For
many months to come the
enemy avoided the narrow
waters; and his next
enterprise, which took
place three days later,
was directed against
Dunkirk. (Thomazi, La
Guerre navale dans la zone
des armees du nord, p.
177.) On the night
of the 24th a group of
destroyers approached the
town and bombarded it for
several minutes; they then
made off to the eastward
and sank the French
destroyer Etendard,
which very boldly engaged
them. One of the trawlers
on patrol the Notre
Dame de Lourdes ‑
was much damaged by their
gun‑fire, but managed to
get back to Dunkirk. The
British monitors in the
anchorage and the
destroyer Greyhound
opened fire on the enemy's
destroyers, but the attack
was not sufficiently
sustained for their fire
to be effective.
April
23, 1917
A GRAVE WARNING
8
The Submarine Campaign, April 1917
The
Admiralty's review of the
naval position and of the
submarine campaign was
circulated to the
Government during the last
week in March, but was not
discussed. On April 23,
therefore, nearly a month
later, Admiral Jellicoe
presented the Government
with another memorandum
upon the naval situation.
The
new paper, though not in
substance more alarming
than the last (See
ante, p. 370.), was
even more gravely worded.
"It is necessary," he
wrote, "to call the very
serious attention of the
War Cabinet to the
increasingly heavy losses
of our merchant ships by
mine and submarine attack.
It appears evident that
the situation calls for
immediate action." The
figures which followed at
once explained and
justified these words. In
the first fortnight of the
month (April 1917) the
German submarines had sunk
419,621 tons of British,
Allied and neutral
shipping, and the rate of
destruction seemed to be
rising. On a single day,
April 20, 27,704 tons of
British shipping were
reported sunk, and 29,705
on the following day. It
was quite obvious that
such a rate of loss, if
continued, would bring
about a crisis. The First
Sea Lord's remedy was that
more destroyers should be
built, that the United
States (America
declared war against
Germany on April 6,
1917. See ante, p. 275.)
should be asked to
send more ships; and that
more merchant shipping
should be laid down,
either in the form of
small ships, or of very
large unsinkable ships for
which he could provide
escort.
Admiral
Jellicoe then dealt with
his plan of preventing the
German submarines from
leaving the German Bight
by intensive mining. He
admitted that the policy
had not been successful,
but attributed the failure
to faults in material and
design. "I have reason to
fear," he wrote, "that our
present pattern of mine is
not satisfactory against
submarines; otherwise it
is hardly credible that
with the large number that
have been laid in the last
four months the losses in
German submarines would
not have been very heavy."
A new pattern of mine had
been designed; but there
would be no deliveries
before July. In the rest
of the paper the First Sea
Lord recommended building
up reserves of foodstuffs
while the shipping still
existed, and laying down a
number of very large,
unsinkable vessels which
would suffice to carry the
country's essential
supplies.
The
statements in this very
important paper must
obviously be related to
the known facts of the
position at sea. From the
language he employed, the
First Sea Lord made it
quite clear that he still
held to the general plan
which the High Naval
Command had adopted nearly
four months before; that
is, he hoped to master the
German submarines or to
hold them in check by
multiplying the weapons
used in our existing
methods of attack. "The
various methods of
attack," he wrote, "are by
bombs dropped from
aircraft, by depth charges
dropped from patrol
vessels, by paravane
attack, and by heavy shell
in the nature of depth
charges fired by patrol
vessels. The only
immediate remedy that is
possible is the provision
of as many destroyers and
patrol vessels as can be
provided by the United
States of America." Quite
obviously, therefore, the
First Sea Lord did not
then contemplate any
fundamental alteration in
our entire system of
defence. It is not
difficult to understand
why his reliance on light
craft, and more
particularly on
destroyers, still left him
in grave anxiety. From the
beginning of the war to
the end of March 1917
there had been one hundred
and forty‑two actions
between German submarines
and British destroyers,
and the destroyers had
only sunk their opponent
in six of them. When
therefore a German
submarine commander fell
in with a British
destroyer, though he would
certainly have to submerge
and perhaps to change his
ground, still his chances
of escaping destruction
were about 28 to 1.
