Naval History Homepage and Site Search

 

 

World War 1 at Sea

 

NAVAL OPERATIONS, Volume 4, June 1916 to April 1917 (Part 2 of 2)


by Henry Newbolt


Links to main World War 1 pages:
- Military & Naval Chronology
- Naval Operations -
Merchant Navy
- Navy and Army Despatches
- Honours and Gallantry Awards
- Royal & Dominion Navy Casualties
- Warships & Auxiliaries of the RN
- Guide to Warship Locations
- Campaigns, Battles & Actions

Motor Launch gun-crew firing 13-pounder (Andy Hunter, click to enlarge)

on to Naval Operations, Vol. 5

or return to World War 1, 1914-1918

 

To enjoy reading the text and following the maps at the same time, try opening the same page in two separate browser windows


CONTENTS

(continued)

(Part 2 of 2)

 

VII. German Naval Policy, 1916‑1917 ... 229

 

VIII. The Mediterranean, January To August 1917 ... 276

   1. Submarine Warfare, January to May 1917 ... 276

2. Attack on the Otranto barrage ‑ Action in the Adriatic ... 297

3. Submarine Warfare, May to August 1917 ... 306

 

IX. Unrestricted Submarine Warfare ... 323

   1. February to April 1917 ... 323

   2. The Admiralty's Appreciation ... 325

   3. The Problems of Submarine Warfare ... 333

   4. The German Estimate of British Endurance at Sea ... 341

   5. The Achievements of Submarine Warfare, 1914-1917 ... 346

   6. Unrestricted Submarine Warfare begins ‑ Attacks on the Dover Straits ... 352

   7. Further Attacks on the Dover Straits ... 360

   8. The Submarine Campaign, April 1917 ... 379

 

APPENDICES

 

A ‑ Precautions Against Raiders During 1916 ... 386

B ‑ Submarine Organisation In Home Waters ... 388

 

 

Index (not included – you can use Search)

 

 

PLANS IN VOLUME

(continued)

 

The Patrol Zones in the Mediterranean ... 276

The British and German Dispositions in the Dover Straits, February 25‑26, 1917 ... 353

The British and German Dispositions in the Dover Straits, March 17‑18, 1917 ... 361

Dover Straits Dispositions ... 366

The British and German Dispositions in the Dover Straits, April 20‑21, 1917 ... 371

Diagram Showing the Progress of the Submarine Campaign, June 1916 To April 1917 ... 382

 

 

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER VII

 

GERMAN NAVAL POLICY, 1916‑1917

 

1

 

Although the concessions to America in April 1916 had been much criticised in Germany, the nation had, on the whole, thought it wise to make them. (See Vol. III, p. 312.) Less than a year later, the country was resounding with a clamour for unrestricted warfare so violent and unanimous that no Government could have resisted it. Ministers of State changed their opinions as radically as the populace: those who, at the beginning, had favoured concession and restraint, were quite ready, at the close, to support the policy of attacking the commerce of all nations, whether neutral or belligerent. The group of public men who remained unconvinced of anything but the risks involved was very small; they took little trouble to put forward their views in public, and when they did so, their voices were lost in the cry for unrestricted submarine warfare which rose from every part of Germany.

 

This change of opinion sprang, no doubt, from many causes, some of which are too subtle and deeply hidden to be traced here; but among them we can certainly name four of importance. First, there was the unswerving conviction of the Naval Staff that the submarine fleet could end the war in a German victory; second, the reinstating, during 1916, of a campaign against commerce so successful that it seemed very difficult to refuse those who directed it the additional freedom for which they asked; third, the failure of the peace negotiations; and fourth, the indefinite and hesitating way in which the few political opponents of submarine war expressed themselves.

 

The decision to accede to America's demands in April 1916 had only been taken after an acute struggle behind the scenes in which the Chancellor and the military leaders were sharply opposed. When the crisis passed, the difference of outlook between the two groups only became more marked, and the divisions of the German Government more sharply thrown up against the darkening horizon.

 

The Chancellor and his assistant, Karl Helfferich, were avowedly the heads of a peace party. (Erzberger, Erlebnisse im Weltkriege, p. 219.) They were supported by Jagow, a strenuous opponent of submarine warfare, and by Count Bernstorff, who knew, from his residence in Washington, that the American nation could make war effectively if ever it chose to do so, a point which the professional soldiers of Germany, the most highly trained in Europe, could never grasp. These four, then, Bethmann Hollweg, Helfferich, Jagow and Bernstorff, were convinced that Germany's interests would be best served by negotiating an early peace on a fairly conciliatory basis, and foresaw that a renewal of unrestricted submarine warfare would defeat their policy, because it would turn America from a probable mediator into a certain enemy.

 

General von Falkenhayn was, at the time, the Chancellor's chief opponent. He was still Chief of the General Staff, and had a position equal to the Chancellor's in the Imperial Council; but the campaign against Verdun was bringing his reputation to shipwreck. It followed, therefore, that although he continued to advocate unrestricted submarine warfare as the only measure likely to break down the military deadlock, he could only throw the weight of a declining influence into the controversy, and his attitude can hardly have affected the Government's decision.

 

The German public had not yet definitely made up its mind about the submarine campaign. Certain very powerful private associations, such as the Bund der Landwirte (League of Landowners) and the Zentral Verband Deutscher Industrieller (Central Association of German Industrialists), supported the clamour for resuming submarine war without restraint or concession. Prince Salm, the President of the Navy League, was proclaiming that it would be very greatly to Germany's advantage if America did enter the war against her; and Admiral von Tirpitz, now out of office, was striving to bring the Press and the public to his own way of thinking. His authority with the general public was very great; Erzberger likens his influence over the German masses to the fatal charm of the piper of Hamelin's music. (Erzberger, pp. 210‑11.) This, however, is a bitter reflection from a man who had been persistently overruled and misinformed. The vigorous campaign of propaganda undertaken by the navy throughout the year proves that large sections of the nation had still to be convinced, and that, in the meantime, they were content that the Government should hold their hand.

 

1915-1916

THE CHANCELLOR'S DIFFICULTIES

 

The two sides of the question were never fairly presented to the unpersuaded mass of Germans. The naval censorship was originally in the hands of the Admiralty, and not of the Naval Staff. So long as this arrangement continued, Admiral von Tirpitz and his assistants were free to spread their views, and to suppress all contrary opinions; and they appear to have used their advantage. During 1915, secret and official memoranda, prepared by Tirpitz, were frequently communicated to private persons; whilst a paper written in good faith by an industrial magnate, who wished to warn the nation about the dangers of submarine war, was held up until the first declaration had been issued. (Verhandlungen des Untersuchungsaussehusses, pp. 362‑3.)

 

The Chancellor succeeded in transferring the naval censorship from the Admiralty to the Naval Staff; but it was just as unfairly exercised by its new controllers as it had been by the old. If there was anybody in the German Empire which ought to have been informed of both sides of the controversy, it was the Bundesrat (The Bundesrat is described by a German constitutional lawyer as the "body which carries the sovereign power of the Empire"; another describes it as a "congress of ambassadors of the federal kingdoms" (Gebhardt, Verfassung des Deutsches Reichs, p. 94). Prussia sent to it seventeen representatives; Bavaria six; Baden and Alsace Lorraine three; Mecklenburg and Brunswick two; other principalities one), or Federal Council ‑ the connecting link between the Imperial Government and the States of the Union; yet the Naval Staff injected their convictions into every crevice of the public structure with such ruthlessness that the naval representative who reported on the position to the Bundesrat, during the summer of 1916, produced figures so inaccurate that the Chancellor had to send telegrams to every part of Germany to contradict the information supplied. (Bethmann Hollweg, Betrachtungen zum Weltkriege, Vol. II., p.123.)

 

It was the Chancellor's peculiar misfortune that the controversy seemed to be straining and shaking into incoherence all that was loosely knit in the construction of Imperial Germany. Parliamentary opinion was quite uncertain, for in February 1916 the Prussian Lower House had passed a resolution in favour of unrestricted submarine warfare without consulting or warning the Government; and the Reichstag was equally capable of springing a surprise motion beneath the feet of the Executive. Apart from this, the coming debate could not fail to set up the strain of an acute constitutional quarrel. Was the resumption of submarine war a political or a military question? In the first case the responsibility of advising lay with the Chancellor; in the second with the Chief of the Staff. But human affairs do not always arrange themselves according to the departments of the German administration, and it so happened that the submarine question was both political and military. The result was a deadlock: the military leaders claimed that the question was exclusively theirs, and Bethmann Hollweg firmly insisted that a matter affecting the Empire's international relations could not be decided without the Chancellor. It was obviously impossible to strike a compromise between opinions which were so radically opposed; the deadlock could only be ended by a personal decision of the Emperor, and we shall see presently by what desperate device this constitutional necessity was evaded.

 

The naval officers of the High Command were agreed on the general principle of re‑starting the submarine campaign as soon as they could; but they by no means saw eye to eye about the best means of making their views prevail.

 

As he sailed to raid Lowestoft (April 24, 1916), Admiral Scheer recalled all submarines from the trade routes, and refused, from then onwards, to allow them to carry on commerce warfare according to the rules of international law; yet those rules only were sanctioned by the promise which had been made to Washington.

 

A month later Jutland was fought. The German Commander‑in‑Chief at once used the increased prestige which his leadership had gained for him to press his views on the Emperor. His "idea" was that "the moral impression which this battle left on the neutral nations created a most favourable atmosphere for us to carry on the war against England by all possible means, and to resume the U‑boat campaign in all its intensity."

 

No more characteristic judgment was pronounced during the war ‑ it is an extreme perversion of the Bismarckian theory of imponderabilia. The atmosphere created by the first reports of the Battle of Jutland was not only imponderable, it was evanescent. When it vanished, the true result of the battle became as clear as a well‑drawn balance sheet. The High Seas Fleet had inflicted loss on a battle cruiser squadron and had escaped with its life from the Grand Fleet; but the great experiment was over, and it had proved that the control of the sea was irrevocably in British hands. No moral impression ‑ least of all a temporary one ‑ could be of any value in face of a reality like this, a reality which became every day plainer to neutrals as well as to enemies. Tirpitz showed almost as faulty a judgment: he notes that "that engagement, victorious, though not fought to a finish, was unable, after nearly two years of the war, to achieve any lasting political result, in spite of our advantages in the battle itself; for in

 

June 1916  

CONFLICTING OPINIONS

 

the time that had elapsed, the general position had changed and settled too much in England's favour, and the countries that were still neutral had lost their belief in our ultimate victory." This estimate is more correct than Scheer's, for it marks the political result of the German account of Jutland as temporary and ineffectual; but it shows the Grand Admiral to be equally unable to distinguish words from the realities of war. Nothing in the two years had done more to change and settle the position in England's favour than the Battle of Jutland; for a superiority which had before been only demonstrable was there actually demonstrated.

 

The Naval Staff, however, had a better reason for demanding a renewal of the U‑boat campaign, and this, too, was a reason based upon the result of Jutland. The failure of the High Seas Fleet left them no other weapon but the submarine. If the unrestricted campaign could not be risked, then they begged to be allowed a milder form of war, so as to inflict at least some injury on England. Admiral Scheer objected to any milder form, and the Chief of the Naval Cabinet, Mueller, remonstrated with him in a letter dated June 23, 1916, arguing against his "everything or nothing" point of view. "I can fully sympathise with you, but the matter is, unfortunately, not so simple. We were forced, though with rage in our hearts, to make concessions to America, and in so doing to the neutrals in general; but, on the other hand, we cannot wholly renounce the small interruptions of trade  .... still possible in the Mediterranean. It is the thankless task of the Chief of the Naval Staff to try and find some way of making this possible in British waters as well." What is necessary is "a compromise between the harsh professional conception of the U‑boat weapon and the general, political and military demands which the Chief of the Staff has to satisfy." The words "the harsh professional conception" are here strikingly apt, but they are not to be taken in a sympathetic sense, for the use of the weapon in question is only given up "with rage in our hearts."

 

This letter was followed a week later by a visit to Admiral Scheer from the Imperial Chancellor, who informed him that he was personally against an unrestricted U‑boat campaign, because it would give rise to fresh troublesome incidents and "would place the fate of the German Empire in the hands of a U‑boat commander." This made the Admiral extremely bitter: "So we did not wield our U‑boat weapon as a sword which was certain to bring us victory, but (as my Chief of the Staff, Rear‑Admiral von Trotha, put it) we used it as a soporific for the feelings of the nation, and presented the blunt edge to the enemy." The people did not know that the campaign was only big talk and pretence; while "America laughed because she knew that it lay with her to determine how far we might go."

 

But Admiral Scheer, though short‑sighted and violent, was shrewd enough to realise that he could not well remain in conflict with the civilian and naval elements of the Government at one and the same time. As he was divided from his naval colleagues only on a professional question, but from the Chancellor on a matter of policy, it was natural that he should yield to Holtzendorff and Mueller. He denies in his book that he ever did yield. Admiral von Holtzendorff's plan of restricted submarine warfare was none the less put into force in the autumn of the year, and we hear no more of Admiral Scheer's opposition to it.

 

2

 

The Chancellor decided that the best issue from the difficulties which were encompassing both his country and himself was to press for American mediation. The decision was in a sense a wise one. He knew quite well that the Naval Staff and the High Command were only temporarily silenced; and he foresaw that the pressure they had already exerted upon him would be renewed before the year was out. If the temporary barrier which he had put up against a decision in favour of submarine war were blown down ‑ he knew the structure of it was none too solid ‑ he foresaw disaster and ruin. He did not believe that a "peace of victory" was any longer possible; but he did believe that a renewal of unrestricted submarine warfare would be the first move towards a peace made between a beaten Germany and an enormous coalition of victorious enemies; to secure American mediation was to secure the road to a compounded peace and to block the road to a new submarine campaign against neutral commerce. His decision to press the American Government to make a regular diplomatic move was thus outwardly a wise one; but had he known to what lengths the American Government was prepared to go to support the Allies, had he guessed what offers President Wilson had already made to the principal Allied Governments, Bethmann Hollweg would have hesitated to invite America's intervention, and would probably have withdrawn his opposition to unrestricted submarine warfare altogether; he might even have advised the military leaders that nothing but a crushing victory could end the war satisfactorily. This statement requires a little explanation.

 

1915‑1916 

AMERICAN POLICY

 

During the year 1915, President Wilson had apparently realised that the war in Europe which had already involved rnany American interests would do so in an increasing degree, and that he would not be able to keep his country neutral if the struggle were much protracted. He had grounds of complaint against both groups of belligerents, but he seems to have made up his mind that his difficulties with Great Britain and the Entente were not comparable to his differences with the Central Powers, and that if America ever intervened it rnust be on the Allied side. These, however, were only his personal convictions and those of his most trusted adviser, Colonel House: he felt it his duty to keep them out of all his public and most of his private utterances, and to set an example of that neutral way of thinking and acting which he had invited his countrymen to follow. Probably most of the American nation hoped that the President would follow no settled plan but that of maintaining neutrality and of dealing with difficulties as they arose; but President Wilson, who had a more intimate knowledge of what those difficulties were likely to be, and of the passions they might arouse, could not adopt such a policy as this. Its great and, to him, decisive disadvantage was that sooner or later it would probably bring him face to face with a difficulty which could only be settled by intervention; and that if he had previously made neutrality the sole object of his policy, America would be taken by surprise and be forced to enter the war for no more inspiring object than the settlement of a diplomatic quarrel.

 

After considerable hesitations and misgivings, therefore, he decided to try to strike an arrangement with the Entente Powers, and sent Colonel House to Europe on a special mission. The Colonel was instructed to prepare both belligerent groups for an American invitation to a peace conference; but the invitation was to be presented to each group in very different colours. The Allies were to be informed that if the Germans refused reasonable terms of peace, and so broke up the conference to which they would be invited, America would at once enter the war on the Allied side and force the Central Powers to agree.

 

The reasonable terms were to include the restoration of Belgium and Serbia, the cession of Alsace‑Lorraine to France, of Constantinople to Russia, of the Italian‑speaking section of Austria‑Hungary to Italy, and the creation of an independent Polish State. Germany was to be compensated for loss of territory by concessions outside Europe, and both groups of belligerents were to give guarantees against undertaking aggressive war by disarming, and were also to join a general league for enforcing peace. This offer, which in Colonel House's view was practically an offer of American help to the Allies, was communicated to British and French Ministers in January 1916. Sir Edward Grey and several other Ministers received it well, Monsieur Briand more guardedly; and no answer was given.

 

This proposed mediation could obviously only be put before the German Ministers in a careful disguise. When Colonel House was in Berlin ‑ which he visited at the end of January ‑ he probably gave the German Government to understand that both groups of belligerents would be invited by America to meet in conference and then left to discuss territorial questions and indemnities between themselves, and that the American Government would stand aside and concern itself merely with a conference upon disarmament and the creation of a league for enforcing peace. This, at all events, is what Count Bernstorff understood by American mediation.

 

Upon this proposal the German Ministers did not commit themselves to any very definite expression of opinion; but the Chancellor does not seem to have suspected what the American intentions really were, and he discussed the question of American mediation with Colonel House in a friendly way. On the other hand, Bethmann Hollweg, Zimmermann and Jagow satisfied Colonel House that there was not the slightest hope of the Central Empires agreeing to the terms of peace which he and the President considered reasonable. The Colonel therefore returned to London in February quite convinced that American mediation must be followed by American intervention.

 

He was back in America early in March, and after consulting with the President, he seems to have asked Sir Edward Grey whether the Allies were ready to invite America to mediate on the conditions which he had recently offered. Sir Edward Grey replied that the British Government could not take the initiative in asking the French to attend a peace conference; and both Colonel House and President Wilson took this answer to mean that the American offer had been refused. Anglo‑American relations, thereupon, became much less cordial; Count Bernstorff was quick to perceive this, but he never suspected the real reason.

 

Such then was the position when the German Foreign Minister instructed the Ambassador to press for American mediation. In a long telegram, sent on May 27, Count Bernstorff was instructed in the tangled and deceptive system he was to follow.

 

July 1916  

TORTUOUS INSTRUCTIONS

 

It was taken for granted that the President would strive to arrange for a peace on a status quo ante basis. As this would not be acceptable to Germany, the Ambassador was to prevent the American Government from making a positive proposal to the Central Powers; but to do so in a way which would "attain the object without endangering the relations between America and Germany." (Bernstorff, My Three Years in America, p. 237.) The telegram shows the confusion which still reigned in high places in Germany and the extraordinary difficulties with which the Chancellor was faced. We have his own assurance, and that of his assistant, Karl Helfferich, that he would have been willing to accept a peace on a status quo ante basis (Helfferich, Der Weltkrieg, Vol. II., p. 299.); but, as he did not dare to express his views openly, he was committing the Ambassador to a policy opposed to the one which he really desired to pursue.

 

Count Bernstorff answered at once that it was quite impossible for him to prevent the President from mediating when and how he liked; but his reply went further. (Bernstorff, p. 240.) He was quick to see that some unrevealed purpose lay behind instructions so badly drawn and contradictory, and he warned his Government in the clearest possible language against hoping to get America's consent to a renewal of the submarine campaign if the Entente Powers declined the President's mediation (July 13, 1916).

 

The Chancellor's tortuous instructions were evidence of the very great difficulties of his position. Count Bernstorff realised, at an early period of the controversy, that the whole matter was, as he put it, a race between peace negotiations and unrestricted submarine war. This was a frank view and a clear‑sighted one; it was, no doubt, a view which would be shared by the Chancellor. His last instructions to Bernstorff were thus, in a sense, a step forward. He might have made other such steps had not an event occurred which seriously weakened his'position.

 

3

 

On August 27, Rumania entered the war against the Central Powers. The appearance of a new opponent caused a deep sensation in Germany. Austria had already very nearly succumbed under the onslaughts of Brusilof's armies in Galicia, and now a new enemy was on her flank. It was obvious that the danger was pressing and that a tremendous effort was necessary to avert it. The Government acted promptly. Within two days Field‑Marshall von Hindenburg was appointed Chief of the Great General Staff, with his assistant, Ludendorff, as Quartermaster‑General; and within a few weeks steps were being taken to roll back the Rumanian invasion of Hungary.

 

We shall see later the real significance and importance of this appointment. Marshall von Hindenburg was not made a "military dictator," for the duties of his office were unchanged; nor did his appointment imply a victory for the conservative parties in the Reichstag or the Prussian Landtag. Nevertheless, the consequences of his assuming office did, in the end, paralyse the civil advisers of the Emperor and reduce even the Head of the State himself to the mere function of proclaiming the decisions of his Chief of Staff.

 

The explanation of this astonishing development lies deep in the history and character of the German people. Their traditions and their laws all tended to make them believe that salvation from great danger can only come from the effort of one great man; and now everything combined to point out Hindenburg as the man in whose power it was to save the country from the final danger. His military talents might not be greater than Mackensen's or Falkenhayn's, but it had fallen to him to turn back the tide of Russian invasion in 1914; and the utter defeat of the Russian armies in the year following was generally attributed to him. He had thus freed his countrymen from a nightmare which had been haunting them for a whole generation, and, rightly or wrongly, the German people regarded him as their only possible deliverer from the traditional Cossack terror.

 

Bethmann Hollweg fully understood the significance of Hindenburg's arrival at Great Headquarters. It was not, he said, that any new powers were granted to the new Chief of the General Staff; but simply that no Government which was known to be opposing the views of the new military chief could have withstood the popular indignation. (Verhandlungen des Untersuchungsaussehusses, pp. 144, 148.)

 

The effects of the appointment upon parliamentary opinion were equally deep. Throughout the war, the Government had relied largely for support upon the influence of the Centre Party in the Reichstag. Its help had always been loyally given. When the submarine controversy had raged at the time of the Sussex crisis, the party chiefs had seen to it that there should be no majority in favour of submarine war.

 

Aug. 1916 

AN IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

 

Since then, they had never committed themselves to a hard-and‑fast statement. But when the new Chief of Staff took office, the Chancellor realised that their attitude was no longer so reliable: "The Centre Party now renounced their old tradition and claimed a free hand."

 

As soon as Hindenburg had taken up his appointment, a general conference of ministers, army and navy leaders assembled at Pless. The first and, as far as we know, the only item on the agenda was the question of resuming unrestricted submarine warfare. Should the German navy, in fact, be allowed to assist by every means in its power in the impending effort to avert the new danger? There were present Hindenburg; Ludendorff, who was now Quartermaster‑General; General Wild von Hobenborn, War Minister; Admirals von Capelle (Secretary of the Navy), von Holtzendorff (Chief of the Admiralty Staff), and Koch; Bethmann Hollweg, Imperial Chancellor; Helfferich, Minister of the Interior; and Jagow, Minister for Foreign Affairs; with Baron von Gruenau as Secretary.

 

Admiral von Holtzendorff opened the discussion, and read from a carefully prepared paper. His main argument was directed against those who opposed unrestricted submarine war on the grounds that it would involve war with the United States. The Government at Washington might indeed declare war; but what could they do as a belligerent? They would have no spare tonnage with which to assist the Entente, and their attitude could hardly affect other neutrals. Holland would declare war against the first Power that violated her territory, Denmark would remain neutral; the South American States could do nothing against U‑boat warfare, for they had not enough shipping to carry away their grain harvests. In a few months, the last vestiges of German international commerce would be gone. Could Turkey, Bulgaria and Austria‑Hungary bear another winter of war? "I do not see a finis Germaniae in the use of the weapon which cripples Great Britain's capacity to support her Allies; but rather in the neglect to employ it."

 

The Foreign Minister, Jagow, strove to prove the wrongness of the Admiral's political outlook. If the United States entered the war, the effect on neutrals would be incalculable. "Germany will be treated like a mad dog against which everybody combines." When unrestricted submarine war had first been started, neutrals had been thoroughly disturbed. There was no comparison possible between English and German pressure upon neutral States. Great Britain did not touch individuals: she worked upon associations and trading combines, who served her purposes by freely electing to do so, in return for special advantages. The German method destroyed ships and took human life.

 

Karl Helfferich, the Minister of the Interior, continued the argument, and attacked the statistics upon which Holtzendorff had based his conclusions. Great Britain had 12 1/2 million tons of shipping at her disposal; she employed a part of it to supply herself, and the remainder was engaged in the world's trade. Supposing that German submarines succeeded in reducing the 12 1/2 million tons available, Great Britain would then simply withdraw some of her surplus shipping from general trade; and her destruction would be as far off as ever. Had Holtzendorff reflected, he asked, that Germany had supplied herself, and absorbed a considerable fraction of the world's carrying trade, with only 5 million tons of shipping? Why should not England, by foresight and economy, make a far smaller tonnage than she had hitherto disposed of suffice for her needs? The argument that America could do no harm even if she declared war was utterly unsound. "Up to the present, the Entente has borrowed 1,250 million dollars from the United States. If she declares war, America, with all her reserves, will be at the disposal of the Allies, for their cause will be hers." And finally, "I can see in the employment of the U‑boat weapon nothing but catastrophe." Admiral von Capelle, on the other hand, proclaimed the conviction of the navy that nothing but the unredricted U‑boat war would lead to peace, and added some weaker remarks to the effect that in any event it could do no harm, even " failing full success."

 

The Imperial Chancellor now intervened. He had had a preliminary discussion with Hindenburg, and he agreed with him that a decision was not possible on this question while the military position was so uncertain. Also, he could not promise that a sudden declaration would not cause a breach between Denmark and the Central Powers: unrestricted U‑boat war would be stamped from the start as "an act of desperation." He further proved his superiority in judgment over his naval colleagues by affirming that the expected result ‑ the breaking of England ‑ was merely an assumption, which nobody could prove. " We cannot lay an iron ring round England. Also our blockade can be broken by warships accompanying the transports." It seemed to him, therefore, that they could decide nothing "till the military situation had been cleared."

 

Holtzendorff replied ‑ it sounds an impulsive reply: "I am convinced ‑ I cannot adduce any proof ‑ that a fortnight's

 

Aug. 1916 

DECISION POSTPONED

 

unrestricted U‑boat war will have this effect, that the neutrals will keep aloof from England." In this matter the Norwegians were to teach him a lesson in psychology.

 

Capelle spoke of the powers of the large U‑boats, whose number had been doubled. Helfferich argued that the only result would be extreme exertion and perfected organisation in England. Holtzendorff retorted: "We find ourselves in a tight position, to get out of which we must act. We need not threaten the neutrals, but we can invite them to behave towards us as they behaved towards England" ‑ a line of thought adopted already, as we have seen, by Scheer and Tirpitz, but controverted by Jagow and unintelligible to any reasonable mind.

 

The Chancellor's warning that Denmark and other neutrals were unsteady, weighed heavily with Hindenburg and his Quartermaster‑General. "South of the Carpathians," said Ludendorff, "the Rumanians are on the march. They are bad soldiers; but the Austrians are even worse. The last man available from the east or west must be sent to Rumania. If Holland and Denmark declare war against us, we shall not be able to oppose them." Hindenburg, too, was of opinion that this risk must not be run till the military position had been settled. "A decision is not possible at present," he pronounced autocratically, "I shall make the time for it known." For the moment, then, Bethmann Hollweg had succeeded in directing the discussion. He was quite clear that no decision could be or ought to be taken until the military position had cleared and the other members of the Alliance had been consulted. When Austria was menaced with a danger which seemed likely to break her power of resistance, it was hardly reasonable to involve her in a war with new enemies. In a few weeks the Reichstag would meet; he proposed then to tell the political leaders that "the decision (with regard to submarine warfare) had been postponed; and that Field‑Marshall von Hindenburg had stated that he must wait for the issue of the Rumanian campaign before he could form a definite opinion."

 

The outcome of the conference was, therefore, that the question was postponed. The Chancellor had shown that he was inclined to accept Helfferich's conclusions rather than Holtzendorff's upon the technical side of the problem; but he had been quite silent upon the general principle of submarine war. Only Jagow had used language which showed once more that the thinking power of Germany lay with her civilians rather than with her militarists. The neutrals, he said, could not be conciliated: they showed tremendous unrest during the previous U‑boat campaign, and naturally so. "The difference between our method and England's is, above all, to be found in the fact that we should be destroying ships and human life in order to exert pressure, whereas by the English method the neutrals are only restricted in the free exercise of their activity." This simple discovery is significant, as having been made by each nation in its own way. To the Dutch and Scandinavian traders it came as a practical matter of business; to the Latin mind it was laid bare by the clear, quick light of reason; to the Anglo‑Saxon by the equally swift flash of humour. The German statesman reached it by the long and serious groping of a methodic mind; the German Admirals could never see it at all, even when it was pointed out to them.

 

4

 

The conference left Admiral von Holtzendorff's existing plan of submarine warfare untouched: he was still free to carry on a restricted campaign, and he carried it on with great energy and persistence. His submarine commanders did not pay any great attention to the promises made by the German Government, for ships were frequently torpedoed without warning; but the German naval leaders were quite right in assuming that the American President would find it difficult to champion "the sacred rights of humanity" unless American lives and property were destroyed. They were thus able to keep their submarine fleet fairly active; and the following table of British losses, after the Sussex crisis, gives an outline picture of their activities; and it must be added that the attack, in August, fell even more heavily on Allied shipping.

 

    

1916

Mined or Torpedoed.

Losses in European waters and the Atlantic.

Losses in the Mediterranean.

June 

5

10

July  

9

19

August

11

12

 

It is noteworthy that the losses in Home Waters shows a steady increase; and this suggests a point which became very important later on. It had generally been supposed that the concessions made to America would make it impossible to carry on effective submarine warfare except in the Mediterranean. Holtzendorff had now proved that this

 

Sept. 10, 1916

LUDENDORFF'S VIEWS

 

was not so, and that there was still a means of attacking British commerce at its points of concentration near home. His next step was to try to bring the new military chiefs to his own point of view, and on September 10, rather more than a week after the conference at Pless, Captain von Buelow visited General Ludendorff at Great Headquarters on behalf of the Naval Staff. (Ludendorff, Urkunden des obersten Heeresleitung, p. 302.)

 

He began the conversation by saying that the Naval Staff's information about neutrals contradicted the Chancellor's recent statement, and added that to renew the submarine war would give an impression of strength which would act as a deterrent to small neutrals contemplating a rupture with Germany. Ludendorff answered that he must accept the Chancellor's view on political questions, and that he had not enough men to hold the Danish and Dutch frontiers, but added significantly an expression of his regret that a question which was "purely military" should have been given a political treatment. When the interview ended, the naval representative gave the Quartermaster‑General one of the memoranda which were then being prepared at naval headquarters by a group of bankers and scientists, and the conversation was reopened a few days later. Ludendorff then admitted outright that he was in favour of beginning unrestricted submarine warfare as soon as the military position on the continent was secure. (Several years later, a bitter controversy raged round these memoranda. Several of the witnesses at the Untersuchungsausschuss accused the Naval Staff of collecting a number of men who had no authority to speak on economics, industry or trade, and getting them to prepare statistical arguments in favour of unrestricted submarine war (pp. 407‑412). Erzberger makes the same charge (214). There seems to have been a great deal of force in the accusation. Ballin, the greatest shipping magnate in Germany, was never asked for his opinion on submarine warfare during the war.)

 

Captain von Buelow drew up a record of his interview in duplicate, and sent one copy to General Ludendorff. To his own copy he added some notes, which were intended only for himself and Holtzendorff. (Beilagen zu den stenographischen Berichten des Untersuchungsaussehusses, Teil IV., p. 181.) "General Ludendorff believes in a successful issue to submarine war  .... he has no faith in being able to force a favourable decision by means of war on land alone. On the authority of the Chancellor, he believes in the Danish danger. The Chancellor stands firm on this point, and he will continue to do so because he opposes submarine war and can terrify General Ludendorff with this Danish spectre and cause delay.  ...

 

"We must, therefore (daher Zweckmuessig)

 

"1. With regard to General Ludendorff:

(a) energetically represent the disadvantage of delay;

(b) endeavour, by means of reports from our Attaches and so on, to weaken (the belief) in this Danish and Dutch danger.

 

"2. With regard to the Chancellor:

Strive to make him soften down his verdict about the Danish danger. I think that the Kalkmann memorandum might have effect upon the Chancellor and such people as Ballin: possibly it might work upon the former through the latter." (Ludendorff, p. 305.)

 

The Chancellor did not wait to feel the effect of these subtle influences. Realising that the resolutions taken at Pless gave him only a limited time in which to thwart the movement in favour of unrestricted submarine war, he took the only step which was still open to him, and laid the real points at issue before the Emperor for decision.

 

His memorandum went straight to the point: the war might be ended by an unrestricted submarine campaign or by diplomacy. As the first method ought not to be resorted to until the second had failed, the Chancellor asked that Count Bernstorff might be allowed to reopen the question with the American President, and urge upon him the need of making an early move. Hoping, doubtless, that when the Emperor gave his decision upon the points now submitted to him, the naval leaders would co‑operate in the policy adopted, the Chancellor was careful to say that the memorandum had been written with Holtzendorff's full concurrence.

 

The Emperor approved the Chancellor's proposals, and the necessary instructions were sent to Washington. Bethmann Hollweg was thus still in nominal charge of the Empire's policy. Had he been seconded by the officers of State from whom he looked for support, his efforts to open negotiations, backed by American diplomacy, might have been successful. But in spite of the appointment of Hindenburg to an overriding command, there was still no unity of purpose in the Government, and the heads of the departments of State and the commanders in the field continued to pursue their own objects, regardless of the general policy to which the Chancellor was committed.

 

Admiral Scheer was the first to set the example. At a

 

Sept.‑Nov. 1916 

OPPOSING PURPOSES

 

date between September 8 and November 22 which cannot be fixed exactly, he sent his Chief of Staff, Trotha, to Great Headquarters to see General Ludendorff. (Scheer, p. 247.) If the outcome of this second interview between the naval and military leaders has been correctly reported, no conclusion is possible except one: that the military leaders and the naval command were determined to obstruct the Chancellor's diplomatic action by every means in their power. Several points were agreed upon: first, that there was no possibility of ending the war well (zum guten Ende) except by unrestricted submarine war; secondly, that "a half U‑boat war" should in no circumstances be adopted; thirdly, that all special agreements with the northern Powers ‑ Sweden, Norway and Denmark should be cancelled as soon as possible, in order that there should be no "gaps" in the submarine operations; and, lastly, that there should be no "turning back."

 

Each one of these conclusions was a direct challenge to the Chancellor's negotiations: if only submarine warfare could end the war "well," it was obvious that diplomacy would end it badly; "a half U‑boat warfare" was exactly what the Chancellor's concessions were obliging the navy to practise; and the only result of cancelling diplomatic agreements with foreign Powers, in order to give submarines a wider target, would be to reduce the Chancellor's department and the Foreign Office to sub‑sections of the General Staff. These remarkable resolutions could not, of course, alter the policy which the Government had now adopted; but they throw a vivid light upon the fierce dissensions which were making co‑ordinated action between its various departments impossible.

 

The Chancellor's instructions to Count Bernstorff were too late. When they arrived, there was no longer any hope that the American Government would approach the belligerents before the winter; for, after much hesitation, President Wilson had decided not to make any move until he had been re‑elected. A brief retrospect of what had taken place during the summer in the American capital is necessary if the reasons for this postponement are to be understood. In July 1916, the President had ordered his Ambassador in London to return to Washington. The message did not explain why his presence was desired, but Sir Edward Grey grasped that it must be connected with the diplomatic intervention which Colonel House had offered earlier in the year. Since Sir Edward Grey had replied to the American Proposals, several public utterances by the President had made Sir Edward Grey extremely doubtful whether he intended to intervene on conditions as friendly to the Allies as those which he had offered in January, possibly, indeed, doubtful whether he had ever intended to assist us on the very points which we considered essential to a well‑regulated peace treaty. (See Grey, Twenty‑five Years, Vol. II., pp. 128‑30.)

 

On May 27, 1916, President Wilson had addressed the American League of Peace at its first annual meeting. He knew that he had to speak to an audience which expected him to mediate in Europe, but which did not realise that he had already attempted to do so and failed; and he knew that those foreign statesmen with whom he had attempted to negotiate at the beginning of the year would scrutinise his utterance critically. All this made him extremely cautious; but his speech, analysed by those who shared, or at least thought they shared, his most intimate thoughts, seemed to go beyond what mere caution demanded. In his opening sentences the President proclaimed that the United States was not concerned with the causes or origins of the war. "The obscure fountains," he said emphatically, "from which its stupendous flood has burst forth we are not interested to search for or explore." Was this a mere form of words deliberately chosen to disguise the offer of help which he had given to the Allies earlier in the year, or did the passage mean that the offer had lapsed and would not again be renewed on such favourable terms?

 

Sir Edward Grey, at all events, thought the utterance was suspicious: he interviewed Mr. Page before his departure for Washington, and was much stiffer and more unyielding on the question of American mediation than he had been, earlier in the year, to Colonel House. In the first place, we knew the catch words "Freedom of the Seas" to be nothing but the outer wrapping to a policy which we had opposed for a long time past: that of endeavouring to make all naval supremacy useless. Secondly, Sir Edward Grey made it quite clear that the phrase in the President's speech about the obscure, untraceable origins of the war, seemed very unfair to us. In conclusion, he warned Mr. Page that we should never agree to mediation unless the French also consented: "Least of all could the English make or receive any suggestion, at least until her great new army had done its best." In other words, we were hopeful of final victory, and did not intend to be turned aside from our purpose so long as our confidence in being able to achieve it was unshaken.

 

This last remark must have shown the American Ambassador

 

May, 1916 

DIVERGENT POLICIES

 

how wide a gulf there was between the President's outlook and ours, and how easily the difference between us might grow into an open antagonism. We were hoping for a final, decisive victory, and were ready to make any effort within our strength to get it: the American Government were convinced that neither side would be able to force a military decision; and were basing their own hopes of mediating successfully on the assumption that all the Powers at war would very soon admit the deadlock. Obviously, then, Great Britain's resolute hopes were standing in the way of an early settlement. This, however, was not all: Sir Edward Grey's caveat about maritime warfare and naval power cut at the very roots of the American policy; for it was President Wilson's avowed wish to mediate between the warring Powers in such a way that they would be left to settle their territorial claims between themselves, whilst he presided over an International Congress to prevent future wars and to ensure that the "Freedom of the Seas" should be so enforced that navies could "only be used against each other, and no longer against commerce and for purposes of blockade." (Bernstorff, p. 249.)

 

The President's detachment from what were for us the practical issues of the war worked directly against us. So long as the German armies held Belgian and French territories, it would be very difficult for us to get them back by mere diplomatic bargaining; practically impossible to oblige the enemy Powers to compensate our Allies for the damage they had done; and totally impossible to arrange for the return of Alsace‑Lorraine to France. Yet these were, to us, the three absolutely essential conditions for peace; without them the balance of power in Europe would be so upset that a league to enforce peace would be impossible. It is quite true that the President had empowered Colonel House to inform the Allies that, in the last resort, the United States would be willing to enforce most of our peace conditions by armed intervention; and that, in consequence, we knew that the President had more concern and interest in the political frontiers of Europe than he pretended. There was, none the less, a general apprehension that he was half‑hearted on these points, and that his only real concerns were a general disarmament and a league to enforce peace‑measures which we could not consider until the territorial readjustment of Europe was complete. Even Sir Edward Grey, who had been most concerned with the secret negotiations at the beginning of the year, and was probably better informed of President Wilson's intentions than any other European statesman, seems to have feared that the American peace plan could not be ours, simply because points which we thought essential the American President seemed to treat as secondary.

 

It was, perhaps, because the President realised this, that he was so distant and depressed when Mr. Page went to visit him. (Page, Life and Letters, p. 188.) And if this realisation was, in fact, weighing upon him, it must certainly have inclined him to postpone his mediation; for no American President could lightly view the prospect of entering a peace conference in which his principal antagonists would be the democratic Powers of western Europe. The reason he gave to Bernstorff involved a temporary abandonment of the theory of stalemate: it was that Rumania had entered the war, and that the state of military equilibrium on which he had based his hopes of an early peace had been broken. (Bernstorff, p. 243.)

 

The reasons for the postponement are, however, less important than its consequences, for in two months the diplomatic advantages which Bethmann Hollweg and Bernstorff had so laboriously acquired were all lost.

