Mesopotamian Campaign and other Despatches, World War 1

1918

30462 - 4 JANUARY 1918

WESTERN FRONT

ARMY DESPATCH dated 25 December 1917

(excerpt)

War Office, 8th January, 1918.

The following Despatch has been received by the Secretary of State for War from Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, K.T., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., Commanding-in-Chief, British Armies in France:

General Headquarters, British Armies in the Field. 25th December, 1917.

My Lord,

I have the honour to submit the following Report on the operations of the Forces under my Command from the opening of the British offensive on the 9th April, 1917, to the conclusion of the Flanders offensive in November. ….

The Army's Acknowledgments.

To the Navy.

(64) The debt which the Army owes to the Navy grows ever greater as the years pass, and is deeply realised by all ranks of the British Armies in France. As the result of the unceasing vigilance of the Navy, the enemy's hope that his policy of unrestricted submarine warfare would hamper our operations in France and Flanders has been most signally disappointed. The immense quantities of ammunition and material required by the Army, and the large numbers of men sent to us as drafts, continue to reach us with unfailing regularity. ……

I have the honour to be, My Lord, Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

D. HAIG, Field Marshal. Commanding-in-Chief, British Armies in France.

30469 - 8 JANUARY 1918

MESOPOTAMIAN CAMPAIGN

ARMY DESPATCH dated 15 October 1917

(excerpts)

War Office, 10th January, 1918.

The Secretary of State for War has received the following Despatch addressed to the Chief of the General Staff, India, by Lieutenant-General Sir Stanley Maude, K.C.B., late Commanding-in-Chief, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force:

General Headquarters, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, October 15th, 1917.

SIR,

1. I have the honour to submit herewith a report on the operations carried out by the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force during the period extending from April 1st to September 30th. ….

14. Our communications by water and by land have been thoroughly overhauled to meet the new situation, additional ships and barges have been placed on the river, and our railway system has been developed as rapidly as existing conditions have permitted. The ever-increasing needs of this Army have rendered expansion as regards port facilities at Basrah necessary, and this has been successfully met by the opening of a subsidiary port in its vicinity, which is being still further developed as the result of the recommendations of a Committee assembled to report upon the matter.

An abnormally low river during the flood season gave rise to some anxiety that this might be followed by a correspondingly low river during the summer months, and, though the river did not fall below its lowest record, it reached as low a gauge as it has touched within reasonable recollection. The work of the Inland Water Transport was therefore from June onwards one of considerable difficulty, and it was due to the skill and energy of the personnel of the I.W.T., and to the admirable buoying of the channels, that the number of serious groundings was almost negligible, and that the service of maintenance in front of the Base was carried on unimpaired. ….

15. The cordial co-operation of the Royal Navy, which yielded such valuable results during the advance on Baghdad, has since then been maintained uninterruptedly. The gunboat flotilla participated in the fighting during April, rendering substantial assistance to the land forces, and during the summer months when active operations were temporarily suspended much useful patrol work on the Lines of Communication has been performed by it in spite of the low water conditions then existing. I was fortunate in receiving visits in turn from Vice-Admiral E A. Gaunt, C.B., C.M.G., Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, and Rear-Admiral D. St. A. Wake, C.B., C.I.E., Rear-Admiral in the Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia, and these visits provided an opportunity for the discussion of topics of interest to both services. ….

22. A list giving the names of those Officers, Ladies, Warrant and Non-Commissioned Officers and Men whose services are deemed deserving of reward and special mention accompanies this despatch.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant,

F. S. MAUDE, Lieutenant-General. Commanding-in-Chief, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force.

30474 - 11 JANUARY 1918

EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGN - NAVAL MENTIONS

ARMY DESPATCH dated 28 June 1917

War Office, 12th January, 1918.

The following Despatch has been received by the Secretary of State for War from General Sir Archibald Murray, K.C.B., late Commander-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force:

General Headquarters, 28th June, 1917.

MY LORD, - In accordance with the concluding paragraph of my Despatch, dated 28th June, 1917, I have the honour to enclose herewith a list of those Officers, Ladies, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men whose names I wish to bring to your notice for gallant or distinguished conduct in the Field, or for other valuable services.

I have the honour to be, My Lord, Your most obedient Servant,

A. J. MURRAY, General, Commanding-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

Staff

(including)

Armstrong, Lt.- Col, (temp. Brig.- Gen.) St. G. B., R.M.L.I.

30480 - 15 JANUARY 1918

EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGN - NAVAL MENTIONS

ARMY DESPATCH dated 16 January 1918

War Office, 10th January, 1918.

The names of the undermentioned Officers, Ladies, Warrant and Non-commissioned Officers and Men have been brought to the notice of the Secretary of State for War by General Sir Edmund Allenby, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., Commanding-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, for distinguished service in connection with military operations under his command:

(including)

Jackson, Rear-Admiral T., C.B., M.V.O., R.N., Senior Naval Officer, Egypt and Red Sea.

Royal Naval Reserve

Cain, Lt. A. E.

Gregory, Cdr. G., R.D.

30492 - 22 JANUARY 1918

EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGN

ARMY DESPATCH dated 16 December 1917

(excerpts)

War Office, 25th January, 1918.

The Secretary of State for War has received the following Despatch from General Sir Edmund Allenby, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., Commanding-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force:

General Headquarters, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 16th December, 1917.

My LORD, I have the honour to submit a report on the operations of the Force serving in Egypt and Palestine since 28th June, 1917, the date on which I assumed command. ….

6. …. The bombardment of the Gaza defences commenced on October 27th, and on October 30th warships of the Royal Navy, assisted by a French battleship, began co-operating in this bombardment. ….

26. During the whole period Rear-Admiral T. Jackson, C.B., M.V.O., has given me most loyal support, and has co-operated with me in a manner which has materially contributed to our success. ….

I have the honour to be, Your Lordship's most obedient servant, E. H. H. ALLENBY, General, Commanding-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force

30547 - 26 FEBRUARY 1918

War Office

Additional Mentions in Despatches

The following names are added to the list of Officers, Ladies, Non-commissioned Officers and Men recommended for distinguished and gallant services and devotion to duty in the despatch from the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, the British Armies in France, dated 7th November, 1917, which was published in the London Gazettes dated 11th, 14th, 18th, 21st, 24th and 28th December, 1917

Royal Marines.

Ligertwood, Lt. P. (killed).

Wilks, Temp. Maj. G. L., attd. Tank Corps.

(followed by Army lists)

30560 - 5 MARCH 1918

EAST AFRICA CAMPAIGN - NAVAL MENTIONS

ARMY DESPATCH dated 30 May 1917

War Office, 7th March, 1918.

The following Despatch has been received by the Secretary of State for War from Major-General A. R. Hoskins, C.M.G., D.S.O., late Commanding-in-Chief, East Africa Force.

General Headquarters, East Africa, Force, 30th May, 1917.

My Lord,

I beg to forward herewith lists of those whom I recommend for mention in despatches.

I have the honour to be, My Lord, Your obedient Servant,

A. E. HOSKINS, Major-General.

Royal Navy

Brownlee, Act. Sub-Lieut. A., R.N.R.

Murray, Sub-Lieut. R. G., R.N.

Sprague, Surg. (act. Staff Surg.) C. G., R.N.

Royal Naval Air Service

Mathias, C.P.O., 2nd Gr., E., O.N. M.6508.

Seager, Air Mech, 2nd Gr., J. H., O.N. F7818.

Department of Senior Marine Transport Officer

Headlam, Comdr. E. J., D.S.O., R.N.

Lister, Lieut. G. B., R.N.R.

Morgan, Asst. Paymr. J. W. G., R.N.R.

Webb, Engr.- Lieut. H. O. R., Ind. Marine.

Marine Transport Department

Lunt, Lieut, (act. Lieut.- Cdr.) W. McC., R.N.R.

Reece, Lieut. D. N. W., R.N.R.

Watkins, Asst. Paymr. H. M., R.N.R.

Williams, Lieut. H. G. R., R.N.R.

Buckeley, Capt. E.

Wolfenden, Capt. B.

Rufiji River Transport

Irwin, Temp. 2nd Lt. R. M., Unattd. List, East Afr. Forces.

Merriman, Boatswain H. J., R.N.

(followed by Army lists)

Army Service Corps

(including)

Ellison, Lt. (T./Capt.) J. F., R.M.L.I.

30570 - 8 MARCH 1918

MESOPOTAMIAN CAMPAIGN - NAVAL MENTIONS

ARMY DESPATCH dated 2 November 1917

War Office, 12th March, 1918.

The Secretary of State for War has received the following despatch addressed to the Chief of the General Staff, India, by Lieut.- General Sir Stanley Maude, K.C.B., Commanding in Chief, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force:

General Headquarters, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, 2nd November, 1917.

Sir,

With reference to the concluding paragraph of my Despatch dated 15th October, 1917, I have the honour to submit herewith a list of names of those Officers, ladies, non-commissioned Officers and men serving, or who have served, under my command, whose distinguished and gallant services and devotion to duty I consider deserving of special mention.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient Servant,

F. S. Maude, Lieut.- General, Commanding in Chief, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force.

Royal Navy.

Gaunt, Rear-Admiral E. F. A., C.B., C.M.G.

Wake, Rear-Admiral D. St. A., C.B., C.I.E.

Buxton, Cdr. B., D.S.O.

Dugmore, Capt. E. V. F. R.

Gervers, Lt.- Cdr. (act. Cdr.) C. T.