Apart
from this, light craft
were, actually, being
built and delivered very
fast ‑ since the beginning
of the year, five cruisers
and light cruisers and
thirty‑seven destroyers
had been put into
commission ‑ but these
additional light forces
had not raised the monthly
rate of German submarine
losses, which was still
remarkably low. In the
western area, where the
position was serious,
there were now seventy
destroyers ‑ eight at
Queenstown, forty‑one at
Plymouth, and twenty‑one
at Portsmouth ‑ yet these
seventy units had not sunk
a single German submarine
since the unrestricted
warfare began. (These
were the numbers on
April 23, 1917, the date
affixed to the First Sea
Lord's memorandum.) Possibly
the First Sea Lord was
right in thinking that
fast light craft were the
best answer to the
submarines that we
possessed; but it was
becoming apparent that
they were not being used
in such a way as to
achieve the desired
result.
As
for the mining policy
adopted at the beginning
of the year, Admiral
Jellicoe was quite right
in admitting that it had
not been successful; and
here again we can
understand
April
7, 1917
MINELAYING AND MINESWEEPING
the
cause of its failure. We
now know that just as we
had always managed to keep
traffic moving from and to
our ports, in spite of the
German minelaying, so too
the Germans had been able
by the same means to
defeat our mining
operations. Since the
beginning of January we
had laid thirty‑one fields
in the Bight. They had
always been discovered
before they caused serious
loss, and as soon as they
were known to exist the
necessary measures had
been taken to clear them,
or to discover their exact
position and to mark them
suitably. This, of course,
was not definitely known
at the time; but if German
mining had never seriously
interrupted the commercial
traffic round the British
Isles, it needed some
faith to believe that the
ninety‑six German
submarines in Germany and
Flanders would ever be
pinned to their bases by
British mines, or even
that they would suffer any
serious losses when
entering or leaving
harbour, seeing that they
could always choose their
time of sailing or return,
and need never move until
all the necessary
precautions had been
taken.
Several
naval officers thought ‑
Admiral Beatty was one of
them ‑ that our minelaying
had achieved nothing
because the original plan
of laying a barrage across
the Heligoland Bight and
keeping it continuously
patrolled had not been
adhered to. This was an
explanation, and perhaps a
sufficient one; but it is
obvious that the plan was
only workable if it was
actually within our power
to drive off German
sweepers whenever and
wherever they were at
work. Knowledge and
experience acquired later
make it doubtful whether
the original project could
ever have been carried
through.
On
April 7 the Admiralty
received information which
seemed to suggest that a
force of German
auxiliaries would shortly
be operating somewhere in
the neighbourhood of the
Horn Reefs light vessel.
The Commander‑in‑Chief,
when informed, sent out
the 2nd Light Cruiser
Squadron under
Rear‑Admiral Lambert; the
Champion (flotilla
cruiser) and twelve
destroyers to intercept
the Germans. The attack
was unsuccessful, partly,
no doubt, owing to the
difficulty of
co‑ordinating a combined
operation in novel
circumstances, and partly
because an unexpectedly
strong current set them
both away from the line
along which the German
auxiliaries which we
afterwards ascertained to
be sweepers ‑ were
working. It is none the
less significant that all
through the night of April
8 our cruiser and
destroyer forces were
operating inside the area
which German sweepers were
reconnoitring, and that
the Germans, in spite of
this, were able to
complete their work and
return home unmolested. If
a single operation was
subject to so many hazards
and required such forces
for its execution, it is
easy to understand how
difficult it would have
been to attain our first
object of keeping a
continuous effective watch
off our mine barrage in
the Bight, and of driving
off the German forces that
would certainly have
attempted to clear a
passage through it. Yet
nothing less would have
sufficed: it was upon the
possibility of this
continuous effective watch
that the entire plan
depended.
In
any case, the time was now
past for what must be a
long and uncertain
experiment. The situation
was so urgent that its
possibilities and needs
were starkly outlined: the
moment was at hand when a
final method must be
adopted; the choice would
bring about our
deliverance or leave us
for the first time in
history at the mercy of
our enemies. Experience
had cleared the ground,
the rest depended upon the
judgment, and perhaps
still more upon the
imaginative conviction of
our naval leaders. It was
evident that, setting
aside all palliatives or
gradual remedies, the
problem forced upon us by
the successes of the
U‑boat commanders could be
dealt with in one of two
ways: either our whole
forces must be thrown into
the attack upon the German
submarines, or else the
defence of our merchantmen
must be made the first
consideration and the
anti‑submarine offensive
the second.