 

American public opinion had undoubtedly for the moment turned against us; but the President saw, clearly enough, that the friendly and even cordial relations which had sprung up between the United States and Germany rested on a very insecure basis; and in his Address on being renominated to the Presidency, he used language which was little else than a warning to the German Government against presuming too much upon the new state of things. (President Wilson was renominated by the democratic convention in September 1916, and re‑elected on November 7, 1916.) "The rights of our own citizens became involved: that was inevitable. Where they did, this was our guiding principle; that property rights can be vindicated by claims for damages when the war is over, and no modern nation can decline to arbitrate such claims; but the fundamental rights of humanity cannot be so vindicated. The loss of life is irreparable. Neither can direct violations of a nation's sovereignty await vindication in suits for damages. The nation that violates these essential rights must expect to be checked and called to account by direct challenge and resistance." (Scott, President Wilson's Foreign Policy, pp. 227‑8.)

 

Words like these would have warned Admiral von Holtzendorff of the folly of what he was proposing to do if he had been capable of thinking about anything but submarines and their radius of action. Intent upon his plan of reinstating unrestricted warfare, he had kept his U‑boats busy during September; but they had not attacked commerce outside their usual

 

Oct. 1916  

AN ACT OF FOLLY

 

areas. Nineteen British vessels had been sunk in the Mediterranean, eleven in the North Sea, and twelve in the Western approaches, in the Bay of Biscay and off the coast of Portugal. And, as in the previous month, the neutrals suffered still more heavily ‑ Norway alone lost twenty‑six vessels of 45,000 tons aggregate; while in the Arctic Ocean seven Norwegian ships and one Russian were sunk, as well as one British vessel. In October the zone of operations was much extended: six vessels were sunk in the White Sea; and on October 9 the citizens of the Eastern States of America received the sensational news that a German submarine was operating off Nantucket light‑vessel. This boat was U.53; she had crossed the Atlantic under the command of Hans Rose, and he had been courteously received, on the day before the announcement in the Press, by the naval commandant at Newport. Then, after a brief exchange of visits, the submarine left her American harbour, and, having sunk five vessels off the outer light‑vessel, returned home to Germany.

 

The exasperation caused by the visit spread like a prairie fire. Ever since the war began, the Americans had been exceptionally touchy about the exercise of belligerent rights within their waters. In 1914 our watching cruisers had shadowed certain steamers on their way to New York and Boston; the American Government had at once protested, notwithstanding that our action was admittedly legitimate. During the election campaign the same apprehensive and angry feeling about the integrity of American coastal waters again made itself evident; and our Admiral was warned that he had better relax his watch on New York and the Chesapeake until the agitation in the Press had died down. It can, therefore, be imagined what feelings were aroused when it was reported that U.53 had actually carried submarine war to the American coasts, and was sinking vessels with the assistance of American navigational marks and under the eyes of American light‑keepers. The proceeding was defended on the plea that the sinkings had been made outside territorial waters and according to the rules of cruiser warfare; but popular indignation is not easily subdued by quotations from books of maritime law. The agitation continued, and took a threatening shape. The President himself took note of it, and warned the German Ambassador that the incident must not be repeated. (Bernstorff, p. 227.)

 

That such an act  of folly and so tactless an insistence on bare legal right should have been perpetrated by a Government with a high reputation for unity and cohesion, was surprising enough; and it was natural to ask how it could have been allowed. If Holtzendorff was so reckless as to wish for the experiment, was there no one in Germany with the sense and the power to forbid it? The answer is, no doubt, to be found in the rigid departmental divisions of the German Government. So long as the submarines carried out their operations according to the rules of cruiser warfare, as the Emperor had commanded them to do, the choice of the theatre for displaying their exploits was a "purely military" question. It is, therefore, very doubtful whether Admiral von Holtzendorff ever consulted the political heads of the Government about the cruise of the U.53; and she was probably sent out to give effect to the crude, illusory notion which Captain von Buelow had urged on General Ludendorff a month before: that the more harshly Germany acts at sea, the more will neutrals respect her.

 

This clumsy attempt to be impressive had, however, less permanent ill effects than might have been expected. Indignation was sharp, but short‑lived. In a few days those sections of the American Press which had always advocated the German cause were expressing admiration for the exploit , and an event now occurred which diverted public attention to another matter.

 

On October 12, the British Ambassador presented a Note replying to the American protest about our treatment of mails. The contents of our Note were soon published throughout the American Press, and their reception was decidedly bad. A very large number of Americans believed, quite honestly, that we were using belligerent measures as a cover for seizing unfair advantages over American traders; and when it was seen that we did not mean to yield on the point, which was one of importance to us, feeling began to run high. The New York World, a paper which was supposed to be closely in touch with the Government, described our Note as evasive and impudent.

 

Fortunately for the Allies, we too were saved by a diversion. The fight for the Presidency was now in full blast, and Americans gave it their undivided attention. The two antagonists, Wilson and Hughes, were equally matched; each represented a powerful group of interests; and in the turmoil foreign relations were temporarily forgotten. President Wilson was returned to office on November 7; and when the American public turned back once more to the insistent questions of peace by mediation, and of British and German acts of war, several events of great importance took place in quick succession.

 

Oct.‑Nov. 1916

PROMISES DISREGARDED

 

just before the Presidential campaign began, Mr. Grew, the American Charge d'Affaires in Berlin, had reported that the German Government intended shortly to seize a large number of Belgian workmen and carry them by force to Germany to work in the mines and factories. (U.S. Government publication, European War, No. 4, pp. 357‑9.) The rest of the month passed in efforts to obtain further information, and, finally, Mr. Grew was handed a written memorandum stating that the German Government intended "to adopt compulsory measures against Belgian unemployed, who are a burden to charity, so that friction arising therefrom may be avoided." As the "charity" which was thus to be relieved of its burdens was the "Commission d'alimentation et de secours" ‑ a purely American concern ‑ the excuse was clumsy in the extreme. Mr. Grew answered at once that the German Government's action was a breach of International Law; and on November 29 he was instructed by his Government to hand in a strongly worded note verbale. A wave of resentment at the German deportation laws swept the United States. Count Bernstorff wired to his Government saying that opinion had "been poisoned" against Germany; and he stated that, but for this unhappy measure, President Wilson would have mediated between the nations at war as soon as he was re‑elected. (Bernstorff, p. 258.)

 

The German Ambassador's views on such a subject are necessarily weighty. Count Bernstorff had much to explain to the German nation. He had to find a reason why President Wilson should have altered his views so completely in rather less than three months; and, looking back over the events of the autumn of 1916, it seemed to him that the Belgian deportations had caused the change. The explanation is not a sufficient one: it is not difficult to see that the President had other and graver reasons for mistrusting the German Government. The fact was that the submarine war was becoming more dangerous every day. Admiral von Holtzendorff was spreading his submarines over a wider and wider area, and they were showing an increasing disregard for the promises upon which American neutrality depended.

 

During the previous month, the steamship Marina of the Donaldson line had been torpedoed, without warning off Cork. (European War, No. 4, p. 258, et seq.) A heavy sea was running at the time; and of fifty‑one Americans on board, six were drowned. Investigation showed that the vessel was "on her owner's service, running on her ordinary berth, and entirely under the orders of her owners." She would, on her return from America, have carried a number of horses for use in the British army. This would, admittedly, have made the Government the consignees of part of the cargo; but it could not properly be alleged, as the German Foreign Office did, that the Marina was a "horse transport ship in the service of the British Government." Nor was this all. Two days earlier, the Rowanmore, with American citizens on board, had been shelled off the Irish coast whilst lowering her boats; on the very day that the Marina was sunk, the American steamer Lanao was sunk off Cape Vincent, in spite of the fact that the cargo was innocent; and on November 8, the large British liner Arabia was sunk without warning in the Mediterranean. As had happened when the Marina was torpedoed, the German Government excused their action by stating that the Arabia was in British Government service. We had no difficulty in proving that the statement was false; and when he took stock of the position on returning to office, President Wilson must have been painfully conscious that the pledges which the German Government had given him in April were being deliberately violated.

 

But more than a month was needed to examine each case and to receive the German answers to the questions raised; so that it was not until the middle of December that all the facts were known. By then very important negotiations of another kind were in progress, and these cases, flagrant as they were, did not receive much attention. The American Government did not press their protests, and Count Bernstorff concluded, in consequence, that what had occurred was without importance; but this was a very hazardous assumption. (Bernstorff, p. 262.) If the President, in the interests of his impending effort at mediation, decided to draw as little attention as he could to the incidents, it by no means followed that he was not deeply and painfully impressed by the unscrupulous policy which had caused them.

 

The steady spread of the submarine campaign and its increasing successes had now brought on a fresh internal struggle in the German Government; and the taking of American lives in violation of promises given was as much the outcome of confusion, uncertainty and diversity of aim as of deliberate bad faith.

 

Oct. 1‑4, 1916

THE CHANCELLOR'S PROTEST

 

On October 1, only a week after Bethmann Hollweg had presented his memorandum upon American mediation to the tinperor, he received a " very confidential " report from Holtzendorff. (Beilagen, Teil IV., pp. 183, 184.) It was to the effect that the Great General Staff had advised him to begin unrestricted submarine warfare on October 18, and to issue the necessary orders on the 10th. The news amazed him; and his reply went much further than a mere protest against a breach of procedure. After explaining the lamentable effects of withdrawing all diplomatic undertakings without warning or explanation, he attacked the principle of submarine war itself. It consisted in striving for results based on the merest guesswork, at the cost of a certain and definite evil. "The effect of submarine warfare upon England is purely speculative  .... it is impossible to impose an unbreakable blockade upon her." Apart from this, Great Britain would certainly not face the danger passively. If she introduced an effective convoy system, the whole basis upon which the Naval Staff had built up its arguments would be withdrawn. Doubtless intensified submarine war would injure Great Britain, but that was a very different thing from compelling her to make peace, when that same act of war would rally America, Holland, Denmark and Spain to her assistance. "The perspective which all this opens up is so wide, and of such general import, that, quite apart from American action, no final decision can possibly be come to until His Majesty has had the matter set before him in all its aspects."

 

This energetic protest was presented to the Field‑Marshall by Baron von Gruenau, the Chancellor's representative at Headquarters. His report shows how completely the military and civil departments of Government mistrusted one another. Hindenburg and Ludendorff wished him to tell the Chancellor how much they deplored the mistake. Nothing was further from their thoughts than to take separate action. "Both these gentlemen assured me, several times over, that no discord must be allowed to disturb their local co‑operation with you." But having thus discharged his duty, Gruenau continued that he had very good reason for thinking that " General Ludendorff is counting upon an early beginning to the line of action mentioned " [intensified submarine warfare].

 

Two days later, however (October 4), the General Staff realised that their manoeuvre had been premature. On that day Holtzendorff, whose obstinate energy no consideration seems ever to have restrained, went to press his views upon the Emperor. He was told curtly "that there could be no question of re‑starting intensified submarine warfare for the moment." (Beilagen, Teil IV., p. 185.)

 

This ended the attempt to force the Government's hand; but it only set on foot the Great General Staff's campaign against the Chancellor's authority. We may doubt whether Hindenburg and Ludendorff shared Holtzendorff's anxiety to re‑start an autumn campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare; but it is absolutely certain that they had determined to constitute themselves the deciding authority on the whole question. What they desired and aimed at was that they might be in a position to settle the matter themselves, without these interminable discussions, in which the Chancellor's considerations of policy had the same weight as their own views on the military position. For this it was needful to set up a new fence round the Chancellor's field of authority. The first move in the new game was made by Hindenburg. His letter was written only a day after the Emperor had conveyed his decision to Admiral von Holtzendorff. It was not sent through Gruenau, although it appears, from previous communications, that he was the official intermediary; it was addressed direct to Bethmann Hollweg, and ran thus:

 

"At the meeting in Pless, at the end of August or the beginning of September ‑ I cannot fix the date more closely ‑ I recollect that Your Excellency said that the decision whether submarine warfare should be intensified rested with the High Military Command. Your Excellency only stipulated that you might consult the Allies and announce certain friendly settlements with other nations. Your Excellency has also emphasised the responsibility of the High Command on the submarine question to members of the Reichstag, although the actual expressions used have not been communicated to me. From numerous statements that have come into my possession, I am of the opinion (which is shared by wide political circles) that responsibility for the submarine war rests solely with the High Command. From the telegram quoted above, I conceive that Your Excellency's views on the question are not what I had supposed. I understand your point, but in order that we may be quite clear (tatsachlich festzustellen) how far responsibility for a sharpened submarine war rests with the High Command, I should be grateful for an expression of your opinion."

 

It is difficult, at first sight, to understand how Hindenburg found it possible to put the Chancellor's words in question. The discussion at Pless had been very carefully recorded by

 

Oct. 1916

MILITARY PRESSURE

 

Gruenau, and a copy of his minutes was doubtless available at Headquarters. They contain no syllable which suggests, even remotely, that the Chancellor resigned any part of his responsibility for deciding whether intensified submarine warfare should, or should not, be re‑started. How then could the Field‑Marshall risk the statement that he had done so? The answer is, no doubt, that the statement was merely a brief and convenient expression of what he regarded as the result of the debate. As for the risk of contradiction, he was not likely to make much of that. The minutes of the Pless conference, however accurate, could only be a summary of the proceedings, and not a verbatim report of them. It was, therefore, always open to any person present to maintain that more had actually been said than appeared on the documents.

 

The Chancellor answered sharply that he had never said anything of the kind attributed to him; but he was less firm on the challenge to state his opinion with regard to responsibility. If the Emperor ordered intensified submarine warfare, doubtless he did it by virtue of his authority as military Commander‑in‑Chief. This, however, did not dispose of the question. The decision itself could not be taken without first examining the foreign affairs of the Empire. "I hope, therefore, Your Excellency agrees with my opinion that, apart from the immediate participation of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, a measure of such importance as that of unrestricted submarine warfare ought not to be decided on without consultation with the Imperial Chancellor."

 

The strength of the answer lay in the reminder that only the Emperor could issue the necessary orders; but it is clear that the Chancellor felt his own position to be shaken. The Field‑Marshall was openly interfering with the politics of the Empire and using the Reichstag parties for his own ends. Almost simultaneously with Hindenburg's letter, the Centre Party passed a resolution about the constitutional position of the Imperial Chancellor in war, and the connection between the two was patent. (Bethmann Hollweg pp. 127‑8.) On October 14, therefore, Bethmann Hollweg telegraphed to Washington, urging that the President should be asked to hasten his first peace move, as the demand for unrestricted submarine warfare was rising. (Bernstorff, p. 254.)

 

Four days later, an Imperial Council met at Pless. A proclamation of Polish independence was agreed to; but beyond this we know practically nothing of what occurred. (Bethmann Hollweg, p. 95.) If submarine warfare were discussed, evidently nothing was done to bind the Government to a consistent line of action; for after the meeting, as before it, Holtzendorff continued to press for wider powers, regardless of the diplomatic situation and of the Emperor's ruling. Whether the Chancellor could have held the military party in check much longer may be doubted. In any case, he shortly became party to a move which dominated everything on the international chess‑board.

 

6

 

Ever since the summer, Baron Burian, the Foreign Minister of the Austro‑Hungarian Empire, had been warning Berlin that Austria's war machinery was running down; and now, as the winter was coming on, bringing with it a terrible prospect of want and suffering, he renewed his representations and urged that every neutral State in Europe should be asked to make a joint move in favour of peace. (German Official Documents relating to the World War published by the Carnegie Endowment, p. 1053.) A plan of the kind had the advantage that it in no way obstructed President Wilson; but rather assisted him. On the other hand, joint action between Norway, Sweden, Holland, Switzerland and Spain would not be easily or quickly arranged; so that, if speed was what was wanted, it was doubtful if anything would be gained.

 

Bethmann Hollweg has never given his whole opinion on the plan of making an independent peace move. As far as one can judge from his very guarded answers when he appeared before the Reichstag Committee of Inquiry, years later, he was not averse to it, though he did not approve of the method finally adopted. He was absolutely certain that there was a peace party in the British Cabinet; and he thought, by some misreading of diplomatic events, that Great Britain had made a "peace feeler" during the year. He was entirely mistaken, but it was a misunderstanding which was quite widely shared; for the same assertion is to be found in Count Bernstorff's evidence before the Committee of Inquiry and in Hildebrand's Life of Ballin. The Chancellor had thus some reason to think that the Entente would not reject peace proposals outright, if made to them; and probably on this ground seconded Baron Burian's proposal. It seems strange, at first sight, that the High Military Command should have been in favour of making peace proposals, yet they undoubtedly were; and their motives, though complex and disingenuous, were not inconsistent. In the first place, they thought that a peace which put their victories on record might

 

Oct. 20, 1916

PEACE PROPOSALS

 

possibly be arranged. The German army had defended itself successfully on the Western Front, and overpowered our latest Ally, Rumania. If the German negotiators could come to the conference table with such good cards in their hands, it seemed inconceivable that they should not leave it with most of the tricks to their score. Behind this there was another and more powerful motive. They completely mistrusted American mediation. The assurances that the President would leave the belligerents to settle their claims against one another, and preside over an international congress for preventing war, had not persuaded them. To Hindenburg and Ludendorff, President Wilson seemed the man who, before all others, was likely to rob them of the fruit of their victories.

 

Thirdly, there was the alternative and much stronger hope that a breakdown of the negotiations would put the Entente Powers in the wrong and clear away the last remaining argument against unrestricted submarine war. To this hope the Emperor himself, as we shall see presently, was a party.

 

These were roughly the sources out of which the German peace proposals sprang; and by October 20 the matter was settled; for on that day the Emperor sent Bethmann Hollweg a highly sanctimonious letter telling him to propose peace to the Entente Powers.

 

It now remained to settle what conditions of peace the negotiators should insist on. This was a very difficult matter. The terms desired by the Austrian and German Governments were compatible; but the demands of the German Generals were very heavy, and their attitude was extremely threatening. (German official documents, p. 1053, et seq.) Their conditions included a control of the Belgian railway and heavy indemnities both from Belgium and France; and, in order to show the Chancellor that they really intended to see these terms enforced, Hindenburg asked him, by letter, to state what minimum conditions he would insist on at the conference, even at the cost of continuing the war. In the end, agreement was only reached by leaving out all mention of the very large number of points in dispute and drawing up the rest in the vaguest possible language. Bethmann Hollweg stated, years later, that he always looked upon this list of conditions as a compromise between the conflicting views and ambitions of the parties in Germany, and that he never attached any great importance to them. This agrees with his answer to Hindenburg's challenge, Which he met by saying that the best terms to be obtained at a future conference depended upon the progress of the negotiations, and nothing was to be gained by binding the Govern. ment to a particular set of clauses.

 

When finally settled, the compromise ran thus: Belgium was to be evacuated, and was, in return, to give certain undefined securities to Germany; France would be given back her invaded provinces, but was to pay an indemnity, in addition to which the Briey basin was to be annexed as a "frontier rectification." The greater part of Serbia was to be given as spoil to Bulgaria, and the nucleus which remained was to be bound by close economic ties to Austria‑Hungary. Montenegro was to disappear, and be divided between the dual monarchy and an independent Albania. Rumania was apparently to be treated less harshly; for no demands against her are mentioned except frontier rectifications at the Iron Gates and in the Bistritza valley. Russia was to cede all provinces occupied by the German armies, which were either to be annexed or set up as independent States, bound closely to Germany; the limits of the autonomous Poland, which were to be set up, were not defined even approximately. The captured German colonies were to be returned, with the exception of Kiao‑chao and the Japanese acquisitions in the Pacific. In order to compensate Germany for these losses, Belgium was to cede her the Congo. All capitulations in the Turkish Empire were to terminate, and Russia was to be given free passage through the Straits. Nothing was settled about the Russian conquests south of the Caucasus.

 

It was decided that these conditions should be rigidly kept secret, and that not a syllable of them should be divulged until a peace conference had actually been assembled.

 

November was almost out when the German Note had been examined and approved by Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey. Even then Bethmann Hollweg still kept it back, and waited for the moment when German victories should have seemed to reach their zenith. All through the month the Rumanian armies retreated before the Austro‑Germans, and on December 6 Bucharest fell. Two days later Bethmann Hollweg received a letter from Field‑Marshall von Hindenburg telling him that there was no longer any objection to issuing the Peace Note; always providing that the war was continued without respite by land and sea; that unrestricted submarine warfare was to be begun at the end of January; and that the political leaders could reckon on negotiating the kind of "peace that Germany needed." This was all fairly sweeping, but the condition about submarine warfare was positively staggering. The Chancellor was to negotiate a peace, with American and neutral co‑operation, whilst the

 

Nov.‑Dec. 1916  

A LIMITED VIEW

 

Navy and army commanders were preparing for the sinking of peaceful merchant ships in violation of the most solemn diplomatic engagements; and finally, at a moment when every effort had been ostensibly made to insinuate a conciliatory feeling into the affairs of nations, the Naval High Command was to be given a free hand to provoke universal exasperation and bitterness. The fact was that Hindenburg saw no reason to delay unrestricted submarine war now that he had enough troops to overrun Holland and Denmark if they protested against it. To him the United States was simply a country without an army; and the enormous assistance that she could give the Entente, without even landing a soldier in Europe, was outside the limits of his vision. He had made up is mind that the High Command was to decide the question, and his letter was a fresh reminder of their determination to take the matter out of the Chancellor's hands. Bethmann Hollweg understood it so, and answered more firmly than he had done before. "Unrestricted submarine war can only be started by withdrawing our undertakings to America, Holland, Denmark and Sweden. Whether such a withdrawal is possible in January 1917 can only be settled after reviewing the whole situation as it then stands; no final decision can be taken now. If, however, our peace proposal is rejected, our attitude on the question of armed merchant vessels will be presented with the greatest energy.

 

"I should have been grateful had the High Military Command presented their proposals to the Emperor after consultation with the political sections of the Government."

 

The implication of these words is clear: the military leaders were simply pressing their views on the Emperor when they could get him by himself, and were doing their utmost to supersede the old system of general discussions in which every section of the Government was represented.

 

The militarists had to wait until early in December before the politicians put forward "peace proposals." But when the time came they could not complain of the methods adopted. Bethnann Hollweg in his speech to the Reichstag, in which he announced the opening of negotiations, took the magnanimous, imperial, innocent and minatory tone which was as like his master as it was unlike himself. In the Note to the neutral intermediaries he dwelt on the indestructible strength of Germany and her Allies, and their unswerving "conviction that respect for the rights of other nations is not in any degree incompatible with their own rights and legitimate interests"; he added that "they feel sure that the propositions which they would bring forward, and which would aim at assuring the existence, honour and free development of their peoples, would be such as to serve as a basis for the restoration of a lasting peace."

 

In the Reichstag he repeated these points, and added two more, evidently for the sake of their effect at home. "In August 1914 our enemies challenged the superiority of power in a world war; to‑day we raise the question of peace, which is a question of humanity. The answer which will be given by our enemies we await with that sereneness of mind which is guaranteed to us by our external and internal strength, and by our clear conscience. If our enemies decline and wish to take upon themselves the world's heavy burden of all those terrors which will follow thereupon, then, even in the least and humblest homes, every German heart will burn in sacred wrath against our enemies, who are unwilling to stop human slaughter because they desire to continue their plans of conquest and annihilation. In a fateful hour we took a fateful decision. God will be our judge."

 

This voice of the "clear conscience" is not the voice of Bethmann Hollweg, certainly not the voice of that Bethmann Hollweg who in August 1914 spoke candidly of "the wrong that we have done in neutral Belgium." Nor could it be considered a tactful utterance, suited to its ostensible purpose. It invited the question whether it was in any way sincere, or only a move in the game. In England there were a few who asserted that it was a genuine offer, and that we were bound both by religion and by our hopeless military position to accept it. But here, as in every country of the Entente, the opposite view was held by the great majority. It was, of course, at that time a matter of opinion, or of instinct and the fighting spirit: it can now be examined as a matter of fact. We know now that the German generals had pronounced the military position hopeless and the national position desperate; the admirals had declared that Germany could only be saved by a ruthless U‑boat campaign, which the politicians, on the other hand, maintained to mean "nothing but catastrophe." We know also that the naval and military chiefs had agreed to force on the U‑boat campaign and in no circumstances to admit any yielding. Was Bethmann Hollweg sincere, though inconsistent? Was he trying ‑ was he allowed to try ‑ by a real offer of peace, to save Germany from the deadly dilemma which he had so clearly explained to the Kaiser and his less capable advisers?

 

To begin with the offer itself: we have already seen that neither note nor speech gave any real offer; what the proposals were to be was not stated, nor even hinted at. The

 

Dec. 1916

DOUBTFUL INTENTIONS

 

Entente by responding would accept the German claims as to the origin of the war and the indestructible strength of the Central Powers, and they would be exposed to the risks involved in refusing the terms when offered, however impossible they proved to be. We know, however, that Bethmann Hollweg did think the bait might take. He telegraphed, on December 19, to Hindenburg: "I do not consider it impossible that our adversaries may express their readiness to enter into peace negotiations with certain reservations." He goes on to ask "whether it is thinkable to make our consent to an armistice dependent on such conditions that the disadvantage should not be ours but our enemies'." It is extraordinary that such a bait should have seemed to him sufficiently attractive; on the contrary, there was the remarkable assertion that the Germans had never swerved from the conviction that the rights of other nations were not in any degree incompatible with their own rights and legitimate interests: to the friends of Belgium and Serbia surely not a convincing statement.

 

The explanation is that Bethmann Hollweg was only considering possibilities: it was necessary for him to be ready to meet any answer, but the answer for which he had been commanded to scheme was, beyond doubt, a refusal, and his object, or the object of the All‑Highest whom he obeyed, was the resumption of the U‑boat war. This statement may appear to assume an astonishing inconsistency in the Kaiser and his Chancellor, but its truth is not to be questioned. In a telegram dated October 1, 1916, Bethmann Hollweg protested to Gruenau against a decision reported to have been taken without an agreement with himself and the sanction of His Majesty, and set out the existing situation. "We have, as everybody knows, promised Arnerica to wage the U‑boat war only in accordance with the Prize Regulations. By personal command of His Majesty, Count Bernstorff has been instructed to induce President Wilson to issue an appeal for peace. Provided that Wilson can be so induced, the probable rejection of the appeal by England and her Allies, while we accept it, is intended to afford us a basis upon which we can morally justify the withdrawal of our promise to America before all the world, and above all before the European neutrals, and thus influence their probable attitude in the future." He adds that "before the situation has been cleared in that respect," and His Majesty's commands received, no U‑boat campaign can be announced.

 

In the face of this document, can it be doubted that the German peace offer, as well as the American one to be procured by Bernstorff, was deliberately planned as a preliminary to the ruthless U‑boat campaign?

 

We have other evidence, and it all points in the same direction. On December 19 Mr. Gerard, the American Ambassador, arrived in Copenhagen and saw the Austrian Ambassador. Gerard foreshadowed a peace move from the American President, the Pope, and possibly the King of Spain. He then ‑ and this must clearly have been in answer to a question or hint from the Austrian Ambassador ‑ "laid stress on his apprehension at the possible resumption of the unrestricted submarine war. In his opinion even the unconditional rejection of the peace offer on the part of the Entente would not be sufficient ground for disregarding on principle the fundamental international laws as hitherto recognised." The United States, if provoked, would enter the war. At the moment when Mr. Gerard spoke, President Wilson's Note had already been received by the British Government. It was "in no way prompted by the recent overtures of the Central Powers"; indeed, it could not have been expressed better if it had been designed to show up their principal defect. The President "is not proposing peace: he is not even offering mediation": he is seeking "to call out from all the nations now at war an avowal of their respective views as to the terms upon which the war might be concluded."

 

Such an avowal could well be made by the Entente Powers: they had only to ask for restitution (including Alsace‑Lorraine), reparation and guarantees. But Germany could not avow her aims, for either they were incompatible with these and proved her guilt, or they were not incompatible, and therefore admitted her guilt. This dilemma had been perceived by the Germans as soon as they received from the Papal Nuncio the first news of President Wilson's action. On December 18 Count Wedel, the Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed to the Berlin Foreign Office: "Baron Burian agrees with Your Excellency, and considers it probable that we shall be compelled to reject. Our reply should, in his opinion, be so worded that our tactical position shall not become worse, and that the possibility shall not be precluded of continuing to spin the thread." It is quite clear that what Germany will be compelled to reject is the statement of any proposed terms, the only thing which the Pope or the President had suggested, and the conclusion is therefore unavoidable that such a statement of terms being impossible for Germany, her peace offer could not have been intended to bring peace - in other words, it was a tactical move, an offer made to clear the situation for the militarists. The action

 

Dec. 1916 

THE ALLIES UNANIMOUS

 

of the naval and military chiefs irresistibly enforces this view.

 

7

 

Whilst the German Note was being drawn up and settled, Great Britain had passed through a political crisis. On December 4 Mr. Asquith's Government had fallen, and Mr. Lloyd George had formed a new Cabinet. The "War Cominittee" (formed on November 3, 1915) had held their last meeting on December 1, 1916; and the new "War Cabinet" met for the first time on December 9. It consisted of the new premier, Lord Curzon, Lord Milner, Mr. Henderson and Mr. Bonar Law, and was given the powers of an executive council for prosecuting the war. It was by this body that Bethmann Hollweg's Peace Note was discussed.

 

Nobody could guess what concrete proposals lay behind the Note; but it was obvious that the German Government had no intention of agreeing to the terms which we still hoped to enforce. The War Cabinet was, indeed, so unanimous for rejecting the peace offer that no suggestion of any other procedure was even uttered. The only point upon which opinion was divided was the method of rejection. As it was thought that the Note was a mere manoeuvre to influence neutrals, and to throw the responsibility for continuing the war upon the Entente Powers, the Foreign Office had been very busy in obtaining opinions from the neutral chancelleries during the week preceding the discussion in the War Cabinet.

 

The inquiries showed that there was a very general feeling in neutral countries against rejecting the German offer outright. The Swedish Foreign Minister and Cardinal Gasparri of the Vatican were specially emphatic that Germany ought, at least, to be asked to state her terms. In the end it was decided that a common Allied Note should be drawn up and issued from Paris. It was thought best that France, who had suffered so terribly, should be, in some sort, the Allied spokesman. Nothing but rejection was possible; for since December 12, when Bethmann Hollweg had made his announcement in the Reichstag, Allied opinion had been expressing itself in a very decided fashion. On December 13 Monsieur Briand had been cheered loudly in the French Chamber when he denounced the German Peace Note as a subtle, cunning manoeuvre to divide the Allies; two days later M. Pokrovsky, the Russian Foreign Minister, made a speech to the Duma announcing the Tsar's determination to fight on and remain faithful to his Allies; and apart from these official declarations, public feeling was very decided. One has only to glance at the daily papers of that date to realise the torrent of indignation which would have overwhelmed any attempt to compromise and give the German offer a further hearing.

 

If Bethmann Hollweg had been sincere when he said that he had only agreed to issue a separate Peace Note because he distrusted President Wilson's procrastinating methods, he must have regretted his own impatience. It was exactly a week after he had made his speech in the Reichstag, and only three days after the British War Cabinet had seriously discussed the German Peace Offer, that the American proposals were handed in. For this trivial anticipation the Imperial Chancellor had sacrificed the active collaboration of the greatest neutral Power in the world, and had bitterly disappointed its President. (Bernstorff, p. 270.)

 

His regret at the bad manceuvring into which he had been forced by his master must have been the keener in that, at home, these same violent influences were passing out of his control. Some days after the German Peace Note had been sent out, and almost simultaneously with the American offer to mediate, the military authorities decided to force the Chancellor's hand finally, and re‑start unrestricted submarine warfare regardless of every other consideration. What prompted their decision has never been ascertained. It may very possibly have been the shortage of food in Germany and even of rations at the front caused by our blockade, and the dread of the terrible winter which lay before them. But when afterwards cross‑questioned by the Reichstag Committee, Ludendorff said that it was the French attack at Verdun on December 15 which decided him. (German official domments, p. 887.)

 

The statement does not stand examination. The documents now published show quite clearly that the High Command decided, early in December, to press for unrestricted submarine war regardless of peace notes and diplomatic negotiations. Now the second battle of Verdun, which Ludendorff alleges was the deciding factor, began on October 24, and ended on December 18. Its results were quite clear before December began; so that Ludendorff's explanation may be an explanation, but the dates by which he strove to support it are wrong. In order to cover himself he stated that the French attack at Verdun began on December 15, which was practically the date on which it ended.

 

The available documents throw no light upon the question; but they do show that some exceptionally severe shock took effect upon General Headquarters in the first

 

Dec. 1916 

CIVILIAN MINISTERS YIELDING

 

part of December. During the previous month Hindenburg and Ludendorff had discussed conditions of peace in a way which showed a complete confidence in the army's power to enforce the harsh terms they desired to see imposed. In January the Field‑Marshall stated that the military position could "hardly be worse than it is now." (German official documents, p. 1319.) The French victory at Verdun is no explanation for such a change of outlook. Doubtless it came as a painful blow to German Headquarters to see their troops hurled in confusion from the heights which they had gained at such awful cost in the earlier part of the year; but they must have known perfectly well that the French victory was local and without any large strategical significance. It does not explain the FieldMarshall's new attitude; and nobody can read through the mass of materials now published without getting a strong impression that some set of facts, probably the facts of our blockade and the rapidly growing destitution of the central nations, came before Ludendorff's notice in the early part of December with a force which impressed upon him the urgent conviction that he must lose no time.

 

On December 20, when the Imperial Chancellor was carefully watching the effects of his Peace Note upon neutral opinion and waiting for the next move in the diplomatic game, the Foreign Office representative at Pless, Lersner, transmitted a telegram from Ludendorff to Zimmermann and Bethmann Hollweg. The message was singularly brief, and stated simply that the Quartermaster‑General considered that Mr. Lloyd George's speech in the House of Commons was equivalent to a rejection of the German proposals, and that "as a result of the impressions I have received on the Western Front, I am of opinion that submarine warfare should now be launched with the greatest vigour." (Ibid., p. 1199, et seq.) Zimmermann saw that the message was serious, and answered it at once. He begged Lersner to keep a "steady pulse and a cool head," and to inform Ludendorff that the whole question must stand over until a formal answer to the German peace proposals had been received. It was clear, however, that the civilian ministers were giving way; for, as a sop to the military leaders, a promise was given that the American Government was shortly to be told that armed merchantmen would be torpedoed at sight. The undertaking must have caused the utmost misgiving to Zimmermann and Bethmann Hollweg, for Count Bernstorff had already told his Government that such a measure would be almost fatal; and when he got the message, he repeated his warning.

 

Lersner strove conscientiously to do his duty . He pointed out "the extraordinary responsibility which the Supreme Command was taking upon itself with regard to the Emperor, the people and the Army, by this precipitate insistence"; and made a last effort to show what war with America would mean. No compromise or concession satisfied the generals; they were determined now to give the Entente no time to reply to the Peace Note in either sense. On December 22 Holtzendorff had once more, in a detailed memorandum to Hindenburg, given urgent reasons for adopting the unrestricted U‑boat campaign. Without this method, he said, England would not be effectively starved, and, "further, the psychological elements of fear and panic would be lacking." Hindenburg accordingly telegraphed next day to the Chancellor. "The diplomatic and military reparations for the unrestricted submarine war should be begun now, so that it may for certain set in at the end of January."

 

Bethmann Hollweg himself replied to this, pointing out once more that the position must first be made clear with regard to America. This could not be done until the Entente had given a formal reply to the German peace offer. "At present nobody can foresee what it will be. In all probability it will be negative, but might nevertheless leave a loophole. We must not close this. This would happen should we begin action  .... before the receipt of the reply. Thereby the political success we have achieved through our peace offer  .... would be seriously impaired. Even now, we meet with the assumption that we got up the whole peace action mala fide and merely as a way of working up to the unrestricted submarine war." A bad impression had also been produced by the German Press, which, like Ludendorff, had replied to Lloyd George's speech and Wilson's Note with an immediate "cry for the submarines."

 

On December 26, after Ludendorfl had revived the old falsehood about the decision come to on August 31, Hindenburg sent Bethmann Hollweg his ultimatum. It was simply to let the Chancellor know that he intended to get his own way. Bethmann Hollweg probably saw that the end had come; but as the necessary orders could only be sent out by the Emperor, the final step could not be taken until a conference had been assembled. He therefore promised to go to Pless in a few days.

 

In the meantime, he had received two urgent communlcations. One was a memorandum from Falkenhayn, which

 

Dec. 26, 1916-Jan. 7, 1917

REAL GERMAN AIMS

 

throws a glaring light on the untrustworthiness of the German peace terms as drawn up, but not even yet divulged. England, it is argued, is as much bound as Germany to carry on the war to the bitter end: the fear that she will be "driven to extremes" lacks all substance. "Just as for us the war must be declared lost if the entry of Belgium into our 'concern' is not enforced, England loses it if she has to allow such a transfer." This point is made doubly plain. "No doubt can exist that the country must remain at our disposal as a strategical area for protection of the most important German industrial district and as Hinterland for our position on the Flanders coast, which is indispensable to our maritime importance." The Kaiser was of the same opinion, but for a different and very characteristic reason. On January 2 he declared to Gruenau that "after rejecting our efforts for the third time, King Albert could not be allowed to return to Belgium; the coast of Flanders must become ours."

 

The other correspondent was Admiral von Holtzendorff, who at Hindenburg's request had circulated a written statement of his views, to which he attached a memorandum showing the facts upon which they were based. It may be said that this document was drawn up by persons not competent to judge of the matter; but it was in form a closely reasoned statement, based on an enormous array of statistics. Bethmann Hollweg, it would seem, had not read it before, and the time at his disposal was too short to allow him to have it thoroughly examined by experts. He did what he could to get an independent opinion, by passing it on to Helfferich; but it was not until January 9 that the Minister of the Interior gave his views. They were a repetition of what he had said at Pless in August: Admiral von Holtzendorff's forecast about bringing Great Britain to her knees by destroying four million tons of shipping in five months was pure speculation, and any method of calculation which left American resources out of the reckoning was radically unsound.

 

Between December 26, when the Chancellor promised to come to Pless, and the date of the final decision, the German Government received a formal notification that the Entente Powers had rejected their Peace Note. The Austrian Government now made a desperate effort to keep the negotiations alive, and on January 2 the Emperor Karl sent a personal appeal to his Ally. The reply to it was not encouraging; but the Austrian Government persevered; and, four days later, Count Czernin had a conference with Prince Hohenlohe, Bethmann Hollweg, Zimmermann and the Under-Secretary of State, von Stumm. (Baron Burian resigned his post as Minister for Foreign Affairs on December 22, 1916, and Count Czernin was appointed in his stead.)

 

He probably saw that it was useless to press for fresh negotiations, and so, beyond recording his opinion that the war must end in a compromise, he confined himself to the matter immediately in debate, which was simply how the Entente's last Note could best be answered. It was agreed that a reply should be sent to the United States and to all the neutral Powers of Europe, and a draft was accordingly drawn up. There the matter rested; and three days later, on January 8, the Chancellor travelled to Pless for the final discussion on the future conduct of the war. Just before he arrived, the military leaders and Admiral von Holtzendorff met for a preliminary conference. Determined as they had always been to have their own way, they seem to have been appalled at what they now intended to do. The notes of the meeting, rough and laconic as they are, read like the records of a conspiracy. Those present had made up their minds; but they were deeply moved. Holtzendorff read out the orders to the submarine fleet and the notification to the American Government, and went on to say that the Emperor had "no real conception of the position." The meeting then came to the real point: would the Chancellor agree? The minutes of proceedings show best how the discussion proceeded: (German official documents, p. 1317.)

 

Holtzendorff: The Chancellor arrives here to‑morrow.

 

Hindenburg: What are his troubles?

 

Holtzendorff: The Chancellor wishes to keep in his own hands the diplomatic preparation of the unrestricted U‑boat war in order to keep the United States out of it. The Chancellor had characterised the Note with regard to armed steamships as a U‑boat trap which would bring on the conflict with the United States.

 

Ludendorff: But the Chancellor knew all that.

 

Holtzendorff: The Foreign Office thinks that if the United States came in, South America would come into the war too. And, besides this, they are thinking about the times which will follow the conclusion of peace.

 

Hindenburg: We must conquer first.

 

Ludendorff: To characterise the Note concerning firing on armed steamers as a U‑boat trap is just another attempt to put the matter off.