Knox, Cdr. (actg. Capt.) G. V. C.

Sherbrooke, Cdr. H. G., D.S.O.

Staff and Headquarters

(including)

Hughes, Temp. Lt.- Col. (temp. Brig.- Gen.) R. H. W., C.M.G. D.S.O., R.E. (Comdr. R.N.R.).

INDIAN ARMY

(including)

Sea Transport

Livesay, Lt. H. W. B., R.I.M.

Manfield, Lt. Comdr. D. J., R.I.M.

Turbett, Lt. (temp. Comdr.) L. W. R. T., R.I.M.

Bryson, Gunner J., R.I.M.

Masters of Transports

Caire, Mr. E. G.

Courtenay, Mr. E.

Davidson, Mr. J. A.

Elliot, Mr. G.

Hearne, Mr. J. J.

Hughes, Mr. J. H.

Langlands, Mr. D. H.

Minnett, Mr. H. F.

Nicholls, Mr. T. R.

Puzey, Mr. C. W.

Robins, Mr. L.

Sharpe, Mr. H. A.

Clough, Mr. J. W. (Chief Officer).

Inland Water Transport

Baker, Temp. Maj. A. H., R.E. (Engr. Lt.- Comdr., R.I.M.)

Burton, Temp. Capt. F., R.E. (Engr., R.I.M.)

De Woolfson, Temp. Capt. A. H. E., R.E. (Engr., R.I.M.)

Fairweather, Temp. Maj. H., R.E. (Lt.- Comdr., R.N.R.)

Graham, Temp. Sub-Lt. D. C., R.I.M.

Greenlees, Temp. Capt. F., R.E. (Engr., R.I.M.).

Milne, Temp. Lt. W. A., R.I.M.

Moilliet, Lt.- Comdr. H. M. K., R.I.M.

Morley, Temp., Capt. R. C., R.E. (Engr. R.I.M.).

Moulton, Temp. Lt. E. W., R.I.M.

Ward, Temp. Lt.- Col. J. C., D.S.O., R.E. (Lt. Comdr., R.N.R.).

Barnsley, Temp. Gnr. J. G., R.I.M.

Elliott, Temp. Gnr. G., R.I.M.

Garraway, Temp. Gnr. L., R.I.M.

Johnston, Temp. Gnr. F., R.I.M.

Metcalfe, Temp. Gnr. R., R.I.M.

Pereira, Temp. Gnr. V. M. F., R.I M.

Pointing, Temp. Gur. A., R.I.M.

Thompson, Temp. Gnr. J., R.I.M.

Wilkinson, Temp. Gnr. E., R.I.M.

Abdul Gunny, No. 8086, R.I.M.

Arben Alii, No. 8827 Actg. Serang, R.I.M.

Arben Ally, No. 8895 Actg. Serang, R.I.M.

Fernandez, No. D'yd. 886 Fitter Mistri A. M., R.I.M.

Hoosein Miya Sheikh Esoof, No. D'yd. 1024 Pater Mistri, R.I.M.

Kumar Alluman, No. 2966 Serang, R.I.M.

Mahomed Ismail, No. D'yd. 1025 Plater Mistri, R.I.M.

Mohamed Ismail, No. 8079 Actg. Serang, R.I.M.

Sahibdin Mahomed Ally, No. D'yd. 1021 Plater, R.I.M.

Sheikh Kanchu Bala, No. 382 Serang (temp. Gnr.), R.I.M.

Sheikh Mohamed Baba, No. 1929 Actg. Serang, R.I.M.

Shubid Ally, No. 9015 Actg. Serang, R.I.M.

Wazier Rahmad, No. C.1278 Serang, R.I.M

Aziz Taunton, No. 9499 Interpreter Clerk, R.I.M.

Chotoo Khan, No. 7683 Storekeeper, R.I.M.

Rutton Devecha, Temp. Clerk, R.I.M.

Port Administration And Conservancy.

Bingham, Comdr. A. B., R.I.M.

Rawson, Lt. G., R.I.M.

30611 - 2 APRIL 1918

EAST AFRICAN CAMPAIGN

ARMY DESPATCH dated 21 January 1918

(excerpts)

War Office, 5th April, 1918.

The Secretary of State for War has received the following Despatch from Lieutenant-General Sir J. L. van Deventer, K.G.B., British Forces in East Africa:

Dar-es-Salaam , 21st January, 1918.

My Lord, I have the honour to forward herewith my Despatch on the operations of the forces in East Africa from 30th May to 1st December, 1917. ….

16. …. This began on the 10th by a turning movement south of Tandamuti Hill, which was heavily bombarded by the Navy with the object of deceiving the enemy as to the point of attack. The movement was successful in causing the enemy to abandon his ground and fall back to another strong position at Nurunyu. ….

33. …. The Royal Flying Corps under Major Wallace, D.S.O., and Royal Naval Air Service, under Commander Bowhill, have been indefatigable in their work of reconnaissance, of such great value in this badly-mapped country, and have never hesitated to take any risks in carrying out this duty. Their well-organised bombing raids have been also most successfully carried out. ….

36. I owe most grateful thanks to Rear-Admiral E. F. B. Charlton, C.B., and all ranks of the Royal Navy, for their hearty and ready co-operation at all times when joint operations were in progress; and to the Naval Transport Service, which has continually to cope with a gigantic and intricate problem, on the successful solution of which the timely conduct of the operations and the smooth working of the supply system so largely depend. ….

I have the honour to be, My Lord, Your Lordship's obedient servant,

J. L. VAN DEVENTER, Lieutenant-General, Commanding-in-Chief, East African Force.

30626 - 9 APRIL 1918

ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

ARMY DESPATCH dated 9 March 1918

(3 pages)

30629 - 12 APRIL 1918

MAHAUDS (WAZIRISTAN) CAMPAIGN

ARMY DESPATCH dated 11 January 1918

(6 pages)

30691 - 17 MAY 1918

WESTERN FRONT - NAVAL MENTIONS

ARMY DESPATCH dated 7 April 1918

War Office, 20th May, 1918.

The following despatch has been received by the Secretary of State for War from Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, K.T., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E., Commander-in-Chief of the British Armies in France:

General Headquarters, 7th April, 1918.

My Lord, I have the honour to submit a list of names of those officers, ladies, non-commissioned officers and men serving, or who have served, under my command during the period September 25th, 1917, to midnight, February 24/25th, 1918, whose distinguished and gallant services and devotion to duty I consider deserving of special mention.

I have the honour to be, My Lord, Your obedient Servant,

D. HAIG, Commander-in-Chief, The British Armies in France.

Royal Navy.

Carter, Staff Payr. A. J., attd. R.N.T. Serv.

Crouch, Payr. (A./Staff Payr.) C. H. A., attd. R.N.T. Serv.

McCracken, T./Surgeon W. J., D.S.O. M.C., M.D., attd. R.N.V.R.

Man, Comdr. J., attd. R.N.T. Serv.

Neat, Fleet Payr. E. H., attd. R.N.T. Serv.

Thomas, Capt. C. W., attd. R.N.T. Serv.

Denney, M. 12854 3rd Writer H. A., attd. R.N.T. Serv.

Gear, M.7678 3rd Writer M., attd. R.N.T. Serv.

Jervis, 155758 Chief Writer (P) F. H., attd. R.N.T. Serv.

Ryan, M.7677 3rd Writer P., attd. R.N.T. Serv.

Swanton, 10530 Sick Berth Attdt. W. H., attd. R.M.A.

Veater, 342291 Chief Writer E. J., attd. R.N. T. Serv.

Royal Marine Artillery.

Angold, T/Lt. H. F.

Lamb, T./Lt. P. R.

Lewis, T./Lt. T. W.

Mathew, Maj. G.

Percy, T./Capt. J. H.

Baverstock, RMA/249 (S) Dvr. W.

Puttock, RMA/532 (S) Dvr. T. H.

Robins, RMA/10149 Cpl. W. T.

Roxby, RMA/14151 Gnr. E. H.

Royal Marines.

Barton, Deal/1883 (S.) Pte. T., attd. (R.N.) Div. Train.

Hawker, Deal/5326 S./M. W. J., attd. Reinf 'nt Camp.

Royal Marine Light Infantry.

Lord, T./2nd Lt. J. V.

McCready, T./Lt.- Col. T. R., M.C., attd. M.G. Coy.

Newling, T./Capt. G. A., M.C.

Cox, Po./3363 (R.M.R./A./0496) L./C. C., attd. R.N.T. Serv.

Craig, Ch. 802 (S.) Pte. F., attd. R.N. Div.

Ford, Ch./8292 (R.M.R./Po.B./1085) Pte. (A./Cpl.) A. R.

Frankland, Ply./617 (S.) Pte. H. R. S., attd. R.N. Div.

Gorringe, Ch./11080 (R.M.R./B./417) Pte. (L./C.) H. D., attd. R.N.T. Serv.

Osborne, Po./780 (S.) Pte. W. T.

Page, Po./6537 (R.M.R./A./0939) L./C. G. H., attd. R.N.T. Serv.

Royal Marine Medical Unit.

Williams, Q.M. & T./Hon. Lt. C. L., attd. (R.N.) Fd. Amb.

Jones, Deal/3156 (S.) Cpl. W. Z.

Wilson, Deal/3126 (S.) Cpl. (A./,Sjt.) T.

Royal Marine Labour Corps.

Burns, Lt. A. W.

Cable, Maj. J. F.

Gill, Capt. T. H.

Malarky, Lt. P.