Between
these two alternatives the
highest naval opinion was
still sharply divided.
Admiral Jellicoe and
Admiral Duff had decided
for the first quite early
in the year, and it is
clear from the language
that he used in his
memorandum to the
Government that Admiral
Jellicoe had not changed
his opinion after three
months of unrestricted
submarine warfare. He
still hoped that if the
destroyer patrol could be
reinforced and more
liberally supplied with
offensive weapons, the
German submarines could be
driven from the shipping
routes, or else be made to
operate at such a
disadvantage that they
would cease to be
dangerous. Admiral Beatty
held the opposite view: he
considered that the
existing system of
defensive patrolling by
trawlers and of offensive
patrolling by destroyers
was wrong in principle,
and that the whole second
line fleet of cruisers,
destroyers, sloops, "P"
boats and armed trawlers
should be used for
escorting merchantmen
through the dangerous
areas. These two
conflicting opinions will
be found clearly expressed
in the words of their most
authoritative exponents.
Plan - Diagram Showing the Progress of
the Submarine Campaign,
June 1916 To April 1917
Early
in April a conference had
assembled at Longhope to
consider the question of
protecting Scandinavian
trade. The officers
present decided that the
trade ought to be convoyed
April,
1917
SCANDINAVIAN TRADE
along
the coastal route and
across the North Sea.(Grand
Fleet destroyers had
been covering the trade
route between Lerwick
and Bergen for about a
week past.) Admiral
Beatty endorsed their
recommendations, in a
letter which, although it
was concerned only with
the immediate proposals,
contained a strong
expression of opinion upon
convoy as a strategical
principle. After stating
that the proposals for the
Scandinavian trade were an
"alteration in the policy
hitherto adopted," he went
on: "It is necessary to
decide the relative
urgency of: (i) protecting
and patrolling the coast,
(ii) protecting traffic
along the coast. At first
sight it would seem that
these two objects are
similar, and that if the
coast is patrolled and
protected, traffic should
be able to proceed safely
along it. Experience has
shown, however, that this
is not the case: patrols
have given little, if any,
security to shipping
during the war; submarines
attack vessels close to
the coast and mines are
continually being laid off
the shore.
" Escorts have, however, proved an
effectual protection, and
a system of escorts does,
to a large extent, fulfil
the conditions of a
patrol, the escorting
vessels being placed in
the best position for
meeting and attacking
hostile submarines.
It is manifestly impracticable to
provide an escort for each
individual vessel, the
only alternative is to
introduce a system of
convoys ..."
Although
the Admiralty were
prepared to allow the
Scandinavian trade to be
placed under escort, they
seem to have been
decidedly at issue with
Admiral Beatty upon the
general principle
involved. The opinion
which at the time
prevailed at the Admiralty
was that, if merchantmen
were placed under convoy,
then the escort would have
to be twice as numerous as
the ships escorted. The
Admiralty's advisers did
not share the view, which
was then not uncommon,
that a comparatively weak
escort would suffice. It
was because their doubts
were so strong that the
Admiralty could only
approve, with serious
misgivings, the plan of
placing Scandinavian trade
under convoy. They were,
however, prepared to
sanction further
experiment, and the S.N.O.
Gibraltar was informed
that a system of convoy
was to be tried on the
Gibraltar route. They were
presumably willing to
reverse their opinions on
the general principle if
the results were
satisfactory. The
Commander‑in‑Chief was
allowed to give effect to
the plan recommended by
the conference at
Longhope. An escort force
of twenty‑three destroyers
was collected from the
seventh (Humber and Tyne),
eighth (Rosyth), and
Cromarty flotillas; and a
further escort force of
between fifty and seventy
trawlers was assembled
from the patrol areas
between the Orkneys and
the Humber. As a temporary
measure, a flotilla leader
and eight destroyers were
also detached from the
Grand Fleet to Lerwick for
convoy duties. Much now
depended upon the results
obtained by the new
system; but whilst it was
being tried cautiously in
the North Sea, the
situation elsewhere was
passing beyond, our
control.