 

Holtzendorff: What shall we do if the Chancellor does not join us?

 

Hindenburg: That is just what I am racking my brain about.

 

Jan. 8‑9, 1917

THE LAST CONFERENCE

 

Holtzendorff: Then you must become Chancellor.

 

Hindenburg: No, I cannot do that and I will not do it; cannot deal with the Reichstag.

 

Holtzendorff: In my opinion, Buelow and Tirpitz are out of the question on account of their relations with the Emperor.

 

Ludendorff: I would not try to persuade Hindenburg.

 

Hindenburg: I cannot talk in the Reichstag. I refuse. What about Dallwitz?

 

Ludendorff: You mean whether he wants the U‑boat war at all?

 

Holtzendorff: The Chancellor has the confidence of foreign nations to a great extent.

 

Hindenburg: Well, we shall hold together, anyway. It simply must be. We are counting on the possibility of war with the United States, and have made all preparations to meet it. Things cannot be worse than they are now. The war must be brought to an end by the use of all means as soon as possible.

 

Holtzendorff: Again, His Majesty has no real conception of the situation or of the feeling among his own people.

 

Ludendorff: That is true.

 

Holtzendorff: People and the army are crying for the unrestricted U‑boat war.

 

Ludendorff: That is true.

 

Holtzendorff: Secretary of State Helfferich said to me: "Your method leads to ruin." I answered him: "You are letting us run headlong into ruin."

 

Early next day the Chancellor arrived. What happened is best told in his own words. (Bethmann Hollweg, Vol. II., p. 137.) "With all these thoughts in my mind, I came to the general conference. It was held in the Emperor's presence on the evening of the 9th, and the atmosphere was just as charged as it had been during the forenoon when I discussed the matter, by myself, with the High Command. I felt that I was dealing with men who no longer intended to discuss the decisions they had made. I certainly thought the help which America could give to our enemies was higher than the High Command imagined it to be; but after the Entente's answer to our Peace Note, I could not suggest fresh negotiations  .... I thought of resigning; but that would have altered nothing. The Supreme Command were now my political and personal opponents  .... and within his heart the Emperor was on their side. Had I opposed the decision, the crisis of July 1917 would have occurred six months earlier. A submarine war‑chancellor would have been found all the earlier, in that he would have taken office at the desire of the great majority of the nation, of its representatives, of the army and the navy. I had no thought of saving myself; my only duty was not to obstruct a decision which could not be avoided; It was just because I feared to do so by resigning on January 9, that I remained In office." These words sound like the man himself, and they agree with what the reporter to the conference noted down:

 

"Chancellor: The prospects for unrestricted submarine warfare are, doubtless, very favourable  .... but it must be admitted that they cannot be demonstrated by proof. Submarine warfare is the last card. We are making a very serious‑decision; but if the military authorities consider it essential, I am not in a position to contradict them." In this manner the last step was taken. Fatal as the decision was, it had been inevitable from the very beginning of the debate. This is made clear by every document now available. By December 26 the last hope of common sense had disappeared. Hindenburg had changed his tactics: he no longer asserted that the Chancellor agreed with him, he simply accepted his disagreement and telegraphed his intention of disregarding it. "I must state that although Your Excellency in your capacity as Imperial Chancellor certainly claims the exclusive responsibility, in full consciousness of my responsibility for a victorious issue of the war, I shall naturally use all my endeavour to see that all I consider proper will be done from the military side."

 

He followed this on December 31 with a rebuke on the subject of the peace terms. "Your Excellency's statement on the 29th that it might not be possible for us to retain the mining districts of Briey has filled me with doubt as to Your Excellency's fundamental standpoint." This latter and the reasonable reply which it drew from the Chancellor confirm the view that Bethmann Hollweg stood contrasted with the imperators real or titular as the one mind whose lines of thought were such as to be intelligible to those of non-Germanic birth and education.

 

But he, a mere civilian, could not face army, navy and Kaiser acting in concert. Admiral Scheer was now moving: in great anxiety lest the same concession as before should be made to America, he was sending a representative ‑ Captain von Leventzow ‑ to Berlin to convey an urgent warning against "such a middle course." This emissary saw Bethmann Hollweg on January 8, and the same date stands at the head of a telegram to the Chancellor from Hindenburg at

 

Jan. 1917   

A STRANGE PROCEEDING

 

Pless. "I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that, according to the military situation, the intensified submarine war can and therefore should, begin on February 1." Next day Holtzendorff, Admiral Scheer tells us, convinced His Majesty also. This formality covered the actual decision which had been made by Hindenburg: the procedure was completed by a telegraphic order "sent by the All‑Highest to the Chief of the Naval Staff " ‑ who either had or had not just left his presence. "I command that the unrestricted U‑boat campaign shall begin on February 1, in full force  .... the fundamental plans of operation are to be submitted to me."

 

It is more than probable that the Kaiser's histrionic powers enabled him to believe in this command as the issue of his own will; and there can be no doubt that it was in no way discordant with his own wishes. But the method of staging is illuminated by the following telegram sent by Lersner, the Secretary at Pless (Headquarters), and marked as "only for the Imperial Chancellor and the Secretary of State! "

 

"His Majesty has received a large number of telegrams of assent and devotion in reply to his proclamation, to the German people. In strict confidence, I hear that Field-Marshall von Hindenburg and General Ludendorff are responsible for a great number of these, in order to show the world how unanimous all Germany is in its loyalty to the Emperor. His Majesty has expressed himself highly pleased at these marks of homage. Their widest publication in the Press would, in my humble opinion, cause His Majesty much pleasure."

 

On the very day when the decision was taken at Pless, the British Government replied to the American Peace Note.

 

President Wilson had not offered his mediation in the way that Colonel House had foreshadowed at the beginning of the year; indeed, he had not offered mediation at all, but had simply suggested that both parties at war should let him know what terms of peace they would be ready to accept, and left it to be understood that he would see whether the conditions of each side could not, after all, be reconciled. (Note Communicated by the United States Ambassador, December 20, 1916. [Cd. 8431.] MiscelIaneous. No. 39 (1916).)

 

The War Cabinet were evidently quite convinced that President Wilson's real intentions had completely changed since Colonel House's visit in January. The President had then offered his assistance on conditions; in December the British Cabinet's chief anxiety was to decide whether, if the Allied Powers declined the invitation and said that the time to publish their peace terms had not arrived, the President would then undertake to coerce us, and, if so, what measures would h etake? It was a very serious question. The Federal Reserve Board had recently stepped in and stopped the raising of a further Allied Loan, and the President had been given powers to retaliate against those blockade measures which had caused most irritation. By virtue of a resolution passed by Congress early in the year, he could refuse clearance to Allied vessels in American ports as a reprisal against our "Black List" measures. Similar measures with regard to munitions and materials for our munition factories would leave us in a very serious position. So far as we could tell, the American public would support the President if he decided to compel us to come to terms with the Central Powers. The danger was, if anything, greater than we knew. For whilst the British Government were discussing the Note, Mr. Gerard, the American Ambassador at Berlin, was assuring Baron Burian, in an official interview, that the United States Government were quite prepared to "force the peace" by preventing the Entente Powers from obtaining munitions and food, if their terms of peace obstructed the President's negotiations. (German official documents, p. 1084.)

 

Lord Robert Cecil laid his views before the Government in a written memorandum. As Minister of Blockade he had exceptional facilities for gauging neutral opinion. He advised complying with the American Note and giving the President no excuse at all for applying compulsion. Whether he would take the drastic steps which Congress had authorised was doubtful; but, if he was disappointed in our reply, he might quite well combine with other neutrals in questioning the legality of our blockade. "Very little encouragement from America would make the Governments of Sweden and Holland impossible to deal with. When an atmosphere of irritation had been caused by measures of this description, the President would feel himself strong enough to proceed to much more drastic measures." Lord Robert Cecil's views prevailed; but the details of our answer still remained to be settled. How should our war aims be defined? To draw up a list of the conditions of peace which each of the Entente Powers desired was obviously undesirable, and it would require very skilful draughtsmanship to state them definitely enough to meet the President's request, and, at the same time, to avoid any controversial details which might possibly excite disagreement

 

Jan. 10, 1917 

THE ALLIED REPLY

 

between the Allies. This very difficult task was under taken by Monsieur Briand, the French Premier, Mr. Balfour, the British Foreign Minister under the new Government, and by Monsieur Berthelot, a high permanent official at the Quai d'Orsay. It was not until January 10 that the answer was delivered. (Reply of the Allied Governments to the Note communicated by the United States Ambassador on December 20, 1916. [Cd. 8486.] Miscellaneous. No. 5 (1917), and Despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington respecting the Allied Note of January 10, 1917. [Col. 8439.] Miscellaneous. No. 3 (1917).) After expressing gratitude for the President's good offices, the Allied Governments objected, with some energy, to the sentences in the American Note which stated that "the objects which the Statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in mind in this war are virtually the same," and then stated their terms. Belgium, Serbia and Montenegro were to be returned; France was to receive back her invaded districts; and "provinces formerly won from the Allies by force, against the wishes of the inhabitants," were to be restored; Italians, Czechs, Rumanians, and Slavs under foreign domination were to be freed from it; and the "bloody tyranny" of the Turks expelled from Europe.

 

In order to make our standpoint perfectly clear, our official answer was supplemented by a special note from Mr. Balfour to the American President. With striking lucidity and power the British Foreign Minister explained the real difference between the American attitude and ours. To us the territorial rearrangements foreshadowed in our Note were the essential basis of peace, and President Wilson's scheme of general pacification must come after they had been imposed on the Central Powers. The weakness of both Notes was that nothing in the actual military situation suggested that the Entente would be able to enforce such terms within a calculable time. The position in Russia was getting steadily worse. Transport was breaking down, large masses of the army were starving, and provisions in the capital were becoming as scarce as though the town were besieged. Similar signs of weakness were showing themselves in Italy. If, with the Alliance at its full strength, we had failed to protect France, Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro and Rumania from invasion, it was hardly likely that we should succeed in extending their frontiers when our military strength was declining. If it was hoped that our answer would impress America with our confidence in the justice of our cause and our determination to fight the war to a victorious finish, the Note failed. Colonel House told Count Bernstorff that President Wilson called it "a piece of bluff" which he did not take seriously. (Bernstorff, p. 319.)

 

It had been decided, at Pless, that unrestricted submarine war was to begin on February 1; there were thus three weeks left to clear the board for the last phase of the game. On January 16 Count Bernstorff received his instructions. He was to keep silent about what the German Government intended to do until January 31, and then announce that unrestricted submarine warfare was to begin on the following day. The German Ambassador knew that the President did not think that the Entente's Note debarred him from continuing his attempt at mediation; he therefore strove to mitigate what he could no longer prevent, and urged that neutral vessels should be given a month to get out of the danger zone without fear of being attacked. (German official documents, pp. 1108, et seq.) He proposed also that the submarine campaign should be postponed until the President's negotiations had gone a little further. Both his suggestions were rejected without discussion.

 

During the whole month President Wilson strove untiringly to clear away the obstacles which still obstructed his mediation. As the Entente had announced their peace conditions, and the German Government had kept theirs secret, he endeavoured to clear the matter up, and pressed for the German terms to be communicated. The authorities at Berlin were very reluctant to comply with this request, for they feared that by doing so they would give him an opportunity of acting as a sort of arbitrator between the belligerents. Realising, however, that this was rather a fine point, as they reckoned to be at war with America in a few weeks, the terms were eventually sent to Count Bernstorff, with instructions to communicate them to the President confidentially. (Ibid., P. 1048.) The concession had no effect, for the telegram was only sent to Washington two days before the German Ambassador announced that the new submarine campaign was going to begin at once.

 

On January 22 President Wilson addressed the Senate about his peace negotiations. (Scott, President Wilson's Foreign Policy, p. 250.) He still hoped that they could be continued, and spoke in his vague, guarded way about guarantees for future peace, whilst, at the same time, disclaiming any wish to intervene directly between the Powers at war. Certain passages were much discussed in Germany at a later time, but the points in debate seem of no importance at all in view of what actually happened a week

  

Feb.- April 1917

AMERICA AT WAR

 

later. At five o'clock in the afternoon of January 31 Count Bernstorff carried out his orders. The announcement was received so quietly by Mr. Lansing, the Secretary of State, that it is almost certain he had guessed what was coming. On February 3 President Wilson told Congress that he had severed diplomatic relations with Germany, and on the evening of the same day, Count Bernstorff received his passports. (Bernstorff, p. 324.) The American President was at the time uncertain whether public opinion required more of him than this; he still hoped to get out of declaring war by proclaiming an "armed neutrality which we shall know how to maintain, and for which there is abundant precedent." (Scott, President Wilson's Foreign Policy, p. 260, et seq.) On April 3, when he saw from the progress of the submarine campaign that what he proposed was quite inadequate, he asked Congress to declare war.

 

 

 


 

 

CHAPTER VIII

 

THE MEDITERRANEAN. JANUARY TO AUGUST 1917

 

 

1

Submarine Warfare, January to May 1917

 

THE difficulties and disadvantages which beset a mixed command at sea have been repeatedly exemplified in Naval History: it was not likely that they could be altogether eliminated from our campaign against the German submarines in the Mediterranean. Three Allies were necessarily involved, and by the system adopted the whole sea was divided between them in zones of control, co‑ordinated but independent. Around the coasts of Algeria and Tunis was a French zone, and the patrol of the areas west and south of Greece was also under French orders; for the protection of the routes between Malta and Egypt and in the whole of the Aegean Great Britain was in command; in the waters east, west and south of Italy the Italians were responsible.

 

  

Plan - The Patrol Zones in the Mediterranean

  

The hazards involved in this arrangement were not overlooked. Even in Home Waters the division of the coast patrol into separate commands had already in some cases led to difficulties; in the Mediterranean the differences of nationality, language and outlook would all interfere with a perfect co‑operation, but the protection of each part of the coastal lines of traffic could not be easily managed otherwise than by the nation to whom that portion of the coast belonged, and gaps in such protection should occur, if at all, only at the frontier between one country and another. For the wide stretches of sea which vessels on ocean voyages must cross ‑ such, for instance, as those between Messina and Egypt or between Marseilles and Salonica ‑ protection could be afforded only by patrolling a fixed route or attaching a direct escort, provided by the countries through whose zones the vessel passed. Here another difficulty must be faced. The number of patrol craft capable of accompanying merchant vessels on long ocean voyages was manifestly too small to provide an escort for every steamer, and all that

 

Feb. 1917  

DANTON TORPEDOED

 

could be done would be to make such use of them as seemed fron, time to time most advantageous.

 

In the result, vessels of the highest importance, such as troop transports and ammunition ships, were directly escorted by destroyers for their whole voyage when arrangements could be made; but occasionally, when such vessels crossed from one zone to another, the arrangements broke down. In February an Italian troop transport, the Minas, proceeding from Italy for Salonica, was lost as the result of an international misunderstanding. She was escorted by an Italian destroyer as far as the limit of the British zone; there, in the expectation that the transport would be met by British destroyers sent out from Malta, her escort turned back. But Admiral Ballard at Malta had not been given to understand that she would need British escort; he sent none, and the transport went on alone, to be torpedoed and sunk by a submarine, with the loss of 870 lives.

 

This disastrous failure in co‑operation brought to a head the feeling that the arrangements for escort and patrol throughout the Mediterranean should be centralised under one command. This could only be done by consent of the three Powers concerned, and steps were taken to secure an international conference of the naval authorities in the Mediterranean which should discuss this and the other related questions of routes and anti‑submarine measures. To fix the time and place for a meeting of men so strenuously occupied as the Allied Admirals was naturally a long affair; but ultimately it was arranged that the conference should take place at Corfu at the end of April.

 

Meanwhile, the sinkings of Allied shipping in the Mediterranean continued to be heavy. In February fifty ships, amounting to a total of 101,000 tons, were lost. In March the destruction was a little less ‑ thirty‑six ships of 72,000 tons; but among them was the French battleship Danton, sunk by U.64, under Commander Morath. The Danton was zigzagging and was under escort of one destroyer; nevertheless, the submarine was able to put two torpedoes into her, and the great battleship sank in three‑quarters of an hour. The escorting destroyer caught sight of U.64's periscope, gave chase and dropped depth charges; but the submarine dived deeply and escaped unhurt. For the remainder of her fortnight's cruise U.64 passed to the western basin of the Mediterranean, where, close to the shores of Sicily, she sank two defensively armed British merchantmen and three Italian sailing vessels before returning to Cattaro.

 

Apart from the question of zones, the actual method of traffic protection in force in the Mediterranean ‑ a fixed patrolled route between the major ports ‑ had early in the year been discredited by the Admiralty, and they had approached the French Ministry of Marine with a view to substituting for it the principle of dispersal where wide stretches of open sea must unavoidably be crossed. By the scheme now proposed each vessel would have a track of its own, which would not be patrolled, and the patrols would be concentrated in those narrow waters where focal points could not be avoided. While the matter was still under consideration by the French, the Admiralty decided to make trial of the scheme by putting it into force with British ships in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean. From January 15 onward our ships did not follow the fixed patrolled routes between Egypt and Salonica or Malta, but sailed independently each on a track prescribed for it by the British naval authorities. The fixed route was still patrolled by British forces, though it was used only by non‑British vessels. Dispersal on unpatrolled routes was not followed by large losses; in fact, in the first six weeks of its adoption only four British vessels were lost in the Mediterranean east of Malta, all of them torpedoed without warning, a fate from which the presence of the patrols would probably have been unable to save them.

 

In the latter half of February and the first few days of March losses had been particularly heavy on the route along the coast of Algeria, which was patrolled by French small craft; in fact, it was only on that route that any steamships were lost in the western basin. The principle at that time was for vessels, not defensively armed, to navigate close to the shore; and, if a submarine was known to be on the route, they were to be under way at night only, anchoring in some port of refuge from dawn till dusk. The rule was certainly effective in saving unarmed ships, but between February 20 and March 3 seven defensively armed vessels were torpedoed without warning while under way in the daytime. The six successful encounters between submarines and armed merchant vessels which took place on the same route during that interval were also fought in daylight.

 

The Admiralty now decided to abandon the Algerian coast route and to try the system of routes dispersed over the whole Mediterranean. From March 7 onward British merchant vessels leaving Gibraltar for Malta Channel hugged the Spanish coast in daylight as far as Cape San Antonio, whence, making their offing at dusk, they proceeded on

 

Feb.‑Apr. 1917

DISPERSING TRAFFIC

 

varying courses prescribed for them by the naval authorities at Gibraltar. The same principle was enforced by the Senior Naval Officer, Malta, on west‑bound traffic. Each ship had its own track, and each track was a large zigzag. so arranged that the ship was never less than thirty miles from the African coast till south of Sardinia. The object of giving each ship a different zigzag track was that if one were met by a submarine the enemy would have to wait a long time before another vessel came up to him. Formerly, when all ships followed the same track, a submarine had often several vessels in sight, and the finding of one endangered all on the route. The new method, although it applied to British armed vessels only, seemed to be proving effective, and no more of them were sunk in the western basin during March. That there were still submarines on the Algerian coast route was proved by the loss of a tug, three encounters between French patrol vessels and submarines, and a duel in which a French armed merchantman drove her assailant off.

 

On the dispersed routes east of Malta three British vessels were sunk in March, all torpedoed without warning, and there were other losses in the focal area off Alexandria, which after a peaceful interval of sixty‑eight days was once more raided by the enemy. The submarine was U.63. From Cattaro she seems to have gone directly south to communicate with the disaffected tribes on the west border of Egypt, and she was sighted off Alexandria first on March 24. In the course of the following week she torpedoed without warning two British ships within fifteen miles of Alexandria, and destroyed an Egyptian sailing vessel by gunfire. The second of the two British ships was a collier on passage from Alexandria for Port Said, and was under escort of four auxiliary patrol vessels. Neither she nor they saw anything of the submarine. The other patrol vessels based on Alexandria were engaged in guarding the French fixed route between Alexandria and the east point of Crete.

 

Whatever effort the German submarine service had made in February and March, it was intensified in April, when every boat that could be got to sea went out to the attack. At least twenty‑four separate cruises can be traced in the Mediterranean, amounting altogether to twice as many hours as in March. Whereas in Home Waters the number of steamers destroyed in April was practically the same as in March, (One hundred and fifteen in March, 119 in April.) in the Mediterranean it was increased threefold, and the tonnage sunk in that sea represented a quarter of the losses for the month throughout the whole world.

 

Two cruises are worth examining in some detail. Lieut.-Commander Walter Hans in U.52 proceeded from Cattaro at the end of March for Germany. To the westward of Malta he destroyed two Italian sailing vessels, and then on April 4 appeared off Genoa. The Italian liner Ravenna, with 180 passengers on board, found herself torpedoed without warning, and a few hours later the United States steamship Missourian saw and avoided the track of an approaching torpedo. The submarine came to the surface and fired a round, whereupon the Missourian was surrendered, to be sunk by a few shells at close range.

 

Proceeding westward along the coast route, Lieut.‑Commander Hans shortly before midnight observed a large vessel steaming towards Marseilles: she had all lights out, but was clearly visible in the light of the full moon. She was the Ellerman liner City of Paris with a general cargo from India and thirteen passengers on board, and she had been following the prescribed route along the Italian coast. In accordance with the regulations for navigation in the Mediterranean, any vessel sighting a submarine made a wireless report, with the code word "Allo" as a prefix; the message was repeated by all shore stations near, and any vessel taking it in had to sheer out to sea so as to avoid the area in which the submarine had been seen. The City of Paris took in several "Allo" messages, and by successive alterations of course was now some fifty miles south of Nice. Unfortunately, her manoeuvres, instead of saving her, had brought her to the enemy, who stopped her with a torpedo. The crew and passengers boarded the boats in good order. The submarine then came up to them, and Lieut.‑Commander Hans demanded the captain as his prisoner. Unable to find him, he fired four shells into the still floating steamer, and finally sank her with another torpedo. The City of Paris several times before sinking had signalled her position; but no help came for thirty‑six hours. The French patrols at last found three boats; in them were twenty‑nine of the crew, lascars, dead from cold. Another boat, with twelve on board, all dead, drifted ashore after four days, and two more boats were never found. Out of the crew and passengers in the City of Paris 122 perished.

 

Meanwhile, Lieut.‑Commander Hans had gone in towards Cannes; there in the offing he sank an Italian sailing vessel. Continuing westward along the coast, he cruised between April 7 and 10 off the shores of Catalonia. Here he sank three steamers ‑ one American, one Italian, one French ‑

 

March‑April, 1917  

CRUISE OF U.35

 

stopped and released a Greek steamer, was fired on by a French patrol boat, and missed with a torpedo a British armed merchant vessel. On the 11th he made a wireless signal which enabled the direction‑finding stations to fix his position at that moment. He did not remain off Catalonia, but proceeded southward on his journey towards Gibraltar. Before he reached the Straits on the 13th he sank two more steamers, one Danish, and one a defensively armed British vessel, torpedoed without warning. One other of this class engaged the submarine; but the ancient gun with which she was armed broke down at the first round, and she escaped only under cover of the screen formed by the smoke‑producing boxes with which merchant vessels were now frequently supplied. U.52 passed the Straits of Gibraltar during the night of April 13‑14, and was back in Germany a fortnight later. Outside Lisbon she sank a Greek steamer, and off Finisterre torpedoed a british armed merchant vessel without warning. These with some sailing vessels gave her a total for the voyage of 33,172 tons destroyed in the Mediterranean and 7,792 tons in the Atlantic.

 

The other cruise to be examined is that of Lieut.-Commander von Arnauld in U.35. He also left Cattaro at the end of March, and his voyage was to prove the longest and most successful yet undertaken by a Mediterranean submarine solely for commerce destruction. He first appeared close to the south coast of Sicily, where he sank a British defensively armed steamer without warning. Proceeding westward to the south of Sardinia, he engaged another British steamer with gunfire, and though she replied with her gun and used her smoke‑producing apparatus, she was forced to surrender and give up her captain as prisoner. A cinematograph operator on board the submarine took a record of the scene. Next evening U.35 sank an American sailing ship; and two days later, in the same district, engaged for three hours the British armed steamer Maplewood, securing her surrender after the expenditure of over one hundred rounds. The steamer's gun was never within range, and though she fired two hundred shells, none of them reached the submarine. Her captain also was made prisoner.

 

Lieut.-Commander von Arnauld now crossed to the Algerian coast route. There he would not find any British armed vessels, since by the latest orders they were spread on dispersed routes in the open sea. Off Algiers he attempted to torpedo a French steamer, but missed; and another French vessel on which he opened fire escaped, in spite of sixty shells, by stopping and starting again, thus throwing out the range of the German gunner. Though U.35 followed the Algiers route westward she found no more prey on it, but in the open sea she sank a British sailing vessel and a Greek steamer. Late on April 12 she passed through the Straits of Gibraltar, not, like U.52, to go home, but to cruise in the western approach to the Mediterranean, an area which had so far been unvisited except by submarines definitely on passage to or from Germany.

 

For the passage through the Mediterranean British ships were defensively armed; but there were still not enough guns for all vessels approaching the United Kingdom, and on the very day that Lieut.‑Commander von Arnauld passed unseen out through the Straits an Admiralty order came to Gibraltar to the effect that any armed vessel bound for the United States or Canada was to dismount her gun at Gibraltar for transference to a ship proceeding to England or Egypt. The order took effect next morning on the steamer Patagonier, bound for America. She gave up her gun and proceeded west.

 

Arnauld's first three victims in his new cruising area were all from America, bound for Mediterranean ports ‑ two Italians and a Greek. One of the Italian steamers was armed; but such defence as she put up was useless, and she was soon surrendered. The two others could not resist, being unarmed. So also was now the Patagonier, which unfortunately met the submarine early next morning 105 miles west of Cape Spartel. She made a fruitless effort to escape, which Arnauld punished by taking prisoner the Patagonier's master. He then crossed over to the Spanish side of the Mediterranean entrance. By that time the crews of the sunken ships had landed, and their reports led to the issue of a wireless warning from Gibraltar that a submarine was active near Cape Spartel. It was, however, from the Spanish shore that the next message came, reporting that a Portuguese vessel had been sunk off Huelva. This was not the work of Arnauld, but of Lieut.‑Commander Hans of U.52, who had passed the Straits of Gibraltar the evening after U.35 and was taking the direct route for Germany.

 

For protection of shipping in the area west of Gibraltar the French Morocco Division was nominally responsible. The division consisted only of two or three old light cruisers, more dangerous than useful to employ in submarine‑hunting, which, in fact, they had never attempted. But seeing that submarines ‑ it was not known how many ‑ were certainly operating in this rich and unprotected area, the Admiralty ordered Admiral Currey at Gibraltar to use his light craft to

 

April 15‑20, 1917

CRUISE OF U.52

 

drive them away, and also asked the French to assist. They were setting Admiral Currey no easy task. The force at his disposal consisted of four armed boarding steamers, ten torpedo boats, five sloops, nine trawlers, and seven armed yachts ‑ a total of thirty‑five small craft, of which a third were always under repair. With this force he had to maintain the patrol of Gibraltar Straits and of Mediterranean Zone 1, which extended eastward to the meridian of Cape Palos and contained trade routes each 250 miles in length, along the shores of Spain and Africa. His sloops were almost always engaged in the close escort of transports or other important ships bound for Salonica or Egypt. One of these sloops, the Acacia, returned from escort at this juncture and was sent to patrol towards Huelva; all other armed vessels available at Gibraltar also went out to the westward.

 

For patrolling the area west of the Straits, the French kept some submarines at Gibraltar. A German submarine had been expected to arrive off Gibraltar on the 15th from the west, and arrangements were made for three French submarines to lie in wait across its probable track. But at the last moment these orders were cancelled by the French Senior Naval Officer, and the submarines for the patrol were still in harbour, when the undoubted presence of an enemy boat on their patrol line became known. One French submarine left at once with a trawler.

 

The Acacia soon found evidence of the work of a submarine: she picked up boats containing the crew of a Greek steamer, bound from Huelva to the United States and sunk by Lieut.‑Commander von Arnauld on the 15th; but although the sloop remained out till the 17th, she saw no more of the submarine. Arnauld was back again on the route due west from Gibraltar. There on the 17th he sank a Russian and three British steamers. One of them was bound to Genoa from the United States, and was therefore unarmed; the two others, in ballast from Mediterranean Ports for Baltimore, had given up their guns at Gibraltar under the new order. In the early dawn of the 18th the submarine opened fire on another British steamer, the Hurst; but this one was armed, and replied, though all she could see of her assailant was the flash of its gun. Her resistance seemed effectual, for after a short time the enemy abandoned the pursuit of the Hurst in favour of a steamer to the westward, which she torpedoed without warning, taking prisoner the captain to add to the five masters she already had on board. This was the furthest westerly point of her cruise -180 miles from Cape Spartel. Next day, April 20, she attacked five ships.

 

One was a British collier for Tunis and another was on her way from Dakar to Gibraltar; both of these were unarmed and were sunk by gunfire. Another, armed, escaped after half an hour's engagement. Still another, this time a French vessel, escaped by forcing the submarine to chase head on to the heavy seas. A British transport, the Leasowe Castle, was now approaching Gibraltar, and Admiral Currey had been ordered to escort her in. Before her escort had made contact with her, the transport, still 100 miles from Gibraltar, reported that she had been torpedoed in the rudder. She had been firing on the submarine which attacked her; but the explosion of the torpedo dismounted her gun and she was left defenceless. Luckily the submarine commander did not press his attack; he disappeared to westward; and since the Leasowe Castle's propeller had not been damaged, she was able to complete her voyage to Gibraltar without further incident.

 

On April 22 the order as to disarming ships bound from Gibraltar to America was rescinded on a representation from Admiral Currey. To meet the danger to shipping, he now began diverting west‑bound traffic along the coast of Africa well to the southward, and for a day or two he suspended the sailing of British and Allied ships as a temporary measure. All he could manage in the way of patrol was to send out an armed boarding steamer and three trawlers along the British track, and four torpedo boats to the coast of Spain. Even these patrols could not be relieved and were only supplied by depleting the forces in the Mediterranean zone under his charge. He asked for destroyers, since the French could supply no fast craft; but he received the usual answer that he must do his best with his present resources, there being no possibility of reinforcement.

 

Lieut.‑Commander von Arnauld had therefore little to fear in the western approach to Gibraltar. He remained there till the 24th, sinking in his last three days two Italians, a Dane and two Norwegians, the last four of these vessels all close to Sagres Point. Two French vessels, both armed, succeeded in discouraging him from close attack, and a British steamer used her smoke‑producing apparatus to such good effect that she also escaped. Arnauld passed Gibraltar on April 25, having sunk to the westward of the Straits seventeen vessels totalling 46,854 tons. His operations on the Atlantic side of Gibraltar, disturbing enough at any time, were doubly so at the period he chose. It had just then been decided to experiment with a convoy homeward from Gibraltar. For the safety of the first part

 

April 25‑30, 1917   

U.35 AGAIN AT WORK

 

of the voyage Admiral Currey was to be responsible; and, since with such resources as he had he could not hope to protect the Mediterranean part of his station as well, he was given permission on the 26th to abandon the patrol of Zone I temporarily, sending ships along the Spanish coast in territorial waters where they should be exempt from submarine attack.

 

Arnauld, when once again he was in the Mediterranean, at first followed the track of shipping along the coast of Spain; but by April 30 he was back on the southern coast route by Algeria. After a month's trial of the system of dispersed routes for British armed vessels the Admiralty had reverted to the former arrangement, and ships now crossed over to Algeria from near Cape Palos. The U‑boat commander made no further attempts on armed vessels; probably his ammunition was nearly exhausted. His one victim on his return journey was a Greek steamer on passage from Tunis to England. When he opened fire on her the noise attracted a French patrol boat, which engaged the submarine at long range, causing it to submerge. But Arnauld had one torpedo left; with this he sank the unfortunate Greek. It was his last exploit on that cruise. A patrolling seaplane attempted to bomb him a few hours later; but he made good his return to Cattaro. In his five weeks' cruise he had sunk altogether nearly 65,000 tons of shipping; he had raided the hitherto comparatively safe area west of Gibraltar; and, as a further disquieting innovation, he had engaged armed merchant vessels with gunfire and in some cases had compelled them to surrender after long resistance. Not only, it would seem, did the armament of the steamers expose them to be torpedoed without warning, but it could not be relied on to save them from a determined assailant.

 

Even a destroyer escort could not guarantee a ship against disaster. Of all the mercantile vessels at sea those for which the greatest anxiety was felt were the transports carrying troop; these, therefore, in addition to being armed with the the best guns available, had always a direct escort of destroyers. Yet on April 15 two of them were lost. The Arcadian, carrying over 1,000 troops in addition to a crew of 200 or more, was in the southern Aegean on the way from Salonica to Alexandria when she was torpedoed by an unseen submarine, and sank in six minutes. Only a quarter of an hour before she was struck the men on board had completed boat drill, which circumstance contributed to the perfect discipline which prevailed and to the saving of 1,050 men by the boats and the escorting destroyer. Unfortunately, as the transport was sinking she turned over, carrying down wreckage and spars, which, when released, shot up like arrows and mortally injured men swimming in the water. From this cause and from the sudden capsizing of the ship 277 men were found to be missing when the roll was called. The transport was in the French zone round the south of Greece, and, three hours after she had sunk, a French destroyer and some French trawlers arrived to assist in the work of rescue. While the Arcadian was sinking, a still larger transport, the Cameronia, carrying 2,630 officers and men from Marseilles to Egypt, was struck by a torpedo when half‑way between Sicily and Greece. There were two destroyers escorting the Cameronia; though they had not preserved her from submarine attack, they and some destroyers and other craft sent out from Malta were able to save all but 200 of the crew and troops.

 

The destruction in one hour of these two large vessels, with the loss of so many lives, was the heaviest blow struck by the U‑boats at the transport service since the sinking of the Royal Edward in the Aegean in the autumn of 1915. (see Vol. III., p. 112.) It was a vivid demonstration of what had already been clearly perceived ‑ the menace of the submarine to the expeditions overseas. The First Sea Lord felt compelled to inform the Cabinet that the Admiralty was no longer able to safeguard adequately the communications of the armies in Salonica and Egypt, and he strongly urged that the British contingent at Salonica should be entirely withdrawn. But the Allied policy in force at the time did not permit such a solution of the difficulty, and the base at Salonica continued to be a serious drain on our naval and merchant shipping resources.

 

There was one feature of the submarine campaign in the Mediterranean which differentiated it from that in Home Waters. The wide spaces and great depths of the Mediterranean were not favourable to minelaying by submarines, and it is not surprising that losses by mines were but a small proportion of the whole. In March two fields were laid off Naples, but neither secured a victim. In April a field laid off Alexandria by U.73, shortly after U.63 had withdrawn from that area, was discovered and avoided without loss. Attempts were made to foul the track along the north coast of Africa, and six separate fields were deposited between Cape Bon and Oran. Four large vessels were sunk by these mines. A curious phase of submarine activity at this tiffle was the bombardment of two villages on the Tripolitan coast,

 

April‑June, 1917

BRITISH MINEFIELDS

 

possibly with the intention of affecting the native mind in sorne way.

 

Although most of the submarines came from and returned to the Adriatic, it was known that there were some at Constantinople, whence they could pass out through the Dardanelles into the Mediterranean. After the evacuation of the Gallipoli peninsula a series of shallow minefields was laid to blockade the exit and to catch submarines and other ships attempting to emerge. In December, 1916, UB.46, while endeavouring to return through the Dardanelles, had struck one of these mines and sunk; but this was the only certain success of the fields. By the end of the year the winter gales had set most of the mines adrift; others had been swept up by the Turks; and early in 1917 it was decided that the mined area must be reinforced. In the Mediterranean command there was an opinion that large nets, if moored, would prove a sufficient obstacle to the passage of submarines. But in the Admiralty this form of barrier was already discredited; submarines were known to carry a cutter by the action of which they could easily pass through heavy nets; these, therefore, unless studded with mines, were practically useless. Moreover, it was impossible at the time to supply the quantity of nets that would be required.

 

The decision taken was for another series of minefields, some shallow to catch vessels navigating on the surface, others deep to strike submarines submerged. The first of the 1917 fields was laid off Suvla Bay during the night of April 18, mainly at a depth of 60 feet, though some of the mines were intentionally set to be nearer the surface. Early in May a fresh supply of mines arrived from England, and the reinforcement of the Dardanelles barrage was vigorously continued. Fields were laid on eight nights in May and six nights in June. The enemy appeared to be unaware of what was being done; at any rate, there were no signs of any attempt to prevent the minelayers from reaching their objectives or to sweep up the mines when laid. During the summer months the minelayers were employed elsewhere; but two motor launches had been fitted to lay four mines each, and on several occasions they went close in to the shore, to complete the barrier; they, like the other minelayers, met with no interference frorn the Turks. In the autumn the large minelayers resumed work and by the end of 1917 as many as 2,500 mines had been placed in a barrage extending round the exit from the Dardanelles from Suvla Bay on the north shore of the Gallipoli peninsula to Bashika Bay in Asia Minor.

 

Though this considerable effort was made to prevent submarines from entering the Mediterranean by way of the Dardanelles, little or nothing was done to blockade the far more important submarine base at Cattaro. This was in the Italian zone, where the authorities were content to rely on the British drifter flotilla as the principal means of hindering the almost daily passages of submarines in and out of the Adriatic. The flotilla consisted of thirty motor launches and 120 net drifters, supplied with depth charges for dropping on submarines which might run into the nets. Each vessel mounted a gun drawn from the reserves of one or other of the Allies, but in no case was the weapon of sufficient size to permit reply to the fire of a submarine which might prefer to fight at the range of its own gun. The flotilla was based at Taranto and had for parent ship the battleship Queen, sole remnant of the battle squadron formerly lent to the Italian Government. The rest of the squadron had gone home to be paid off, so that the crews hitherto employed in the ships might be released for service in the rapidly increasing anti‑submarine forces in Home Waters. Even the Queen's crew had gone home, leaving her in charge of a care and maintenance party. The empty ship formed an excellent depot for the personnel of the net barrage.

 

The flotilla was under the general orders of the Italian Commander‑in‑Chief, though directly in charge of Captain A. W. Heneage, who was Commodore of the Adriatic Patrols. By the instructions in force during April the drifters maintained a line of nets from the Italian shore to Fano Island, a distance of forty‑four miles, leaving by day a passage ten miles wide along the Otranto coast for ordinary mercantile traffic. At first the motor launches had not been permitted by the Italian authorities to be out at night, owing to their resemblance to submarines on the surface; so that the drifters had to do without protection in the dark hours. But now a scheme of grey‑and‑white diagonal painting had been adopted for the motor launches; it made them sufficiently unlike submarines to save them from attack by any Italian patrols which might happen to be at sea, but it had the disadvantage of making them conspicuous and robbing them of any chance of surprising submarines. To the north of the net line there was from time to time a group of Italian submarines operating in the middle section of the Strait, and to the southward a few French boats from Corfu patrolled across the Strait. In England, wherever a net line had been operated it was considered that an integral part of the barrage must consist of destroyers constantly present with the double object of forcing submarines to dive and of engaging

 

Jan.‑May 1917   

THE OTRANTO NET

 

them if they should be caught in the nets. But the Italian destroyers nominally appropriated to the Otranto net remained, as a rule, at anchor in harbour, the idea being that if signals for assistance should be received from the drifters the destroyers would then get up their anchors and proceed to sea.

 

In spite of these arrangements, submarines going from and to Cattaro, which lay some 150 miles north of the net line, seemed to find little difficulty in passing through its area without revealing their presence. During 1916 there had been nine occasions when disturbances in the nets indicated the presence of submarines. The action then taken accounted for certainly two submarines and in all probability two more. The first was the Austrian submarine U.6, which on May 13 fouled the nets of the two drifters Calistoga and Dulcie Doris and, coming to the surface, was sunk by their gunfire; the second was a German boat, UB.44, sunk on July 30 by depth charges while still struggling in the net. Two other Austrian submarines were thought at the time to have been sunk by the depth charges dropped on July 8 and 10 over disturbances in the nets, though in neither of these cases did any part of a submarine or its crew come to the surface. Thus the net drifters of the Otranto barrage succeeded in getting rid of at least two submarines before the end of July 1916. From that time onward the enemy became more wary, and the nets caught nothing till December; even then the chase, whatever it was, got away.