Pettigrew, Lt. J.

Tait, Capt. J.

White, Capt. J.

Wood, Capt. W.

Buckle, Deal/8052 (S.) Sjt. P. S. W.

Purvis, Deal/9581 (S.) Sjt. J. R.

Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve.

Appleton, T./Sub-Lt. (A./Lt.) W. H.

Arblaster. T./Lt./Cdr. W., M.C.

Beak, T. /Cdr. D. M. W., M.C.

Bradford, T./Sub-Lt.

Buckle, T./Lt.- Cdr. A. W., D.S.O.

Donaldson, T./Lt. H., D.S.O.

Fegan, T./Lt. K. I. M., M.C.

Harris, T./Lt. W. K., D.S.O., M.C.

Neill, Lt. N. C., attd. R.N., T. Serv.

Pollock, T./Cdr. H. B., D.S.O.

Wood, T./Sub-Lt. F. V.

Woodford, T./Lt. C. J., D.S.M. (killed).

Atkins, No. KP/236 P.O. F., M.M.

Chapman, KP/565 P.O. J.

Coldwell, LZ/369, C.P.O. (R.S.M.), L. E., (now Entrenching Bn.).

Mather, TZ/1265 P.O. J.

Smith, No. CZ/4420 L./S. T. G., attd. R.N. Div. Emply. Coy.

Thomson, C/2 1801 C.P.O. J. C., attd. Corps Schl.

Royal Naval Reserves.

Baker, Payr. M. B., attd. R.N.T. Serv.

Bradbrook, Asst. Payr. H. S., attd. R.N.T. Serv.

Dainty, Lt.- Comdr. J. G., R.D., attd. R.N.T. Serv.

Kelly, Asst. Payr. (Actg. Payr.) J., attd. R.N.T. Serv.

Nicholson, Comdr. C., R.D., attd. R.N.T. Serv.

Partridge, Lt.- Comdr. R. M., attd. R.N.T. Serv.

Petrie, Lt. A., R.N.T. Serv.

Seatle, Lt.- Comdr. W. F., R.D., attd. R.N.T. Serv.

Stonehouse, Lt.- Comdr. A.W., attd. R.N.T. Serv.

(followed by Army lists)

Staff

(including)

Asquith, Cdr. (T./Brig.- Gen.) A. M., D.S.O., R.N.V.R.

Bourne, Maj. A. G. B., M.V.O., R.M.A.

Foster, Maj. & Bt. Lt.- Col. R. F. C., R.M.A.

Hutchison, Lt.- Col. (T./Brig.- Gen.) A. R. H., C.M.G., D.S.O., R.M.L.I.

Lough, Capt. (T./Maj.) R. D. H., D.S.O., R.M.L.I.

Lumsden, Lt.- Col. (T./Brig.- Gen.) F. W., V.C., D.S.O., R.M.A.

Marescaux, Rear Admiral (T./Col.) G. C. A., C.M.G., Spec. List (ret. R.N.).

Montgomery, Maj. (T1./Lt.- Col.) H. F., D.S.O., R.M.L.I.

Westenra, Lt. The Hon. W., R.N.V.R.

30711 - 28 MAY 1918

War Office

The following despatch has been received by the Secretary of State for War from General Sir Herbert C. O. Plumer, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., A.D.C.:

Headquarters, 18th April, 1918.

My Lord, I have the honour to submit a list of names of those officers, ladies, non-commissioned officers, and men, serving, or who have served, under my Command, whose distinguished and gallant services and devotion to duty I consider deserving of special mention.

I have the honour to be, My Lord, Your obedient Servant,

Herbert Plumer, Gen

Staff.

(including)

French, Maj. (A./Lt.-Col.) A. H., D.S.O., R.M.L.I., attd. R.E.

30740 - 7 JUNE 1918

SALONIKA CAMPAIGN - NAVAL MENTIONS

ARMY DESPATCH dated 25 March 1918

War Office, 11th June 1918

The following dispatch has been received by the Secretary of State for War from Lt.-Gen. G. F. Milne, K.C.B., D.S.O., Commander-in- Chief, British Salonika Force:

General Headquarters, Salonika, 25th March, 1918.

My Lord,

I have the honour to submit herewith a list of the names of the Officers, Warrant Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, Men and Nursing Staff, whose services I desire to bring to your Lordship's notice for gallant conduct and distinguished services rendered during the period from the 21st September, 1917, to February 28th, 1918.

I have the honour to be, My Lord, Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,

G. F. MILNE, Lt.- Gen.

Royal Navy.

Ewart, Engr.- Comdr. A. E,, R.N.

Olivier, Comdr. (A./Capt.) S. R., R.N.

Usborne, Capt. C. V., C.M.G., R.N.

Flower, O.W.M. 12087 Ch. 3rd Writer A. T., R.N.

Jones, Lt. P. J., R.N.

Reed, O.W. 160218 (R.F.R. Dev/B.801), P.O., 1st Cl., W. C.

Worrell, Gnr. T. J., R.N.

Royal Naval Reserve

Donaldson, Lt. E.

Milburn, Lt. R. W.

(followed by RAF and Army lists)

30746 - 11 JUNE 1918

PALESTINE CAMPAIGN - NAVAL MENTIONS

ARMY DESPATCH dated 3 April 1918

War Office. 14th June, 1918.

The following despatch has been received by the Secretary of State for War from General Sir E. H. H. Allenby, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., General Officer Commanding - in - Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force:

General Headquarters, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 3rd April, 1918.

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith a list of Officers, Ladies, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men, serving or who have served, under my Command, whose distinguished and gallant services and devotion to duty I consider deserving of special mention.

I have the honour to be. My Lord, Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,

E. H. H. ALLENBY, General.

Navy

Richardson, T/.Surg. A. H.

Snagge, Comdr. A. L.

(followed by RAF and Army lists)

30829 - 2 AUGUST 1918

EAST AFRICAN CAMPAIGN - NAVAL MENTIONS

ARMY DESPATCH dated 6 August 1918

War Office, 6th August, 1918.

EAST AFRICA

The names of the undermentioned have been brought to the notice of the Secretary of State for War by Lieutenant-Genera]. Sir J. L. van Deventer, K.C.B., Commanding-in-Chief, British Forces East Africa, for distinguished services during the operations from 30th May to December, 1917, described in his despatch of 21st January, 1918:

Naval Transport Establishment.

Lancaster, Inspr. L. C. (frmly Marine Defence).

Peterson, Lt. J. F , R.N.R.

Philogene, Chief Clerk E.

Royal Marine Artillery.

Gardner, T./Lt. H.

Clark, RMA/8411Clr. Sjt. J.

Ellis, RMA/14537 Gnr. F.

Powers, RMA/8265 Sjt. M.

(followed by RAF and Army lists)

30856 - 20 AUGUST 1918

SOUTH-WEST AFRICA CAMPAIGN - NAVAL MENTIONS

ARMY LIST dated 22 August 1918

War Office, 22nd August, 1918.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies has received from the Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief, Union of South Africa, the following list of Officers and other ranks whose names have been brought to notice by General the Rt. Hon. Louis Botha for distinguished service in the Field and in connection with the campaign in German South-West Africa, 1914-15:

I. Royal Navy.

Barry, Capt. O. C. M., R.N.

Chave, Comdr. B., R.N.R.

Furlong, Sub-Lt. C. Le S., R.N.V.R.

Green, Lt. M. J. R.N.V.R.

Lambert, Capt. R. C. K., D.S.O.

Lockhart, Comdr. M. McG., R.N.

Price, Comdr. T. S., R.N.V.R.

Smyth, Sub-Lt. H. W., R.N.R.

Lamerton, C.P.O. W., R.N.V.R.

Royal Naval Armoured Cars.

Whittal, Lt.- Comdr. W.

Cornell, P.O., J.

II. Royal Air Force.

(including)

Hinshelwood, Sub-Lt. T., R.N.A.S.

(followed by Army lists)

30867 - 23 AUGUST 1918

MESOPOTAMIAN CAMPAIGN - NAVAL MENTIONS

ARMY DESPATCH dated 27 August 1918 (sic)

War Office, 27th August, 1918.

The Secretary of State for War has received the following despatch addressed to the Chief of the General' Staff, India, by Lieut.- General W. R. Marshall, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., Commanding- in-Chief, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force:

General Headquarters, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, 15th April, 1918.

SIR:

With reference to the concluding paragraph of my Despatch dated the 15th April, 1918, I have the honour to submit herewith a list of names of those officers, ladies, non-commissioned officers and men serving, or who have served, under my command, whose distinguished and gallant services and devotion to duty I consider deserving of special mention.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your Obedient Servant,

W. R. MARSHALL, Lieut.- General, Commanding-in-Chief, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force.

Royal Navy.

Wake, Rear-Admiral D. St. A., C.B., C.I.E.

Buxton, Comdr. B., D.S.O,

Sherbrooke, Comdr. (A./Capt.) H. G., D.S.O.

(followed by RAF and Army lists)

Sea Transport

(including)

Poyntz, Lt. A. R. C., D.S.O., R.I.M.

Turbett, Lt. Comdr. (T./Comdr.) L. W. R. T., R.I.M.

Burrows, Gnr. A., R.I.M.

Masters Of Transports.

Beale, Mr. E. W.

Carre, Mr. E. G.

Elton, Mr. G. R.

Galgey, Mr. J. H.

Kelner, Mr. J. G.

Langlands, Mr. D. H.

Macdonald, Mr. C.

Morris, Mr. W. J. (Chief Offr.).