During
the month of April the
German submarine
commanders operated
against shipping by the
methods which have already
been described, and their
attack rose to a zenith of
efficiency. The patrolled
routes were almost as
severely attacked as
during the previous month,
and on the outer routes
the situation was worse
than it had ever been
before. One trail of
destruction spread fanwise
into the Atlantic from the
south‑west point of
Ireland, and another from
Land's End. During the
month efforts were made to
concentrate shipping on a
route which approached the
coast of Ireland along the
latitude of Galway Bay,
but quite fruitlessly.
Sinkings were thickest in
a rough quadrilateral
between the parallels of
51û and 53û N. and the
meridians of 12û and 15û
W. The central point of
this zone of devastation
was about one hundred and
seventy miles due west
from Berehaven, in the
open waters of the
Atlantic, where permanent
patrolling was impossible.
(See Map 11.) The
hope that the German
submarine commanders would
be less destructive when
compelled to depend upon
torpedoes instead of
gun‑fire proved to be ill
founded. It seemed rather
that they now torpedoed
vessels by deliberate
choice, in order to lose
no time. Over thirty
vessels were sunk within
the area to the west of
Berehaven, and every one
of them had been torpedoed
at sight. The use of the
torpedo had increased with
the rising list of
sinkings. In January about
eighty vessels had been
sunk by gun‑fire for every
thirty ships torpedoed; in
April the proportion was
entirely reversed, and
about 60 per cent. of the
total sinkings were done
with the torpedo.
In
the Mediterranean the
situation was equally
dark. On the advice of the
Admiralty, the French
naval command had recently
altered their system of
defence. The traffic
between France and
Salonica was still kept to
a fixed patrolled route,
but that between Cape Bon
and Port Said was put on
to tracks which were
varied as found necessary.
The French were, moreover,
pressing on with a system
of aeroplane patrolling
from which they hoped for
good results: aviation
centres were being set up
at Camaret, Susa and Bona,
and advanced stations,
which they called "postes
de combat,"
April
28‑30,
1917
ALMOST DESPERATE
were
established at Tabarka,
Kelibia, Collo,
Mostaganem, Beni Saf,
Cette and Marseilles; the
large force of 300
aeroplanes was allotted to
the service.
The
sinkings in the
Mediterranean had fallen
during March; but in April
the submarine commanders
completely outpaced the
defence, and in the
Mediterranean, as
elsewhere, the curve of
sinkings rose to an apex.
By the end of the month
the German submarines had
destroyed 881,027 tons of
shipping, at the cost of
two UC‑boats (numbers 68
and 30). Since
unrestricted war against
shipping had begun, they
had sunk over 2,000,000
tons of merchantmen, and
the losses to their
operating forces had been
two U‑boats, seven UC's
and one UB, and of these
only seven had been
destroyed by British
forces acting against
them: one of the remaining
three had stranded on the
Dutch coast, another had
sunk on her own mines, the
third had been lost from
unknown causes.
The
position resulting from
our devastating losses
appeared at the time to be
almost desperate. Sir Leo
Chiozza Money made an
exhaustive analysis of the
position, and, after
allowing for replacements
in merchant tonnage by
building, repairing and
purchasing from abroad, he
reported to the Government
that the 8,394,000 odd
tons of shipping in the
import and export service
of Great Britain would
probably be reduced to
4,812,000 at the end of
the year; the total
carrying capacity of this
tonnage would be between
1,600,000 and 2,030,000
tons per month, and of
this 1,425,000 would be
required for food and
cereals. The conclusion
was obvious: nothing would
be left for the necessary
transport of troops and
stores, the export of coal
and all the import
business of the country,
and Great Britain, the
prop and support of the
whole coalition, would
collapse.
Everything,
indeed, combined to show
that the Allies were
really within sight of
disaster. The lists of
sinkings, the numbers of
successful attacks, the
increasing use of the
torpedo, the moderate rate
of German submarine losses
all told the same story.
Admiral von Holtzendorff's
prophecy of victory was
apparently verging towards
fulfilment, and only a
change in our system of
defence could turn the
tide.
APPENDIX A
PRECAUTIONS AGAINST RAIDERS DURING 1916
(See Map 14.)