 

The first three months of 1917 passed without any sign that the submarines based in the Adriatic found the Otranto net an obstacle. On April 10, however, something fouled the nets of two drifters in the centre of the Straits; yet, although five depth charges were dropped, nothing came to the surface which could support the idea that a submarine had been destroyed.

 

Just outside the Straits of Otranto was Corfu, the headquarters of the French fleet. This was to be the meeting place of the Allied admirals who were to discuss in conference the Measures to be adopted to secure a more efficient protection for shipping in the Mediterranean. By April 27 all the admirals and officers called to the conference had assembled at Corfu, and the first meeting took place next morning on board the French flagship Provence.

 

Admiral Gauchet, the French Commander‑in‑Chief, who presided, reminded those present that the Malta Conference of March 1916 had adopted the system of patrolled routes, whereas the London Conference of January 1917 had proposed a simultaneous trial of the fixed patrolled routes and of the unpatrolled dispersed routes for separate ships; the object of the present conference at Corfu was to compare the two methods and recommend a system for the future. The discussion showed a sharp divergence of opinion, French authorities inclining towards fixed routes, while the British thought more of the dispersing system. The final decision was a compromise. Where coastal routes could be used, ships were to follow them, navigating only at night and anchoring at dawn in one or other of the series of protected harbours; the coast routes and narrow channels elsewhere would be patrolled. Whenever it was necessary to cross the open sea ‑ for example, between Malta and Alexandria, vessels were to be dispersed on individual routes. Important ships were to be escorted for their whole voyage, and advantage of the escort could be taken to the extent of sending with it two additional vessels, but the protection of a convoy of more than three was considered beyond the power of a single escort. Only those craft incapable of acting as escorts were to be used for patrolling, and so little value was attached by the British to the patrolled routes that Admiral Thursby obtained assent to a proposal that troop transports should not approach the coast, but should rely for protection solely on their escorts.

 

To reduce the number of vessels traversing the Mediterranean the conference recommended that all traffic between the Atlantic and ports east of Aden should go by the Cape of Good Hope, except where military operations would be hampered by the enforcing of the longer voyage. Material and troops for Salonica and Egypt were to come by rail to Taranto and be embarked there.

 

The recommendations implied an alteration in the method of using the flotillas. This was next discussed. Admiral Mark Kerr, commanding the British Adriatic Squadron, proposed a drastic experiment. He pointed out that the three systems in force ‑ the net barrage, the escorts and the patrols ‑ were each too weak in numbers to be efficient. There were 120 net drifters at Taranto, of which seventy were at sea at a time. Each drifter covered half a mile, and therefore the maximum barrage that could be maintained was a single line of nets over thirty‑five out of the forty‑four miles of the Strait. His proposal was that for a definite time the whole of the 120 net drifters of the barrage should be withdrawn from the Straits of Otranto and distributed on the patrolled lines. At the end of that time, should the experiment be deemed a failure, the drifters could be sent

 

April 27, 1917    

THE NAVAL CONFERENCE

 

back to Otranto, reinforced with vessels from the patrols to rnake a barrage which would have more hope of efficiency. in effect, his suggestion was to try first a patrol made efficient at the expense of the barrage, and, if that failed to stem the tide of destruction, then to try a barrage made efficient at the expense of the patrolled routes. The proposal was too drastic for the conference, and a majority of the members voted against it.

 

For a month or more the French and Italian authorities had been examining the question of the erection of a fixed barrage across the Straits of Otranto. This was now brought forward for discussion, and was debated so hopefully that the actual site of the obstruction was settled, and recommendations were even passed for similar barrages off the Dardanelles, in the Gulf of Smyrna and at Gibraltar. In fact, all that was left to be done was the building; and this, as our own experience with the Folkestone‑Gris Nez boom had shown, was easier to project than to complete.

 

Offensive measures in the Adriatic had not been actively pushed, and the conference proceeded to consider what might be done. Operations by large ships had already been dismissed as impracticable while the Austrian fleet remained in harbour; but something could be attempted by other forces. Submarines, for instance, could be constantly on watch in those places where enemy boats were known to pass; off Saseno at the east end of the net line seemed a specially favourable place. It appeared that the Italians had refrained from air raids on the submarine bases and torpedo factory in expectation of the arrival of a fast seaplane carrier; as, however, the enemy bases were within striking distance of the Italian coast, the carrier was not indispensable, and the conference recommended that air raids should be carried out as frequently as possible.

 

It was obvious that unless the conference could devise some method of improvement, the situation was extremely grave, for the Italians had already announced that, owing to their peculiar dependence upon imports, unless their demands for shippig could be satisfied they must cease offensive action from March 1, and even their defensive operations would be very seriously embarrassed. Using this as a text the Italian representative urged the special need of Italy for protection on her routes for merchant traffic and, in fact, demanded the allocation of more patrol vessels to the routes to and from Italy. This was scarcely possible. By pooling the total resources of the Allies in the Mediterranean, including eight Japanese destroyers which had just arrived, and deducting the vessels necessary for blockade, sweeping, and guarding bases, it was found possible to keep at sea 112 escorts and eighty‑nine patrols. These numbers included the Italian navy. It was difficult to arrive at an accurate estimate of the number of merchant vessels in the Mediterranean; but it was considered that the figure 300 would be approximately correct. Of these 100 would be on the coastal routes and 200 on the high seas. If the vessels on the high seas sailed in convoys of three, a total of 140 escorts would be required against the 112 actually maintainable.

 

The shortage was even more apparent on the coastal routes. They were 2,030 miles long, and as it was necessary to have an armed vessel for every ten miles of route, to obtain an effective patrol, 203 boats would be required. But only eighty‑nine were available, and even these were not always employed to the best advantage, owing to the variations in command in the different zones. The conference therefore decided to recommend the creation of a central authority at Malta to have charge of all arrangements regarding routes, escorts, and patrols throughout the whole Mediterranean. With this final decision the conference concluded its work.

 

During the four days it had lasted, April 28 to May 1, the movements of eight different submarines could be traced in various parts of the Mediterranean. Between them they sank six large steamers and eight Italian sailing vessels, a total destruction of 27,000 tons of shipping. One of these submarines remained throughout the daylight hours of April 28 off Taormina, on the east coast of Sicily. She began by blowing in half the British armed steamer Karonga and taking prisoner her captain. During the rest of that day she raided the fishing fleet, sinking five of the little craft within sight of the shore. She appears to have been left unmolested by the Italian patrol service, although she was close to the important trade route focus at Messina. On the same day the British armed steamer Pontiac, on passage from Port Said to Spezzia with maize, was torpedoed without warning and sunk when half‑way between Egypt and Sicily; and the British steamer Teakwood, also armed, was torpedoed in the dusk without warning about thirty miles west of Cape Matapan. A small Italian sailing vessel was destroyed west of Corsica by U.33, which concluded with this success her three weeks' cruise in the Gulf of Lyons. In the western Mediterranean a Spanish steamer was stopped and released by Lieut.‑Commander von Arnauld who had by this date re-entered the Mediterranean after his destructive operations

 

April 29‑30, 1917

MINELAYING SUBMARINES

 

west of Gibraltar, and within sight of the houses on the northern shore of Malta an Italian sailing vessel was sunk by the gunfire of the minelaying submarine UC.37. Thus o nApril 28 there were enemy boats at work in six different districts - Taormina, south of Crete, west of Cape Matapan, west of Corsica, north of Malta and off Andalusia. Further, mines were discovered by the blowing up of a French fishing‑boat off Mostaganem, with the result that that port and Arzeu had to be closed to navigation till they could be swept.

 

The second day of the conference, April 29, was marked by rather better news. One of the Adriatic drifters dropped depth charges on a submarine entangled in the nets and claimed success. Off Marsala at the western point of Sicily one of our submarines, E.2, which had been patrolling the south coast of Sicily for three days, sighted an enemy boat engaged in inspecting an Italian sailing vessel which she had fired on and caused to be abandoned. E.2 approached within 400 yards and fired a torpedo. After wavering a little in its course it passed right under the enemy's conning‑tower, but unfortunately too deep to hit. It was some time before E.2 was again in a position to fire. Strangely enough, the enemy did not move. The reason was soon apparent; just as E.2 was about to fire her second torpedo, two naked men could be seen to swarm up the conning‑tower and disappear into the German boat; presumably they were two of the crew who had swum over to examine the Italian sailing ship. As soon as she had recovered her men the enemy dived, and E.2's second torpedo had no better luck than her first. The Q‑ship Saros was cruising in the neighbourhood of Pantellaria hoping to be accosted; but the enemy made no further appearance and returned safely to the Adriatic. Another Italian sailing vessel was sunk by the minelayer UC.37, which had reached the vicinity of Cape Bon. In the course of the night she laid a minefield off Cape Rosa, the eastern headland of the Gulf of Bona.

 

After finishing her minelaying, UC.37, early on April 30, torpedoed the French transport Colbert, which was proceeding from Marseilles to Salonica with 150 troops and 950 mules on board and was then passing fifteen miles from Cape Rosa. The transport was in convoy with another armed steamer, but was not under escort. No one on board saw anything of her assailant till the submarine broke surface half an hour after the vessel sank. The enemy was then fired on by a French trawler, and disappeared. The only other loss on this day was a Greek steamer, in the French coal trade, returning from Tunis to the Tees. She was stopped by Arnauld and attacked with gunfire. She was only two miles from the Algerian shore, and a French patrol boat was soon on the scene. She did not succeed in saving the Greek, for though Arnauld dived out of danger, he expended his last torpedo in sinking the merchant ship. A little later a French seaplane saw him come to the surface and dropped some bombs in his neighbourhood; they did him no harm, and he regained Cattaro without further incident.

 

The discovery of UC.37's mines off Cape Rosa on May 1 caused the suspension of all navigation between Algiers and Bizerta for a whole day. Several minefields were now known to exist on the French African coast. They were proving none too easy to sweep, and Admiral Ballard obtained Admiralty permission to abandon at his discretion the Algerian coast route for merchant ships bound to Gibraltar and to disperse them as before. Yet even in the open sea under escort they could not be considered safe. The British Sun, with 7,000 tons of oil on board, was on passage from Port Said to Malta and, as befitted so important a vessel, she had an escort of three trawlers, stationed one ahead and one on each beam. Unfortunately they were slow, and the speed of the escorted vessel had to be reduced to 6 1/2 knots to enable her protectors to keep up with her. Though they saw no submarine, a torpedo struck the oiler on the port quarter, and set part of her cargo on fire. A quarter of an hour later one of the escorting trawlers saw a periscope, gave chase and dropped a depth charge, with no ascertainable result. By this time all hope of saving the oiler was gone; she was fiercely ablaze aft, and her captain decided to abandon her. All her crew boarded their boats in good order, taking with them the Japanese quarter‑master, who could not be persuaded to surrender the wheel except by force. They transhipped to the trawlers and watched their vessel sink. The oil spread over the sea in a burning sheet, and her last plunge sent up a volcanic eruption of flames.

 

Some idea of the immensity of the Mediterranean and of the difficulties of protecting ships over its enormous stretches of sea may be gathered from the fact that this lurid scene was being enacted 210 miles from Malta, 660 miles from Alexandria, and 282 miles from Corfu, where the Allied Admirals were debating the methods of overcoming those difficulties. As we have seen, they had just decided to put all the arrangements for merchant ship routes and all the escort and patrol services under one supreme authority.

 

The Admiralty concurred in all the conclusions of the conference, and requested the Allied Ministries of Marine to

 

May 1917  

PROBLEMS OF COMMAND

 

put them into force at once. Although opinion in Whitehall was inclined to doubt the possibility of erecting successful fixed barrages in any of the places suggested, it was decided that technical officers should visit the proposed sites and report on the feasibility of carrying out the work, on the material required, and on the order of precedence in which the barrages should be begun.

 

As regards the appointment of an officer who should have supreme control of the direction of the routes of merchant vessels and of the escorting and patrol forces, there was some divergence of opinion. The French Commander‑in‑Chief naturally wished that the new director should be of his own nationality and under his general control in the matter of principles and the main outlines of the scheme of direction. But as the large majority of merchant ships and of patrol and escort vessels were British, the Admiralty could not consent to the appointment over them of a French officer, nor did they feel inclined to agree to the limitations of the initiative of the new officer which seemed to be implied by the insistence of the French Commander‑in‑Chief on the ultimate control of the work of the office. When, however, Admiral Gauchet urged that at times of emergency he must be in a position to dispose of the whole of the patrol force as required for operations without having to negotiate with a co‑equal authority, the Admiralty saw the reasonableness of his demand and gave way on that point. The French made a corresponding concession, and it was agreed that a British Vice‑Admiral should be appointed as Commander‑in‑Chief of the British Naval Forces in the Mediterranean and head of the organisation at Malta for the general direction of routes, which should be entrusted with initiative of every kind. But in order that there should be no doubt as to the supremacy of Admiral Gauchet in the conduct of operations, it was decreed by the Admiralty that the British Commander‑in‑Chief should fly his flag ashore.

 

Scarcely had the officers who had assembled at Corfu returned to their stations than the submarines struck down another important ship in circumstances which threw further doubt on the possibility of securing safety even when the maximum of protection was given. The large transport Transylvania, with 3,000 soldiers on board, left Marseilles for Alexandria in the evening of May 3. In accordance with the usual routine, she was accompanied by two destroyers; they were both Japanese vessels, the Matsu and Sakaki.

 

When the Japanese Government decided in February to send eight destroyers to work in the Mediterranean, they specially arranged that the boats should not be under British or French orders, and despatched with them Rear‑Admiral K. Sato, flying his flag in the light cruiser Akashi, to take command of them. Though he was not to take orders from any of the Admirals in the Mediterranean, he was instructed to work in co‑operation with the British authorities and to help in any way desirable. The most obvious need was for more escorts; and convoy work, since it seemed to offer the best chance of contact with enemy submarines, naturally commended itself to the Japanese naval officers. Since the arrival of Admiral Sato's destroyers in mid‑April they had been acting as escorts, the Transylvania being so far the most important vessel of which they had taken charge.

 

She followed the coast route south of France, and in the evening of May 3 passed the Franco‑Italian border line. About a day ahead of her was a convoy of four ships bound for Italy, under the escort of an Italian cruiser. The cruiser went in to Genoa in the afternoon of May 8 with one of the ships, leaving the others to continue their voyage unescorted. One of them, the British steamer Washington, was shortly afterwards torpedoed and sunk by an unseen submarine. This disturbing fact was presumably reported to the Transylvania, which was steaming towards the same area.

 

The transport was zigzagging at 14 knots, and was about forty miles from the position of the loss of the Washington, when she also was struck by a torpedo, which holed her in the port engine‑room. She was immediately headed for the land, little more than two miles distant. One of the Japanese destroyers, the Matsu, went alongside to take off the people on board, while the other circled round to look for the submarine. Twenty minutes later a torpedo was observed approaching the Matsu. She backed at full speed, and the torpedo struck the Transylvania, which now began to sink. In less than an hour she was gone. Of her passengers and crew all but 270 were saved by her own boats, the Japanese destroyers, and Italian patrol vessels which arrived on the scene as she sank.

 

Before leaving the neighbourhood of Genoa this submarine torpedoed three more vessels, all British and all armed. Luckily they were all close inshore, and managed to beach themselves. She appears to have gone south on the 8th. Her raid had the effect of stopping all departures from Genoa for several days. Among the vessels held up there was a transport with Australian troops.

 

March‑May 1917

THE OTRANTO BARRAGE

 

 

2

Attack on the Otranto barrage. Action in the Adriatic

 

One of the points discussed at the Corfu Conference had been the possibility of further Allied operations in the Adriatic, and it had been decided that little more could be done until the Austrians showed more activity with their surface ships. This, as it happened, was what the enemy were actually contemplating, and a fortnight later the barrage and the Italian communications across the Straits of Otranto had to endure the first serious attack of the war.

 

The drifter barrage had now become a serious embarrassment to the submarines passing in and out of the Adriatic. By the end of April seven submarines had reported themselves incommoded by either the motor launches, the drifters or the aircraft acting in connection with it. Already four small attempts to damage it had been made: on March 11 four Austrian destroyers came out to explore it, but were seen only by a French submarine on watch; a reconnaissance on April 21 ended in the sinking of an Italian steamer outside Valona Bay; and two other destroyer cruises were made on April 25 and May 5, but failed to find any craft to attack. At last the inconvenience to the submarines decided the Austrian Commander‑in‑Chief, Admiral Njegovan, to make an expedition in greater force, and deliver a double attack, on the drifter line and on the Italian transports which were now passing every night between Italy and Valona.

 

As both the proposed objectives lay to the south of Brindisi, the forces employed would run the obvious risk of being cut off from Cattaro by an Anglo‑ltalian counter‑attack. The Austrian admiral therefore took every precaution that could ensure their return. On May 14 he sent out three submarines ‑ U.4 to lie off Valona, UC 25 to mine the exits from Brindisi, and U.27 to cruise on the line between Brindisi and Cattaro. These were to strike at any forces which might be drawn out from Brindisi by the main attack. The raid on the drifter line was to be made by the three cruisers Novara, Saida, and Helgoland (3444 tons, 9‑3.9" guns, 27 knots.) under the command of Captain Horthy of the Novara, and that on the transports near Valona by the destroyers Czepel and Balaton. The two attacks were to be approximately simultaneous. Afterwards, the raiding forces were to return to Cattaro, the destroyers leading by about twenty miles. By this time it would be light, and aircraft from Durazzo and Cattaro, were to scout for and attack any forces coming out from Brindisi.

 

By the ordinary routine in force, the drifters had no protection, and the only regular patrols were carried out by submarines. On the night of May 14 there were two of them on watch‑the Italian F.10, south of Cattaro, and the French Bernouilli, north of Durazzo. Admiral Alfredo Acton, the Italian Commander‑in‑Chief, knew or guessed that a move by the Austrians was imminent, but he does not appear to have been sure of their objective. He had therefore to make such dispositions as would cover the unprotected coastline and its exposed railway near Brindisi, and would also meet a blow aimed at Valona or at the barrage. To do this, so far as it could be done, he sent out at 9.0 p.m. on May 14 a group of four French destroyers, the Commandant Riviere, the Bisson, the Cimeterre, and the Boutefeu, under the command of Captain Vicuna in the Italian flotilla‑leader the Mirabello. Their orders were to steam south‑east at about ten miles from the coast, and to cross the Straits at midnight; when eight miles to west‑south‑west of Cape Linguetta they were to turn north and make for Cape Rodoni, which they should reach at about half‑past four; then to come south again and reach a point on the latitude of Valona at about seven in the morning. This position proved, in the event, to be ten miles to the north‑east of the actual rendezvous for the Austrian light cruisers, so that the Admiral's dispositions were successful in ensuring that contact should be made with the enemy early in the morning, and that the bulk of his own forces should be placed between the enemy and their base by daylight.

 

As he could not hope for anything like a decisive action in any other conditions, he felt bound to make this the cardinal point of his policy. The other alternative open to him, that of keeping the Mirabello's division patrolling the drifter line all night, would not have afforded an adequate protection, and would have left open the Austrian line of retreat after their cruisers had struck their blow. It would also have made Admiral Acton dependent upon the scanty and confused reports of a night action when he moved out from Brindisi to cut off the enemy. Whether by chance, or as a result of accurate intelligence, the Austrian Admiral's plan for an attack on the Valona supply ships was equally well designed. A convoy of three Italian steamships escorted by the Italian destroyer Borea had left Gallipoli at ten o'clock in the forenoon of the 14th, and was under orders to be at the entrance to the Valona swept channel at a quarter‑past seven on the following

 

May 15, 1917

THE CONVOY ATTACKED

 

morning. The strait was to be crossed by the usual transport route which made the Albanian coast at Strade Bianche, a conspicuous white patch on the mountains about twenty miles south of the entrance into Valona Bay.

 

The convoy, in line ahead, with the Borea leading, reached this point by 3 a.m. on May 15. (See Map 10.) It was a calm night with scarcely a ripple on the water. As they turned to a north-north‑westerly course the moon, which had just risen above the mountains, was on the convoy's starboard quarter. It was still very dark and shadowy under the land, when suddenly Commander Franceschi in the Borea became aware that there was a considerable volume of smoke on his starboard bow, moving past him at high speed. In reply to his challenge the two enemy destroyers, Czepel and Balaton, switched on searchlights and opened fire. Commander Franceschi swung his ship round to starboard to get between the Austrians and his convoy, but the enemy's first round had severed the Borea's main steam‑pipe, and she could not complete the turn. In a very short time she was disabled and sinking. Of the transports, one carrying munitions caught fire and blew up, another was soon blazing fiercely, and the third had been hit. For some reason the Austrians did not sink her, but steamed away northward. (The fire on the second transport was extinguished, and she was towed in; the third reached Valona under her own power.)

 

By this time the three Austrian cruisers had found and passed through the line of net drifters. Admiral Acton, if indeed he had suspected any immediate raid by the enemy in this direction, had given no warning to the officer in command of the barrage, and the drifters, in consequence, took the Austrian cruisers to be friendly ships. The nets at the moment were being managed by seven groups of drifters, each group averaging seven vessels, the groups evenly spaced between Fano Island and Santa Maria di Leuca. It was not till the sound of the attack on the Italian convoy was heard by the easternmost group that they had any suspicion that the enemy were out. Even then they stubbornly determined to keep their stations and continued to shoot their nets for two hours after the sounds of gunfire had ceased. Then they had their own danger to face. The three cruisers had turned and now began a systematic destruction of the barrage. Each took a third part of the line, and steaming slowly along it called on the crews of the drifters to abandon their ships. In some cases the men, feeling their position to be hopeless, obeyed the order and were taken as prisoners on board the Austrian cruisers, which then sank the empty drifters by gunfire. But others, in spite of the heavy odds, would not give in so tamely.

 

Skipper Joseph Watt of the Gowan Lea had been in action before, on December 22, when his little craft was riddled by an Austrian destroyer. When now the cruiser, which was attacking the western section, loomed up at 100 yards distance and ordered him to surrender, he called on his men to give three cheers and fight to a finish. Putting on full speed, the tiny Gowan Lea charged for the enemy, firing her one small gun (57 mm. (2 1/2 in.)) till a shell disabled it, and her only chance of offence or defence was gone. The gun's crew, continuously under heavy fire, still tried to make it work even after a box of ammunition had exploded and smashed the leg of one of the crew. It never seems to have occurred to Skipper Watt or his men that they should surrender; they applied themselves to the task of getting their gun into action; and when the cruiser passed on, thinking probably that the vessel's crew could not have survived such a fire as she had poured upon them, they were still at work on the dislocated breech‑block.

 

The drifter next to the Gowan Lea was called the Admirable: A shell exploded her boiler and her crew jumped overboard. But one man, seeing her still afloat, scrambled back on board and ran towards the gun. It was clearly his intention to fight the Austrian cruiser single‑handed; but a shell from her struck him dead before he could fire a round. At the other end of the line were similar scenes of gallantry.

 

The Floandi was a group leader, and bound to set a bold example. To the heavy fire of the Novara, Skipper D. J. Nicholls replied with his six‑pounder gun; a wound, a second wound, even a third could not move him from his place of command. His enginemen were as resolute as he; one of them was killed at his post and the other wounded. At last the cruiser moved on, leaving the little Floandi maimed but undefeated. These encounters recall the immortal fight of "the one and the fifty‑three"; but even the odds against Sir Richard Grenville can scarcely have reached such a height as in the action between the Austrian cruiser and Skipper Watt of the Gowan Lea. (Skipper Watt was awarded the V.C.) When the cruisers had finished their work and steamed away northward, of the forty‑seven drifters, fourteen had been sunk; three others, seriously damaged, were still afloat on the calm moonlit sea.

 

The two groups of drifters in the middle of the line suffered little. The cruiser detailed for this central section

 

May 15, 1917

ADMIRAL ACTON SAILS

 

was slow in arriving, and the group commanders, alarmed by the firing to east and west of them, had ordered their drifters to slip nets and scatter. The only vessel caught by the cruiser was one which had steamed off eastward instead of north‑westerly like her consorts. Though the group leaders whose boats carried wireless apparatus sent out warning signals, no one at Brindisi took them in, and Admiral Acton's first news of either part of the double attack came from the lookouts on Saseno Island at the mouth of Valona Bay, who, hearing firing, guessed that the convoy expected at dawn was in danger. Their report reached Brindisi at 3.50 a.m. Italian time, (One hour fast on G.M.T.) and, being in Italian code, was not understood by the British and French officers there. But Admiral Acton, before an hour passed, had ordered the Mirabello to steer southward, as there were enemy ships in Otranto Strait. ("0435. Units nemiche in canals Otranto dirigete per sud.") The Mirabello and her detachment were then north of Durazzo. They turned due south and steamed past Durazzo Bay at about twenty miles distance from the land. There were now only three French destroyers with the Mirabello, since one, the Boutefeu, had been compelled by condenser trouble to return.

    

Of the Brindisi squadron under Admiral Acton the Bristol and four Italian destroyers were at half an hour's notice for sea, and the Dartmouth was to come to the same state of readiness at 5.30. The third British light cruiser, Liverpool, was at six hours' notice, and her engineers were at work on her boilers. The state of the Italian vessels is not known. Admiral Acton embarked with his staff in the Dartmouth, and ordered the readier part of his squadron to sea as soon as possible. The Bristol with the Italian destroyers Mosto and Pilo was first away; she left harbour shortly after five o'clock, the Italian admiral following some twenty minutes later in the Dartmouth, with the Italian destroyers Schiaffino and Giovanni Acerbi. He had ordered his light cruiser Marsala, the two destroyer leaders Aquila and Racchia and the destroyer Insidioso to join him as soon as they were ready. The Aquila left soon after the Admiral sailed. It was now some three hours since the transports had been attacked, but as Brindisi is forty miles nearer to Cattaro than either the drifter line or the spot where the transport had sunk, there was some chance of his being able to bring the enemy to action. By a quarter to seven the Brindisi detachment was concentrated and was steaming to the north eastwards at 24 knots on a roughly formed line abreast. During the concentration Admiral Acton received a message from Captain Vicuna in the Mirabello to say that he was in contact with three ships of the Spaun type.

 

The position at seven o'clock was thus a rather curious one. The Brindisi force under Admiral Acton was on a north‑easterly course between Brindisi and Cape Rodoni; twenty‑five miles to the south‑eastward of him were the Czepel and the Balaton, of whose presence he was still ignorant; and forty‑six miles to the south‑south‑castward were the three Austrian light cruisers with the Mirabello's detachment on their heels. The enemy forces nearest to him were, therefore, those of which he knew least at the moment.

 

Captain Horthy was also still ignorant of the position. His destroyers, having turned south to close him at a quarter-past six, had not seen anything of the Brindisi forces under Admiral Acton; and, though the aeroplanes from Cattaro were rapidly getting a picture of the situation, they had not yet got a signal through to him. So far as he knew, therefore, the Mirabello's detachment was the only Allied force with which he would have to deal. He opened fire on them at ten minutes past seven; but the action never became close, as the Mirabello's captain made a complete circle a few moments later to avoid a submarine. (Probably U.4, which had been watching Valona.) Shortly after half‑past seven Captain Horthy received messages from the Czepel, the Balaton and the Cattaro aeroplanes that there was a force of seven light cruisers and destroyers to the north of him.

 

The two destroyers had at last come into touch with the Brindisi force. It was not, however, till twenty minutes later that Admiral Acton attempted to attack the two Austrians. The Italian destroyers, led by the Aquila, then closed in and opened fire when they were at a range of 12,500 yards.

    

In the action which followed, the Austrians were helped by two aeroplanes from Cattaro, which managed to report the fall of their shot. At half‑past eight the Czepel hit one of the Aquila's boilers and brought her to a standstill. Having inflicted this damage on the Italians and suffered little themselves, the two Austrian destroyers made good their escape into shelter behind the batteries of Durazzo. Admiral Acton did not know that the Austrian destroyers he had just engaged were leading the Novara group of cruisers; the Mirabello, he knew, was in touch with these, and from her signals he thought they would be found to northward of him.

 

The Mirabello's positions as signalled, however, were wrong; the Austrian cruisers were astern of him, and were, in fact, rapidly closing the immobilised Aquila, which he had left

 

May 15, 1917

THE AUSTRIANS SUFFER

 

behind. At nine o'clock the Bristol reported smoke astern, and soon the three cruisers could be made out. Admiral Acton turned at once. By 9.30 he was within range and was covering the Aquila, which also joined in the firing. Captain Horthy had thus two British light cruisers and some Italian destroyers ahead of him, and the Mirabello and three French destroyers following him astern. Seven or eight Austrian aeroplanes were overhead menacing the British ships. One, indeed, dropped two bombs close to the Dartmouth. Italian aeroplanes from Brindisi attacked them obstinately, but appeared to get the worst of the air combat.

 

On the sea the action went against the Austrians. The opening range was about 12,000 yards, and in the first few minutes one of the Dartmouth's six‑inch shells hit the Novara near the fore‑bridge, and killed Commander Szuboritz, the second in command. Captain Horthy, who had formed his cruisers in line ahead and taken the head of the line, at once ordered smoke screens to be sent up, and boldly closed the range in order to use his 3.9‑inch guns with better effect. In this he was partially successful; for the Dartmouth, which was hit three times in all, suffered a certain amount of damage In the first part of the action. Also, the Bristol, whose bottom was very foul, began to drop behind, and the three Austrian cruisers concentrated their fire upon Admiral Acton's flagship. Captain Horthy was, indeed, very near scoring a success; but just as he was getting the Dartmouth's range, he seems to have feared that the French destroyers to the south of him were likely to be dangerous; so he turned back to his north‑westerly course and opened the range again. He need have feared nothing from the division with the Mirabello. She herself had just discovered that water was leaking into her oil tanks, and had been obliged to stop. Almost simultaneously condenser trouble brought another of the French destroyers to a standstill. The remaining two French destroyers stayed behind to guard their consorts against submarine attack; so that the Mirabello's division was out of the reckoning. Admiral Acton felt obliged to leave two of his destroyers with the Aquila; and thus the Dartmouth was left with only two Italian destroyers to continue the action, the Bristol some way astern doing her best to keep up.

 

It was now ten o'clock. Reinforcements were coming out from both Brindisi and Cattaro. At the beginning of the action Captain Horthy had signalled for help, and in less than an hour a heavy cruiser and five torpedo craft were on their way to join him. The Marsala, a flotilla leader and two Italian destroyers had left Brindisi at half‑past eight. They had first steamed towards Valona, but were now steering northward to join Admiral Acton. Further, the French Commander‑in‑Chief at Corfu, though he had received from Brindisi no direct information of the Austrian raid, guessed from intercepted messages that an action was in progress, and sent three French destroyers to assist. These were now north of Valona Bay.

 

During the next quarter of an hour the firing increased in intensity, and at ten minutes past ten Captain Horthy was struck by a splinter; he tried for a few minutes to keep command, but fainted, and Lieutenant Witkorocski took charge. At a quarter‑past ten the Bristol checked her fire, as she had by then fallen some way behind; and for some twenty minutes the Dartmouth continued the engagement alone. When the Bristol began firing again, she was between 14,000 and 12,000 yards from the last ship in the enemy's line, so that throughout the fighting the brunt of it fell upon the Dartmouth.

 

The action seems to have been at its height between half-past ten and eleven o'clock. It was then that Admiral Acton opened out the range and slowed down in order to allow the Bristol to close; and it was then, also, that a shot from the Dartmouth damaged the Novara's engines. Just before eleven the Austrian's speed was rapidly falling off; but Admiral Acton was no longer in a position to press his advantage: in spite of the damage to the Novara the Austrians had drawn ahead, and whilst the Dartmouth had slowed down for the Bristol they had increased their lead. There was, of course, nothing to tell him that the Novara was in serious and increasing difficulties, and he decided that he would gain nothing by continuing a running fight towards Cattaro in which the Austrians had the heels of him. The Saida had trailed behind the other two cruisers and was some way astern; the Marsala's division was to the southward. Admiral Acton therefore turned sharply to port just before eleven o'clock, hoping to cut off the straggler and force her down upon the Marsala and her consorts. He was too far off to succeed in this, but the Dartmouth and Bristol crossed under the Saida's stern at a fairly close range and straddled her. The manoeuvre seemed promising, in that the Saida sent out a distress signal as the two cruisers closed on her; but it does not appear that she was badly hit during the last outburst of rapid fire. Austrian aircraft at this time made a strong attack on the two British cruisers, dropping bombs and sweeping their decks with maxims. No damage was done either by bullets or bombs.

 

May 15, 1917

DARTMOUTH TORPEDOED

 

As Admiral Acton turned to the south‑west he sighted smoke to the northward, and realised that reinforcements had come out of Cattaro and were approaching. He therefore continued southward to close the Marsala's division, and joined up with them at about half‑past eleven. Then turning northward again he followed the Novara.

 

In the meanwhile things had not gone well with the Austrians. The shot from the Dartmouth which had done most damage had put one of the Novara's main feed pumps out of action, and perforated the auxiliary steam‑pipe to the starboard turbine. Some time after eleven she stopped altogether, and Lieutenant Witkorocski had to signal to the Saida to close and take her in tow.

 

This was observed from the British ships. But the heavy cruiser from Cattaro was also in sight, and not wishing to attack a force which included such a formidable vessel, Admiral Acton at noon turned towards Brindisi. To the south of him was the Aquila in tow by the Schiaffino, with the Mosto escorting them. The Mirabello had joined up with one of the Corfu destroyers, and was towing the French destroyer which had broken down. These detachments reached Brindisi without any further accidents; but the cruisers still had to suffer the most serious blow of the day.

 

They were in line abreast with destroyers ahead and on the flanks. Shortly before two o'clock, while still forty miles from Brindisi, the Dartmouth was hit on the port side by a torpedo fired by a submarine, and for a time seemed about to sink. Two of the Corfu destroyers hunted the submarine and kept her down while the other two cruisers steamed on at full speed for Brindisi. The torpedo had come from UC.25. She had seen nothing of the various forces which had come out of Brindisi that day, but found herself by chance on the track of the returning cruisers and made a lucky shot. For a time the water gained in the Dartmouth, and Captain Addison, after putting the crew into the Italian and French destroyers, returned on board with a special party of officers and men, who succeeded in partially righting the ship and re‑raising steam. A tug arrived late in the evening, and the Dartmouth and her escort got into Brindisi at three on the following morning. Even this did not end the list of successes which the Austrians could count to their score: during the afternoon the destroyer Boutefeu, which had been ordered out to assist the Dartmouth, struck one of the mines laid off the harbour by UC.25 and sank rapidly.

 

The raid on the Otranto barrage demonstrated with painful emphasis the defencelessness of the drifters against a night attack from the north. Yet it seemed hardly likely that the raid would be repeated except at night; the light hours could be reckoned as fairly safe; and the drifters continued to maintain the barrage, though until some sort of protection could be arranged for them they were ordered to operate only in the daytime. Not until July were the Italians able to provide any man‑of‑war cover: throughout June the barrage drifters returned at dusk to port either at the east or west ends of the net line.

 

(Note: Newbolt heads one of the pages "The Austrians Suffer", but in the series of actions:

 

Italian destroyer Borea was sunk, one transport blew up, two damaged,

14 British drifters sunk, 3 seriously damaged,

Italian destroyer Aquila damaged.

British cruiser Dartmouth damaged, then torpedoed,

French destroyer Boutefeu mined and sunk.

 

against

 

Austrian cruisers Novara and Saida damaged)

 

 

3

Submarine Warfare, May to August 1917

 

The other attempt to obstruct the emergence of submarines from the Adriatic ‑ the Allied submarine patrol off Cattaro and in other likely places ‑ which had been maintained by the force of Allied submarines based on Brindisi, at last bore fruit. The first success fell to the French submarine, Circe, watching outside Cattaro on May 24. She observed a submarine on passage outwards, escorted by destroyers and aircraft. Being in a good position for firing she sank it by two torpedoes, and managed to escape unseen. The boat she had destroyed proved to be UC.24. This success caused an intensification of the enemy precautions and rendered remote the chance of repeating the stroke. In fact ‑ perhaps in consequence of the raising of the net barrage every night - submarine activity showed some slight increase in June; even so it was possible to doubt whether the nets, when in place, were any real obstacle to the passage of U‑boats. Twenty‑four separate cruises of submarines can be traced in that month; five of them began in May, and seven, commencing late in June, continued into July. Though the number of vessels destroyed, ninety‑four in all, was the same as that for April, less than half were steamers, and the mercantile tonnage sinkings decreased from 218,000 in April, the worst month, to 133,000 in June:

 

Mercantile tonnage destroyed by submarines in the Mediterranean.

 

1917.

No. of Steamers.

No. of Sailing Vessels.

Total Tonnage.

Percentage of World Total.

Jan.

12

2

58,800

22

Feb.

27

21

100,000

21

Mar.

17

18

54,000

11

Apr.

51

43

218,000

26

May

38

43

146,700

26

June

41

53

133,700

21

 

June 4, 1917  

UNBREAKABLE COURAGE

 

Among the innumerable examples of heroism shown by the men of the merchant service the action of the Manchester Trader falls to be recorded here. She was an Admiralty collier on her way home after being cleared at Mudros, and was a few miles from Pantellaria early on June 4 when a submarine began to fire on her from a range of about five miles. The master, Captain F. D. Struss, sent out wireless calls for assistance, and replied to the fire with his own gun, not so much with the idea of hitting his assailant, for he was outranged, but to make the submarine keep its distance. Nevertheless, the German made several hits on the Manchester Trader, till Captain Struss conceived the idea of swerving every time he saw the flash of the enemy's gun. He then found, as he afterwards wrote to his owners, that he "need take on board only one out of three or four shells, the others either just striking sliding blows on her sides or missing altogether."

 

After two and a half hours of this duel he found that he had only seven shells left. One of these was loaded into the gun, and he was waiting for a good chance to fire, when a shot from the submarine burst so close to the gun that it caused the precious shell to explode, killed the leading gunner, and put the gun out of action. The enemy soon discovered that the Manchester Trader was defenceless, and quickly overhauled her, firing rapidly as she approached. All the crew, mostly aliens, were under cover; the only people exposed to this shelling were Captain Struss and an apprentice named Sutcliffe, a lad of seventeen years old, who was at the wheel when the action commenced and remained there throughout the four and a half hours of its duration. At length Captain Struss admitted the hopelessness of his position and abandoned his battered ship. Knowing that submarines made prisoners of the masters of vessels which offered resistance, he had changed into a suit of dungarees. He thus escaped recognition; and further, when the submarine commander came up and asked for the master, the crew all shouted that he had been killed. The answer was so extremely probable that it satisfied the German. He took away instead the second mate, who by silently accepting captivity showed a fine loyalty to his skipper. The submarine then began again to shell the abandoned steamer.

 

At this point help arrived. A trawler, forty miles away when she received the S.O.S. call from the Manchester Trader, reached her while the submarine was still firing. After a few shots from the trawler the enemy drew off at fast speed and eventually disappeared. In spite of what the crew had endured only one man, the gunner, had been killed. Among the awards which so gallant a fight deserved, Sutcliffe, the lad at the wheel, received the medal for Distinguished Service.

 

The most destructive cruise of any submarine in June was one by Lieut.-Commander von Arnauld in U.35. As before, he chose the western approach to the Straits of Gibraltar, where he had had such success in April. Since his return the area had been visited only by UC.73 coming out from Germany for the Adriatic. She spent the last half of May outside Gibraltar, but did not succeed in rivalling Lieut.‑Commander von Arnauld's previous cruise, partly because west‑bound shipping was twice held up for periods of several days. A French submarine watching near Cape St Vincent saw UC.73 and discharged two torpedoes; but the circumstances were not entirely favourable, and the German boat was not hit. She entered the Mediterranean at the end of May, and reached Cattaro after a six‑weeks' voyage.