Oake-Shott, Mr. C. A.

Salmon, Mr. R. H. N.

Saunders, Mr. J. W. T.

Simpson-Jones, Mr. G.

Walker, Mr H.

Inland Water Transport.

(including)

Baker, T./Maj. A. H., R.E. (R.I.M.).

Bayfield, T./Capt. E. M., R.E. (R.I.M.).

Cairns, T./Capt. W., Spec. List (R.I.M.).

Campbell, T./Maj. (A./Lt.- Col.) C. R., R.E. (R.I.M.).

Dickinson, T./Capt. A. W., Spec. List (R.I.M.).

Flint, T./Capt. J. H., Spec. List (R.I.M.).

Garstein, T./Maj. R. H., R.E. (R.I.M.).

Ingram, T./Lt. (A./Capt.) V. O., Spec. List (R.I.M.).

Innes, T./Capt. R. McG., Spec. List (R.I.M.).

James, T./Capt. W. J., Spec. List (R.I.M.).

Kidby, T./Capt. E. W. B., Spec. List (R.I.M.).

Kinch, T./Maj. A. G., D.S.O., R.E. (R.I.M.).

Knowles, T./Capt. E. O.} Spec. List (R.I.M.).

Lee, T./Lt. (A./Capt.) O. C., Spec. List (R.I.M.).

MacCullum, T./Maj. H., M.C., Spec. List (R.I.M.).

Metcalfe, T./Maj. J. N., D.S.C., R.E. (R.I.M.).

Morgan, T./Lt. P. R. (R.I.M.).

Pigg, T./Lt. A. H., Spec. List (R.I.M.).

Robertson, T./Lt.- Col. H., C.M.G., R.E. (R.I.M.).

Ross, T./Lt. D. E., Spec. List (R.I.M.).

Smithson, T./Lt. (A./Capt.) E., Spec. List (R.I.M.).

Thompson, T./Capt. T., Spec. List (R.I.M.).

Ward, T./Maj. (A./Col.) J. C., D.S.O., R.E. (R.I.M.).

Green, T./Gnr. A. V. (R.I.M.).

Lovett, T./Gnr. A. H., R.I.M.

McNeil, T./Gnr. A., R.I.M.

Parker, T./Engr. and Artfr. D., R.I.M.

Thompson, T./Engr. and Artfr. J., R.I.M.

Gania Meah, 8448 2nd Cl. Master, R.I.M.

Haji Matook Bin Jassim, 9822 Head Caulker, R.I.M.

Hassim Bin Ibrahim, 9853 Head Sailmaker, R.I.M.

Kasim Ibram, 6060 Lascar, R.I.M.

Lall Meah, Abdul Karim, 8 (sic), 2nd Cl. Master, R.I.M.

Mangal Singh, 9906 Wireman Mistri., R.I.M.

Mohamed Hoosin Nazib, 5019 Serang R.I.M.

Nazoo Meah, 2029, 2nd Cl. Master, R.I.M.

Sando Ali, 999 Seacunny, R.I.M.

Shaikh Booran, 6160 Sailmaker, R.I.M.

Umir Din, 9901 Workshop Foreman, R.I.M.

Port Administration and Conservancy.

(including)

Bingham, Comdr. A. G., R.I.M.

Nicoll, Lt. C. J., D.S.O., R.I.M.

Rawson, Lt. G., R.I.M.

30874 - 26 AUGUST 1918

MESOPOTAMIAN CAMPAIGN

ARMY DESPATCH dated 28 August 1918

(excerpts)

War Office, August, 1918.

The Secretary of State for War has received the following Despatch, addressed to the Chief of the General Staff, India, by Lieutenant- General W. R. Marshall, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., Commanding-in-Chief Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force:

General Headquarters, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, 15th April, 1918.

SIR,

I assumed the command of this force on the 18th November last on the death of the late lamented Lieut.- Gen. Sir Stanley Maude, and now have the honour to submit a report on the operations in Mesopotamia from October 1st, 1917, till 31st March of this year.

2. The last despatch of General Maude covered the period April 1st to September 30th, 1917, and concluded with the operations which resulted in the capture and occupation of Ramadi on the Euphrates. At the commencement of the period covered by the present despatch this force was opposed on the north-east by Turks, who were holding the hills known as Jebel Hamrin, while up the Tigris they were entrenched in front of Daur, and the left wing was secure at Ramadi.

3. At the beginning of October it was decided to clear the Turks from the left bank of the Diala, and occupy the Jebel Hamrin, astride of that river, in order that the control of the canals might be in our hands. ….

20. The Royal Navy has ever been anxious to give me every assistance when called upon, and I am grateful to Rear-Admiral D. St. A. Wake, C.B., C.I.E., and the officers and ratings under his command for their ready co-operation……

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant,

W. R. Marshall, Lieut.- General, Commanding-in-Chief, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force

30939 - 4 OCTOBER 1918

HEDJAZ OPERATIONS - NAVAL MENTIONS

ARMY DESPATCH dated 7 October 1918

War Office, 7th October, 1918.

The names of the undermentioned have been brought to the notice of the Secretary of State for War for valuable services rendered in connection with Military Operations in Hedjaz:

Royal Navy.

Boyle, Capt. W. H. D., C.B.

Buchanan-Wollaston, Capt. H. A.

Jackson, Rear-Adml. T., C.B., M.V.O.

Linberry, Lt.-Comdr. (A./Comdr.) T. J.

Perkins, Lt.-Comdr. G. T. W.

Salt, Lt.-Comdr. J. W. T.

Unwin, Comdr. (A./Capt.) E., V.C., C.M.G. (right - Digger)

Warren, Comdr. (A./Capt.) A. G.

Royal Naval Reserve.

Fenwick, Lt. J. E.

Lobb, T./Lt. T. A., late R.N.R.

Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve.

Feilding, Lt. The Hon. F. E. H. J.

Hogarth, Lt.-Comdr. (A./Comdr,) D. G., C.M.G.

(followed by RAF and Army lists)

30963 - 18 OCTOBER 1918

WESTERN FRONT OPERATIONS

ARMY DESPATCH dated 21st October 1918

(28 pages)

30966 - 18 OCTOBER 1918

ITALIAN FRONT OPERATIONS

ARMY DESPATCH dated 23rd October 1918

(4 pages)

30994 - 5 NOVEMBER 1918

PALESTINE CAMPAIGN

ARMY DESPATCH dated 6th November 1918

(excerpts)

War Office, 6th November, 1918.

The Secretary of State for War has received the following Despatch from General Sir Edmund Allenby, G.C.M.G., K.C.B. Commanding-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force:

General Headquarters, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 18th, September, 1918.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to submit a report on the operations undertaken since the 11th December, 1917, by the Force serving in Egypt and Palestine.

1. The operations described in my Despatch of the 16th December, 1917, had resulted in the enemy's army being broken into two separate parts. ….

4. The operation on the left was the first to be carried out. ….

Throughout these operations the XXIst Corps received most effective support from the Royal Navy.

This operation, by increasing the distance between the enemy and Jaffa from three to eight miles, rendered Jaffa and its harbour secure, and gained elbow room for the troops covering Ludd and Ramleh and the main Jaffa-Jerusalem road……

24. Throughout the period I have received every help from Rear-Admiral T. Jackson, C.B., M.V.O.

I have the honour to be, Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,

E. H. H. ALLENBY, General, Commanding-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

31031 - 22 NOVEMBER 1918

ARMY OF INDIA

ARMY DESPATCH dated 20 August 1918

(excerpts)

India Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1. 20th November, 1918.

The following despatch from His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India on the work of the Army in India and of the Civil Departments of the Government of India and of Civilians in connection with the War has been received from the Government of India:

No. 17445-1. ARMY HEADQUARTERS, INDIA.

Simla, the 20th August, 1918.

From His Excellency General Sir Charles Carmichael Monro, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., Commander-in-Chief in India.

To The Secretary to the Government of India, Army Department.

SIR,

Although the time has not yet arrived for publishing full details regarding the assistance rendered by India towards the prosecution of the war, and though this despatch does not purport to be a complete narrative of India's effort in this respect, I have the honour to submit, in continuation of my despatches of the 9th March, 1916, and 23rd July, 1917, which dealt with minor operations, a brief account of the work done in India, including the Native States, during the first three years of the war. ….

8. The reorganisation of the force in Mesopotamia preparatory to the advance on Baghdad, the development of the port of Basrah, and the provision of a large river flotilla for service on the Tigris, created fresh demands on India necessitating extensive changes in the organisation of sources of supply. The Indian Munitions Board was accordingly constituted, and early in 1917 it assumed responsibility for the construction of river craft and the provision .of railway material, engineering stores, machinery, tools, timber, textiles, hides and electrical plant, not only for the forces overseas, but also for those serving in India. ….

14. My thanks are due …. and, lastly, to the Marine Department which has been responsible for the fitting out, repair and coaling of numerous transports and hospital ships, and the embarkation and transportation of large numbers of troops who have been conveyed to their destinations overseas with promptitude, comfort and safety.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your most obedient servant,

C. C. MONRO, General, Commander-in-Chief in India.



31049 - 3 DECEMBER 1918

ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

ARMY DESPATCH dated 15 November 1918

(5 pages)



31069 - 13 DECEMBER 1918

EAST AFRICAN CAMPAIGN

ARMY DESPATCH dated 30 September 1918

(excerpts)

War Office, 16th December, 1918.