Rumours
that a raider was about to
put to sea were circulated
in June, July and October.
On
May 31, the
Commander‑in‑Chief was
told that the Moewe,
or an old cruiser of the Niobe
class, would shortly leave
Wilhelmshaven. Admiral
Jellicoe sent the Donegal
to reinforce the 10th
Cruiser Squadron, and
ordered Admiral Tupper to
spread his ships on a line
between Muckle Flugga and
Iceland. On the 3rd June
the Commander‑in‑Chief,
who was uneasy about the
safety of the Archangel
route, ordered the Donegal
and three ships of the 3rd
Cruiser Squadron to
patrol. Special
precautions against
raiders continued until
June 11.
During
the afternoon of July 8
the Admiralty telegraphed
to the Commander‑in‑Chief
that fairly reliable
information had been
received from Copenhagen
that a new Moewe
would leave Kiel for the
North Sea and Atlantic at
5 p.m. on Sunday, 9th,
accompanied by four or
five torpedo boats. She
was described as having
two sloping funnels,
painted dark grey all
over, of slender build
like a light cruiser, very
high speed. Two Light
Cruiser Squadrons with
eight destroyers were sent
from Rosyth to patrol an
area 80 to 100 miles off
the Norwegian coast,
through which it was
expected that the raider
would have to go.
The
1st and 3rd Light Cruiser
Squadrons sailed at 4.30
p.m. on 9th to carry out
these orders.
The
4th Light Cruiser Squadron
with six destroyers was
also ordered further north
to ensure a daylight
intercept of hostile
vessels; two cruisers, Donegal
and Shannon (2nd
Cruiser Squadron) were
sent north of the
Shetlands (between 63û and
65û N.) with a destroyer
each for boarding
purposes. The local patrol
was strengthened between
these cruisers and the
Shetlands.
The
Gabriel and a
half‑flotilla of
destroyers patrolled the
Fair Island Channel from 5
a.m. on 11th.
No
enemy ships had been seen
by the usual patrols up to
9th.
These
intercepting dispositions
remained in force till
12th, when the Admiralty
informed the
Commander‑in‑Chief that no
news could be obtained
about the raider, and the
1st and 3rd Light Cruiser
Squadrons returned about
noon to Rosyth. The 4th
Light Cruiser Squadron
swept to the southward,
and returned to Scapa on
18th. The Donegal
and Shannon also
swept to southward and
returned to Scapa by 7
p.m. on 14th.
There
was another alarm of a
raider on 21st, when the Inconstant
and Cordelia
(1st Light Cruiser
Squadron) sailed at 3 a.m.
to sweep in the direction
of Horn Reefs from a
position near the Naze,
with orders to keep clear
of the area of submarine
activity. The enemy
submarine track was said
to run in a north‑westerly
direction from Ameland,
with one or two boats
stationed on it as far as
70 miles from land. The
light cruisers returned on
23rd without having
sighted anything.
As
a result of a conference
held in October, the
Commander-in‑Chief made
out a set of standing
orders for intercepting
raiders. When the order
was given, the
intercepting forces were
ordered to take up
"disposition number one,"
if news of the raider had
been received before she
had reached latitude 59û
N.: if she had passed it,
they were ordered to take
up "disposition number
two."
In
December these
arrangements were put into
force. The departure of
the Moewe on
November 22 was kept
entirely secret; but
shortly after midnight on
the night of December
9/10, the British Minister
at Christiania wired home
that a "German ship of
war" was about to pass
Haugesund and go out to
sea at Skudesnaes. (See
p. 197 n.) This
information was sent to
the Commander‑in‑Chief,
who was told that it was
essential that the raider
should be stopped.
The
Commander‑in‑Chief at once
ordered the 1st Light
Cruiser Squadron, with
three ships of the 4th and
seven destroyers, to take
up "disposition number
one," and ordered up the
2nd Light Cruiser Squadron
from Rosyth to serve as a
relieving force to the
ships of the 1st and 4th.
Two flotilla leaders and
four destroyers were sent
to occupy Fair Island
Channel. These
dispositions remained in
force until the 14th.
APPENDIX B
SUBMARINE
ORGANISATION IN HOME
WATERS