 

Lieut.‑Commander von Arnauld passed westward through the Straits a week later. The first notice of his presence on this former cruising ground of his was received at Gibraltar on June 9 from the Tregarthen, which escaped after attack about ninety miles west of Cape Spartel. As soon as this news reached the Admiralty they ordered all west‑bound vessels at Gibraltar to be held up. It soon appeared that the Tregarthen was not the first vessel attacked: early on the 8th Arnauld had sunk a British Vessel, which, though armed, was unable to contend with the submarine's gun, and being without wireless apparatus, could not send out warning signals or calls for assistance. However, the sound of the firing was heard at Cape Spartel, and three sloops and a torpedo boat from Gibraltar went out to investigate. They found much wreckage. Two French submarines accompanied by British trawlers cruised off Cape St Vincent, and armed yachts, torpedo boats, and motor launches patrolled as far to the westward as they could get. These patrols, combined with the warnings sent out to shipping by wireless from Gibraltar and with the fact that all vessels of any size were now defensively armed, may have tended to reduce Arnauld's chances of fruitful attack. His operations in the Mediterranean approach lasted a little more than a fortnight. He sank eleven ships, totalling nearly 31,000 tons; eight armed vessels kept him at a distance till he either broke off the engagement of his own accord or departed on the arrival of a patrol; three others, torpedoed without warning, made their way into port.

 

The Admiralty's instructions that west bound shipping

 

June, 1917 

HOSPITAL SHIPS IN DANGER

 

was to be held up at Gibraltar soon produced congestion. By the evening of June 14 there were forty‑two ships awaiting permission to sail westward, and although there were then only two sloops available to patrol to westward, the traffic had to be released with instructions to reach Cape Spartel at or soon after dusk and follow the African coast as far as the parallel of 35û. On the 16th fifteen ships sailed. Only one was attacked. A torpedo passed along her side without exploding. Looking in the direction from which it had come she saw the submarine breaking surface. She fired three rounds at it and thought she hit it; the submarine did not reply, but dived rapidly and made off.

 

While Lieut.‑Commander von Arnauld's cruise was in progress, the German submarine UC.52, on passage from Germany, put into Cadiz for repairs. Since the damage to her was in the nature of machinery breakdown due to the action of the weather, the Spanish authorities permitted it to be put right on condition that the submarine when she left should refrain from attacking any vessel during her voyage to the Adriatic. The progress of the repair was carefully watched by our agents at Cadiz, and when on the 27th they reported that she was ready to sail, our own submarine E.38 went out and lay off the port to catch her. The U‑boat slipped out two nights later when it was very dark and managed to get past E.38 without being sighted. A sweep by four torpedo boats and four motor launches from Gibraltar also failed to locate her, and she reached the Adriatic safely, having carefully refrained from attacking any merchant ships. After this episode, the Spanish Government announced that any submarine taking refuge in Spanish ports would be interned.

 

At the end of March the Germans had announced their intention to sink hospital ships in the Mediterranean, alleging as their reason for this callous breach of international law that the vessels were being used for the transport of troops and ammunition. The allegation was totally unfounded, but it seemed possible that the threat might be carried out, and the hospital ships were held in harbour till some arrangements for their protection could be made. Four British destroyers had just been allocated to work on the Otranto barrage under Admiral Kerr; they were now kept back to act as escorts for the threatened vessels. By April 15, after the hospital ships had been kept in harbour for a week, they were allowed to resume sailings, each to have an escort of two destroyers when carrying sick and wounded. They were to zigzag and to be darkened at night; in fact, they were to take the same precautions as if they were troop‑ships. Further, they were to take precedence over troop‑ships as regards the supply of escorts, the consequent delay in the movement of troops being accepted as necessary. From that time onwards hospital ships surrendered their immunity from attack.

 

There was no long delay: on May 26 at 7 p.m. the two hospital ships, Dover Castle and Karapara, both clearly painted as such, were steaming in company eastward along the Algerian coast under the escort of the destroyers Cameleon and Nemesis, two of those intended for the Otranto barrage, but allocated, after the German announcement, to the defence of hospital ships. Suddenly there was an explosion; the Dover Castle had been torpedoed by an unseen submarine. She immediately manned and lowered all her boats, and by 8 p.m. all the patients were clear of the ship. The Karapara had been ordered to proceed into Bona, the nearest port, her attendant destroyer putting up a smoke screen which effectively hid the hospital ship from view. Both arrived safely at Bona. Meanwhile the Cameleon picked up the patients from the Dover Castle's boats, went alongside to take on board the remainder, and departed also for Bona, her commander considering the safety of the 950 lives on board his destroyer more important than the possible saving of a damaged ship. There still remained in the Dover Castle her captain and a volunteer party preparing her for being towed if that should prove feasible. Before the Cameleon passed completely out of their sight another torpedo hit the Dover Castle; this one was fatal, and she sank in 2 1/2 minutes. The party boarded a boat, and were picked up six hours later by a French patrol. Owing to the calm and clear weather, and to the perfect discipline which had prevailed throughout, the loss of life was small: out of the 841 on board the hospital ship, patients and crew, only six stokers were killed or drowned, probably at the time of the explosions.

 

There were now so many vessels being torpedoed while under what had been thought was a strong escort that the actual disposition of the destroyers in this instance was specially investigated. The practice adopted by the senior of the two escorting officers was to station a destroyer on each side abaft the beam of the convoy. This arrangement was the result of careful thought and of discussion with other patrol officers. It was generally recognised that a submarine's best chance of hitting a ship was to fire from a position off her bow; and to frustrate this method of attack it had been usual to place the escort ahead of the beam. But it was now known that the transport Transylvania and other ships had been torpedoed by submarines firing from

 

May‑June, 1917 

ESCORT PROBLEMS

 

astern of the escort; and as in such cases the destroyers had to turn before they could get into position for dropping depth charges, the result was that the submarine escaped. The new idea was that, if the escorting destroyers were stationed abaft the beam, an attacking submarine would be ahead of them, and therefore liable to instant attack when sighted. Unfortunately, on this occasion, the enemy was not sighted, and the destroyers had no chance to attack. The Admiralty disapproved the innovation; they considered it was framed to utilise the convoy as a decoy rather than to prevent the submarine from firing from her most favourable position. After this, therefore, the former practice was restored, and escorts were always stationed on the bows of their convoys.

 

The necessity for escorting hospital ships continued for several months in spite of negotiations with the German Government to secure their safety. In June the Berlin Admiralty staff agreed to refrain from attack on hospital ships provided they were under the constant supervision of neutral commissioners who would remain permanently on board; only those ships which carried such commissioners were to wear the Red Cross or special markings, and none of them was to be escorted by armed vessels; a special route was not obligatory. Here the King of Spain lent his assistance, and Spanish officers were appointed to embark as commissioners. Some months elapsed before the new arrangement was in working order; but by undertaking to guarantee to the satisfaction of the German Admiralty the employment of hospital ships for no other purpose than the conveyance of sick and wounded, the Spanish Government ended a particularly revolting phase of submarine war as conducted by Germany, and rendered a memorable service to humanity.

 

The submarine which had sunk the Dover Castle appears to have been a UC‑boat. Coming out of the Adriatic about May 23, she torpedoed and sank the British steamer Elmmoor close to the south point of Sicily, and then, proceeding along the French African coast, where she sank the Dover Castle, mined Algiers about the 27th. The minefield, though it hindered navigation, caused no losses. The submarine continued her cruise until about June 9, and it was most probably this boat which fought the gallant Manchester Trader.

 

The losses in June included two transports, the Cameronian and the Cestrian. Each was accompanied by a pair of escorting ships, and each was torpedoed by an unseen submarine. The Cameronian was on passage to Egypt with mules, and when still some fifty miles short of Alexandria was sunk in the dark hours before dawn on June 2. The soldiers on board her were only those in charge of the mules. She sank five minutes after being struck, but the loss of life would have been small if the explosion had not instantly flooded a deck on which were forty men sleeping in hammocks. The loss in the Cestrian was fortunately lighter still. She was in the Aegean, carrying horses, but had on board also more than 800 soldiers. She was torpedoed at 9.30 a.m. on the 24th, but did not sink till 2 p.m. Perfect discipline was maintained, and the loss of life was confined to three members of the crew killed by the explosion of the torpedo. The torpedoing of the Cestrian was one of the rare successes of the Constantinople submarines, which since the declaration of unrestricted warfare had been operating intermittently in the Aegean. It was the work of UB.42, then commanded by Lieutenant Schwartz. This boat had been out in February and again early in April, and had sunk a few sailing vessels. On her second cruise she had also torpedoed the sloop Veronica not far from Alexandria and had put her out of action for some months. The other Constantinople boat operating in the Aegean was the submarine minelayer UC.23, which in May and June mined the approaches to Salonica, and also on her second cruise had the fortune to sink two steamers (Der Krieg zur See. Die Mittelmeer Division. Kap 25.); but UB.42's destruction of the Cestrian was so far the greatest achievement of the Constantinople flotilla. The loss caused us a good deal of anxiety, for she was taking part in a considerable transference of British troops from Salonica to Egypt.

 

Possibly as a result of the Allied blockade of the mainland of Greece, which had begun in December 1916, (See ante, p. 171.) anti-Royalist feeling had by this time begun to make progress. The islands, one by one, declared for the Provisional Government conducted by M. Venizelos under the aegis of France, and trade from them was permitted to non‑blockaded ports. At Crete, the headquarters of the Provisional Government, a Venizelist army was drilling. Its preparations had so far advanced that from May 17 onwards a division was transferred to Salonica to relieve British troops. These Greek troops were carried in Greek vessels, each being given an escort of two ships provided from the British First Detached Squadron, which was based on Candia and was responsible for all escorts in the Aegean. There were only enough escorts available for two transports a day, but at the actual rate of embarkation this number proved sufficient

 

June, 1917 

PRESSURE ON GREECE

 

to enable the movement of Greek troops to proceed smoothly. Mines were reported off Candia on the 22nd; but a channel was swept in time for the transports to proceed in accordance with their programme. The British troops moved from Salonica to Egypt consisted of the Sixtieth Division and the Seventh and Eighth Mounted Brigades ‑ in all some 21,000 officers and men and 8,500 animals. These were conveyed in sixteen voyages, each transport having an escort of two destroyers and returning for another load as soon as it had disembarked at Alexandria the troops and animals that had come on board at Salonica. The voyage took from three to four days. The move began on June 1, and continued throughout the month, coming to an end on June 30, when the headquarters Staff left Salonica for Alexandria. Throughout the sixteen voyages, the only transport to meet a submarine was the Cestrian, torpedoed and sunk on June 24. It was her third voyage during the move, and she had already safely transported 1,600 men of the Sixtieth Division.

 

The fear of mines at Salonica, aroused by the report that a submarine had been sighted near the harbour, caused all sailings to be suspended from June 7 to 9. When they were resumed, a fresh movement of French troops threw an additional burden on the transport and escort services; the move of the Sixtieth Division went on, but until the French troops had all been despatched to their new destination the Venizelists in Crete were held up for lack of escort. This French force had been ordered to the mainland of Greece to ensure a favourable termination of the political crisis which was rapidly approaching in that country. On June 5 a French plenipotentiary, Monsieur Jonnart, arrived at Athens, with instructions to assume the direction of Allied affairs and policy in Greece. He was also to intimate to King Constantine the desire of the Allies that he should abdicate until the war was over. This demand was to be backed up by a show of force sufficient to overawe any resistance that the Royalist party might wish to offer; and it was for this purpose that French troops were now being moved from Salonica to the Piraeus. A French naval squadron arrived there on the 5th, and in the evening of the 10th a number of transports came in to the Piraeus. During the forenoon of June 12 the troops in them, about 8,000 French and 3,000 Russians, landed, nominally for purposes of health; but they disembarked under the guns of the French squadron, which included the battleships Justice and Verite, the latter flying the flag of Vice‑Admiral de Gueydon.

 

That morning, June 12, King Constantine abdicated in favour of his second son, Prince Alexander. All was quiet in Athens, and Admiral Hayes‑Sadler, who, in the Implacable was watching events, reported that this was "due chiefly to the powerful influence of the King, who proclaimed to the people that his departure was provisional only, and that as it was the only method of saving the dynasty, any attempt to prevent it would have the effect of destroying the monarchy and the nation." Two days later the blockade of Greece was raised. Its enforcement had been carried out mainly by the French, in whose zone western and southern Greece lay, and by the British Third Detached Squadron based on Salonica. Its cessation freed a certain number of small craft for other duties; and the situation rapidly cleared. Before the end of June Monsieur Venizelos became Prime Minister; on June 27 Greece definitely joined the Allies and declared war on the Central Powers. Venizelos then requested France to return the Greek fleet to Greece; he announced his intention of defensively arming Greek shipping, and asked that Greece might be responsible for the defence of one of the patrol zones. (It was not till February 25, 1918, that French opposition to this last request could be overcome. Greece was then permitted to patrol a small zone including the Piraeus.) Thus the political problem in the Mediterranean, the dubious position of Greece, was at last solved, with the Allies, represented by France, in control.

 

There remained, however, the naval problem ‑ the submarine campaign ‑ and no final solution of this was at present in sight, though a favourable change had, in fact, begun. The losses from submarine action certainly showed a marked and progressive reduction after April of this year. In that month fifty‑one steamers were sunk and the total was 218,000 tons; in July the number of steamers sunk was twenty‑two and the total tonnage 85,000. The convoy system was now in full operation in the Eastern Mediterranean for vessels other than those important enough to receive a special escort. But, as has been noted before, this special escort did not always succeed in baffling attack. For instance, the Eloby, on Admiralty charter conveying munitions and some hundreds of soldiers from Marseilles to Salonica, was torpedoed when in convoy with one other ship and under the escort of a French destroyer. The shock of the explosion set off the ammunition, and a terrible destruction of life resulted. There were several other losses in convoys of this type, among them the large P. and O. liner, Mooltan, which with another vessel was under escort by two Japanese destroyers. She had

 

July, 1917

CONVOYS ORGANISED

 

554 souls on board, but by the skilful handling of the destroyers, who promptly put up a smoke screen, all except one were saved.

 

A striking example of the impunity with which subrnarines could attack vessels presumably well protected and in patrolled areas was the fate of the Mongara, a P. and O. liner, on passage from Port Said. In the afternoon of July 3 she was approaching Messina in company with an Italian mail boat, and was escorted by an Italian destroyer ahead and an Italian armed trawler astern. Already, when off Catania, she had seen a torpedo coming for her, and had avoided it by putting her helm over. She had a line of men on the lookout all round the ship, and a particularly keen watcher in the crow's nest. When Messina breakwater came in sight the destroyer went on ahead into port, and in view of the narrowness of the strait and the necessities of navigation, the Mongara ceased zigzagging and steadied on to a course for entering harbour. She was still a mile from the breakwater when a torpedo from an unseen submarine struck her, and she sank in a few minutes. This was presumably the work of a UC‑boat, which, after mining Malta and Syracuse, had penetrated into these narrow waters. The minefield at Malta also cost us a ship. It was not laid in the swept channel maintained by the minesweepers of the port, and no damage could well have been done by it so long as ships followed the prescribed route. But, unfortunately, a hospital ship under escort of the two sloops Aster and Azalea took a wrong course right over the minefield. The hospital ship herself escaped unhurt; but the Aster struck a mine and sank, and the Azalea was so damaged as to need extensive repair.

 

The British type of large convoy, five or six vessels in close formation escorted by four trawlers, came into force on the Malta‑Alexandria route about the end of May. Until then ships had been escorted singly to Suda Bay and taken on from there by a fresh escort, but Admiral Ballard now organised a system of through convoys whereby ships went the whole distance without calling anywhere or changing escorts. The first convoy of this type ‑ four ships with four trawlers escorting ‑ left Malta on May 22, and a similar convoy proceeded from Malta either for Bizerta or Alexandria practically day thenceforward. From Alexandria westbound a similar convoy proceeded every other day with the escort which had brought a convoy from Malta. In the Western Mediterranean between Bizerta and Gibraltar ships followed the coast route under the protection of French patrols, very important vessels being given a special escort and following a devious route in the open sea.

 

The first loss among the Malta convoys occurred oil June 20, when the Ruperra, one of a convoy of six ships for Bizerta, escorted by four trawlers, was torpedoed by an unseen submarine. A month passed before there was another loss. On July 16, a convoy of six vessels in two lines was on its way from Malta to Alexandria with four trawlers escorting, when the Khephren, a large British vessel leading the port line, sighted a periscope close on her starboard beam, between her and the leader of the starboard line. The Khephren turned and opened fire, but at the same time observed a torpedo so close that it was impossible to avoid it. It struck her, and she sank in four minutes. In spite of the rapidity of the accident, every one of her crew was saved, only one man being injured by fragments from the shell of the other convoyed ships, which, being in close order, were within range of the periscope, and instantly opened fire on it. These two, the Khephren and the Ruperra, were the only losses among the 275 vessels escorted in the Malta convoys from their inception on May 22 to the loss of the Khephren on July 16.

 

Although the anti‑submarine forces could not claim a definite success in July, they had certainly succeeded in making the enemy's operations more difficult. Among the numerous comparatively fruitless cruises of submarines was that of a boat which left Cattaro at the end of June. On July I she was sighted by French aircraft from Corfu, and hunted by them and by Italian torpedo boats. Three days later she was seen south of Sicily by a French gunboat, which headed for her and forced her to dive. There was a convoy within sight, but it did not alter course and was not attacked. Proceeding westward, the submarine came upon a pair of ships escorted by another French gunboat. She torpedoed one of the ships, but was at once forced to dive by the gunboat, which had seen her periscope and dropped depth charges on her. These had no fatal effect, for on July 6 she was off the west point of Sicily, and there destroyed a small Italian sailing vessel, the Roma. Since the one boat of this craft was so smashed as to be unseaworthy, the submarine took the Roma's crew on board, while she cruised for two days in the area between Cape Bon and Sicily. During that time she made no attacks. At noon on July 8 the crew of the Roma were called on deck and ordered to embark in the boat of another small Italian sailing vessel which the submarine had arrested and blown up with a bomb. She then apparently cruised in the neighbourhood of

 

July, 1917 

PERIODICAL CONVOYS

 

Cape Bon, for another fruitless three days, after which she was sighted, out of range, by a French destroyer off Bizerta, and again by an armed French merchantman, also out of range next day. On the 13th a P. and O. liner sighted her periscope right astern. The liner fired one round, and the periscope disappeared; it had not been seen by the escorting destroyer. Another steamer was in sight, heading in the opposite direction; this vessel saw nothing of the submarine and was not attacked. The U‑boat continued cruising in the neighbourhood of Bizerta, where on the 14th she was twice seen, once by a French tug and once by a French patrol vessel, which fired on her and made her dive. Still cruising fruitlessly, she was sighted the following evening by a French destroyer escorting a couple of vessels. The French boat had a torpedo at the ready in her tube; she discharged it at once, but the submarine was quicker and dived. When the torpedo reached her she was deep enough for it to pass right over her. The destroyer had followed her torpedo, and passing over the submarine's wake, saw the submarine itself below the surface, outlined in phosphorescent light. She dropped a depth charge on it. When the turmoil due to the explosion had subsided no more could be seen of the enemy boat, and nothing came to the surface to give evidence of a hit. Although the submarine seemed to have escaped damage, she now abandoned the busy area off Bizerta and started for home. On her way she fired on a small Italian sailing vessel and sank a Greek steamer outside the Adriatic. In her three weeks' cruise she had been bombed by aircraft and fired on several times by patrol boats and defensively armed merchantmen; she had twice been depth‑charged and once had narrowly escaped a torpedo. Her cruise, too, from the point of view of warfare on merchant shipping, was ineffective: she had sunk one steamer of 2,358 tons and four sailing vessels whose united tonnage made up an equal amount.

 

Another system of periodical convoys was organised by the Italians for the supply ships coming to Italy from Gibraltar. Vessels with speeds of over 12 knots were allowed to proceed alone; but slower ships were collected in convoys of four, each convoy being escorted by one armed merchant cruiser. By this means an average of 190 ships a month sailed from Gibraltar for Italian ports. Although one cruiser and eleven armed merchant cruisers were allocated by the Italian Admiralty specially to work this convoy system, there was sometimes difficulty in arranging an escort, and some convoys left with no further protection than could be expected from one well‑armed consort. Nevertheless, Admiral Heathcoat Grant, who succeeded Admiral Currey at Gibraltar on July 5, was able to report that the system was successful and showed the advantage of convoy over single ships on passage, Actually, the only steamer lost in July on the coast route between Gibraltar and Naples was an Italian vessel torpedoed without warning at night between Genoa and Spezzia.

 

Towards the end of July the British ocean system of large convoys was introduced for the passage from Gibraltar to England. It did not apply to ships faster than 11 knots, and consequently excluded all the more important vessels, such as liners, transports, and ships with specially valuable Government cargoes; but in the convoys were collected the tramp steamers, returning colliers, iron ore ships, and others without which neither the war nor the trade of the Allies could continue. The most dangerous parts of the voyage for these Gibraltar convoys were the beginning and end. The vessels were met on approaching England by destroyers and screened in; but for the danger zone between Gibraltar and Cape St Vincent they had to rely on such protection as could be provided from Admiral Heathcoat Grant's forces. In addition to his own auxiliary patrol vessels, the Admiral had four French submarines and a few trawlers from the French Morocco Division.

 

To these last he delegated the patrol of the trade route between Cape St. Mary and Cape Trafalgar, a stretch which included Cadiz and the iron‑ore port of Huelva. The British patrol vessels under his command he distributed at four principal stations ‑ one to the westward of Cape Spartel, which was the converging point of all shipping bound in or out of the Mediterranean, one between Cape Spartel and Gibraltar, one across the strait off Gibraltar itself, and one east from Gibraltar along the coast of Spain, which was the route for all east‑bound traffic. When a convoy had to be screened out, these patrols were necessarily depleted, and the Admiral therefore asked for large reinforcements. These, as it happened, had been arranged, and on August 1 he learned that before October the French Morocco Division and a flotilla of United States gunboats would arrive to swell his anti‑submarine forces. But to protect the July convoys he had nothing beyond his original resources, fifty-four armed craft of all kinds for all purposes; even of these he had constantly to employ the best in the escort of important single ships bound to and from Malta.

 

The first of the convoys left Gibraltar at 8 p.m. on July 26, containing thirteen ships of various Allied nationalities, the largest being an Italian of 4,500 tons, bound to Wales for coal. The convoy had an ocean escort of one Q‑ship; from

 

July, 1917 

CONVOY ORGANISATION

 

Gibraltar to the meridian of Cape St Vincent it was accompanied by two sloops, an armed boarding vessel and two torpedo boats, all from Gibraltar. A submarine was known to be operating off Cape Finisterre, but this was not on the route, and when the convoy started, no submarine was known to be in the Gibraltar danger zone. But shortly after its departure a report came in from a French armed trawler that she had engaged a U‑boat about twenty miles north‑west from Cape Spartel, uncomfortably near the track which the convoy would follow. Several more reports of this submarine were received before the convoy was clear of the danger zone, but nothing was seen of the enemy, and the only loss sustained was from a collision in which a French vessel rammed one of the escorting sloops and so badly damaged herself that she sank.

 

As yet, no convoy system for outward‑bound vessels from home had been introduced. One of these, the Manchester Commerce, with 6,000 tons of Welsh coal for Toulon, was the first victim of the submarine waiting off Cape Spartel. The collier was torpedoed before she saw anything of the enemy, the explosion wrecking her wireless and preventing the despatch of an Allo message. But this area off Cape Spartel was patrolled by Gibraltar torpedo-boats, and one of them, hearing the explosion, came up within twenty minutes after the ship had sunk, and rescued the crew in their boats. Three large merchant vessels left Gibraltar that day, July 29; but the second convoy, which should have sailed on the 30th, was held back when news came in that morning of the sinking of two more large east‑bound colliers in the same area. This time the submarine was sighted by a torpedo-boat, which dropped three depth charges on her, but without any apparent effect. The Implacable, the last of the fully commissioned British battleships in the Mediterranean, was then at Gibraltar ready to sail for home, and two destroyers were with her as escort. She was detained until the moon, which was nearly full, should have waned. But although the convoy was kept back, a large Clan liner and a hospital ship sailed from Gibraltar for home on the 30th.

 

The submarine news on July 31 was more reassuring. Oil was still rising from the spot in the Spartel area where the three depth charges had been dropped, and the natural inference was that the U‑boat was there on the bottom disabled; the only enemy reported in the Mediterranean approach was off Cape Trafalgar in the forenoon. The convoy, eight ships, sailed at 8 p.m. with a powerful escort of destroyers and sloops; it would be well clear of the Cape Spartel area before dawn. It was accompanied through the danger zone by five vessels bound for the United States; they were to separate from it at the meridian thirty miles west of Cape St Vincent. Although there was still submarine activity in the waters through which the convoy passed, it was not molested, and it reached England safely. The U‑boat had apparently crossed over to the line of approach from the south to Cape Spartel. There on August 1 she fired a torpedo at and missed a British steamer whose master in return attempted, though unsuccessfully, to ram her. An hour later another British steamer in the same area was fired on until a Gibraltar sloop came up and drove the submarine away.

 

The next convoy was due to leave on August 4. The small numbers in the previous convoys, eight and thirteen respectively, surprised the Admiralty. During the first six months of 1917 ships had left Gibraltar westward for English and French ports at the average rate of six a day. Now, in the last ten days of July only twenty‑one had left. The Admiralty had expected many more. As a matter of fact the low numbers were purely accidental: all vessels approaching from the east had been called in to Gibraltar, and those of suitable speeds were not allowed to leave except in the convoys. On August 4 the third convoy sailed with more normal numbers; there were twenty vessels in five columns; and three ships bound for America left with them, to part company as before when beyond the danger zone. The U‑boat had now gone back to the coast of Spain, where in the afternoon of the 3rd she destroyed by gunfire a Norwegian steamer off Huelva. An unusual incident marked the passage of the convoy. By 10 a.m. on August 5 it was about ninety miles west of Gibraltar. At this point the Ryton, the second ship in the port wing column, struck some submerged object, and a few seconds later struck it again. The force of impact was enough to crush in the hull of the steamer so badly that she sank shortly afterwards. It seemed most probable that what had been struck was the U‑boat, and that it could scarcely have survived two such shocks. But here again the vitality of the submarine was under‑estimated. It must certainly have been dangerously injured; but it managed nevertheless to travel 1,800 miles and to reach a German port in safety.

 

From this time onward convoys left at regular four‑day intervals without any noteworthy incident; altogether seven proceeded in August, with a total of 110 ships. The Mediterranean‑bound vessels continued to arrive singly even after

 

July‑Aug. 1917   

COMMANDS REORGANISED

 

mid‑August, when a system of out‑bound convoys from home was introduced. At the parallel of Cape Finisterre, these out‑bound convoys dispersed, the ships then proceeding independently to their destinations. It is significant that the losses in the Mediterranean approach now occurred only among these dispersed and independent ships.

 

By this time the discussions with the French as to the nationality of the officer who was to be in supreme control of routes and patrols in the Mediterranean had been settled. On June 9 the French had accepted the principle that a British Admiral should take charge of this important branch of anti‑submarine warfare. The officer first selected for the new post, which was to include that of Commander‑in‑Chief of all British forces in the Mediterranean, was Admiral Wemyss. He was relieved as Commander‑in‑Chief, East Indies, on July 21 by Rear‑Admiral Ernest F. A. Gaunt, who had been serving as a Rear‑Admiral in the Grand Fleet. The opportunity was taken for separating Egypt from the East Indies command, and Rear‑Admiral Thomas Jackson took over as Senior Naval Officer, Egypt, the next day, his command including the Red Sea as far as the Straits of Bab‑el‑Mandeb. By these two changes ‑ the appointment of a Commander‑in‑Chief of the British Naval Forces and the removal of Egypt and the Red Sea from the East Indies command ‑ the Mediterranean as a British Naval Station was restored to the position of importance it had held before the convention of August 6, 1914, when the French assumed supreme command and the British Mediterranean forces were reduced to a cruiser squadron. The new arrangement had not been necessitated by any pressure by the enemy's surface ships, to which the French alone showed an overwhelming numerical superiority; it was the submarines that by their activity in these waters had brought back a British Commander‑in‑Chief to the Mediterranean.

 

Although Admiral Wemyss was the first choice, it was not he who actually arrived to take up the restored command. As soon as he reached home, he was appointed to the Admiralty as Deputy First Sea Lord to Admiral Jellicoe, whom he afterwards succeeded; and Vice‑Admiral Sir Somerset Gough Calthorpe was sent out as British Commander‑in‑Chief in the Mediterranean. The terms of this officer's appointment, dated August 6, made him head of the organisation to be set up at Malta for the general direction of routes, including escort and patrol duties, and made him also director within his command of the anti‑submarine operations of the British and French naval forces. The Italians had not consented to put their patrol and escort services under the general command preferring to manage their anti‑submarine operations themselves in their own zones. But subject to the general authority of the French Commander‑in‑Chief, Admiral Calthorpe was to lay down the principles to be observed in the control, escort, and navigation of all mercantile traffic in the Mediterranean. He hoisted his flag on August 26. Simultaneously, the outlying squadrons suffered a reduction in status. Vice‑Admiral Thursby was relieved by Rear-Admiral Sydney R. Fremantle, and the Eastern Mediterranean Squadron over which the latter hoisted his flag on August 25 became the British Aegean Squadron. Admiral Mark Kerr went home, leaving Commodore Heneage in command of the British Adriatic Squadron; and Admiral Ballard at Malta ceased to direct operations.

 

 

 


 

 

CHAPTER IX

 

UNRESTRICTED SUBMARINE WARFARE

 

 

1

February to April 1917

 

We have already noted that the battle of Jutland, in spite of the fact that it was not fought to a finish, had in reality ended one stage of the naval war and defined the form and method of the final struggle. That our enemies were the first to recognise this and frame their action accordingly, is not to be wondered at: they were driven by a necessity which, though ruinous, was unavoidable. The British navy might still cherish confident hopes of a second and more decisive general action; the German Naval Chiefs had been instantly compelled to realise that if Great Britain was to be overthrown at sea, the blow must be struck, not by the High Seas Fleet, but by the submarines; there remained no alternative but unrestricted U‑boat war. The moment of decision could not be foreseen by the British Admiralty or the War Cabinet, but they knew that it could not be long delayed: they were not privileged to follow in detail the struggle which was going on at Pless between the counsellors of violence and the counsellors of prudence and moderation, but the diplomatic strain between Germany and America was visible to all the world. In Great Britain there was probably no one in any responsible position who had not for some months past realised and gravely weighed the coming danger.

 

Late in October, 1916, Admiral Jellicoe wrote to the Admiralty that there appeared to be "a serious danger that our losses in merchant ships, combined with the losses in neutral merchant ships, may, by the early summer of 1917, have such a serious effect upon the import of food and other necessaries into the Allied countries as to force us into accepting peace terms which the military position on the Continent would not justify, and which would fall short of our desires." Admiral Beatty was still more emphatic: he spoke of the danger as "jeopardising the fate of the nation and seriously interfering with the successful prosecution of the war." What followed was a complete recognition of a very disturbing situation. The Government had replied to Admiral Jellicoe's letter by inviting him to confer with them in person, and this he did on November 2 in London. The serious feature of the campaign was, as he pointed out, that the submarine attack was being extended steadily westwards into the open waters at the outer end of the English Channel. The Admiralty, in an official memorandum to the Government, took the same view as Admiral Jellicoe, and added a still more discouraging comment. "Of all the problems which the Admiralty have to consider," they wrote, "no doubt the most formidable and the most embarrassing is that raised by submarine attack upon merchant vessels. No conclusive answer has as yet been found to this form of warfare; perhaps no conclusive answer ever will be found. We must for the present be content with palliation."

 

The consultation between the Government and Admiral Jellicoe was followed by a conference at the Admiralty, which further emphasised the perplexity of the situation. This conference was, by its composition, representative of the highest naval opinion, yet it only seems to have been unanimously agreed upon one single point: the need for appointing an officer of high rank to co‑ordinate and control all anti‑submarine operations. This result accurately represented the general state of naval opinion, which was at the time very undecided. The prevailing anxiety had called out a large number of suggestions from naval officers of all ranks. The remedies they proposed differed widely. A powerful body of opinion was in favour of an attack upon the German coasts. Admiral Bayly at Queenstown had suggested this long before, and during the autumn of the year Captain Percy Royds sent in a strongly‑worded paper advising an attack on Zeebrugge. Commodore Tyrwhitt pressed for an attack on the Zeebrugge locks; but after a conference between him and Admirals Jellicoe, Bacon and Oliver, the Admiralty decided that the scheme should not be proceeded with.

 

A number of other naval officers put forward plans for intensive mining as the desired cure; and there was certainly a group of far‑sighted men who realised that if the merchant service was to be protected, it would have to be placed under escort. Those who at this stage foresaw the measure which was in the end to save the situation deserve to be honourably and gratefully remembered.

 

For the present, however, there appeared to be only one

 

Jan. 1917

ADMIRALTY VIEWS

 

point on which there was anything like a general measure of agreement ‑ it was evident that many naval officers considered the command of the anti‑submarine forces to be too much decentralised and divided. As a result of the conference, therefore, it was decided to create a special division of the Admiralty for controlling and co‑ordinating the operations of our anti‑submarine forces, and to place a Flag Officer in charge of it. Admiral Duff was the officer selected; he had been Second in Command of the 4th Battle Squadron of the Grand Fleet, and possessed the confidence of Admiral Jellicoe in a high degree. Both these officers left the Grand Fleet to take up their new duties at Whitehall in the first days' of December. (For Admiral Jellicoe's appointment to the post of First Sea, Lord, see ante, p. 71.)

 

 

2

The Admiralty's Appreciation

 

Shortly after Admiral Duff took office, the Admiralty made an exhaustive survey of all the methods and devices of anti-submarine warfare then in force, and outlined their future policy with regard to them. These measures fall roughly into two classes: those which were items in the general plan of attacking U‑boats wherever they could be found; and those which were intended to give better protection to merchant shipping.

 

1. It was proposed that, as soon as possible, detachments of destroyers and "P" boats should be based at Portsmouth and Devonport for the sole purpose of hunting submarines. As a general rule, destroyers and "P" boats at the principal bases had either been detached from their escorting or patrolling duties to undertake a hunt, if the Admiralty or the local Commander‑in‑Chief thought it advisable; or else they had turned automatically from their ordinary duties to attack a submarine if it was known to be operating within striking distance. It was therefore now suggested that special "hunting patrols" should be formed in order to leave the remaining patrol forces free to carry out their ordinary work. It would follow that these hunting patrols, in the course of their duties, would acquire a specialised knowledge of antisubmarine tactics.

 

The Admiralty were also pressing forward certain other measures, which, though they were classified separately in the general appreciation or survey of the position, were really complementary to the plan of constituting these special hunting flotillas. The most important of these complementary measures was the organisation of air patrols at various points on the south coast; attempts were also being made to organise ships fitted with hydrophones into special detachments which should always operate together. These hydrophone patrols became immensely important later on; but at the time a suitable hydrophone had still to be designed, and the Admiralty remarked, with regard to this new measure, that experiments were being carried out in the Solent "with a certain measure of success."

 

2. A variety of special measures with regard to mining were being considered. The Admiralty attached very great importance to a project that had recently been put forward for laying deep minefields on the tracks that German U‑boats were known to be using, and for stationing so many patrol craft near the fields that the U‑boats would be compelled to dive into the danger zone. In addition to this, it had been suggested that a fleet of motor launches should lay mines in shallow waters close up to the mouths of the German rivers, and should mine the submarine tracks off the German harbours. The Admiralty had recently decided to lay a mine barrage across the Heligoland bight; the fields which composed it would be of various sizes, and laid at varying depths, so that the different projects in the Admiralty summary of anti‑submarine warfare were little but suggestions on points of detail in this larger and more comprehensive plan.

 

3. The Admiralty were considering a number of plans for constituting special submarine patrols at the northern exit to the North Sea. There was nothing that was absolutely new in any of these plans, and their exact significance can only be understood by reviewing the strategical and tactical employment of the British submarine flotillas since the war began.

 

The original war orders to the fleet divided the available British submarines into a number of local defence flotillas and a striking force. The local defence flotillas, which were largely made up of the older "A," "B," and "C" boats, were allocated to the defended ports in the Channel and the east coast. The striking or overseas force was based on Harwich, and was composed of the newer "D" and "E" boats. The original war orders stated that this overseas force was to be used offensively towards the German coast and for reinforcing Cruiser Force C, which would be employed with the first and third flotillas in the eastern approaches to the Channel and the southern part of the North Sea. From

 

Jan. 1917   

DUTIES OF SUBMARINES

 

the beginning of the war, therefore, a considerable number of older submarines were allocated to coast defence duties. On the other hand, the submarines patrolling in the German bight had collected a large amount of information with regard to the local German patrols, and had torpedoed five German warships between August 1914 and July 1915; so that during the first year of the war the submarines had proved of more utility as an outpost than as a coast defence force. The German staff, it would seem, were conscious that we had pushed out patrols too close to their bases; for their defensive minelaying during the first year of the war was evidently intended to force our submarine patrols to move further out.

 

In the summer and autumn of the year 1915, the Commander‑in‑Chief asked that three submarine units, each consisting of a destroyer and three submarines, should be attached to the Grand Fleet. They were to be based on the Tyne, and were apparently to act as an outpost to the Grand Fleet during operations against the High Seas Fleet. In October 1915 the Titania and the 11th Overseas Flotilla were attached to the Grand Fleet and based on Blyth. In their general instructions two duties were assigned to them: to act as a coast defence and anti‑invasion force if the Germans raided the British coast north of Flamborough Head, and to patrol north of the line bounding the zone watched by the Harwich flotilla. (The line of division was from Flamborough Head to Lyngvig.)

 

Although from the beginning of the war our older submarines had been intended to act as a coast defence force, they were not so used when the need arose. When, in April 1916, Admiral Boedicker bombarded Yarmouth and Lowestoft, the defence of the south‑eastern coast and of the Flanders bight fell entirely upon Commodore Tyrwhitt's destroyers and the overseas submarine flotillas. The Admiralty's instructions to station a force of submarines "at gun range" off Yarmouth and Lowestoft were not carried out by the local commander, and the result was that the submarines were not put to a practical test as a coast defence force during the war. None the less, the idea persisted that this was one of their most important strategical uses; and when it was recognised and admitted that the Grand Fleet ought only to come south of the Dogger Bank in quite exceptional circumstances (See p. 49.), an additional importance and emphasis were given to the anti-invasion duties of the submarine fleet. In August 1916 a balance was struck between the old duty of maintaining offensive patrols in waters where German forces were likely to be found, and the equally old, but now more exacting, duty of protecting the east coast against raids or invasion. An additional flotilla was allotted to the Grand Fleet, all the submarine forces on the east coast were strengthened, and the North Sea was divided into four submarine patrols:

 

The Maas patrol (1 submarine) and the Terschelling patrol (5 submarines) were to be maintained from Harwich, and the Horn Reefs and Skagerrak patrol (4 submarines) from the Tyne and Tees.

 

This distribution of force and this allocation of duties lasted, without much alteration, until the end of the year 1916. The idea of using British submarines against the German U‑boats, and of incorporating our submarine flotillas in the anti‑submarine forces, dates from the early autumn of 1916, when the Commander‑in‑Chief appointed a Grand Fleet committee to inquire into the matter. They did not report until February 1917, and in the meantime the new Commander‑in‑Chief, Admiral Beatty, sent in a forcible criticism of the existing organisation. Ten submarines out of the eighty‑six which were available were patrolling in the enemy's waters; the remainder were kept ready to meet an imaginary danger of invasion. Even those submarines which were out on patrol worked in an isolated, unco‑ordinated way, and had achieved nothing commensurate with the losses they had incurred. The existing system of sending out submarines to patrol and cruise within special areas, without specified objects or objectives, was radically at fault, and must be changed. As a provisional remedy the Commander‑inChief urged that the submarine flotillas should be re‑grouped and reorganised. Forty boats of the newer types should be attached to the Grand Fleet and employed in continuous specially devised operations. The defensive coast patrols should be maintained entirely by the older "C" boats.