The Secretary of State for War has received the following Despatch from Lieutenant-General Sir J. L. van Deventer, K.C.B., C.M.G., Commanding-in-Chief, East African Force:

Dar-es-Salaam, 30th September, 1918.

My Lord,

In my last Despatch I brought the narrative of operations in East Africa down to the escape across the Rovuma into Portuguese East Africa of the German Commander with the residue of his force, consisting, according to recent figures, of about 320 Europeans, 2,000 askari, two guns and thirty to thirty-five machine guns. ….

15. It now appeared certain, that the Mozambique-Malema line would assume considerable importance. To save shipping, it was essential to avoid the transfer of troops, motorcars, etc., by sea from one line to another as much as possible; work was therefore commenced on a lateral road from Medo to a crossing over the Lurio near Nanripo, whence it would be continued through Mcuburi to Nampula.

The Portuguese authorities afforded us valuable assistance in the Mozambique harbour with tugs and lighters; they also gave us liberal transport facilities on the Lumbo-Mnapo Railway; and the Portuguese Engineers carried out most useful work on the motor road, running westwards from Mnapo. ….

16.The first Portuguese troops for Quelimane, accompanied by Colonel Rosa, left Mocimboa-da-Praia on the 15th and arrived on the 20th. I had meanwhile offered Colonel Rosa the services of some British troops for Quelimane, and, on his acceptance of this, I arranged to send down headquarters and three companies of the 2nd/3rd K.A.R., then at Lindi.

The port of Quelimane is only accessible to ships of small draught, owing to the shallowness of the bar; but the Portuguese very kindly placed two of their vessels at my disposal, and the Senior Naval Officer greatly assisted me by detailing the collier "Hebburn" to take down the first detachment of K.A.R. By the end of the month, one company of K.A.R. and 600-700 Portuguese native troops had been pushed out to Nhamacurra, which covers an important sugar factory, and is the terminus of the tramline running towards Lugella. Another company of the 2nd/3rd was en route to Nhamacurra; and the rest were due at Quelimane on the 6th July. Major Gore-Brown, 2nd/3rd K.A.R., was in command of the combined force at Nhamacurra. The Gunboats "Thistle" and "Adamastor" were covering the town of Quelimane, and a couple of hundred British and Portuguese marines had been landed to reinforce the garrison. ….

26. …. My relations with the Royal Navy have always been most happy; and I wish to express my grateful thanks to Vice-Admiral E. F. B. Charlton, K.C.M.G., C.B., and Rear-Admiral The Honourable E. F. Fitzherbert, C.B., for their constant and ready co-operation.

I also wish to record my appreciation of the services of the Officers and Men of the Naval Transport Service, whose work was considerably increased by the necessity for opening new ports in Portuguese East Africa. ….

…. The opening at short notice of new sea bases, and the maintenance of several such bases at the same time, made the question of shipping arrangements a serious problem. By consigning cargo direct to sub-bases whenever possible, and by the expeditious discharge of ships, often in spite of an unavoidable shortage of the usual harbour services and landing facilities, the tonnage available was utilised with the greatest possible economy. For this satisfactory result great credit is due to my Q.M.G. Department, while the Department of Inland Water Transport, during its comparatively short period of activity, also contributed appreciably to the success obtained.

I have the honour to be, My Lord, Your Lordship's obedient servant,

J. L. VAN DEVENTER, Lieutenant-General, Commander-in-Chief, East African Force.

31077 - 17 DECEMBER 1918

WESTERN FRONT - NAVAL MENTIONS

ARMY DESPATCH dated 8 November 1918

War Office, 20th December, 1918.

The following despatch has been received by the Secretary of State for War from Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, K.T., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E., Commander-in-Chief, the British Armies in France:

General Headquarters, 8th November, 1918.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to submit a list of names of those officers, ladies, non-commissioned officers and men serving, or who have served, under my command during the period 25th February, 1918, to midnight 16th/17th September, 1918, whose distinguished and gallant services and devotion to duty I consider deserving of special mention.

I have the honour to be, My Lord, Your Lordship's obedient servant,

D. HAIG, Field-Marshal, Commanding-in-Chief, The British Armies in France.

Royal Navy.

Hamilton, Comdr. W., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Harris, Comdr. A. E., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Huddleston, Comdr. W. B., C.M.G., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Blake, M/12020 2nd Writer E. B., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Day, M/18560 3rd Writer S. G., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Keay, M/16136 3rd Writer J. R., attd. R.N, Trans. Serv.

Royal Marine Artillery.

Hart, T./Lt. W. D., M.O., 2nd How. By.

Micklem, T./Maj. C., 2nd How. By.

Poole, Lt.- Col. G. R., C.M.G., attd. R.G.A.

Pordage, T./Lt. E. J. W., attd. A.A. By.

Wilson, T./Lt. G., 4th How. By.

Beresford, 956 (S) Gnr. W., attd. A.A. By.

Glass, 276 (S) Mech. A. H., attd. A.A. By.

Howard, 11018 Sjt. A. E. R., attd. A.A. By.

Royal Marines.

Liddington, T./Capt. W. R., attd. 63rd Div. Train.

Wilson, Qrmr. and T./Lt. J., attd. 150th Fd. Amb.

Aitken, S/2073 Pte. A., attd. 63rd Div. Train.

Brooke, S/3077 S./Sjt. C., attd. 148th Fd. Amb.

Buckton, S/1711 Cpl. (A./Sjt.) H. C., attd. 63rd Div. Train.

Fortescue, S/3278 Sjt, M., attd. 149th Fd. Amb.

Royal Marine Light Infantry.

Carroll, Capt. (T./Maj.) J. W., attd. R. Marine Labour Corps.

Clutterbuck, Maj. (A./Lt.- Col.) N. S., D.S.O., 1st Bn.

Fletcher, Maj. (T./Lt.- Col.) E. K., D.S.O., attd. 1st Bn.

Lee, T./Lt. J. C., 2nd Bn.

McKenzie, Lt. (A./Capt.) J., attd. R. Marine Labour Corps.

Sandilands, Maj. (A./Lt.- Col.) P., 1st Bn.

Smith, T./Lt. H. C. (secd. Labour Corps).

Winne, Lt. (A./Capt.) R. H., attd. R. Marine Labour Corps.

Butler, Ply./618 (S) Pte. (A./Clr. Sjt.) A M., attd. H.Q., 63rd Div.

Cooper, Po./11640/Po./B/1179 Pte. A., attd R.N. Trans. Serv.

Eccles, Ch./8648 C.S.M. D. E., attd. R. Marine Labour Corps.

Gibbs, Po./9054/Po./B/979 Pte. R., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

McConnell, Po./4321/Po./A/0639 Pte. J., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Wakeham, Ply./56J4 C.S.M. (A./S.M.) J. H., attd. R. Marine Labour Corps.

Webb, Ch./304 (S) Pte. (A./Sjt.) F. J., 1st Bn., attd. X/63rd T.M. By.

West, Po./5149/Po./A./0751 Pte. J., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Royal Marine Labour Corps.

Cooper, T./Capt. J.

Fuller, T./Capt. H. V.

Harvey, T./Capt. T. A.

Home, T./Lt. R.

Newton, T./Lt. R. H.

Thompson, T./Lt. W.

Bagge, Deal/8594 (S) Pte. (A./Sjt.) H.

Chapman, Deal/9363 (S) Pte. (A./Sjt.) J. G.

Cunion, Deal/12430 (S) Sjt. E.

Davison, Deal/9397 (S) Pte. (A./Cpl.) C.

Ferguson, Deal/10156 (S) Pte. (A./Sjt.) H. N.

Henderson, Deal/9875 (S) Pte. (A./C.S.M.) T.

Mclntosh, Deal/9531 (S) Pte. (A./Sjt.) R. N.

Mills, Deal/8300 (S) Pte. P.

Nimmo, Deal/8328 (S) Sjt. J. (now T./2nd Lt.).

Parsons, Deal/9983 (S) Pte. (A./Sjt.) F. G.

Ronald, Deal/9600 (S) Pte. (A./Cpl.) H.

Smith, Deal/8428 (S) L. (now T./2nd Lt.).

Royal Naval Reserve.

Browne, Lt.- Comdr. R. H. (Ret.), attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Cann, T./Asst. Paymaster, Lt. L.P.C., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Foster, T./Asst. Paymaster, Lt. T., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Fowler, T./Paymaster, Sub-Lt. T. C. E., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Harley, T./Lt. G. A., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Legge, Lt. J. A. (Ret.), attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

MacFadyen, T./Lt. D., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

O'Sullivan, T./Lt. J., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Sandberg, T./Lt. P. L., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Sheppard, Lt.- Comdr. A. B. W. (Ret.), attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Walker, T./Lt. G. H., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Williamson, T./Lt. C. A., attd. R.N. Trans, Serv.

Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve.

Beak, T./Comdr. D. M. W., D.S.O., M.C., Drake Bn.

Buckle, T./Comdr. A. W., D.S.O., Anson Bn.

Clarke, T./Lt. J., D.S.O., M.C., Drake Bn.

Egerton, T./Comdr. W. M. le C., D.S.O., Hood Bn.

Elson, Sub-Lt. E. A., Anson Bn.

Harris, T./Sub-Lt. J. O., D.S.O., Hawke Bn.

Howe, Lt. D. L., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Lockwood, T./Lt.- Comdr. E. M., Hawke Bn.

O'Keefe, T./Sub-Lt. (A./Lt.) A. J., Drake Bn., attd. 189th T.M. By.