 

The Admiralty could not agree outright with Admiral Beatty's drastic proposals; they replied that "submarines now constitute our principal defence against raids of all kinds." They were, none the less, most anxious that our flotillas should be employed to the best advantage in the campaign against the German U‑boats: the point still unascertained was what distribution of our submarine forces would be the best adapted to the purpose in view. British submarines might, as the Commander‑in‑Chief suggested, be concentrated in the North Sea, to be used offensively against German U‑boats entering or leaving the Bight; or they might be distributed over the bases in the western approach area, for the defence of trade. Expert naval opinion had not decided which of these two solutions was the better. Since the first

 

Jan. 1917   

NEW USES FOR SUBMARINES

 

days of the war, our submarines on patrol had been on the lookout for enemy submarines, and had attacked them whenever they could. The results did not suggest that our submarines would be very successful if they were organised to act exclusively as an attacking force against the enemy's U‑boats. Since the beginning of the war, British submarines on patrol had established contact with the enemy's boats on fifty‑six occasions; they had only attacked them six times, and out of those six attacks three had been successful. Figures like these showed that if used in anti‑submarine warfare, submarines would probably be more useful for watching and locating enemy boats than for attacking and destroying them. Whether submarines could be used with any success for the defence of trade was equally doubtful. It was not seriously held that submarines could act as a direct cover and escort for merchantmen; but some naval officers thought that submarines might be used for patrolling the outer approach routes to the west of Ireland and the Scillies. Their power to keep the sea for long periods gave them an ability to move successively from one threatened zone to another which was not possessed by the types of surface ships ordinarily used in patrol operations.

 

When the Admiralty drew up their appreciation of the state of things at sea at the beginning of the year 1917, they were keenly aware that our own submarine flotillas might be used to greater advantage; but they had not committed themselves to any one of the conflicting opinions before them, nor had they devised a means of reconciling their own views with those expressed by the Commander‑in‑Chief. The proper strategical and tactical use of submarines in submarine warfare was still undecided.

 

4. In addition to this, the Admiralty were considering a suggestion which involved a new tactical employment for our submarines: that of acting as a sort of long‑distance escort to merchantmen. Even when a German submarine attacked and torpedoed a merchantman without warning, the commander had to remain on the spot for some time to be sure that the torpedoed ship was actually sinking; as a rule, he examined the ship's boats, and occasionally took the master prisoner. This took time, and if the merchantman were followed at a distance of five or six miles by one of our own submarines, there was a good chance that the German U‑boat would be attacked and torpedoed whilst she was still hovering about the sinking merchantman. As a tactical experiment the plan was interesting; and if the suggestion had been made when the Admiralty were instituting their convoy system, it might have led to the larger experiment of using submarines to cover groups of merchantmen steaming in formation. But the plan, as put forward, could never be widely applied, as it was only intended that one submarine should be detached from its ordinary duties to experiment with a Q‑ship in the central part of the Channel.

 

5. The list of measures for attacking U‑boats included a large number of unimportant suggestions, which mostly turned upon some new mechanical device: it was suggested inter alia that mines should be coloured with a special paint which should make them invisible to aircraft patrols, that indicator nets should be fitted with wireless telegraphy conmmunications, and that decoy ships should be supplied with motor lifeboats carrying torpedoes.

 

The Admiralty's general view upon these numerous suggestions was that no measure, taken by itself, was likely to turn the campaign in our favour, and that the urgent need of the moment was more anti‑submarine material. The depth charge bomb which was exploded below the surface by the action of a hydrostatic pistol‑was the principal weapon used against submerged U‑boats. Large orders for depth charges and the appropriate releasing gear had already been placed with the armament firms, and the Admiralty expected that deliveries during the coming year would be at the rate of about 1,500 depth charges per month. This would make it possible to supply every vessel engaged in submarine hunting with the means of attacking submarines whenever they were met; and the Admiralty hoped, doubtless, that the added vigour and the greater scope which would thereby be given to our anti‑submarine offensive would in the end defeat U‑boat operations completely, or at least hamper and cripple them so much that they would cease to be dangerous.

 

The other measures enumerated in the Admiralty survey of anti‑submarine warfare were, as has already been explained, those which were intended to give better protection to merchantmen.

 

(i) A large number merely dealt with the supply of additional material: every effort was being made to supply merchantmen with more guns, more appliances for disguising their movements behind clouds of smoke, and with the protective device against mines known as a paravane. Naval opinion of all grades seems to have been entirely in favour of arming more and more ships with four‑inch and six‑inch guns. It was not unnatural, perhaps, that a fighting method should be so much favoured; but the existing statistics were sufficient to show that this method was, in fact, rapidly losing its efficacy. During the campaign of 1915

 

Jan. 1917   

THE DOVER BARRAGE

 

no merchant ships with a defensive armament had been sunk by German submarines; and, up to August 1916, the number destroyed, though steady, was quite small. In the autumn of the year figures showed that the U‑boat commanders were beginning to overcome the difficulties: twelve defensively armed merchantmen were sunk in December 1916, and in January 1917 the number had risen to twenty. It was true that of the merchantmen which escaped nine out of ten did so by virtue of their gunfire; but it was also to be remembered that if the U‑boat commanders could overcome twenty armed merchantmen in a month, under conditions of restricted warfare, when once the restrictions were removed and they were free to attack without warning, the number was sure to rise enormously; and this is, in fact, what happened when the time came. So long as our merchant ships were going on their way unescorted and alone, they could never have been saved from the assassin's blow, even by the astonishing courage and skill of the men who manned their guns.

 

(ii) The Admiralty were also contemplating a complete reorganisation of the barrage across the Straits of Dover. The project of barring the Dover Straits to submarines originated in the early days of the war. For several months before the war began in 1914, the Admiralty's expert advisers had been investigating the question of defence against submarines. The device which the experts had most strongly recommended was a net constructed of light material and suspended from a steel hawser strung along a number of floats. The net was either laid along the bottom or towed by a drifter, and a submarine which fouled it soon revealed its presence by the disturbance it caused to the upper floats. Admiral Hood, who had operated off the Belgian coast in 1914, had pushed forward a plan for maintaining a line of drifters with indicator nets in the Straits of Dover, and by February 1915 thirty drifters were actually employed. (See Vol. II., p. 271.)

 

In addition to maintaining this semi‑mobile net defence, the Admiralty sanctioned a plan for placing a permanent boom across the straits. An enormous arnount of material and labour was expended upon this project, which proved a complete failure, and was abandoned shortly after Admiral Bacon took command at Dover. During the Winter of 1915 the straits were defended only by the mobile defence forces at Dover, Calais, Boulogne and Dunkirk and by the drifters and their indicator nets. Admiral Bacon was, however, most anxious that the straits should be blocked by some form of permanent barrage. He laid a line of explosive nets along the Belgian coast in April 1916. (See Vol. III., p. 299.)

 

By a curious coincidence, the German Government temporarily abandoned their submarine operations against merchantmen whilst the nets were being laid along the Belgian coast, and this relaxation in the submarine campaign, coinciding as it did with the establishment of the new barrage, misled Admiral Bacon into thinking that it had been very effective. He, therefore determined to place a similar barrage across the Straits of Dover, from the South Goodwins to the Ruytingen shoal, and in December 1916 a line of indicator mine nets, suspended from buoys 500 yards from each other and marked by lightbuoys, ran from the South Goodwins to the West Dyck. The freedom with which the Zeebrugge flotillas had operated in the Channel during the autumn months, and the ease with which the British and German destroyers had crossed the barrage during the raids on the Dover Straits, had shown, however, that the new barrage could not have been a serious obstacle to German submarines. The problem of closing the straits, for which the Admiralty had striven to find a solution since the early days of the war, was, therefore, still unsolved when unrestricted submarine war began; and the Admiralty were giving close attention to the various schemes and projects which were still being placed before them.

 

(iii) Convoys are mentioned almost at the end of the Admiralty's summary of defensive measures. Their position on the list would suffice to show that they were not regarded as of particular importance; and in any case the remarks which follow show that the Admiralty did not, in fact, contemplate anything beyond convoying the coal trade between France and Great Britain. Indeed, Sir Henry Jackson, when First Sea Lord, had indicated his opinion that any form of ocean convoy was impossible, by committing himself to the statement that "neither the Allies nor the neutrals can actually protect by escort even a small proportion of the sailings." And to this must be added the Naval Staff's objection to any system of ocean escort, on the technical ground that ships under convoy would offer a larger target than single vessels.

    

It is clear, however, that dicta such as these could not have any finality about them: they were of the nature of appreciations, which correctly indicated the perplexities of the moment. An unparalleled crisis may well demand an effort without precedent; and we have already seen that Admiral Jellicoe himself was fully alive to the danger of the present crisis. Faced with the possible stoppage of our food

 

Sept. 1916 

A UNIQUE PROBLEM

 

imports and the consequent necessity of accepting the enemy's terms of peace, the Admiralty had no choice but to continue their search for a reply to the U‑boats. The actual position must be minutely and unflinchingly re‑examined: if the evil should be proved to be indisputably beyond cure by the methods hitherto tried or proposed, then all possible remedies must also be re‑examined, and no opinion, no accepted premise, must be regarded as beyond revision.

 

 

3

The Problems of Submarine Warfare

 

The unique difficulty of the situation and the novelty of the problem involved cannot be fully understood without a close inspection of the actual incidents of the campaign. For this purpose a typical set of movements must be selected; for to review in full the searches conducted by our destroyers and patrols during this period would be to write an encyclopaedia of submarine war. Fortunately it is not difficult to choose a special case out of a large number which closely resemble each other; and this will show, with sufficient cogency, why our operations against enemy submarines were, up to a certain date, so unsuccessful, and how inevitably a frank realisation of the facts enforced a revolutionary change of methods, even in the teeth of reasoned and generally admitted principles.

 

On September 3, 1916, between eleven o'clock and noon, the Admiralty learned that a submarine was at work between Beachy Head and Cape d'Antifer. At the time the 3rd Battle Squadron was at Portland with the Beaver, Druid, Forester, Hind and Hornet of the 1st Destroyer Flotilla, and the Manly, Mansfield, Melpomene, and Miranda of the 10th (Harwich); the Lark and the Laurel, of the 9th (Harwich) were at Sheerness. The first step, therefore, was to stop all traffic inside the affected area, and this the Admiralty did early in the afternoon by telegram: "No traffic is to proceed through area between lines drawn south (true) from Dungeness and St. Alban's Head. All vessels bound for, or proceeding through, this area should be detained in port or ordered to the nearest port forthwith." Escorted transports were, however, allowed to sail from Portsmouth; and later in the day the Admiralty modified their original order by allowing all west‑bound traffic to proceed under escort; the Admiral at Dover was to provide escort as far as Beachy Head; the Commander‑in‑Chief at Portsmouth was to arrange for traffic to be convoyed from there to St. Alban's Head.

 

At a quarter to four in the afternoon a fresh report came in. Torpedo boat No. 5 of the Newhaven detachment had fallen in with the submarine at a quarter‑past one and attacked her. At the time, the torpedo boat was on escort duty between Havre and Newhaven, and her captain was just in time to ward off an attack on the s.s. John Swan, which he was then escorting. This last report, with those which had come earlier in the day, showed that the German was moving westward.

 

At twenty‑past five the Chief of the War Staff, Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Oliver, began to set the available destroyers in motion. He had previously directed Commodore Tyrwhitt to detach two destroyers to Portsmouth for temporary escort duty. He therefore wired to Harwich telling the Commodore to send them off at once, and gave him the position of the late encounter. At half ast seven the Lark and Laurel were ordered to proceed down Channel and hunt. Their search was, however, limited by the order to arrive at Portsmouth by 4.0 p.m. on the 4th. They sailed independently, and the Laurel reached Portsmouth towards noon, the Lark at a quarter‑past two. Neither of them sighted anything.

 

As no further reports had come in by eleven o'clock on the 4th, the Admiralty felt free to re‑start traffic, defensively armed vessels and coasters were allowed to proceed to the eastward, whilst, as has been said, all west‑bound ships were moving forward under escort. The only vessels still held up were the unarmed, east‑bound ships.

 

September 4 was wild and stormy, and no further reports came in all day. The Admiralty's main preoccupation was to see that the Princess Victoria, which lay at Cherbourg with a cargo of French bullion, intended for America, should sail on the following day, and that the Laurel and Lark should be there to escort her.

 

At Queenstown Admiral Bayly ordered Q.5 and Q.7 to put to sea. The first was to cruise in the Western Channel from September 5 to 11; the second was to patrol the route between Ushant and Finisterre between September 7 and 18. At about 9.0 p.m. Q.3, which was then at Portland, also sailed.

 

At twenty minutes past nine on the morning of the 5th, the Admiralty were still without news of any further sinkings, and they approved Admiral de Robeck's request to leave Portland with the 3rd Battle Squadron at six o'clock that evening. (The 3rd Battle Squadron had gone to Portland for gunnery and torpedo exercises on August 24; it was still stationed in the Thames.) As soon as permission was given,

 

Sept. 3‑7, 1916   

SUBMARINE HUNTING

 

fresh reports came in. The first showed that there was now a submarine at work in mid‑Channel, due south of St. Alban's Head; the second indicated the presence of a new U‑boat on the French side, between Cape Barfleur and Havre. Later messages showed that the one in mid‑Channel had moved north‑west and had arrived near Portland Bill in the early afternoon. An order was at once sent to Admiral de Robeck telling him to remain in harbour and send out his destroyers to search, whilst Commodore Tyrwhitt was directed to detach four destroyers and a leader to hunt for submarines "towards Portland." Fresh traffic orders were now issued: no vessel was allowed to pass through an area bounded by lines drawn due south from Start Point and Beachy Head. By a later message the usual freedom was given to escorted transports, whilst the Lark and Laurel were to be detached to reinforce the Newhaven escorts.

 

Effect was given to these orders as quickly as possible by Six o'clock in the evening the nine destroyers working with the 3rd Battle Squadron had put to sea, and just before 4.30 a.m. on the following day the Commodore ordered the Lightfoot and four "L" class destroyers to sea. By noon on September 6, therefore, thirteen destroyers were in the Channel.

 

The situation was further complicated by the mining of the traffic route in the Bristol Channel on the previous day. The news of this, with the various reports received during the morning and afternoon of the 6th, seemed to show that there were then two submarines in the English Channel making westwards towards Ushant, and a third, off the north coast of Cornwall. There was nothing to be done but to let the large searching forces already detached continue their pursuit. Very little more was heard of the submarines for the moment, although it was clear that the one on the French coast was keeping her station in the approaches to Havre. Towards seven o'clock in the evening she was sighted off Cape Barfleur by the destroyer Spiteful of the Portsmouth Flotilla, and compelled to dive. No further operation orders were issued, but unescorted traffic was held up all day; later the prohibition was much extended, and all vessels intending to sail from the Clyde, Irish Sea and Bristol Channel for ports south of Ushant were kept in port. The Lightfoot and her destroyers assembled off Cape la Hague at five o'clock in the morning of the 7th and then swept westward. The general westerly movement of the submarines was confirmed by the report from the s.s. Bengali, of her escape from a submarine on the Previous day after a chase which began to the south of the Eddystone, and by the loss of the Heathdene nearly forty miles to the southward of the Lizard.

 

It now seemed probable that the submarine on the French side had crossed towards England during the night; for, early in the forenoon, St. Catherine's reported a submarine to the southward of the Isle of Wight. She must then have moved westward during the day and afterwards back on her tracks; for late that evening a submarine was reported to the southward of Portland Bill on an easterly course. Three more Q ships (Nos. 4, 8, 10) were sent out from Queenstown during the day, with orders to cruise in the Channel. The destroyers from Portland and Harwich cruised at high speed all day; but sighted nothing.

 

Early on the 8th a report came in from the Commodore at Falmouth that the armed brig Helgoland (Lieutenant A. D. Blair, R.N.R.) had engaged two submarines off the Lizard on the afternoon of the previous day, whilst on passage from Falmouth to Milford Haven, and that, a little earlier, a U-boat had been located to the north‑west of Ushant. It thus seemed that, of the submarines which had been attacking shipping for the past three days, one was on her way to the Mediterranean; but that at least one, and possibly two, others were still operating in the Channel itself. Orders were therefore sent to Portland, telling the Vice‑Admiral of the 3rd Battle Squadron to keep his destroyers on the search. At 6.0 p.m. the cross‑channel service was resumed; but all east‑ and west‑bound traffic was still held up. Late in the evening it was quite certain that there were two submarines in the western channel: one about thirty miles to the southwest of Portland Bill, the other off the Bishop.

 

During the afternoon, Q.4, which had been sent out from Queenstown on the previous day, got into action with a submarine about fifty miles to the north‑westward of Ushant. There was a fierce struggle, in which the Q‑ship was worsted. This located a third submarine operating in the Channel and made it doubtful whether one of them was bound for the Mediterranean, as had previously seemed likely. As there was now a reasonable chance that, within a few days, at least two, and possibly three U‑boats would be going back through the Straits of Dover, the Admiralty ordered four destroyers from the 4th Flotilla to move down from the Humber and assist in the search. There were now a destroyer leader, seventeen destroyers and six Q‑ships engaged in the operation.

 

Sinkings continued until the 18th, and to the end our searching forces kept picking up the enemy submarines and endeavouring to bring them to action. On the 12th the

 

Sept. 13‑27, 1916    

INEFFECTIVE MEASURES

 

Spitfire, Unity and Porpoise sighted a U‑boat to the northwest of Ushant, and dropped depth charges over her, though without result. The diversion of destroyers from their proper bases continued long after the raid was over. The Lightfoot division, it is true, was recalled to Portsmouth on the 11th to escort the Repulse through the Channel; but they returned to the chase on the 14th, and only got back to Harwich on the 20th. The destroyers of the 4th Flotilla did not get back to Immingham until the 27th; those attached to the 3rd Battle Squadron continued their search until the 17th; on the following day they escorted the battleships back to the Swin.

 

If the warships engaged in defending and attacking commerce during these operations are enumerated in parallel columns, there appears at once a very remarkable inequality in effective force. For seven days, two, or at the most three German submarines had operated within an area which was watched by forty‑nine destroyers and forty‑eight torpedo boats divided into six local defence flotillas, and by four hundred and sixty‑eight armed auxiliaries:

 

(i) Auxiliaries. The actual figures were:

Area number X1 (Dover)

238

Area number XII (Portsmouth)

81

Area number XI11 (Portland)

62

Area number XIV (Falmouth)

87

Total

468

 

(ii) Local defence flotillas:

Destroyers.

Torpedo boats.

Dover

17

3

Nore

8

13

Portsmouth

12

18

Devonport

11

6

Newhaven

3

Portland

1

5

 Totals

49

48

 

During this time they had been actively hunted by thirteen destroyers and seven Q‑boats, each one of which had a surface fighting power about double that of any of the submarines. Yet in spite of this immense disparity of numbers the three U‑boat commanders had sunk more than thirty British and neutral vessels without suffering any loss themselves. Data of this kind had now for some weeks been under the observation of naval commanders and of the Naval Staff: the lines of thought which they suggested were probably numerous, but there can be little doubt that the more scientific minds must all have been struck with one aspect of the problem. In such cases as the one given, our effort, whether considered as attack or defence, had been not only inadequate, but wholly ineffective. The first consideration must be to determine whether this was inevitably so ‑ in which case the measures taken must be immediately abandoned ‑ or whether the existing methods could be so improved as to achieve success. The case must be reduced to its simplest terms, so that the question would become one of principle and not of chance or of detail.

 

If an enemy is reported to have been at a point A at a certain moment, then he must, after any definite space of time, be somewhere within a circle drawn with A as centre and with a radius equal to his speed of movement multiplied by the time which has elapsed since he was observed at A; and if he is to be found and brought to action, the whole of that circle must be effectively covered by the forces opposed to him. It follows that the chances of finding him will vary inversely with the area of the circle to be occupied. Now in practice, as soon as a U‑boat began to operate in our waters her presence and her position were known, as a rule, first vaguely by wireless or other information, and then in some detail a day or two later when attacks were reported or when survivors from sunk ships had been landed and questioned.

 

In the typical case above given, reports that enemy submarines were at work were transmitted to the Admiralty from shore stations with great rapidity; but a good deal of time had necessarily to elapse before these reports could be verified and positive orders given to the searching forces. If the signal logs of the destroyers engaged in the search are compared with the reports received at the Admiralty, it will be found that the pursuers could not possibly reach the spot where the submarine was last reported before their information was at least twelve hours old, and it was, in fact, generally much older. They would now be at point A and ready to begin hunting; but if the submarine be allowed an average speed of 8 1/2 knots, all that they would have to guide them would be the knowledge that she must be somewhere within a circle whose radius was by this time 100 miles, and whose area was therefore over 30,000 square miles. This figure, it is true, holds good only for the open sea: in restricted waters, such as the eastern and central Channel, the area of search would not be quite so large or so symmetrical. But when all allowances have been made, the problem of making a reasonable and successful disposition of forces for such a pursuit remains formidable in the extreme.

 

Nevertheless it was courageously and energetically attacked. There were evidently two possible ways of lessening the disadvantages under which the counter‑attack was working. The first and most important was to obtain and transmit more speedy information of what the enemy was

 

Jan. 1917   

ATTEMPTS AT PRECISION

 

doing; the second was to mass still larger and better organised forces in the necessarily wide areas where U‑boats might at any moment be found. Of the two the more essential was to secure earlier information of an enemy's presence, because this meant lessening his possible radius of movements, and thereby diminishing the area of search. The aim here would be to give to our anti‑submarine campaign something of the precision and effectiveness of our operations against the High Seas Fleet. Throughout the war we had generally been able to detect premonitory signs of the movement when the German fleet was about to sail, and it was upon this that the success of our intercepting and countering measures in the North Sea had mainly depended. Experience showed that where this very early knowledge of the enemy's intention failed, his force was either not met at all, or was met in circumstances so different from those anticipated that the outcome was largely a matter of chance. In other words, it was the time factor that was our difficulty.

 

The ease with which the Germans had passed their raiders into the Atlantic in spite of Admiral Jellicoe's intercepting dispositions, the freedom with which they could raid the Straits of Dover in the teeth of a more numerous and more daring flotilla, showed how uncertain and even fruitless operations were likely to be whenever the Admiralty or a local commander was obliged to act merely upon reports of what the enemy had been doing; and our operations against the German submarines were now adding an extreme example of tactics based necessarily on guesswork, and not upon any kind of certain knowledge. But it was not easy to see any line of progress on this side. It was not our intelligence system that was at fault: it could show that U‑boats were at sea; at times it showed exactly where they had been operating at a particular moment; but further than this it could not go.

 

The time handicap could perhaps be reduced, and there was the possibility that scientific invention might succeed in  providing us with a new detective method. Men of science believed that apparatus could be devised which would reveal a submarine's presence in a given area to ships at a considerable distance. If their hopes were justified and if they could perfect the apparatus before it was too late, officers in command of anti‑submarine forces would be in a less hopeless position on arriving at their point of search: they would have ears as well as eyes, and would no longer be ploughing a vast expanse of sea in the hope of sighting an invisible enemy who was possibly just beneath them and possibly a hundred miles away.

 

The second question, that of a method of massing more and more forces in the areas where submarines were known to be operating, was one which must affect the whole of our existing system of defence. When the Commander‑in‑Chief had called for opinions upon the conduct of the submarine campaign from all the officers in the Grand Fleet, Admiral Beatty had sent in a far‑sighted paper upon this subject. "The call for suggestions," he wrote, "will doubtless produce some suggestions and devices of value  .... but the measure of their success will depend upon how they are used." Statistics showed first that the submarines were located about sixteen times as often as they were engaged; and, secondly, that after searches had been ordered, the number of vessels actually employed never amounted to more than one in five of those available on each occasion. His figures were:

 

 

September.

October.

Ships sunk

61

45

Occasions when enemy submarines were located

138

161

Occasions when enemy submarines were attacked by us

8

10

 

He added the following figures, covering the same period, to show the results of the localised defence system.

 

Two areas where submarines are busy.

Eight areas where submarines are not busy.

Ships sunk

46

3

Occasions when submarines were located

101

10

Total craft available for offensive work

89

348

 

Figures like these amounted to proof positive that the existing system, which consisted "in the employment of a number of localised forces, each employed on purely defensive duties, in a prescribed area, each under a different chief, each working on different lines," was inherently vicious. The proper remedy was to put one single officer in control of all anti-submarine operations; to give him sole charge of all the forces employed in anti‑submarine warfare, and so enable him to mass them in overwhelming numbers at the threatened points. As we have already seen, this suggestion was unanimously adopted by the conference at the Admiralty and was carried out by the appointment of Admiral Duff.

 

Jan. 1917   

CONTROL OF TRAFFIC

 

 

4

The German Estimate of British Endurance at Sea

 

When Admiral Duff took charge of the Anti‑Submarine Division the traffic round the British Isles was controlled by a set of orders of which the general principle was that vessels should be kept inside the coastal zone as much as possible.

 

Admiralty control over merchant shipping was, however, more rigorously exercised over outgoing than over incoming traffic, as ships leaving ports in the United Kingdom could be given more detailed instructions than vessels sailing from distant foreign ports. When a vessel was sailing from Great Britain, the local shipping control officers knew from the Admiralty where submarines were operating, and could, in consequence, issue orders and route instructions which might carry her clear of the danger. The case of an incoming vessel was absolutely different. The situation in Home Waters changed from day to day, and an approach route which was tolerably safe when a vessel left America might be highly dangerous when she approached the British Isles. For this reason, the incoming traffic was at once more vulnerable and less easy to protect than the outgoing stream of ships. As far as practicable, Atlantic shipping bound for the Channel was made to approach the European coast to the south of Ushant, then to cross over to the coast of Cornwall and to keep along the inshore route. Ships bound to the Irish Sea and the Clyde made the Irish coast near the Skelligs and then hugged the south coast of Ireland. Vessels bound to the Bristol Channel also kept to the south coast of Ireland as far as the Tuskar, after which they crossed to the Welsh coast and made for their destination.

 

Traffic leaving the British Isles was distributed over four principal routes: one ran from Land's End past Ushant to the southward; another went due west from the Scillies; a third went along the south coast of Ireland to the Skelligs and thence westward; the fourth went through Rathlin Sound to Tory Island on the north coast of Ireland and then due west. The traffic bound to the Skelligs was passed along the Bristol Channel and the Welsh coast and thence to the Tuskar. The system was elaborated by a large number of alternative tracks to the four main routes, and of connecting tracks along which shipping might be diverted from one of the main arteries to another. The general effect of this system of control was to concentrate a very great number of ingoing and outgoing ships on the patrolled routes off the south coast of Ireland and in the Bristol Channel.

 

Admiral Duff decided to work upon the existing lines, and he gave his views upon the future of the campaign in a minute upon one of the numerous suggestions which the Admiralty were then considering. "From Dover to Land's End we are forced to rely mainly upon trawler protection  ..... and the use of a single trade route as close to the salient points along the coast as circumstances will admit, will, I believe, allow of such a patrol being made effective as trawlers become available  .... it may reasonably be hoped that, with a carefully distributed trawler patrol backed and strengthened at intervals by the fastest and best armed yachts available, some 'P' craft and destroyers, together with an organised system of seaplane scouting, enemy submarines will find attack on the surface too risky a business to be ventured upon." Admiral Duff was, however, quite clear that the problem of submarine attack at the entrance to the Channel still had to be dealt with; for the minute continued, "A far more important route, and one for which an efficient patrol must be provided before the spring, is that from the Lizard to Ushant."

 

The Admiralty's first measure was an attempt to bring all Channel traffic on to one continually patrolled track running as close inshore as possible from the Scilly Islands to the mouth of the Thames. They expected that the effect upon the enemy would be to make him "turn his attention to a determined attack on the patrol service, as in mid-channel there will be no shipping other than sailing vessels for him to attack, and lay mines indiscriminately along the route and on a larger scale at the salient points." These dangers would be met by keeping the larger trawlers, fitted with wireless installations, patrolling off the points where minelaying was most likely to occur, and by creating a separate minesweeping organisation to deal with every obstruction as soon as it was reported. The project was sent to most of the senior naval officers on the south coast, and they all pronounced favourably upon it. This measure with regard to the traffic in the Channel was, in fact, one of the principal items in our plan of campaign when unrestricted submarine warfare began.

 

A further measure, and one to which the Commander‑in-Chief attached great importance, was the mining of the Heligoland Bight. Early in January he urged the Admiralty to lay a complete semicircle of shallow and deep mines round the bight from the Rote Kliff bank to Ameland. The barrage,

 

Jan. 1917   

MINING THE BIGHT

 

he suggested, should be watched "by light cruiser and destroyer sweeps at varying intervals with submarine patrols." This very ambitious programme was impossible: to give effect to it 54,000 mines and 1,000 ground mines would have been required, and the Admiralty had not anything like that number available. The plan finally adopted was that of laying independent minefields along the semicircle between Ameland and the Schleswig coast. The initial results were not promising. Three minefields were laid during the first part of the month: one off Borkum, the two others to the west‑north‑westward of Heligoland. On the night of January 25, the minelayers Princess Margaret and Wahine mined a very large area in the central part of the Bight, some seventy miles to the west‑north‑west of Heligoland; simultaneously, submarine E.45 mined the northern exit from the Bight, near Lister Deep. On the last night of the month, the Abdiel laid another field to the north‑north‑west of E.45's, in a position about fifteen miles to the south of the Horn Reefs. These fields accounted for some half‑dozen enemy trawlers; they did not cause the loss of a single outgoing or incoming submarine, and were always discovered after fairly short intervals.

 

The plan of using submarines against submarines was deemed to be most practicable in the enclosed waters of the Flanders Bight. During the last months of the year, the enemy's minelaying campaign had grown in intensity, and Harwich, which was just opposite the enemy's base at Zeebrugge, was particularly menaced. At the end of January 1917, therefore, the Admiralty decided to form a special submarine patrol of eight "C" boats at Harwich, to "intercept the enemy minelayers from Zeebrugge." In addition to this, the Commander‑in‑Chief redistributed the submarines under his immediate orders so as to maintain a continuous patrol between the Long Forties and the Skagerrak, right across the tracks of the outgoing and incoming U‑boats.

 

In the last week of January, just on the eve of the German declaration, an Allied naval conference assembled in Whitehall. "I think it highly essential that we should meet," said the British Premier in his opening address, "and meet at the earliest possible opportunity, to discuss certain matters, for undoubtedly the situation is grave, and is becoming increasingly so. We have had complete command of the sea for two years and a half, in spite of all the efforts of the German navy; but there is no doubt that the challenge to the Allies' supremacy is becoming more serious month by month and week by week. The Germans have discovered what a formidable weapon the submarine is from the point of view of destroying the shipping of the Allied and neutral countries, and the tonnage which is being sunk month by month is alarmingly great, and I am afraid it is going to be increased." No terms of reference could be clearer than this; and indeed the discussions of the next two days (January 23 and 24) were entirely focussed upon the submarine campaign and its implications.

 

After long discussion it was decided that all British battleships in the Mediterranean, with the exception of the Lord Nelson and the Agamemnon, should be called home to provide crews for the destroyers and light cruisers which would be completed during the year. The French delegates undertook to keep a battle squadron permanently stationed at Corfu to compensate the Italians for the loss of the old battleships of the "Queen" class, which were stationed at Taranto. This was, perhaps, the most drastic and far-reaching decision taken; all other resolutions seem merely to have modified the existing system of trade defence in the Mediterranean in points of detail. The zones of control were again altered slightly, and after an exchange of views between the French and British staffs, it was agreed that traffic should be concentrated on the coastal routes in the western basin of the Mediterranean, and that, in the eastern, a combination of the French and British systems should be adopted. Traffic to and from Salonica and the Aegean was to be ordered to proceed along fixed routes, changed frequently; British and Allied traffic between Cape Bon and Port Said was to be dispersed according to the British system. As the losses in the western approaches to the English Channel had been severe during the month, the British Admiralty promised the French a reinforcement of twelve trawlers for the Ushant patrol. (The other resolutions of the conference were concerned with shipping, supplies of raw materials, etc.) These were the last decisions taken before the German declaration of unrestricted submarine war.

 

The German Government issued their declaration on January 31, and it took effect on the following day. It has already been shown that the mistake of those who made it was that they limited their range of vision to what they called "purely military considerations." This was, of course, a limitation forced upon them by what, in their view, was now a desperate position. They refused to take account of the moral and political implications of their decision, because they saw a possible chance of victory in one direction

 

Jan.‑Feb. 1917

HOLTZENDORFF'S CALCULATION

 

and no hope of it in the other. For them moral results were negligible, and political results could only be felt after a certain time, and then only in a certain degree. Tonnage destruction, U‑boat building programmes and the statistics of British seaborne trade were the only data upon which the naval and military commands could now base decision. Their decision was wrong, because it was the product of reasoning in which the essential premises had been misstated or deliberately ruled out; but it resulted necessarily from a logic which to the German military leaders seemed flawless, and no one can fairly judge their error without first realising the effect upon minds such as theirs of Holtzendorff's memorandum upon the certain success of the campaign, and then comparing the results actually obtained with the figures promised. If Holtzendorff was risking defeat, so were we; if we were capable of a supreme effort, so were our enemies. On these two points Holtzendorff was not so far wrong. His calculation ran thus: statistics showed that about 6 3/4 million tons of British and 3 million tons of neutral shipping had entered and cleared from British harbours during the year 1916, and Great Britain was known to have some 900,000 tons of captured enemy shipping at its disposal. England was, therefore, fed and supplied by about 10 3/4 million tons of British and neutral shipping. The German U‑boats, working without restrictions and torpedoing at sight, could be counted upon to destroy 600,000 tons of shipping a month, and at least two‑fifths of the neutral shipping engaged in carrying supplies to Britain would be frightened away from the service.

 

At the end of five months, therefore, Great Britain would lose 39 per cent. of the tonnage employed in carrying her essential supplies, and the loss would be final and irreplaceable. This, in itself, would be more than the country could bear, and the loss of tonnage from U‑boat sinkings might be aggravated by subsidiary losses from special causes. A failure of the American and Canadian harvests, for instance, would drive at least 750,000 tons of shipping to the Australian route; the laying up of neutral shipping would partially close the Scandinavian routes to England, and severely restrict British supplies of margarine and fats. And the shortage of foodstuffs could not, he argued, be combated by a rationing system, because there were not enough officials in England to enforce it. After much more reasoning and marshallling of figures, Admiral von Holtzendorff ended his memorandum thus: "I arrive, therefore, at the conclusion that an unrestricted U‑boat war, started at the proper time, will bring about peace before the harvesting period of the 1917 summer, that is, before August 1; the break with America must be accepted; we have no choice but to do so. In spite of the danger of a breach with America, unrestricted submarine war, started soon, is the proper, and indeed the only way to end the war with victory.

 

The faulty bases upon which the Admiral had built up his structure of argument, his wrong premises and wrong deductions, were mercilessly exposed, months later, by Erzberger. We may pass from them to make a brief survey of the known, admitted facts of submarine warfare; for it was upon their knowledge of those facts that Holtzendorff, Scheer and Ludendorff had founded their confidence in final victory.

 

 

5

The Achievements of Submarine Warfare, 1914‑1917

 

In February 1917 the German Government had 111 boats available for active operations, of which forty‑nine were based on the North Sea ports, thirty‑three on Zeebrugge and Ostend, twenty‑four on Pola in the Adriatic, two on Constantinople, and three in the Baltic. (Michelsen, Der U‑bootskrieg 1914‑1918, p. 183.) Of this total, about a third (thirty‑five to forty) were at work at any particular moment. The building programme of the German Admiralty had suffered from the political uncertainties with which this campaign was surrounded. From September 1915 to May 1916 only mining submarines of the smaller type had been laid down; but in May the naval authorities appear to have decided upon a programme of intensive construction. Thirty-four submarines of the larger type (800 to 1,500 tons) were then put on order; and in February 1917, when the decision to wage unrestricted war was taken, a new and very comprehensive programme was settled in collaboration with the magnates of the shipbuilding industry. The German Government had every reason to suppose that deliveries would be far in excess of losses; for the British naval forces had only been destroying from one to two submarines a month during the previous year.

 

Since the beginning of the war the achievements of the German submarines had certainly not been such as to discourage hopes of their ultimate success. Since August 1914 they had destroyed twenty‑four warships and armed auxiliaries, and they had compelled wide changes in the existing rules of naval tactics. The Grand Fleet could only put to

 

1916‑1917 

AN EFFECTIVE WEAPON

 

sea with an escort of nearly one hundred destroyers, no capital ship could leave its base without an escort of small craft, and the German U‑boats had hampered our squadrons to an extent which the most expert and far‑sighted naval officer had never foreseen. After the operation of August 19 Admiral Jellicoe had decided that it was not safe for his enormous fleet of super‑Dreadnoughts ‑ each one of which could steam for thousands of miles without refuelling - to undertake prolonged operations to the south of the Dogger Bank. The Admiralty, with the full facts before them, had agreed that the Grand Fleet ought not to enter the southern end of the North Sea, unless the German command should commit the High Seas Fleet to some new kind of operation wholly different in scope and character from those upon which they had hitherto ventured. Even with this vital reservation they were accepting a certain limitation of our control of the sea, and this was due solely to the U‑boats and their captains. Had Admiral Jellicoe been confronted only by Admiral Scheer and his battle squadrons, it is inconceivable that he should ever have deemed any part of the North Sea a danger area into which he could only penetrate in quite exceptional circumstances.

 

This novel success of the German submarine must be judged as much by their incidental as by their direct influence upon naval warfare. Amongst these casual effects, their power to force unwieldy and disproportionate concentrations of ships may be counted the most extraordinary. If what may be called the routine operations of naval war were put into lists and classified, it would be found that, just as the operations which began in the Channel on September 6 compelled us to use some thirteen vessels to hunt for two or at the most three submarines, so week by week and month by month we were continually driven to the same absorbing detachment of force.

 

Another striking proof of the effectiveness of the U‑boats was the enormous mass of military forces which they had compelled us to divert wholly or partially from other purposes to the anti‑submarine campaign. In February 1917 about two‑thirds of our destroyer strength, and all our submarines, minesweepers and auxiliaries, were engaged in some branch of submarine warfare. The statement must be reduced to figures and statistics before its significance can be fully grasped.

 

In Home waters and the Mediterranean about three thousand destroyers and auxiliary patrol vessels were engaged in combating the submarine menace, either directly or indirectly; so that every German submarine was diverting some twenty‑seven craft and their crews from other duties by pinning them to patrol areas and forcing them to spend their time in screening, searching and hunting operations which very rarely ended in success. In spite of its enormous numbers, the Auxiliary Patrol had only accounted for seven enemy submarines since January 1916. During the year there had been about one hundred engagements between the U‑boats and the British auxiliary forces; so that when an encounter took place, the U‑boat captain's chances of escaping were about fourteen to one.

 

One of these fights suggested that the chances would be even better as time went on. Late in the afternoon of July 11 three trawlers, Onward, Era and Nellie Nutten, were patrolling together about one hundred and twenty miles east of Girdleness, when they sighted a submarine and chased her. They had hardly opened fire before three other submarines appeared. The fight went completely against the trawlers, and all three were sunk or disabled. The action showed that patrol boats with three‑pounders could no longer hope to defeat well‑armed and controlled German submarines, and a large plan of re‑arming the trawlers was set on foot. It was, however, quite evident that any measures we took could be little more than palliatives. It was beyond our power to provide our auxiliary craft with an armament which would put each one of them on an equality with the latest German submarine; and that, after all, would have been the only remedy.

 

The engagement had, indeed, emphasised one of the most serious aspects of this new form of warfare: improvements were sure to be made in the construction and armament of U‑boats which might at any moment render a great part of our anti‑submarine material obsolete and useless. Not only our trawlers, but the minefields and obstructions upon which we were so largely depending might be found one day to have become suddenly ineffectual.

 

Seldom during the war had we been so forcibly reminded of the limitations which the German submarine fleet imposed upon our squadrons as we were in the autumn of the year 1916. In October the Danish Government, fearing that the Germans might seek to compensate themselves for the pressure of the blockade by invading Jutland and carrying off the cattle and the agricultural stocks, had been giving serious attention to their defence problems; and the British Government had ordered the Admiralty and the General Staff to see what assistance could be given to the Danes in a crisis. In their joint staff appreciation the Government's

 

1916‑1917 

PAST AND PRESENT

 

naval and military advisers had said, that for naval reasons it would be almost impossible to support the Danes at all. "The route to be followed by transports proceeding to Denmark," ran the staff appreciation, "passes within 200 miles of the German principal naval base, from which the German fleet can emerge at full strength at any time it may select. The British fleet would have to be kept constantly at sea to protect the line of communications, and at a strength superior to that of the whole German navy. The enemy may be expected to make full use of his submarines ‑ of which he can always keep twenty in the North Sea to attack our covering fleet and transports; and we should incur heavy losses from submarine attack without necessarily being given any opportunity of making a corresponding attack upon the enemy ... Seeing that the British fleet had held together the most inaccessible states of the coalition against the Directory and the Empire, and that during the long peace of the Victorian era it had sufficed to keep distant countries within the British sphere of influence in politics, the conclusion of the joint staff conference was a striking illustration of the contrast between past and present, and there can be no doubt that the submarine was practically the sole cause of the difference. In the Peninsular War the line of communications between Great Britain and Spain ran closer to Brest than the line between Great Britain and Denmark did to Kiel and Wilhelmshaven.

 

The results of the last eight months of submarine warfare must, however, have seemed highly promising to the German military leaders. Since the Sussex crisis the submarine commanders had been operating against shipping under considerable restrictions. Their official apologist, Captain Michelsen, speaks of it as a dead period; but, in point of fact, it was an extremely important one. Admiral von Holtzendorff overcame Admiral Scheer's opposition to compromise, and resumed restricted submarine warfare at some time in the early autumn of 1916, and before the year was out the U~boats were causing us very considerable losses. The actual events of this phase in the submarine campaign must be reviewed, for they are definitely connected with the decision to wage unrestricted warfare. The total destruction of shipping had risen steadily: in June 1916 the losses, British and foreign, were 108,885 tons, and in January 1917, 368,521 tons; and these results had been obtained by intensifying the warfare in the English Channel and the western approaches to the British Isles. (See Fayle, Seaborne Trade, Vol. III., p. 465.) Here they had operated with considerable immunity from attack. The actions between U‑boats and British and French patrol craft in the Channel area were as follows:‑

 

September. ‑ Three actions: two off the Lizard, one off Start Point.

 

October. - Seven actions: two off the Lizard, two off S. and W. coasts of Ireland; three in the Channel.

 

November ‑ Three actions: all in the Channel.

 

December ‑ Eight actions: four in the triangle Lizard‑Ushant, the Scillies; two between the Casquets and Portland; one in the Bristol Channel; one in St. George's Channel.

 

The success of the campaign in the Channel and to the west of it was, however, very marked and highly important; for it was there that shipping was at its greatest concentration. For several months the German submarine commanders had established and maintained themselves there, and had inflicted heavy losses upon British and French shipping, without torpedoing them at sight. The German Naval Staff therefore had this strong argument in favour of unrestricted warfare: If the submarines could sink 350,000 tons a month, working under restrictions, was it not reasonable to suppose that when freed from restrictions they would succeed in bringing the rate up to 600,000 a month ‑ a rate which would certainly be fatal to Great Britain? Admiral von Holtzendorff's calculation of victory was simply an elaboration of this statement of probable chances. The autumn campaign proved, moreover, that the obstructions in the Straits of Dover, from which we had hoped so much, were not effectively stopping the submarines of the Flanders flotilla. All the sinkings in the eastern, and a considerable part of those in the western part of the Channel were done by the UB and UC boats from Zeebrugee. In October some 70,000 tons of shipping were lost in the Channel, and though the rate fell slightly in the next two months, it was well above 50,000 tons a month during the last quarter of the year. The increase of submarine minelayingy. which was practically always carried out from Flanders, told the same story. The curve representing vessels sunk by mines rose throughout the autumn of the year, until in October it stood at the high mark of 37,525 tons.

 

The order to wage unrestricted submarine warfare was, moreover, given at a time when the overseas commitments of the western Allies were very high. Great Britain and France were then maintaining 770,000 men in Salonica, Egypt and in East Africa. All these forces were being supplied along routes which passed through the area of German submarine operations, and the drafts and reinforcements of our colonial troops in France were carried through

 

1916‑1917 

U‑BOAT IMMUNITY

 

the Bay of Biscay and the Western Channel. The diversion of commercial tonnage to purely military services was already making a serious freight shortage; if the military shipping could be seriously attacked and damaged, the enemy's chances of crippling one of our overseas expeditions were, at least, hopeful. The Germans had, moreover, reason to believe that the U‑boat's method of attack had definitely outstripped all means of defence against it. To fight the submarine danger we were using depth charges, mined nets, deep minefields, hunting patrols of destroyers and P. boats, fixed and floating obstructions, armed ships disguised as merchantmen, and special patrols of submarines ‑ all the coastal routes along which merchant ships had to pass were patrolled by large numbers of trawlers and drifters. Yet the list of losses inflicted during the previous year of war proved that all our measures taken together were not adequately meeting the danger, and that no one weapon or method of attack had yet shown exceptional promise.

 

On the other side of the account, the Germans had lost twenty‑five boats during the year; but this rate of destruction was quite insufficient even to check the campaign. Moreover, of these twenty‑five, five had been sunk by accident or ordinary shipwreck and four more had been destroyed either by Russian minefields in the Black Sea or by Russian destroyers and drifters. The actual figures, compiled from Admiralty returns and the tables given in Andreas Michelsen's U‑bootskrieg, are as follows:

 

Accident and unknown causes.

Destroyers and auxiliary patrols.

Q‑boats.

Submarines.

Minefields.

UC.12

UB.26

(bombs).

U.68

U.61

U.10

UB.7

UC.3

(mine net).

UB.19

UC.10

UB.46

U.20

UB.3

(bombs).

 

 

UB.45

UB.16

U.74

(gunfire).

 

 

UC.15

UC.5

UB.44

(nets and bombs).

 

 

 

 

U.56

(Russian destroyers and patrols).

 

 

 

 

UC.13

(")

 

 

 

 

UC.19

(")

 

 

 

 

UB.29

(")

 

 

 

 

UB.13

(indicator nets and bombs).

 

 

 

 

U.77

(gunfire).

 

 

 

 

UC.7

(depth charge from motor boat).

 

 

 

 

The British navy, therefore, could only reckon on destroying with their existing methods some eighteen to twenty U‑boats a year, or between three and four every two months. The counter‑attack, in short, was not yet sufficiently developed to affect the progress of the campaign.

 

 

6

Unrestricted Submarine Warfare begins - Attacks on the Dover Straits

 

From the German point of view the unrestricted submarine war opened most successfully. In the first week of February thirty‑five vessels, British and foreign, were sunk in the Channel and the western approaches. (See Map 11.) The Admiralty reinforced Queenstown with four Grand Fleet destroyers and the 10th Sloop Flotilla from the Humber:

 

Grand Fleet Destroyers

Magic, 34 knots, 1,042 tons, 11th Flotilla.

Peyton, " , 1,021 tons, 14th Flotilla.

Parthian, " , 1,025 tons, 15th Flotilla.

Narwhal, " , 1,032 tons, 12th Flotilla.

 

10th Sloop Flotilla, under orders of Admiral of Minesweepers

Alyssum, Buttercup, Gladiolus, Mignonette, Poppy, Rosemary

Azalea-class, 17 knots, 1,250 tons, two 4‑inch guns.

 

The destroyers were soon absorbed in escorting ships to the protected coastal route, and Admiral Bayly was left, as before, with only his Q‑boats to operate against submarines. There could be no thought for the moment of detaching more destroyers and small craft to the western area. At a conference held at Rosyth on February 15 the Commander‑in‑Chief urged strongly that a further depletion of his flotillas would be most dangerous. Admiral Beatty was, indeed, most anxious lest the Admiralty should be tempted into diverting a proportion of the light squadrons of the Grand Fleet for special operations in the southern part of the North Sea. The First Lord, Sir Edward Carson, seems to have agreed, and the Admiralty pressed on their policy of concentrating traffic round the British Isles on the patrolled coastal routes. At a conference held at the Admiralty on February 19 it was decided that the war channel which had been established in the early days of the war between the Thames and the Humber should be extended to the Tyne. Measures were also taken to improve the buoying of the channel and to keep merchant traffic to it more rigidly.

 

 

 

Plan - The British and German Dispositions in the Dover Straits, February 25‑26, 1917

 

Towards the end of the month the Germans decided to attempt a fresh attack on the Dover Straits from Zeebrugge. The forces under Admiral Bacon's command had been considerably increased since the first raid in October, and the method of disposing and employing them had been modified. On the night of February 25 two light cruisers, two flotilla leaders, twelve "L," four "H" and one "I" class destroyers, the Viking and two monitors were stationed on the Dover side of the straits. Admiral Bacon had, in addition, a number

 

Feb. 25, 1917 

THE DOVER STRAITS

 

of old destroyers and patrol boats, which were employed in escort duties and traffic control, and could not therefore be treated as part of his striking force. The light cruisers Conquest and Active, with the destroyers Porpoise, Paragon, Unity and Ambuscade, were anchored off Deal, in the Downs, which were guarded, at their northern and southern entrances, by the monitors Erebus and Terror respectively. The flotilla leaders Broke and Faulknor and nine destroyers were at Dover, and five "L" class destroyers ‑ the Lance, Landrail, Lochinvar, Laverock and Laurel ‑ were patrolling in the straits. The method of patrol had been considerably modified: the barrage was now marked by five large light‑buoys (Nos. 5A, 7A, 9A, 11A and 18A), and a destroyer was stationed off each with orders to keep on a patrol line running five miles southwest from each light‑buoy.'

 

(The Germans appear to have numbered these buoys 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively. The British dispositions on the night of February 25 were: the Lance patrolling from 5A buoy; the Landrail patrolling from 7A buoy; the Lochinvar patrolling from 9A buoy; the Laverock patrolling from 11A buoy; the Laurel patrolling from 13A buoy.)

 

The German plan of attack differed on this occasion from previous ones, in that the forces allotted to its execution were very much dispersed. The traffic route between England and the Hook, the Downs anchorage, and the outpost forces on the Channel barrage, were all to be attacked during the night. The second "Z" or Zeebrugge Half Flotilla was to operate in the first zone near the Maas lightship; the first "Z" Half Flotilla ‑ G.95, G.96, V.67, V.68 and V.47 ‑ under Commander Konrad Albrecht, was to operate against the Downs, whilst the 6th Flotilla – S.49 (leader), V.46, V.45, G.37, V.44 and G.86 ‑ under Commander Tillessen, were to attack the barrage. These detachments left harbour between six and seven o'clock on February 25th.

 

The weather was fine but overcast; the moon, which was four days old, was hidden by clouds, and the night was, in consequence, very dark. At half‑past ten the Captain of the Laverock, which was then about three and a half miles to the south‑west of 11A buoy on a north‑easterly course, sighted a destroyer on his port bow, steering south‑west. A moment or so later she burned a red flare; she was evidently the leading destroyer of Commander Tillessen's flotilla, which had just crossed the central part of the barrage. The Germans had detected the British destroyer a few moments earlier, and withheld their fire until they were very near. They opened upon the Laverock at close range, and smothered her with shell; but Lieutenant Binmore, who was quite determined to maintain contact, put his helm over, passed through the rear of the German line and steadied upon the same course as the Germans. The consequences of this manoeuvre are an extraordinary illustration of the hazards and uncertainties of a night action. Commander Tillessen was satisfied that he had passed the Laverock on an opposite course. When he sighted her again on his starboard quarter, and on the same southerly course as himself, she seemed to him to be not one destroyer but three, and he was convinced that he was now in action with a whole detachment.

 

The fire from the Laverock's guns must have been extraordinarily rapid and well sustained, for Commander Tillessen never discovered his mistake, and turned to a northerly course at about 10.40. Lieutenant Binmore saw the enemy turn and made after them; but his impressions and those of his opponent were quite different. It seemed to Commander Tillessen that the German flotilla was following a detachment of British destroyers, which was altering course gradually towards the French shore: Lieutenant Binmore was quite certain that he was following the German flotilla. The two forces lost contact a few minutes before eleven and Commander Tillessen re‑crossed the barrage at about eleven o'clock. He intercepted a signal from the Laverock, reporting the engagement, and upon this decided that a surprise attack upon Dover ‑ which he had originally intended to deliver ‑ was no longer practicable, and he held straight on for his base. The other British destroyers kept to their patrol stations. Admiral Bacon at Dover got news of the Laverock's encounter at about eleven o'clock, and at once ordered out the destroyers in harbour. Before they could get to sea, however, the German force under Commander Konrad Albrecht had struck at the second point of attack, the Downs anchorage.

 

A line of armed drifters was spread every night across the northern entrance to the Downs from the North Foreland to the North Goodwin light‑vessel. At eleven o'clock the John Lincoln, at the inshore end of this line, near the North Foreland, sighted a line of destroyers, about a mile to seaward of her, on a northerly course. She watched them and sent up an alarm rocket when they opened fire a few minutes later. The German destroyers sent down a number of shells in the fields near the wireless station at the North Foreland and then bombarded Margate and Westgate for a few minutes. By twenty minutes past eleven they had fired their last rounds and were making off to the north‑eastward. As soon as the commanding officer of the Porpoise division saw the green rocket and sighted the firing he ordered his division

 

Feb. 25‑27, 1917

A FALSE IMPRESSION

 

to weigh. The light cruisers and destroyers passed the Gull at about 11.17 and were off the Elbow light‑buoy at twenty minutes to twelve. They sighted nothing; but they must, at times, have been quite near to a small detachment of two boats ‑ V.47 and V.67 ‑ which Commander Albrecht very imprudently sent towards the Gull, and which remained on patrol between the Gull and the Elbow buoy for the next hour. The Dover destroyers under Captain Percy Withers in the Viking cleared the harbour at about twenty minutes past eleven with orders to spread on a patrol between the South Foreland and Calais. Just after half‑past eleven Captain Withers was ordered to take his division towards Ramsgate. He was recalled at midnight; for none of our forces had detected the presence of the two German destroyers between the Gull and the Elbow buoy and Admiral Bacon was under the impression that the whole German force had retired.

 

The Admiralty received Admiral Bacon's report of the night's work without comment. From the shortness of the bombardment and the rapidity with which the Germans withdrew it was clear that they knew quite well that we were defending the straits with forces far too powerful and numerous for them to oppose in any serious encounter. They had, it is true, every freedom to repeat these harassing night operations when they chose; but the attack had been so entirely fruitless that the risk was no longer worth taking: the Straits and the Downs seemed to be sufficiently safe under the existing dispositions.

 

It was satisfactory to know that this vital point in our sea communications was well covered; but the month of February ‑ the first month of unrestricted submarine war ‑ ended gloomily. The first effect of the German declaration apparently promised to justify Admiral von Holtzendorff's prophecy. Neutral shipping was abandoning the North Sea; Norwegian, Danish, Dutch and Swedish ships suspended their voyages, and neutral ships in British harbours refused to clear. (For full details, see Fayle, Vol. III., Chap. III.)

 

In its purely military aspects the campaign was equally serious. It was evident from the outset that the western approaches to the British Isles would be the decisive theatre in the campaign against shipping. It was here that the oceanic routes converged, and as approaching and outgoing shipping was very much concentrated and obliged to follow certain routes, it could not possibly be defended by the method of dispersion. The western approach was, in fact, a sort of focal area, which could not be avoided and which was too large to be thoroughly patrolled and watched. On February 1, when the campaign began, five German submarines were at work in the area, and their disposition showed that the German naval staff was thoroughly acquainted with our existing traffic routes. A large U‑boat was stationed to the west of Mizen Head, and was attacking ships as they approached the patrolled route along the south coast of Ireland. Another was cruising between Mizen Head and the Scillies to pick up ships which avoided the coastal zone. A third was operating to the west of the Scillies; and a fourth was at work off Trevose Head, right on the patrolled route which ran round the Bristol Channel, and on which a large proportion of the Atlantic shipping was concentrated. The fifth, a boat of the UC type, was in the Channel between Portsmouth and Havre.

 

These dispositions were, as a whole, maintained throughout the month, although the proportion of U‑boats to UC‑boats varied; and the total number of operating submarines was sometimes increased to eight, when boats passed through the area on their way to the Mediterranean. The campaign was in many ways disquieting for us. Throughout the month the UC‑boats from Belgium passed into the Channel through the Dover barrage, which seemed hardly to impede them. The obstruction, which had been begun in September 1916, now stretched right across the entrance to the Straits from the South Calliper to the West Dyck, and it seemed as though the enormous amount of material and labour expended upon it had been almost wasted. It was even more serious that the German submarine commanders were proving that they could operate with impunity quite close to those patrolled and defended routes which were the basis of our whole system of defence.

 

A large submarine on the Bristol Channel route was not attacked or even disturbed by the auxiliary patrol vessels in the area. Half‑way through the month, (February 11 and 12) a UC‑boat cruised right along the outer edge of the patrolled route in the Channel, which Admiral Duff had recently reorganised and reinforced, and sank merchant shipping as she went. The inference was thus irresistible that the mosquito craft of the auxiliary patrol could not adequately protect shipping on the routes they were watching, or even drive submarines away from them; and if that was so, then the whole system of massing shipping along special routes must be considered unsound. It was even more ominous that the German submarines were operating with small risk of being brought to action, and in any case with very little danger of destruction. During the month there were thirty‑

 

Feb. 5, 1917

Q.5 OFF IRELAND

 

nine encounters between German submarines and British patrol and destroyer forces in Home Waters, and on only three occasions was a German submarine sunk. It was therefore not only very difficult to find and engage a U‑boat, but even when this was achieved the chances of escape were thirteen to one in the German's favour. Of the sunken submarines two had been destroyed in the North Sea, and only one in the western approach area. The German losses for the month were:

 

UC.39 on February 8 by H.M.S. Thrasher, near Flamborough Head.

UC.46 on February 8 by H.M.S. Liberty, in the northern entrance to the Straits of Dover.

U.83 on February 17 by H.M.S. Q.5, off the south‑west of Ireland.

UC.32 on February 23 on a mine off Sunderland.

 

Such a rate of destruction was quite insufficient to check the campaign; but the one successful action in the western area deserves to be placed on record, for it shows not only what strenuous and highly disciplined efforts were necessary, and what risks must be accepted, in order to engage and defeat a single Uboat, but also to what degree these risks and difficulties had been increased by the change from restricted to unrestricted submarine war.

 

On February 9, 1917, Admiral Bayly reported to the Admiralty that he intended to station one "Q"‑ship off the north coast of Ireland, one inside the triangle formed by the Scilly Isles, the Tuskar and the Blaskets, and all the remainder of these vessels to the south and west of Ireland. Amongst those whom he sent to the south‑western approaches was Commander Gordon Campbell, whose name has not yet been mentioned in this work, but who had already earned a high reputation in the Q‑ship service. His method of operating was a bold and simple one. His ship, Q.5, which had been an old collier named the Farnborough, was manned by a crew mainly drawn from the Mercantile Marine and the R.N.R., and trained by their commander to a high point of intelligence and self‑control. The ship's part on falling in with a U‑boat was to behave in every way as a common tramp, to misunderstand the enemy's signals, and finally to lie to, as if helpless, when fired upon. The crew would then abandon ship with well‑acted panic, leaving on board only the commander and a few concealed gunners with the masked battery. Commander Campbell during the earlier months of 1916 had by these means on two occasions induced a U‑boat to come to the surface within easy range of him, with the intention of sinking the supposed tramp by gunfire; but in both cases it was the Farnborough's gunners who had sunk their enemy.

 

Commander Campbell had run up the white ensign at exactly the right moment, the shutter which concealed the battery had been simultaneously dropped, and some twenty rounds had ended the engagement. It was soon known, however, that the German submarine officers had received orders to be more cautious in approaching their prey, even when apparently helpless; and when the unrestricted campaign began, the Farnborough's method appeared to be no longer a possible one, for even a genuine tramp was now to be treated on the same footing as a warship, and torpedoed at sight without warning. Commander Campbell determined to accept the new danger and outbid it: in order to perfect his disguise and secure his action at close range, he ordered his officers on watch to manoeuvre deliberately so as to get the ship torpedoed. The most cunning or apprehensive U‑boat commander would hardly suspect a sinking vessel; and before she sank she might well get her chance.

 

The Q.5 was one of the largest and best armed of the vessels employed in submarine decoying: she was of 3,000 tons, and had an armament of five 12‑pounders, two 6‑pounders and a maxim. She sailed from Queenstown on February 9, and cruised for over a week without sighting anything, or hearing anything but the distress calls of vessels all around her. The weather was extremely bad, but on February 17 it moderated, and at a quarter to ten Q.5 was about thirty‑five miles to the west‑south‑west of the Great Skellig, on an easterly course. No one on watch was aware that a submarine was about until a torpedo was reported coming straight for the ship from the starboard side. The torpedo being so well aimed, no manceuvring was necessary to ensure being hit; Commander Campbell merely put his helm over to try and save the engine‑room. In this he was only partly successful, for the torpedo crashed into the foremost part of number 3 hold, and burst the after engine‑room bulkhead. The chief engineer at once reported that the engine‑room was filling, and received in reply the order to "hold on for as long as he could and then hide."

 

"Action" was then sounded and all hands went quietly  to stations previously arranged. Every man except those required on board for the fight then abandoned ship in two lifeboats and one dinghy ‑a fourth boat was partly lowered, with carefully acted confusion. Commander Campbell lay concealed on the bridge and watched the submarine's periscope about a cable's length away. She was the U.83, one of the Germans' newest boats, under the charge of Lieutenant-Commander Bruno Hoppe. He had been out of Germany for

 

FEB. 17, 1917

U.83 DESTROYED

 

three weeks, which he had spent in raiding the Scillies area. Captain Hoppe was entirely deceived as to the real state of affairs; he approached Q.5 slowly, with his vessel still submerged, and Commander Campbell saw U.83 pass down his starboard side under water about ten yards away. The temptation to open fire was almost unbearable; but Commander Campbell resisted it, thinking it better to wait until the enemy had broken surface and exposed himself. He did so when about 300 yards on the Q‑ship's port bow, and again moved slowly past her. A minute or so later he was on a bearing from which all our guns could bear, and was enveloped in a hurricane of bursting shell. There was no missing at such a range, and all was over in a few minutes. "He finally sank," wrote Commander Campbell, "with his conning‑tower opened and shattered, and with the crew pouring out." The "cease fire" was sounded, and one of the lifeboats was sent to their assistance; but of the whole crew one officer ‑ a sub-lieutenant named Boenicke and a seaman, were the only ones who could be saved: the rest had perished in the explosion of the U‑boat and in the dense oil from her which covered the surface.

 

Commander Campbell had now to look to his own ship: the engine‑room and two boiler‑rooms were filling rapidly, and she appeared to be sinking. In response to a signal, the Narwhal, Buttercup and Laburnum arrived early in the afternoon. Q.5 was taken in tow and the four ships made slowly for Buncrana, at times almost in desperate conditions. When they reached harbour at half‑past nine on the following day Q.5 had a list of nearly twenty degrees and her stern was "nearly eight feet under water."

 

The venture, then, was completely successful, and it was not the last of Commander Campbell's successes; but it could not be held to have solved our problem, for it could not be repeated with sufficient frequency or certainty. It proved only that a large and specially equipped ship, with a highly trained crew under fine leadership, might with exceptional good fortune strike a U‑boat off the list and yet escape destruction herself. But the stake was a heavy one, both in men and material, and the output of the German submarine yards could not be kept down by rare successes, however brilliantly won. The sky was lightened by a momentary flash: the darkness remained and deepened. During February 540,000 tons of shipping, British, Allied and neutral, was sunk. Twelve vessels had been destroyed in the North Sea, twenty‑five in the Channel, seven in the Irish Sea, fourteen in the Bristol Channel, eleven in the approaches to the Scillies and eighteen in the approaches to the Fastnet. There was nothing yet in sight to show that Admiral von Holtzendorff's forecast was an over‑sanguine estimate.

 

 

7

Further Attacks on the Dover Straits

 

There were now clear indications that the submarine campaign was diverting to itself the main resources and energies of both sides. Admiral Scheer speaks of a sacrifice of personnel and of material by the High Seas Fleet to the U‑boats, and he adds that it affected the efficiency of his battle squadrons. The British Admiralty had also become aware of a change: they had good reason to believe that in the months which had elapsed since the battle of Jutland the increased superiority of the Grand Fleet had been tacitly recognised, and that in the present circumstances the High Seas Fleet was not likely to be employed in any serious movement. On March 11 they wired to the Commander‑in-Chief that he should use his destroyer flotillas freely for hunting the enemy's submarines.

 

 

Plan - The British and German Dispositions in the Dover Straits, March 17‑18, 1917

 

The message reached him three days after a successful and not unimportant experiment. On March 2 he had ordered the submarine commander at the Tees to send two G‑boats north to patrol between Scapa and Norway. (The "G" class were submarines of 695 tons surface displacement; they were armed with one 3‑inch gun and five torpedo tubes.) The order was evidently given in pursuance of his new policy of keeping a submarine patrol at work across the track of the U‑boats which used the north‑about route. The boats sent on this duty were G.13 and E.49, and their experiment was successfully carried out, though their fate was widely different. E.49 was lost on a mine in Balta Sound on March 12; but four days earlier Lieutenant Bradshaw in G.13 torpedoed and sank UC.43 off Muckle Flugga, and thereby proved that it was not impossible to waylay a U‑boat on the passage to its hunting ground. The Commander‑in-Chief decided that it was worth while to strengthen the attack upon these routes; he therefore called up two more submarines from the Tees (G.7 and G.8), and ordered the Scapa submarines to watch an area west of the Fair Island channel and to the south‑west of the Orkneys. After receiving the Admiralty telegram to use his destroyers more freely, he also made arrangements for keeping a division of destroyers in the Fair Island channel whenever submarines were reported.

 

March 17, 1917  

A DESTROYER RAID

 

These were the first steps of a policy which later became the essence of our offensive anti‑submarine campaign: that of using concentrated specially composed forces in operations thought out beforehand with the same degree of precision as coastal bombardments, landings and cruiser sweeps. It was, in fact, the beginning of the transition from the patrolling or watching system, which had hitherto held the field, to the new system of concerted operations. The alteration in our plan of war seems not to have been based upon theory or discussion, but to have been suggested by experience and instinct, as an opening may be suggested in the heat of conflict to a swordsman of the aggressive temperament.

 

Soon after these decisions had been taken, the guerrilla warfare in the Flanders Bight blazed up afresh. On Saturday March 17 the Admiralty received warning that some movement was impending in the southern part of the North Sea, and a warning was accordingly sent to all local commanders. Admiral Bacon did not alter his dispositions for the night, which were substantially the same as those in force at the time of the previous raid. Four destroyers were maintaining the barrage patrol: the Laertes (senior officer) was off 5A buoy; the Laforey off 7A; the Llewellyn off 9A; and the Paragon off 11A. In the small Downs, off Deal, were the light cruiser Canterbury, the flotilla leader Faulknor and the destroyers Saracen, Viking, Mentor and Ambuscade. The monitors Erebus and Prince Eugene were anchored off Ramsgate at the northern entrance to the Downs. The flotilla leader Broke and the destroyers Myngs, Lucifer, Linnet, Lochinvar and Morris were in reserve at Dover. The Admiralty had correctly assumed that the German forces were moving; for the flotillas at Zeebrugge were about to raid the straits.

 

This time the forces allotted to the attack were more concentrated than in the previous raid. The half flotilla which in February had been ordered to operate against the Dutch traffic route had cruised fruitlessly off the Hook for three and a half hours and had returned to harbour with nothing to report. Such quarry as was to be found was evidently in the Dover Straits and its northern approaches; it was, in consequence, in this area alone that the available German forces were ordered to operate. Commander Tillessen, who was in charge of the operation, divided the area to be attacked into three zones.

 

The first was to the west of a line joining buoy number 7A on the barrage to light buoy number 9. He himself was to operate in this area with the 6th Flotilla ‑ (S.49 leader; G.86, G.87 ‑ 11th Half Flotilla under Lieutenant‑Commander Rilmann ‑ and V.43, V.45, G.37, V.46 ‑ the 12th Half Flotilla under Lieutenant‑Commander Lahs). The second zone of operation was to the east of the line joining the two buoys; it was allotted to Commander Konrad Albrecht, who commanded the first Z half flotilla ‑ V.67, V.68, G.95, G.96 ‑ from the leader, V.47. The third zone ‑ the Downs anchorage was allotted to Lieutenant‑Commander Zander who led the second Z half flotilla (S.15 leader; S.18, S.20 and S.24). The peculiarity of this allocation of force was that the attack upon our most important position ‑ the Downs ‑ was entrusted to the weakest of the three operating detachments. Commander Tillessen took great precautions that the German advantage of being able to open fire at sight, and without challenge, should not be prejudiced by any possible confusion between the operating forces. Not only were the areas allotted to each detachment most strictly defined: their lines of approach were kept distinct. Commander Tillessen was to approach the barrage from the north and west of the Sandettie; Commander Konrad Albrecht was to keep the bank on his starboard hand, and cross the barrage near buoy 11A.

 

The German flotillas left harbour between 6 and 8 p.m.; Commander Tillessen crossed the barrage at about 10.35; Commander Konrad Albrecht was about a quarter of an hour behind him on the other side of the Sandettie, and the 6th Flotilla first came into contact with our destroyers. The Paragon was just completing her run to the south‑westward when Commander Tillessen was crossing the barrage considerably to the eastward of the track assigned to him in his orders. At 10.50, whilst the Paragon was on a northeasterly course towards number 11A buoy, the look‑out men sighted the leading destroyers of the 6th Flotilla, steaming across her bows. The commanding officer challenged, and they replied with torpedoes and gun‑fire. Before his signalmen had completed the challenge a torpedo struck the engineroom, and his destroyer was in a heavy shell fire. In a few moments all was over, the depth charges on board exploded and the Paragon broke in two and sank. There were only ten survivors.

 

But in spite of all his precautions Commander Tillessen was not able to secure himself against the hazards and uncertainties of a night action. When the German destroyers opened fire, Lieutenant‑Commander Lahs commanding the 12th Half Flotilla saw, or thought he saw, the leading boat of the flotilla turning to starboard. He therefore led his half flotilla round to starboard, and by so doing lost touch with the rest of the force. Realising that if he followed and regained contact, Commander Tillessen would probably open

 

March 17, 1917  

SUCCESSIVE DISASTERS 

 

fire upon him ‑ for the essence of the German plan was evidently that all who were fallen in with should be treated as enemies ‑ he steered straight back across the barrage and made for home. When the Paragon was sunk, Commander Konrad Albrecht was just leading his half flotilla across the barrage; he saw the explosion on his starboard bow but for the moment he kept to his course.

 

The explosion was sighted by most of our destroyers on patrol; but they did not all account for it in the same way. The Llewellyn, the next on patrol, reported to Dover that there was "heavy firing in the direction of Calais," the Laforey concluded from the explosion that one of the destroyers on patrol had been mined, left her station and came into a mass of wreckage at about eleven o'clock. She then turned on her searchlight and signalled by visual to the Llewellyn that a ship had blown up, and that she required her assistance to pick up survivors. The Llewellyn was by then on her way; and Commander Tillessen was also returning to the position.

 

For a few minutes after his action with the Paragon, he held his flotilla to its south‑westerly course; then he turned, and steered back. He passed the wreck of the Paragon at about eleven o'clock, and about ten minutes later sighted the Laforey's searchlight astern of him, playing upon another destroyer. He at once turned into the straits again, and in a few minutes came up with the Llewellyn. The Germans kept their guns silent; but G.87 and S.49 each fired a torpedo; one of them struck the fore part of the Llewellyn and brought her up. Commander Tillessen steamed on to the south‑west, and five minutes later established contact with Commander Konrad Albrecht, who on sighting a second detonation, and seeing searchlights, had decided to leave his zone of operations and concentrate upon the 6th Flotilla. The two forces turned north‑eastwards in company and passed the barrage without incident at about half‑past eleven.

 

Commander Tillessen's decision to deliver his second attack with torpedoes only, may have been due to sound judgment or to mere hazard: it certainly turned to his advantage. The Laforey and Llewellyn were in company when the Llewellyn was struck; neither commanding officer sighted another destroyer, and the Laforey's captain was convinced that both the Paragon and the Llewellyn had been attacked by a submarine.

 

These successive disasters left only the Laertes on the regular patrol; for her commanding officer heard no sound when he sighted the explosion, and concluded that what he saw was the flare of an iron foundry near Calais. Soon after, however, he took in a detailed message reporting to Dover that the Paragon and Llewellyn had both been torpedoed off 11A buoy. He then steamed towards the eastern end of the barrage. When he arrived near the buoy he fell in with the Llewellyn, which was still able to steam stern first. The German boats were nowhere to be seen, and the Laforey had made off to the north‑eastward to search for the submarine which the commanding officer believed had done the damage.

 

The Admiral at Dover was hampered by uncertainty as to what was actually happening in the straits. He received the report from the Llewellyn that there was heavy firing in the direction of Calais, and almost simultaneously Calais reported that firing had been observed. Soon after, he received a signal from the Laforey that she was picking up survivors, and on this he ordered his reserve force into the straits (11.20 p.m.). Just after he had done so he received a further report from the Laforey which ran: "Paragon and Llewellyn torpedoed two miles S.W, of 11A buoy - Paragon 10.50, Llewellyn 11.15. Llewellyn while picking up survivors." This confirmed his assumption that an enemy force was in the straits, and he signalled to the commanding officer of the Broke to "keep his boats together and look out for the enemy."

 

Although half an hour had gone by since the Germans had first appeared, there was still a chance that they would be brought to action if they came westward. Just after he had issued his last instructions to the Broke, another message came in from the Laforey. The commanding officer now reported that the Paragon and Llewellyn had been attacked by submarines, and this obviously altered the whole position. It was useless to send more destroyers into a submarine trap which had already ensnared two boats; so Admiral Bacon cancelled his first order, told two "P" boats (The "P" or patrol boats were vessels of between 600 and 700 tons displacement, armed, generally, with one 4‑inch and one or two 12‑pounders.) (numbers 11 and 21) to go to the patrol line and hunt for a submarine between 11A buoy and the French coast, and ordered the Laforey and Laertes to retire five miles westward and keep up the patrol at high speed (11.50 to 11.55 p.m.). The Broke was just clear of the harbour when she received this second signal: she turned back at once and anchored in Dover harbour at midnight. No further news came through for three‑quarters of an hour; but the enemy had not yet struck their last blow.

 

At about eleven o'clock Lieutenant‑Commander Zander with his small detachment had sighted the lights of the

 

March 18, 1917

ADVANTAGES OF OPPORTUNITY

 

British coast near the North Foreland. As he had been ordered to turn back at one o'clock, he was rather ahead of time, so for the next hour and a half he cruised to and fro on an east and west course, at slow speed. Towards 12.30 a.m. he closed the northern opening of the anchorage.

 

The northern entrance to the Downs was guarded, as usual, by a line of drifters spread out between the Broadstairs Knoll and the North Sand Head; a torpedo boat (No. 4) cruised to the south of them. Normally no merchantmen were allowed to anchor north of the Gull; but on March 15 the s.s. Greypoint had been forced by engine trouble to anchor about a mile east of Broadstairs Knoll buoy; she was still there on the night of the raid.

 

Just after half‑past twelve (March 18) the drifter Paramount sighted three destroyers approaching from the north-eastward; she was then, apparently, somewhere near the Broadstairs Knoll buoy. They replied to her green rocket with an outburst of gun‑fire, directed against all the drifters in the neighbourhood, sank the Greypoint with a torpedo, and passed out of sight on a south‑westerly course. A few minutes later they turned and opened fire on Ramsgate and Broadstairs. Meanwhile, the Canterbury's division slipped their cables and got under way (12.42 a.m.); but almost as they did so, the bombardment ceased, and Lieutenant-Commander Zander withdrew. Torpedo boat No. 4 was then near the Gull, and at ten minutes to one her commanding officer sighted three enemy destroyers to the west of him, firing towards the land. He reported this to the Canterbury and strove to keep touch; but the Germans had the heels of him. Soon after one o'clock he lost sight of them near the Elbow buoy, steering eastwards at high speed. Admiral Bacon knew from several messages that the shore was being bombarded, and just after one o'clock he received a further message from the Laforey to say that it was destroyers and not submarines which had attacked the barrage patrol. He recalled the "P" boats at once, and waited for news from the Downs division, which he knew was under way. The Canterbury, Faulknor and the destroyers reached the North Goodwin light‑vessel at a quarter‑past one; but by then the enemy had disappeared and the raid was over.

 

This was the second occasion on which the German destroyers had attacked the straits and inflicted loss upon our defending forces. They must have known the difficulties of our position and their own advantages of opportunity so that there seemed every reason to suppose they would go on and turn these raids upon the straits into a regular destroyer war of attrition. "The enemy," wrote Admiral Bacon in his report, "need only keep a rigid lookout, when close to the straits, for one hour, and fire a torpedo at everything he sees and run away. The enemy can vary the time of attack at will and choose their night. They can predetermine whether to 'shoot and scoo ' or to carry out a more or less prolonged attack. The best disposition of my destroyers differs in each of these two forms of attack."

 

Some days after the raid Admiral Bacon discussed the whole question at the Admiralty, and altered his dispositions for the defence of the barrage. His revised orders, issued five days after the raid was over, divided the barrage into an eastern (7A light buoy to Calais) and a western (5A light buoy to the South Goodwins) patrol. Each was to be watched by a flotilla leader and a detachment of destroyers, steaming parallel to the barrage instead of at right angles to it as hitherto. These new dispositions were apparently only to be put into force "when the enemy showed a desire to raid the straits," that is, presumably when Admiral Bacon had some warning of impending activity.

 

His standing or normal dispositions for guarding the straits are easier to understand from diagrams than from detailed descriptions.

 

 

 

 

Plans - Dover Straits Dispositions

 

It seemed to the Admiralty that the enemy intended to follow up their success rapidly and energetically; for on March 23 news came into Whitehall that a new destroyer flotilla had reached Belgium from Germany. Commodore Tyrwhitt was at once ordered to move his available forces into the Swin, and the Commander‑in‑Chief was directed to send six destroyers to Harwich. For three nights special precautions were taken in the whole Thames and Dover Straits area. It then became evident that the new German flotilla did not intend to act as rapidly as had been expected, and Commodore Tyrwhitt was directed to take his force back to Harwich.

 

For many weeks past the Admiralty had been considering a set of proposals from the Commander‑in‑Chief, who wished to assemble a powerful submarine flotilla in the northern part of the North Sea. They had not agreed to his principal suggestions; but had decided to use submarines as a trade route patrol in the western approaches. The submarine flotillas were accordingly re‑arranged and redistributed round the bases of the British Isles, in a plan of re‑organisation which came into force at about the end of March. The Queenstown flotilla was increased to seven units (3 D. and 4 E.), and six boats (3 D. and 8 E.) were stationed at Lough

 

March 1917   

RISING LOSSES

 

Swilly; the remaining changes were not so important. (See Appendix B.) As the Admiralty had not felt able to give the Commander‑in-Chief the additional submarine flotilla for which he had asked, he called up the entire 10th Flotilla from the Tees and based it at Scapa. When it arrived, he organised it into three patrols: the Muckle Flugga, the Bergen‑Lerwick and the St. Kilda. By this means he hoped to keep the submarine routes to and from the Atlantic, and the Scandinavian traffic routes, under continuous observation. It was too early to say whether this re‑organisation of our submarine flotillas would affect the course of the campaign.

 

When the month of March opened there was a slight lull in the enemy's attack upon the western trade routes; but it was soon ended. On March 5, a U‑boat of the larger type settled on the track between the Start and the Lizard, and five other boats were in the Irish Sea: one well out to sea, three others closer in and one other ‑ a UC‑boat ‑ between the Nymphe Bank and the Scillies. They held these positions for roughly four days; but on the 9th the attack shifted to the eastward, and eight submarines were reported between the Channel and western Ireland. Three submarines ‑ each of a large type were then settled on the patrolled track of incoming shipping. One worked between the Tuskar and Queenstown, the second off the north coast of Cornwall, and the third off the south Devon coast near the Start. This attack upon the areas where our defensive forces were strongest and most concentrated lasted for a whole week, and it was not until the 17th that it was relaxed.

 

On that day we located three submarines between the south coast of Ireland and the Great Sole Bank to the west of Ushant. A UC‑boat had relieved the large U‑boat to the south of the Start, and another UC-boat was cruising in mid‑Channel between Ushant and Portland. The inshore attack had, however, been carried to the French coast with telling effect, and from the 17th a UC-boat operated against shipping in the Ushant area. The French patrols were as little able to dislodge or disturb her as our own further north, and by the end of the month twenty‑seven more steamers and sailing vessels had gone to the bottom between Abervrach and La Rochelle. In our own waters the pressure off the west coast of Ireland became slightly less severe after the 20th; but two UC‑boats were then located in the Start area, where they operated without let or hindrance until the 24th. On the 21st another UC-boat opened operations in the St. George's Channel off the Smalls; she then moved north into the Irish Sea and remained there, sinking ships rapidly until the end of the month. Like her consorts in other areas, she was practically undisturbed by our counter measures.