Ridger, T./Lt.- Comdr., A. L., Hood Bn.

Simmonds, T./Sub-Lt. (A./Lt.) T., D.S.O., M.C., D.C.M., Drake Bn.

Wood, T./Sub-Lt. F. V. Hawke Bn.

Davidson, OZ/1209 A.B. (H.G.) J., Hawke Bn.

Binney, LZ/1113, 1st Cl. Writer D.

Bond, BZ/33 A.B., W. E., M.G. Bn.

Holland, R/4655 A.B. C., Anson Bn., attd. H.Q., 188th Inf. Bde.

COMMANDS AND STAFF

(including)

Evans, Maj. A. K., M.C., R.M.L.I.

Festing, Maj. (T./Lt.- Col.) M. C., D.S.O., R.M.L.I.

Lough, Capt. (T./Maj.) R. D. H., D.S.O., R.M.L.I.

Montgomery, Maj. and Bt. Lt.- Col. H. F., D.S.O., R.M.L.I.

Neville, Capt. R. A. R., R. Marines.

31087 - 27 DECEMBER 1918

PALESTINE CAMPAIGN

ARMY DESPATCH dated 31 October 1918

(excerpts)

War Office, 30th December, 1918.

The Secretary of State for War has received the following Despatch from General Sir Edmund Allenby, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., Commanding-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force:

General Headquarters, 31st October. 1918.

My Lord, I have the honour to forward a despatch describing the operations which, commencing on September 19th, resulted in the destruction of the enemy's army, the liberation of Palestine and Syria, and the occupation of Damascus and Aleppo. ….

25. …. In the meantime, the 7th (Meerut) Division had marched from Haifa to Beirut. Leaving Haifa on October 3rd, it marched along the coast. Crossing the Ladder of Tyre, it was received by the populace of Tyre and Sidon with enthusiasm. On October 8th it reached Beirut, where it was warmly welcomed, the inhabitants handing over 660 Turks, including 60 officers, who had surrendered to them. Ships of the French Navy had already entered the harbour. ….

29 …. The cavalry and infantry received every help from the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers, whilst the infantry, in its attack along the coast, was given valuable assistance by the Destroyers " Druid " and " Forester" (below - Yeoman of Signals George Smith), which Rear-Admiral T. Jackson, C.B., M.V.O., had detailed to assist me. ….

…. My thanks are due to the Royal Navy for its assistance in arranging and securing the landing of supplies at the various harbours along my line of advance, and to the French Navy for valuable information gained in the reconnaissance of the northern ports. ….

I have the honour to be, Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,

E. E. H. ALLENBY, General, Commanding-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

31101 - 31 DECEMBER 1918

RAF BOMBING CAMPAIGN AGAINST GERMANY

ROYAL AIR FORCE DESPATCH dated 1 January 1919

(excerpts)

Air Ministry, 1st January, 1919.

The Secretary of State for the Royal Air Force has received the following Despatch from Major-General Sir H. M. Trenchard, K.C.B., D.S.O., Commanding the Independent Force, Royal Air Force:

MY LORD,

I have the honour to submit the following report on the work of the Independent Air Force from the 5th June to the signing of the Armistice on the 11th November, 1918.

I have also mentioned in the earlier part of this report the work done in the attack on Germany by the squadrons from a base southeast of Nancy before the establishment of the Independent Air Force.

In May, 1918, you informed me that you considered it advisable to constitute an Independent Force to undertake the bombing of the industrial centres of Germany.

You further intimated to me that you intended to place the whole of the British effort in attacking Germany from the air under my command, and that it would be probable that squadrons would be available to carry out this work from England, as well as from the eastern area of France. ….

…. I took over from Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig the tactical command of this Force on the 5th June, and the administrative and complete control on the 15th June, 1918.

From the 11th October, 1917, to the 5th June, 1918, this small Force had, in spite of a very severe winter, carried out no less than 142 raids. Fifty-seven of these raids were made in Germany, and included night and day attacks on Cologne, Stuttgart, Mannheim, Mainz, and Coblenz. Long-distance raids had also been carried out against Namur, Charleroi and Liege, in order to help in attacking the enemy's communications to the Western Front.

It should be remembered that No. 216 Squadron (at that time R.N.A.S.) was hastily formed, and was not equipped until October, 1917. ….

I have the honour to be, My Lord, Your Obedient Servant,

(Sd.) H. TRENCHARD, Major-General, Commanding Independent Force, Royal Air Force.

1919

31106 - 3 JANUARY 1919

ITALIAN CAMPAIGN - NAVAL MENTIONS

ARMY DESPATCH dated 26 October 1918

War Office, 6th January, 1919.

The following despatch has been received by the Secretary of State for War from General F. R., Earl of Cavan, K.P., K.C.B., M.V.O., Commander-in-Chief of the British Force in Italy:

General Headquarters, 26th October, 1918.

My Lord,

I have the honour to submit a list of names of those officers, ladies, non-commissioned officers and men serving, or who have served, under my command during the period February 26th, 1918, to midnight, September 14th, 1918, whose distinguished and gallant services and devotion to duty I consider deserving of special mention.

I have the honour to be, My Lord, Your obedient servant,

CAVAN, General. Commander-in-Chief, The British Force in Italy.

Royal Navy.

Webster, Comdr. G. G.

Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve.

Graham, Sub-Lt. H. M., 63rd (R.N.) Div., attd. Intell. Corps.

(followed by Army lists)

31111 - 3 JANUARY 1919

WESTERN FRONT

ARMY DESPATCH dated 21 December 1918

(excerpt)

War Office, 7th January, 1919.

The Secretary of State for War has received the following despatch from Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, K.T., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E., Commander-in-chief of the British Armies in France:

21st December, 1918.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to submit the following report on the operations of the forces under my command since the successful termination of the great defensive battles on the Somme and Lys Rivers, which were described in my last despatch. ….

The Navy and Home Authorities.

The thanks of all ranks of the British Armies in France and Flanders are once more due to the Royal Navy and Mercantile Marine for their magnificent work, which throughout the heavy demands of the past year has at all times enabled our needs to be supplied.

We thank also the different Home Authorities and the workers in the great munition factories, both men and women, for the magnificent support they have given us through all stages of the war. We understand and appreciate the value of the work they have done. ….

I have the honour to be, my Lord, Your Lordship's obedient servant,

D. HAIG, Field-Marshal. Commanding-in-Chief, British Armies in France.

31138 - 21 JANUARY 1919

EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGN - NAVAL MENTIONS

ARMY DESPATCH dated 23 October 1918

War Office, 22nd January, 1919.

The following despatch has been received by the Secretary of State for War from General Sir E. H. H. Allenby, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., Commander-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force:

General Headquarters, 23rd October, 1918.

My Lord, I have the honour to forward herewith a list of Officers, Nurses, other ranks and Civilians whom I consider worthy of Mention for their services during the period from 16th March, 1918, to 18th September, 1918.

I have the honour to be, My Lord, Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,

E. H. H. ALLENBY, General. Commanding-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

Royal Navy.

Watkins, Lt. H. A., R.N.V.R.

(included in Army lists)

Commands & Staff.

Armstrong, Lt.- Col. & Bt. Col. (T./Brig.- Gen.) St. G. B., R. Marines.

Trew, Maj. (T./Brig.- Gen.) E. F., C.M.G., D.S.O., R. Marines.

31139 - 21 JANUARY 1919

SALONIKA CAMPAIGN

ARMY DESPATCH dated 1 December 1918

(excerpts)

War Office, 22nd January, 1919.

The Secretary of State for War has received the following Despatch from General Sir George F. Milne, K.C.B., D.S.O., Commanding-in-chief, British Salonika Force:

General Headquarters, British Salonika Force. 1st December, 1918.

My Lord,

I have the honour to submit the following report on the operations of the British Army in Macedonia from 1st October, 1917, to the present date. ……

…. On the Doiran front, where the enemy held strongly entrenched and continuous positions in mountainous and rocky country, operations were necessarily restricted to small raids and artillery bombardment. In all these, casualties were inflicted on the enemy at slight loss to ourselves. One raid, novel in its plan and bold in its execution, is worthy of special notice. Shortly after midnight on the 15th-16th April, in bright moonlight, a mixed naval and military party left the shore of the lake by Doiran Station in four boats, silently driven by electric motors, which had been brought up from Salonika and assembled under the eyes of the enemy. From Doiran Station to Doiran Town by water is two miles, but the party landed well within the enemy lines unchallenged. Sentries were left to guard the boats, the town was searched and the lakeside road patrolled. Not a Bulgar was seen, and so, as the main purpose of the raid, the capture of prisoners, could not be achieved, the party embarked, re-crossed the lake in safety and apparently unobserved, and landed again on our shore at four o'clock. This daring operation stands out as a striking testimony to the enterprise of the troops, and its skilful execution was undoubtedly due to the energy and care displayed by Captain R. S. Olivier, R.N., Senior Naval Officer at Salonika, and the officers and men of H.M.S. "St. George" (below - Photo Ships), who not only trained the detachment on this occasion, but have at all times cordially assisted the Army. …..

…. In spite of the fact that the railway had been totally destroyed between Doiran and Serres, and that practically no roads exist in Eastern Macedonia, on the night of 30th/31st October, when I received the news of the conclusion of an armistice with Turkey, two British divisions and one French division were ready on the River Maritza to seize the northern bridges and to occupy the town of Adrianople, the bridge at Ipsala was in my possession, while in rear the 1st Hellenic Corps was echeloned between Kavala and Drama, ready to take part in the general advance on Constantinople.