 

Between March I and 31 the German submarines sank 353,478 tons of British and 220,363 tons of Allied and neutral shipping at the cost of four boats, three of which were lost in the North Sea. In the western approaches and the Mediterranean the enemy lost only one submarine, and the distribution of sinkings showed that the attack upon the western approaches was rising in severity. When we came to examine the situation at the end of the month, it was found that twenty‑three vessels had been sunk in the North Sea and on the East coast, thirty‑one in the Channel, nineteen in the Irish Sea, thirty‑eight in the western approaches between Ireland and Ushant, nineteen in the Bay of Biscay south of the Penmarc'h, and seventeen in the Mediterranean.

 

The High Naval Command did not attempt to conceal that the situation was getting out of hand. A "review of the naval situation," presented to the Government at the end of March, contained passages which deserve close attention. "The blockade [i.e., the German submarine blockade] has now been in operation for some weeks, and the experience gained of it is sufficient to demonstrate the serious nature of the menace. Even if we could rely upon the average number of the enemy submarines operating during the next six months as not exceeding that of the last month, it must be recognised that, with the advent of longer days and finer weather, the offensive capacity of the submarine will greatly increase. As a matter of fact, we are faced with the certainty of an increase, month by month, in the number of hostile submarines." This was an outspoken admission that our counter measures were insufficient even to hold the danger at bay. It is true that the Admiralty referred later to new methods of war ‑ which were not then in force and could not be tried for several months yet ‑ but they drew no conclusion that they would turn the scale; all that they felt justified in saying was that these new methods of war must be "put against" the "certain increase" in the enemy's activity.

 

 

The British and German Dispositions in the Dover Straits, April 20‑21, 1917

 

After reviewing the losses already caused, the Admiralty paper continued: "As regards probable losses in the near future, a not unreasonable estimate is considered to be 500,000 tons (Allied and neutral) during March, increasing possibly to 700,000 tons in June. From that month onwards some amelioration of the situation may be expected." It required but little foresight to see that if the Government

 

March 7, 1917

THE DEFENCE OUTSTRIPPED

 

agreed that this rate of loss was inevitable and beyond remedy, they were admitting that defeat was in sight: the "ameliorated situation" towards which the Admiralty was looking as a possibility was not one which would save the country from disaster and famine. The paper admitted, in the plainest terms, that the attack had outstripped the defence, and the third month of unrestricted submarine warfare opened gloomily.

 

Meanwhile Admiral Bacon had thought out a plan for retaliating upon the German flotilla at Zeebrugge. The Air Service reported to him that a certain number of the destroyers in the canal always slipped and went outside during an air raid. This, in Admiral Bacon's opinion, gave him an excellent chance of using some of the coastal motor boats which had been attached to his command for months past. An air raid was planned for the night of the 7th, and four coastal motor boats and the destroyer Falcon were ordered to co‑operate in it and attack any German destroyers that they might find outside the harbour when the raid was over. Falcon was attached as a supporting vessel. She left at dark and anchored at the eastern end of the banks off Dunkirk, ready to give assistance to the motor boats if they required it. The motor boats left Dunkirk at a quarter‑past nine in the evening, so as to be off Zeebrugge two hours later, when the air raid began. (CMB No. 4, Lieutenant W. N. T. Beckett, RN, in charge of the detachment; No. 5, Acting Lieutenant F. C. Harrison, RN; No. 6, Lieutenant A. Swann, R.N.V.R.; No. 9, Lieutenant A. Dayrell Reed, R.N.R.)

 

The weather was not particularly good; but they were not in difficulties until they cleared the banks of the Zuidcoote pass. The seas then washed them down continuously, and the labouring of the boats put a severe strain on the engines. Just after eleven o'clock they arrived at a light‑buoy which the Germans had laid out to mark a minefield to the north of Zeebrugge. Lieutenant Beckett now turned to the south, with his boats behind him in the order 4, 9, 5, 6, and made for the Wielingen channel, where he hoped to find the enemy. He was not disappointed: on approaching the channel he found four destroyers at anchor, with their heads to the westward, as the tide was then flooding into the Scheldt. The boats now attacked in order. Lieutenant Beckett approached to within about three cables of the western destroyers and fired. He missed, and at once turned to the northward to watch. The others were luckier. "After a pause of two or three minutes," wrote Lieutenant Beckett, a terrific explosion occurred and a destroyer was observed to be enveloped in smoke and water." (The torpedoed destroyer was G.88. (Sunk – Conway's))

 

The boats had all delivered their attack in a few minutes, but some of them were in great danger. Lieutenant Beckett had ordered all his colleagues to retire to the north‑north‑west across the German minefield when they had fired their torpedoes. His own boat was filled with fumes and gas owing to the breakdown of one of his exhausts, and Lieutenant Harrison's boat had completely broken down, and lay under heavy fire in the beam of a destroyer's searchlight. For a whole five minutes she lay helpless, but thanks to the skill and energy of the motor mechanic the engines were re‑started and Lieutenant Harrison escaped to the northward at 20 knots. The Germans, it seems, were completely taken by surprise, and there was no pursuit: the motor boats reached Dunkirk between 4 and 5 in the morning with their crews utterly exhausted. (All the officers and men were decorated. Lieutenants Harrison and Dayrell Reed received the D.S.O.; Lieutenants Beckett and Swann received the D.S.C.; the remainder were given D.S.C.'s and D.S.M.'s.)

 

We have seen that a new German destroyer force had gone to Flanders during the last week in March. It was the third flotilla, composed of the fifth and sixth half flotillas. For nearly a month it remained at its bases, and was not ready for its first enterprise against the Dover Straits until April 20. Its operation orders were signed and issued on the previous day by Commander Kahle. They were based upon the same division of the Straits of Dover into zones, allotted to specified detachments of the operating forces; but they differed in certain important details. First, no force was to be sent to the Downs: the straits alone were to be raided; secondly, the senior officer of the flotilla ‑ Commander Kahle - was to control the operation from ashore.

 

Experience of previous raids had shown that it was best to exercise command from the place where all British reports and orders were collected and deciphered. This place was the general headquarters of the Naval Corps, at Bruges; it was from here, therefore, that Commander Kahle, the senior officer of the flotilla, was ordered to take charge.

 

This was a new method of exercising command. We had certainly never centralised the control of offensive operations in the Flanders Bight, in anything like the same degree. During raids Admiral Bacon did, it is true, control the movements of our destroyers from ashore; but this was very different from what the Germans were doing. Admiral Bacon commanded from ashore when he was taking counter measures

 

April 20, 1917    

MORE DESTROYER RAIDS

 

against a surprise attack: Commander Kahle was ordered to control a deliberately planned operation from an office, many miles away. The Admiralty frequently ordered forces at sea to return to their bases, when they learned that the enemy were taking counter measures; equally frequently they had ordered that operations should be postponed, if the situation demanded it; but when once our forces had sailed the senior officer had always been in absolute control. The intelligence upon which Commander Kahle was to rely for controlling an entire operation was, by us, always transmitted to officers commanding at sea, as advisory information.

 

For the rest, the operation orders were drafted upon previous models. Commander Gautier, in charge of the 5th Half Flotilla, and one boat from the 6th Half Flotilla - V.71, V.73, V.81, S.53, G.85 and G.42 ‑ was to operate in the part of the straits which lies to the north and west of a line joining the Sandettie Bank and the Colbart; he was to attack all outpost forces found within his zone of operations, and was to bombard Dover in so far as our counter measures left him the opportunity to do so. Commander Konrad Albrecht in V.47, with a "Z" Half Flotilla, and two boats from the 6th Half Flotilla ‑ G.95, V.68, G.96, G.91 and V.70 ‑ was to operate on the southern and eastern side of the Sandettie-Colbart line, and was to bombard Calais if he thought it feasible.

 

The Admiralty had no indications of a coming raid, and Admiral Bacon had not, in consequence, been given any special warning. His chief anxiety was still the shipping in the Downs, which had just been raided by aeroplanes carrying torpedoes. His dispositions in the straits were normal. At 8.30 a.m. on April 20 Commander E. L. Cardale in the Nugent sailed with the Matchless, Morris and Amazon for the daylight patrol, and spread them across the straits from west to east in this order as soon as they reached the barrage. At dusk the last‑named three destroyers closed the Nugent and patrolled the eastern side of the barrage in company between 7A buoy and Calais. Shortly afterwards (7.45 p.m.) the destroyer leaders Broke and Swift left harbour to patrol "as a division" between the South Goodwin light vessel and buoy No. 5A. As guns had recently been mounted at the North Foreland and Foreness, the Downs division was not so powerful as it had been before. On the night of the 20th the light cruiser Carysfort, the flotilla cruiser Active and the destroyers Laertes, Laverock and Afridi were at anchor in the small Downs; the monitor Marshall Ney was anchored off Ramsgate. During the morning the Vice‑Admiral had ordered the Falcon, the Racehorse, torpedo boat No. 15, the Crane and "P" boat No. 50 to maintain the coastal patrols between Margate and the western limit of his command for the next twenty‑four hours. The reserve, or striking force, known as the first division, consisted on this night of the destroyers Myngs, Miranda, Saracen (1st Sub‑Division); Mentor, Lydiard, Lucifer (2nd Sub‑Division).

 

Although the Admiral had provided as well as he could against any contingency that might arise at sea, he was anxiously aware that the enemy's raids upon the straits might at any moment create an awkward situation. He kept his reserve of destroyers at Dover as much for the protection of the town and anchorage as for the reinforcement of the outer patrols, and he calculated that if any German destroyers ever attacked Dover his own forces would be in action with them a quarter of an hour after they opened fire. If, then, the shore defences opened at once upon the flashes of the enemy's guns, there would be a danger that our own destroyers might be in the line of fire. He therefore proposed that the General Commanding ashore should not open fire upon bombarding forces until the Vice‑Admiral told him it was safe to do so. To this the General could not agree, and the Admiralty, realising that the matter ought to be settled as quickly as possible, arranged that the local naval and military authorities should confer together at Whitehall; but the meeting had not taken place, and the point was consequently still unsettled, when the raid occurred.

 

Between a quarter‑past six and seven on this night Commanders Gautier and Konrad Albrecht left harbour to raid the straits; Commander Albrecht struck the first blow at Calais: at about ten minutes past eleven his detachment appeared off the town and shelled the surrounding country for about five minutes. The Nugent, patrolling with her division to the westward of her patrol line, sighted the flashes and steered towards them for a few minutes. The gun‑fire then ceased, and Commander Cardale at once returned to his patrol station. The Swift and the Broke, at the western end of the barrage, also sighted the gun‑fire, and thinking that the Nugent's division might be in action, steamed eastwards to support Commander Cardale. About a quarter of an hour later they intercepted a signal from the Nugent to the Vice-Admiral at Dover, saying that there were gun flashes to the S.S.E. This proved that the Nugent was not engaged, so the Swift and Broke at once turned back for their ordinary patrol (about 11.30 p.m.). No more was heard of the Calais

 

April 20‑21, 1917

WILD SHOOTING

 

detachment for the rest of the night; but a few minutes later Dover was attacked.

 

The Sabreur, a trawler on the coastal patrol, was the first to sight the German destroyers. Just before half‑past eleven skipper Robert Scott, whose trawler was then off a wreck‑marking vessel to the south‑east of Dover, sighted a group of destroyers to the southward. They opened fire on him, and hit his ship once or twice; but he put out his lights and managed to get away to the westward. The Germans at once opened on the town, and the shore batteries replied: it was now about 11.30. The German fire was extremely wild, "a considerable number of shells were fired blindly into the county of Kent"; but Admiral Bacon did not apparently feel free to send out his first division until the bombardment was over. At a quarter to twelve he ordered it to go outside, but not to proceed further without orders. He cancelled this order a few moments later, and it was not until five minutes to twelve that he sent out the six destroyers of that division.

 

(The destroyers of the reserve division did not all leave harbour at the same time. The first sub‑division (Myngs, Miranda, Saracen) sailed at once; the second sub‑division (Mentor, Lydiard, Lucifer) was not clear of the entrance until nearly half an hour later.)

 

By then firing had ceased and the Germans were well on their way back to the barrage.

 

When the Myngs left harbour all the destroyers in the Straits were at their regular stations. The Swift and the Broke had both sighted the gun‑fire off Dover, but did not know what had occasioned it. Shortly after midnight the senior officer of the first division signalled to the Broke that he was approaching with six destroyers; as our boats had so frequently been handicapped by the difficulty of distinguishing between friend and foe this was a wise precaution. In order to secure himself further against any possible confusion or misunderstanding, the senior officer decided to patrol between the South Goodwin and the eastern entrance to Dover harbour, and signalled his intentions to Commander A. M. Peck in the Swift (12.19). This line of patrol only touched the area being watched by the Swift and Broke at one point ‑ the South Goodwin ‑ so that there was now little chance of any mistake or delay in opening fire if strange destroyers appeared suddenly in the zone covered by one of the three British detachments in the straits.

 

They did appear, and for a somewhat curious reason. Commander Gautier reached the barrage at about a quarterpast twelve; he had seen nothing of our outpost forces except the Sabreur and was indeed ahead of the forces we had sent out against him. He was well ahead of time, and he seems to have decided that he ought not to return to harbour without making some attempt to attack the forces which had been put down in his operation orders as his first objectives; he therefore turned westward towards the southern entrance of the Downs. Although this new move was in fact taking his flotilla straight into our concentration, some of the German commanders seem to have thought themselves safe, and to have relaxed their precautions. Commander von Arnim of G.42, at all events, gave orders that the crews of the guns and torpedo tubes could "fall out."

 

Meanwhile Admiral Bacon, who knew of nothing which could hold the Germans back, had practically given up all hope of intercepting or of bringing them to action. At midnight he asked Commander Peck in the Swift if he had seen anything of the enemy's destroyers, and was told in reply that they had not been sighted. (The flotilla leaders, it would seem, had not previously been told definitely that there were enemy destroyers in the straits.) Shortly after receiving this answer from the Swift Admiral Bacon recalled the first division (12.25 a.m.). The second sub‑division, which was then only just clear of the harbour entrance, at once returned; the first sub‑division, which was now patrolling between the South Goodwin and Dover, turned to obey the recall; but in a few minutes the whole situation changed.

 

On learning that the reserve destroyers were at sea, Commander Peck of the Swift shifted his line of patrol slightly to the eastward, and at a quarter to one he was on a westerly course, about three miles to the east of the light vessel; the Broke was in station astern of him. He was just about to turn to the eastward when the lookout reported destroyers on his port bow. At the same moment his ship came under fire, and ten seconds later he could make out flares from the funnels of five or six boats, steaming on an opposite course to himself. They were Commander Gautier's division which was now steaming eastward towards the centre of the barrage. Commander Peck at once gave orders to open fire, and put his helm hard a starboard to ram the nearest destroyer. He missed her, for the Swift passed through the enemy's line and was hit several times in the next few minutes; but, as she passed through, one of her torpedoes seemed to hit a German destroyer, and her lyddite shell fire was very telling. Commander Peck was blinded by the flash of his fo'c'sle gun, and when he recovered his sight he was told that his wireless was out of action, and that there were four feet of water on the stokers' mess deck. The

 

April 21, 1917    

TWO DESTROYERS SUNK

 

German destroyers were to the east of him and he followed in chase.

 

Commander E. R. G. R. Evans, who was in charge of the Broke, sighted the German destroyers at the same instant as his colleague and acted in the same way. He put his helm hard over to ram the nearest boat; but at the same moment his torpedo gunner fired a torpedo which seemed to hit. Thinking that it would be useless to ram an enemy already so badly damaged, Commander Evans steadied his ship again for a few moments, and then put his helm hard a starboard for a second time, to ram a destroyer further down in the enemy's line. The Broke crashed into her abreast the after funnel, and for a few minutes was incapable of any further manoeuvre. The rammed destroyer was G.42; there were apparently two boats astern of her, and as they steamed up to the Broke, which was still lying helpless with a mass of wreckage upon her stem, they poured a heavy and destructive shell fire into her. It was some minutes before Commander Evans got clear, and then, finding that his ship was "going ahead still with a fair turn of speed," he followed after the Swift, which was to the eastward, chasing the retreating Germans. Behind him he could see the wreck of a German destroyer which was blazing fiercely.

 

A minute or so later reports from his subordinates showed him that his ship was so damaged that he could not possibly join in the pursuit. One of the boiler‑rooms was badly injured, and steam was falling rapidly; the enemy's shells had exploded a number of cartridges on the deck, and the starboard side of his bridge was burning. He therefore put his helm over, and turned towards the scene of the action. When he reached it, he found that the German destroyer which he had rammed was sinking by the stern, and that, near by, another German destroyer (G.85) was lying helpless and in flames. Desperate as their position was the Germans gave no signs of surrender, and opened fire on the Broke as she came near. Commander Evans replied, and silenced them; but simultaneously his engines stopped, and his ship drifted helplessly towards the burning destroyer. "After we had silenced her, she blazed even more furiously, and I feared that the foremost magazine would blow up before she sank. By this time my stem was nearly touching her, and the engineer sent up to say that he could not move the engines more. I replied that we must go astern if possible or we might blow up." It was now about twenty minutes past one.

 

Help was not far off. The firing which began at a quarter to one, when the Swift and Broke first fell in with the German destroyers, was sighted from all parts of the straits. The Nugent's division heard it, and Commander Cardale very properly decided to remain where he was; the second sub-division, which, as we have seen, had just returned to harbour, slipped for the second time during the night, and made towards the gun flashes. On clearing the harbour Lieutenant-Commander A. J. Landon signalled to the senior officer of the first division that he was taking his sub‑division towards the firing. At about a quarter‑past one he came up to the Broke, which was then drifting helplessly about near the blazing destroyer: he took her in tow at once and sent a message through to Dover asking for tugs. The rest of the night was spent in getting the Broke back to harbour, in sinking the two German destroyers and picking up survivors.

 

We had not destroyed two German destroyers without loss to ourselves: the Broke had forty killed and wounded aboard her when she returned to harbour; the Swift one killed and four wounded. Both ships were in dockyard hands for several weeks. But the success of the night's work was in a sense decisive. It warned the German High Command that if they continued to raid the straits they could no longer count upon inflicting greater losses then they suffered themselves. After a certain amount of experimenting Admiral Bacon had worked out a set of dispositions which provided adequately for all contingencies, and made it fairly certain that if enemy destroyers ever entered the straits again they would not leave them without being seriously engaged.

 

For many months to come the enemy avoided the narrow waters; and his next enterprise, which took place three days later, was directed against Dunkirk. (Thomazi, La Guerre navale dans la zone des armees du nord, p. 177.) On the night of the 24th a group of destroyers approached the town and bombarded it for several minutes; they then made off to the eastward and sank the French destroyer Etendard, which very boldly engaged them. One of the trawlers on patrol the Notre Dame de Lourdes ‑ was much damaged by their gun‑fire, but managed to get back to Dunkirk. The British monitors in the anchorage and the destroyer Greyhound opened fire on the enemy's destroyers, but the attack was not sufficiently sustained for their fire to be effective.

 

April 23, 1917

A GRAVE WARNING

 

 

8

The Submarine Campaign, April 1917

 

The Admiralty's review of the naval position and of the submarine campaign was circulated to the Government during the last week in March, but was not discussed. On April 23, therefore, nearly a month later, Admiral Jellicoe presented the Government with another memorandum upon the naval situation.

 

The new paper, though not in substance more alarming than the last (See ante, p. 370.), was even more gravely worded. "It is necessary," he wrote, "to call the very serious attention of the War Cabinet to the increasingly heavy losses of our merchant ships by mine and submarine attack. It appears evident that the situation calls for immediate action." The figures which followed at once explained and justified these words. In the first fortnight of the month (April 1917) the German submarines had sunk 419,621 tons of British, Allied and neutral shipping, and the rate of destruction seemed to be rising. On a single day, April 20, 27,704 tons of British shipping were reported sunk, and 29,705 on the following day. It was quite obvious that such a rate of loss, if continued, would bring about a crisis. The First Sea Lord's remedy was that more destroyers should be built, that the United States (America declared war against Germany on April 6, 1917. See ante, p. 275.) should be asked to send more ships; and that more merchant shipping should be laid down, either in the form of small ships, or of very large unsinkable ships for which he could provide escort.

 

Admiral Jellicoe then dealt with his plan of preventing the German submarines from leaving the German Bight by intensive mining. He admitted that the policy had not been successful, but attributed the failure to faults in material and design. "I have reason to fear," he wrote, "that our present pattern of mine is not satisfactory against submarines; otherwise it is hardly credible that with the large number that have been laid in the last four months the losses in German submarines would not have been very heavy." A new pattern of mine had been designed; but there would be no deliveries before July. In the rest of the paper the First Sea Lord recommended building up reserves of foodstuffs while the shipping still existed, and laying down a number of very large, unsinkable vessels which would suffice to carry the country's essential supplies.

 

The statements in this very important paper must obviously be related to the known facts of the position at sea. From the language he employed, the First Sea Lord made it quite clear that he still held to the general plan which the High Naval Command had adopted nearly four months before; that is, he hoped to master the German submarines or to hold them in check by multiplying the weapons used in our existing methods of attack. "The various methods of attack," he wrote, "are by bombs dropped from aircraft, by depth charges dropped from patrol vessels, by paravane attack, and by heavy shell in the nature of depth charges fired by patrol vessels. The only immediate remedy that is possible is the provision of as many destroyers and patrol vessels as can be provided by the United States of America." Quite obviously, therefore, the First Sea Lord did not then contemplate any fundamental alteration in our entire system of defence. It is not difficult to understand why his reliance on light craft, and more particularly on destroyers, still left him in grave anxiety. From the beginning of the war to the end of March 1917 there had been one hundred and forty‑two actions between German submarines and British destroyers, and the destroyers had only sunk their opponent in six of them. When therefore a German submarine commander fell in with a British destroyer, though he would certainly have to submerge and perhaps to change his ground, still his chances of escaping destruction were about 28 to 1.

 

Apart from this, light craft were, actually, being built and delivered very fast ‑ since the beginning of the year, five cruisers and light cruisers and thirty‑seven destroyers had been put into commission ‑ but these additional light forces had not raised the monthly rate of German submarine losses, which was still remarkably low. In the western area, where the position was serious, there were now seventy destroyers ‑ eight at Queenstown, forty‑one at Plymouth, and twenty‑one at Portsmouth ‑ yet these seventy units had not sunk a single German submarine since the unrestricted warfare began. (These were the numbers on April 23, 1917, the date affixed to the First Sea Lord's memorandum.) Possibly the First Sea Lord was right in thinking that fast light craft were the best answer to the submarines that we possessed; but it was becoming apparent that they were not being used in such a way as to achieve the desired result.

 

As for the mining policy adopted at the beginning of the year, Admiral Jellicoe was quite right in admitting that it had not been successful; and here again we can understand

 

April 7, 1917

MINELAYING AND MINESWEEPING

 

the cause of its failure. We now know that just as we had always managed to keep traffic moving from and to our ports, in spite of the German minelaying, so too the Germans had been able by the same means to defeat our mining operations. Since the beginning of January we had laid thirty‑one fields in the Bight. They had always been discovered before they caused serious loss, and as soon as they were known to exist the necessary measures had been taken to clear them, or to discover their exact position and to mark them suitably. This, of course, was not definitely known at the time; but if German mining had never seriously interrupted the commercial traffic round the British Isles, it needed some faith to believe that the ninety‑six German submarines in Germany and Flanders would ever be pinned to their bases by British mines, or even that they would suffer any serious losses when entering or leaving harbour, seeing that they could always choose their time of sailing or return, and need never move until all the necessary precautions had been taken.

 

Several naval officers thought ‑ Admiral Beatty was one of them ‑ that our minelaying had achieved nothing because the original plan of laying a barrage across the Heligoland Bight and keeping it continuously patrolled had not been adhered to. This was an explanation, and perhaps a sufficient one; but it is obvious that the plan was only workable if it was actually within our power to drive off German sweepers whenever and wherever they were at work. Knowledge and experience acquired later make it doubtful whether the original project could ever have been carried through.

 

On April 7 the Admiralty received information which seemed to suggest that a force of German auxiliaries would shortly be operating somewhere in the neighbourhood of the Horn Reefs light vessel. The Commander‑in‑Chief, when informed, sent out the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron under Rear‑Admiral Lambert; the Champion (flotilla cruiser) and twelve destroyers to intercept the Germans. The attack was unsuccessful, partly, no doubt, owing to the difficulty of co‑ordinating a combined operation in novel circumstances, and partly because an unexpectedly strong current set them both away from the line along which the German auxiliaries which we afterwards ascertained to be sweepers ‑ were working. It is none the less significant that all through the night of April 8 our cruiser and destroyer forces were operating inside the area which German sweepers were reconnoitring, and that the Germans, in spite of this, were able to complete their work and return home unmolested. If a single operation was subject to so many hazards and required such forces for its execution, it is easy to understand how difficult it would have been to attain our first object of keeping a continuous effective watch off our mine barrage in the Bight, and of driving off the German forces that would certainly have attempted to clear a passage through it. Yet nothing less would have sufficed: it was upon the possibility of this continuous effective watch that the entire plan depended.

 

In any case, the time was now past for what must be a long and uncertain experiment. The situation was so urgent that its possibilities and needs were starkly outlined: the moment was at hand when a final method must be adopted; the choice would bring about our deliverance or leave us for the first time in history at the mercy of our enemies. Experience had cleared the ground, the rest depended upon the judgment, and perhaps still more upon the imaginative conviction of our naval leaders. It was evident that, setting aside all palliatives or gradual remedies, the problem forced upon us by the successes of the U‑boat commanders could be dealt with in one of two ways: either our whole forces must be thrown into the attack upon the German submarines, or else the defence of our merchantmen must be made the first consideration and the anti‑submarine offensive the second.

 

Between these two alternatives the highest naval opinion was still sharply divided. Admiral Jellicoe and Admiral Duff had decided for the first quite early in the year, and it is clear from the language that he used in his memorandum to the Government that Admiral Jellicoe had not changed his opinion after three months of unrestricted submarine warfare. He still hoped that if the destroyer patrol could be reinforced and more liberally supplied with offensive weapons, the German submarines could be driven from the shipping routes, or else be made to operate at such a disadvantage that they would cease to be dangerous. Admiral Beatty held the opposite view: he considered that the existing system of defensive patrolling by trawlers and of offensive patrolling by destroyers was wrong in principle, and that the whole second line fleet of cruisers, destroyers, sloops, "P" boats and armed trawlers should be used for escorting merchantmen through the dangerous areas. These two conflicting opinions will be found clearly expressed in the words of their most authoritative exponents.

 

 

Plan - Diagram Showing the Progress of the Submarine Campaign, June 1916 To April 1917

 

Early in April a conference had assembled at Longhope to consider the question of protecting Scandinavian trade. The officers present decided that the trade ought to be convoyed

 

April, 1917

SCANDINAVIAN TRADE

 

along the coastal route and across the North Sea.(Grand Fleet destroyers had been covering the trade route between Lerwick and Bergen for about a week past.) Admiral Beatty endorsed their recommendations, in a letter which, although it was concerned only with the immediate proposals, contained a strong expression of opinion upon convoy as a strategical principle. After stating that the proposals for the Scandinavian trade were an "alteration in the policy hitherto adopted," he went on: "It is necessary to decide the relative urgency of: (i) protecting and patrolling the coast, (ii) protecting traffic along the coast. At first sight it would seem that these two objects are similar, and that if the coast is patrolled and protected, traffic should be able to proceed safely along it. Experience has shown, however, that this is not the case: patrols have given little, if any, security to shipping during the war; submarines attack vessels close to the coast and mines are continually being laid off the shore.

 

" Escorts have, however, proved an effectual protection, and a system of escorts does, to a large extent, fulfil the conditions of a patrol, the escorting vessels being placed in the best position for meeting and attacking hostile submarines.

 

It is manifestly impracticable to provide an escort for each individual vessel, the only alternative is to introduce a system of convoys ..."

 

Although the Admiralty were prepared to allow the Scandinavian trade to be placed under escort, they seem to have been decidedly at issue with Admiral Beatty upon the general principle involved. The opinion which at the time prevailed at the Admiralty was that, if merchantmen were placed under convoy, then the escort would have to be twice as numerous as the ships escorted. The Admiralty's advisers did not share the view, which was then not uncommon, that a comparatively weak escort would suffice. It was because their doubts were so strong that the Admiralty could only approve, with serious misgivings, the plan of placing Scandinavian trade under convoy. They were, however, prepared to sanction further experiment, and the S.N.O. Gibraltar was informed that a system of convoy was to be tried on the Gibraltar route. They were presumably willing to reverse their opinions on the general principle if the results were satisfactory. The Commander‑in‑Chief was allowed to give effect to the plan recommended by the conference at Longhope. An escort force of twenty‑three destroyers was collected from the seventh (Humber and Tyne), eighth (Rosyth), and Cromarty flotillas; and a further escort force of between fifty and seventy trawlers was assembled from the patrol areas between the Orkneys and the Humber. As a temporary measure, a flotilla leader and eight destroyers were also detached from the Grand Fleet to Lerwick for convoy duties. Much now depended upon the results obtained by the new system; but whilst it was being tried cautiously in the North Sea, the situation elsewhere was passing beyond, our control.

 

During the month of April the German submarine commanders operated against shipping by the methods which have already been described, and their attack rose to a zenith of efficiency. The patrolled routes were almost as severely attacked as during the previous month, and on the outer routes the situation was worse than it had ever been before. One trail of destruction spread fanwise into the Atlantic from the south‑west point of Ireland, and another from Land's End. During the month efforts were made to concentrate shipping on a route which approached the coast of Ireland along the latitude of Galway Bay, but quite fruitlessly. Sinkings were thickest in a rough quadrilateral between the parallels of 51û and 53û N. and the meridians of 12û and 15û W. The central point of this zone of devastation was about one hundred and seventy miles due west from Berehaven, in the open waters of the Atlantic, where permanent patrolling was impossible. (See Map 11.) The hope that the German submarine commanders would be less destructive when compelled to depend upon torpedoes instead of gun‑fire proved to be ill founded. It seemed rather that they now torpedoed vessels by deliberate choice, in order to lose no time. Over thirty vessels were sunk within the area to the west of Berehaven, and every one of them had been torpedoed at sight. The use of the torpedo had increased with the rising list of sinkings. In January about eighty vessels had been sunk by gun‑fire for every thirty ships torpedoed; in April the proportion was entirely reversed, and about 60 per cent. of the total sinkings were done with the torpedo.

 

In the Mediterranean the situation was equally dark. On the advice of the Admiralty, the French naval command had recently altered their system of defence. The traffic between France and Salonica was still kept to a fixed patrolled route, but that between Cape Bon and Port Said was put on to tracks which were varied as found necessary. The French were, moreover, pressing on with a system of aeroplane patrolling from which they hoped for good results: aviation centres were being set up at Camaret, Susa and Bona, and advanced stations, which they called "postes de combat,"

 

April 28‑30, 1917   

ALMOST DESPERATE

 

were established at Tabarka, Kelibia, Collo, Mostaganem, Beni Saf, Cette and Marseilles; the large force of 300 aeroplanes was allotted to the service.

 

The sinkings in the Mediterranean had fallen during March; but in April the submarine commanders completely outpaced the defence, and in the Mediterranean, as elsewhere, the curve of sinkings rose to an apex. By the end of the month the German submarines had destroyed 881,027 tons of shipping, at the cost of two UC‑boats (numbers 68 and 30). Since unrestricted war against shipping had begun, they had sunk over 2,000,000 tons of merchantmen, and the losses to their operating forces had been two U‑boats, seven UC's and one UB, and of these only seven had been destroyed by British forces acting against them: one of the remaining three had stranded on the Dutch coast, another had sunk on her own mines, the third had been lost from unknown causes.

 

The position resulting from our devastating losses appeared at the time to be almost desperate. Sir Leo Chiozza Money made an exhaustive analysis of the position, and, after allowing for replacements in merchant tonnage by building, repairing and purchasing from abroad, he reported to the Government that the 8,394,000 odd tons of shipping in the import and export service of Great Britain would probably be reduced to 4,812,000 at the end of the year; the total carrying capacity of this tonnage would be between 1,600,000 and 2,030,000 tons per month, and of this 1,425,000 would be required for food and cereals. The conclusion was obvious: nothing would be left for the necessary transport of troops and stores, the export of coal and all the import business of the country, and Great Britain, the prop and support of the whole coalition, would collapse.

 

Everything, indeed, combined to show that the Allies were really within sight of disaster. The lists of sinkings, the numbers of successful attacks, the increasing use of the torpedo, the moderate rate of German submarine losses all told the same story. Admiral von Holtzendorff's prophecy of victory was apparently verging towards fulfilment, and only a change in our system of defence could turn the tide.

 

 

 


 

 

APPENDIX A

 

PRECAUTIONS AGAINST RAIDERS DURING 1916

(See Map 14.)

 

Rumours that a raider was about to put to sea were circulated in June, July and October.

 

On May 31, the Commander‑in‑Chief was told that the Moewe, or an old cruiser of the Niobe class, would shortly leave Wilhelmshaven. Admiral Jellicoe sent the Donegal to reinforce the 10th Cruiser Squadron, and ordered Admiral Tupper to spread his ships on a line between Muckle Flugga and Iceland. On the 3rd June the Commander‑in‑Chief, who was uneasy about the safety of the Archangel route, ordered the Donegal and three ships of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron to patrol. Special precautions against raiders continued until June 11.

 

During the afternoon of July 8 the Admiralty telegraphed to the Commander‑in‑Chief that fairly reliable information had been received from Copenhagen that a new Moewe would leave Kiel for the North Sea and Atlantic at 5 p.m. on Sunday, 9th, accompanied by four or five torpedo boats. She was described as having two sloping funnels, painted dark grey all over, of slender build like a light cruiser, very high speed. Two Light Cruiser Squadrons with eight destroyers were sent from Rosyth to patrol an area 80 to 100 miles off the Norwegian coast, through which it was expected that the raider would have to go.

 

The 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons sailed at 4.30 p.m. on 9th to carry out these orders.

 

The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron with six destroyers was also ordered further north to ensure a daylight intercept of hostile vessels; two cruisers, Donegal and Shannon (2nd Cruiser Squadron) were sent north of the Shetlands (between 63û and 65û N.) with a destroyer each for boarding purposes. The local patrol was strengthened between these cruisers and the Shetlands.

 

The Gabriel and a half‑flotilla of destroyers patrolled the Fair Island Channel from 5 a.m. on 11th.

 

No enemy ships had been seen by the usual patrols up to 9th.

 

These intercepting dispositions remained in force till 12th, when the Admiralty informed the Commander‑in‑Chief that no news could be obtained about the raider, and the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons returned about noon to Rosyth. The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron swept to the southward, and returned to Scapa on 18th. The Donegal and Shannon also swept to southward and returned to Scapa by 7 p.m. on 14th.

 

There was another alarm of a raider on 21st, when the Inconstant and Cordelia (1st Light Cruiser Squadron) sailed at 3 a.m. to sweep in the direction of Horn Reefs from a position near the Naze, with orders to keep clear of the area of submarine activity. The enemy submarine track was said to run in a north‑westerly direction from Ameland, with one or two boats stationed on it as far as 70 miles from land. The light cruisers returned on 23rd without having sighted anything.

 

As a result of a conference held in October, the Commander-in‑Chief made out a set of standing orders for intercepting raiders. When the order was given, the intercepting forces were ordered to take up "disposition number one," if news of the raider had been received before she had reached latitude 59û N.: if she had passed it, they were ordered to take up "disposition number two."

 

In December these arrangements were put into force. The departure of the Moewe on November 22 was kept entirely secret; but shortly after midnight on the night of December 9/10, the British Minister at Christiania wired home that a "German ship of war" was about to pass Haugesund and go out to sea at Skudesnaes. (See p. 197 n.) This information was sent to the Commander‑in‑Chief, who was told that it was essential that the raider should be stopped.

 

The Commander‑in‑Chief at once ordered the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with three ships of the 4th and seven destroyers, to take up "disposition number one," and ordered up the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron from Rosyth to serve as a relieving force to the ships of the 1st and 4th. Two flotilla leaders and four destroyers were sent to occupy Fair Island Channel. These dispositions remained in force until the 14th.

 

 

 


 

 

APPENDIX B

 

SUBMARINE ORGANISATION IN HOME WATERS

 

 

S/M Flotilla Nos.

August 1914.

 

December 1914.

January 1916.

August 1916.

(Renumbered)

March 1917.

(Reorganised)

Under orders of

Local Defence

Over-

seas

Under orders of

Local Defence

Over-

seas

Under orders of

Local Defence

Over-

seas

Under orders of

Local Defence

Over-

seas

Under orders of

Local Defence

Over-

seas


1st

C.-in-C. Devonport

2

-

C.-in-C. Devonport

2

-

C.-in-C. Devonport

2

-

C.-in-C. Rosyth

4

-

C.-in-C. Rosyth (Hawkscraig)

1

-

2nd

C.-in-C. Portsmouth

4

-

C.-in-C. Portsmouth

4

-

C.-in-C. Portsmouth

4

-

R.A. E. Coast (Tyne)

8

-

R.A. E. Coast (Tyne)

4

-

3rd

R.A. Dover

6

-

Cdre. (S.) (Yarmouth)

5

-

Cancelled. S/M's to Dardanelles

 

R.A. E. Coast (Humber)

-

10

R.A. E. Coast (Humber)

2

-

4th

R.A. Dover

8

-

R.A. Dover

10

-

R.A. Dover

10

-

C.-in-C. The Nore

6

-

C.-in-C. The Nore

3

-

5th

C.-in-C. The Nore

6

-

C.-in-C. The Nore

6

-

C.-in-C. The Nore

6

-

V.A. Dover

12

-

V.A. Dover

5

-

6th

Ad. of Patrols (Humber)

6

-

Ad. of Patrols (Humber)

7

-

Ad. of Patrols (Humber)

8

-

C.-in-C. Portsmouth

3

-

C.-in-C. Portsmouth

2

-

7th

Ad. of Patrols (Tyne)

3

 

A.C.C.S. (Leith)

4

-

A.C.C.S. (Leith)

8

-

C.-in-C. Rosyth (Clyde)

3

-

-

-

-

7th

A.C.C.S. (Leith)

6

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

 

-

-

8th

Cdre. (S.) (Harwich)

6

19*

Cdre. (S.) (Harwich)

-

22

Cdre. (S.) (Harwich)

-

21

Capt. (S.) (Yarmouth)

-

12

Capt. (S.) (Yarmouth)

-

10

9th

 

 

A.C.C.S. (Clyde)

4

-

A.C.C.S. (Clyde)

3

-

Capt. (S.) (Harwich)

-

25*

Capt. (S.) (Harwich)

11

17

10th

 

 

 

Ad. of Patrols (Tyne)

5

-

Ad. of Patrols (Tyne)

4

-

C.-in-C. (Tees)

-

12*

C.-in-C. G.F. (Tees)

-

12*

11th

 

C.-in-C. G.F. (Blyth)

-

12*

C.-in-C. G.F. (Blyth)

-

12

12th

 

C.-in-C. G.F. (Scapa)

-

7**

C.-in-C. G.F. (Scapa)

-

9

13th

 

 

C.-in-C. G.F. (Scapa)

-

7**

C.-in-C. G.F. (Scapa)

-

2

Platypus'

 

 

V.A. Coast of Ireland (Queenstown)

-

8

Vulcan's

 

V.A. Coast of Ireland (Lough Swilly)

-

6

 

Note: * = Numbers incomplete.            ** = Not ready.

A, B, C classes. About 300 tons; speed on surface 12 knots (nominally). D, E, F, G, H, J, K classes. Various - 600-900 tons, later 1000-2000 tons. Speed - 14-19 knots on surface: some 24 knots.                            

 

on to Naval Operations, Vol. 5

or return to World War 1, 1914-1918

 

revised 2/10/13