This rapid move of about 250 miles, including the re-basing of the troops on the small ports in the Aegean Sea, reflects the greatest credit on the staff and administrative services, but it would have been impossible of achievement without the hearty cooperation of the Royal Navy in clearing the mine-swept areas and ports and in assisting in the transfer of troops and stores. My thanks are specially due to Vice-Admiral Hon. Sir S. A. Gough-Calthorpe, K.C.B., C.V.O., Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, Rear-Admiral M. Culme Seymour, C.B., M.V.O., Commanding the British Aegean Squadron, Captain G. K. Chetwode, R.N., Commanding Destroyer Flotilla, and to Commodore E. Unwin, V.C., C.M.G., the indefatigable Principal Naval Transport Officer in the Eastern Mediterranean, to whose energy was due the possibility of making any use of the open and unsuitable roadstead of Dedeagach as a base of supply. ……

I have the honour to be, My Lord, Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

G. F. MILNE, General, Commanding-in-Chief British Salonika Force.

31152 - 28 JANUARY 1919

SALONIKA CAMPAIGN - NAVAL MENTIONS

ARMY DESPATCH dated 1 November 1918

War Office, 30th January, 1919.

The following despatch has been received by the Secretary of State for War from Lt.- Gen. Sir G. F. Milne, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., Commander-in-Chief, British Salonika Force:

General Headquarters, Salonika, 1st November, 1918.

My Lord,

I have the honour to submit herewith a list of the names of the Officers, Warrant Officers, Men and Nursing Staff, whose services I desire to bring to your Lordship's notice for gallant conduct and distinguished services rendered during the period from the 1st March to the 1st October, 1918.

I have the honour to be, My Lord, Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,

G. F. MILNE, Lt.- Gen., Commanding-in-Chief, British Salonika Force.

Royal Navy.

Forbes, Comdr. C. H.

Whitehead, A./Engr. Lt.- Comdr. R. W.

Wallace, Boatswain J. E.

Watts, Warrant Shipwright W. P.

Adams, Ch./O.N. 198293 Leading Seaman J. L.

Glanville, Po. /O.N.271579 Chief Engine Room Artfr. W. H. T. G.

Harrison, Ch./O.N.J.40650 Able Seaman F.

Mattocks, Ch./O.N.346955 Shipwright O. H. E.

Moseley, O.N./153763 (R.F.R. Po./A3432) Chief Stoker C. E.

Newbitt, Ch./O.N.J.38997 Able Seaman W. E.

Rowlinson, O.N. 140768 (R.F.R. Po./A.3464) Chief P.O., C. G.

Vickers, Dev./O.N. 157216 P.O. 1st Cl. H.

Wright, O.N.344431 1st Cl. Shipwright S.

Royal Naval Reserve.

Scott-Smith, Lt. H. E. G.

Stevens, Paymaster Sub-Lt. W. G. J.

Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve.

Summers, T./Lt.- Comdr. H. C.

(followed by Army lists)

31156 - 28 JANUARY 1919

EAST AFRICA CAMPAIGN - NAVAL MENTIONS

ARMY DESPATCH dated 30 September 1918

War Office, 31st January, 1919.

The following despatch has been received by the Secretary of State for War from Lieutenant-General Sir J. L. Van Deventer, K.C.B., C.M.G., Commanding-in-Chief, East African Force:

General Headquarters, 30th September, 1918.

MY LORD,

I desire to record my appreciation of the excellent services rendered by the Officers, Warrant Officers, Non-commissioned Officers and Men included in the list I am forwarding with this Despatch, during the period from 1st December, 1917, to 31st July, 1918.

I have the honour to be, My Lord, Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

J. L. VAN DEVENTER, Commanding-in-Chief, East African Force.

Naval Transport Establishment.

Downs, 1st Officer A.

Faill, Master Mariner A., Master of H.M.H.S. "Ebani"

Kerr, Engr. Lt. T., R. Ind. Marine.

(followed by Army lists)

31192 - 18 FEBRUARY 1919

MESOPOTAMIAN CAMPAIGN

ARMY DESPATCH dated 1 October 1918

(8 pages)

31195 - 18 FEBRUARY 1919

MESOPOTAMIAN CAMPAIGN - NAVAL MENTIONS

ARMY DESPATCH dated 11 November 1918

War Office, 2lst February, 1919.

The Secretary of State for War has received the following despatch addressed to the Chief of the General Staff, India, by Lieut.- General W. R. Marshall, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., Commanding- in-Chief Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force:

General Headquarters, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, 11th November, 1918.

SIR, With reference to paragraph 29 of my despatch dated the 1st October, 1918, I have the honour to submit herewith a list of names of those officers, ladies, non-commissioned officers and men serving, or who have served under my command, whose distinguished and gallant services and devotion to duty I consider deserving of special mention.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient Servant,

W. R. MARSHALL, Lieut.- General, Commander-in-Chief, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force.

Royal Navy.

Norris, Capt. (A./Commodore, 2nd Cl.) D. T.

(followed, mainly by Army lists)

Sea Transport.

(including)

Philby, Lt.- Comdr. R. M., R.I.M.

Downey, Gnr. J. H., R.I.M.

Hayes, Gnr. E., R.I.M.

Masters of Transports.

Boyd, Mr. J.

Carre, Mr. E. G.

Coope, Mr. R. H.

Hatchard, Mr. F.

James, Mr. D. T. (Chief Offr.).

Jones, Mr. G. S.

Langlands, Mr. D. H.

Leitch, Mr. N. H.

Paddle, Mr. W. H.

Reddock, Mr. J. S.

Rodgers, Mr. D.

Stewart, Mr. A. H.

Inland Water Transport.

(including)

Baker, T./Maj. A. H., O.B.E. (Lt.- Comdr., R.I.M.)

Bayfield, T./Capt. (A./Maj.) E. M., R.E. (R.I.M.).

de Woolfson, T./Capt. (A./Maj.) A. H. F., R.E. (R.I.M.).

Kinch, T./Maj. (A./Lt.- Col.) A. G., D.S.O., R.E. (R.I.M.).

Metcalfe, T./Lt.- Col. J. N., D.S.C., R.E. (R.I.M.).

Moilliet, T./Maj. H. M. K., R.E. (R.I.M.).

Morgan, T./Lt. P. R., R.I.M.

Morley, T./Capt. R. C., R.E. (R.I.M.).

Ward, T./Col. J. C., D.S.O., M.B.E., R.E. (Lt.- Comdr., R.I.M.).

Haboo Mohamed Salim, 5634 Serang, R.I.M.

Nejim Iban Haji Abeyed, 9826 Head Caulker, R.I.M.

Uderam, 9483 Clk., R.I.M.

Wali Ahmed, 6666 1st Cl. Dvr., R.I.M.

Port Traffic.

(including)

Nicoll, Lt. C. J., D.S.C., R.I.M.

Rawson, Lt. G., R.I.M.

31235 - 14 MARCH 1919

INDIAN EMPIRE OPERATIONS

ARMY DESPATCH dated 13 September 1918

(excerpts)

War Office, 17th March, 1919.

The Government of India has forwarded for publication the following despatch from General Sir Charles C. Monro, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., Commander-in-Chief, India, on military operations in the Indian Empire, including Aden, and in South and East Persia, during the period 1st April, 1917, to 31st May, 1918:

Army Headquarters, India, Simla, 13th September, 1918.

From the Commander-in-Chief in India,

To The Secretary to the Government of India, Army Department.

SIR,

1. In continuation of my despatch, dated 23rd July, 1917, (Published in the London Gazette dated 31st October, 1917. No. 30360) on the minor military operations undertaken, up to the 31st March, 1917, on the North-West Frontier of India, and elsewhere in the Indian Empire, including Aden, and in South and East Persia, I have the honour to submit the following despatch, which deals with operations subsequent to the above date up to the 31st May, 1918. They are described in the following order:

(i) Aden.

(ii) Bushire.

(iii) South Persia.

(iv) East Persia.

(v) North-West Frontier.

(vi) Protection of Indian Coasts

(i) Aden.- …. The Royal Navy has afforded valuable help throughout in maintaining the active defence of Aden and in connection with the defence of the defended port.

….

(vi) Protection of Indian coasts,-Measures have been taken for the due protection of Indian coasts and defended ports. This has involved constant labour and vigilance on the part of defended port commanders, their staffs and troops.

I am much indebted in this connection to the valuable advice and assistance which has always been readily afforded to me by the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant,

C. C. MONRO, General, Commander-in-Chief in India.

31249 - 21 MARCH 1919

ARABIAN OPERATIONS - NAVAL MENTIONS

ARMY DESPATCH dated 24 March 1919

War Office, 24th March, 1919.

The names of the under mentioned have been brought to the notice of the Secretary of State for War for valuable services rendered in connection with the Military Operations in Arabia:

Royal Navy

Boyle, Capt. W. H. D., C.B.

Buchanan-Wollaston, Capt. H. A.

Gary, Lt.- Comdr. H. L. M.

Jackson, Rear-Admiral T. C. B., M.V.O.

Lewis, Comdr. (A./Capt.) A. W.

Salmond, Comdr. J. S. C.

Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve.

Hogarth, Comdr. D. G., C.M.G.

(followed by Army lists)

31277 - 4 APRIL 1919

ADEN OPERATIONS - NAVAL MENTIONS

ARMY DESPATCH dated 7 April 1919

War Office, 7th April, 1919.

The names of the undermentioned officers, ladies, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and men are brought to notice for gallant and distinguished service rendered in Connection with the military operations at Aden during the period from 16th August, 1917, to 31st January, 1918:

Royal Navy.

Craufurd, Lt.- Comdr. (A./comdr.) C. E. V.

Lowis, Comdr. (A./Capt.) A. W.

Royal Indian Marine.

Thyne, Comdr. W. K.

(followed by Army lists)

31283 - 8 APRIL 1919

WESTERN FRONT

ARMY DESPATCH dated 21 March 1919

(excerpts)

War Office, 10th April, 1919.

The Secretary of State for War has received the following Despatch from Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, K.T., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E., Commander-in-Chief of the British Armies in France:

General Head Quarters, British Armies in France, 21st March, 1919.

Sir,

I have the honour to submit the following final Despatch in which is described the advance of the British Forces into Germany and the occupation of the bridgehead East of the Rhine at Cologne. I include in this Despatch a brief review of the chief features of military interest which stand out among the operations of the British Armies on the Western front during the time I have been in command of them. I take this last opportunity also to refer by name to some few of the many able and gallant officers who have assisted me in my task, and to thank them personally. ….

PART II.

FEATURES OF THE WAR.

Rearward Services and Personnel;

Transportation.

(19) …. As the Army grew and became more complicated the total feeding strength of our forces in France rose until it approached a total of 2,700,000 men. The vastness of the figures involved in providing for their needs will be realised from the following examples. For the maintenance of a single division for one day, nearly 200 tons dead weight of supplies and stores are needed, representing a shipping tonnage of nearly 450 tons. In an Army of 2,700,000 men, the addition of one ounce to each man's daily rations involves the carrying of an extra 75 tons of goods.

To cope with so great a growth, the number of existing directorates had gradually to be added to or their duties extended, with a corresponding increase in demands for personnel. The supervision of ports was entrusted to the Directorate of Docks which controlled special companies for the transhipping of stores. By the end of November, 1918, the number of individual landings in France at the various: ports managed by us exceeded 10 1/2 million persons. During the 11 months January to November, 1918, the tonnage landed at these ports averaged some 175,000 tons per week. ….

…. The Inland Water Transport section were organised under a separate Directorate for the working in France and Flanders of the canal and cross-channel barge traffic. On Inland waterways alone an average of 56,000 tons of material were carried weekly during 1918, the extent of waterways worked by us at the date of the Armistice being some 465 miles. ….

…… As the effects of the enemy submarine warfare began to be felt and the shortage of shipping became more and more acute, so it became increasingly necessary for the Army in France to be more self-supporting. To meet this emergency vast hospitals and convalescent depots capable of accommodating over 22,000 men were erected west of the Seine at Trouville. Additional General Hospitals with accommodation for over 7,000 patients were established in the neighbourhood of Boulogne, Etaples, and elsewhere. Between January, 1916, and November, 1918, the total capacity of hospitals and convalescent depots1 in France grew from under 44,000 to over 157,000 persons.

Great installations were set up for the manufacture of gun parts and articles of like nature, for the repair of damaged material as well as for the utilisation of the vast quantities of articles of all kinds collected from the battle fields by the organisation working under the direction of the Controller of Salvage. The Forestry Directorate, controlling over 70 Canadian and other Forestry Companies, worked forests all over France, in the North-West, Central and South-West Departments, the Vosges, Jura and Bordeaux country. As the result of its work our Armies were made practically independent of overseas imported timber. The Directorate of Agricultural Production organised farm and garden enterprises for the local supply of vegetables, harvested the crops abandoned by the enemy in his retreat and commenced the reclamation of the devastated area.

At the same time, a great saving of shipping was effected by the speeding up of work at the docks. The average tonnage discharged per hour in port rose from 12 1/2 tons in January, 1917, to 34 1/2 tons in July, 1918; while the average number of days lost by ships waiting berth at the ports fell from some 90 ship days per week at the beginning of 1917 to about 9 ship days per week in 1918.….

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your most obedient Servant,

D. HAIG, Field-Marshal, Commanding-in-Chief, British Armies in France.

31287 - 8 APRIL 1919

MESOPOTAMIAN CAMPAIGN

ARMY DESPATCH dated 1 February 1919

(excerpts)

War Office, 11th April, 1919.

The Secretary of State has received the following despatch, addressed to the Chief of the General Staff, India, by Lieut.- General Sir W. B. Marshall, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., Commanding- in-Chief, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force:

General Head-Quarters, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, 1st February, 1919.

Sir,

1. I have the honour to submit the following report on the operations of the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force from 1st October, 1918, the date of my last despatch, to 31st December, 1918:

2. The overwhelming victories achieved by General Allenby in Palestine and Syria had naturally re-acted, greatly to our advantage, on the situation in N.W. Persia. ….

26. Immediately after the conclusion of the armistice with Turkey on October 31st, I received instructions to re-occupy Baku (in cooperation with our Allies), and all available troops of the 39th (British) Infantry Brigade were ordered to concentrate for this purpose at Enzeli. They were joined there on November 9th by Russian and Armenian troops under General Bicharakhov, who had been driven by the Turks out of Petrovsk, where the Turkish Commander, despite representations by both British and French Staff Officers, refused to recognise the armistice. At this time Nuri was commanding the Turkish forces in the Caucasus. An envoy had been despatched to him on November 4th asking for a definite date to be fixed by the Turks for the evacuation of Baku, but a procrastinating reply was received, and in consequence the envoy was sent back again to him accompanied by a staff officer to inform him that Baku would be occupied by a British and Russian force on November 17th, by which date Turkish troops, with the exception of a small detachment to preserve order, were to be clear of the town.

At dawn on November 16th a fleet of 17 transports left Enzeli escorted by three vessels of the Caspian Fleet, which, had been armed by the Royal Navy under the supervision of Commodore D. T. Norris and Captain B. G. Washington, R.N.

During the morning of November 17th they were joined off Nargin Island by General Bicharakhov's Russian force, escorted by the Russian Caspian Fleet. The expedition was accompanied by French and American representatives, and the vessel conveying Major-General W. M. Thomson, C.B., M.C., commanding the British troops, entered Baku at the head of the combined fleets flying the flags of Great Britain, France, Russia and America. Our troops landed without opposition, and Baku was taken over from the Turks, who completed their evacuation of the town during the afternoon.

Many and varied were the questions which had to be dealt with in Baku, amongst which I may instance shipping control, feeding the inhabitants numbering a quarter of a million, finance, including the reopening of the Russian State bank, settlement of labour disputes on the oilfields, strikes in the town, payment of overdue wages, reopening the Trans-Caucasus system of railways, getting into working order the oil pipe-line from Baku to Batoum, etc., etc. All these questions were most ably and firmly dealt with by General Thomson, who was quite evidently the right man in the right place.

Our efforts had to contend with the mutual jealousy and intolerance of various factions, and it is not too much to say that all arrangements for reorganisation were hampered by entirely unnecessary delays in withdrawal on the part of the Turks. After retiring from Petrovsk they made further delays at Elizabetopol and other towns, much of which being due to the excessive amount of baggage (mostly loot) which they attempted to remove, together with a reserve of one month's supplies requisitioned by them from the country. A mission had also to be sent to Tiflis to put an end to the hostilities which had commenced between the Georgians and Armenians.

28. Besides the troops in Baku, a small force was also despatched to Krasnovodsk in order to secure that place as a naval base for the shipping working under our orders, and to deny it to the Bolsheviks, who were holding Astrakhan in strength. Portions of this Krasnovodsk detachment were taken to assist in the fighting near Askabad and Merv.

Despite armed Bolshevik ships based on Astrakhan, our armed vessels have permitted of the reopening of the Caspian trade and fisheries except in the far north. ….

33. On the Tigris line of communication the daily consignment from Basra up river averages 2,600 tons, of which 600 tons are fuel; in addition moves are carried out of considerable numbers of troops. The maintenance of the fleet of some 2,000 steamers, launches, and barges of the Inland Water Transport R.E. has necessitated the erection of large dockyards and repair yards. Moreover, special construction yards have been opened to put together the steamers and barges which arrived in parts from England.

The port of Basra, from very small beginnings, can now be ranked as thoroughly up-to-date. 6,000 tons a day can be unloaded, and 12 ocean-going vessels can be berthed at permanent berths, 8 of which are fitted with electric cranes. The port has been planned so as to be capable of further extensions on the most modern commercial lines, and should prove a considerable asset to the future trade of the country. ….

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant,

W. B. MARSHALL, Lieut.- General, Commanding-in-Chief, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force.

31310 - 25 APRIL 1919

EAST AFRICA CAMPAIGN

ARMY DESPATCH dated 26 April 1919

(excerpts)

War Office, 26th April, 1919.

The Secretary of State for War has received the following despatch, from Lieutenant-General Sir J. L. Van Deventer, K.C.B., C.M.G., Commander-in-Chief, East African Force:

Pretoria, 20th January, 1919.

My Lord,

I have the honour to submit the following brief report on the operations in East Africa from September 1st to the conclusion of hostilities. ….

6. Meanwhile, General Hawthorn had been straining every nerve to get troops to the Songea area ahead of the enemy. He was, however, much hampered by the inadequacy of his available shipping; for the boats on Lake Nyassa were small, had been worked to their limit during the campaign, and frequently broke down at critical moments.

The 2nd/4th K.A.R. and Northern Rhodesian Police were landed at Mbamba Bay by the end of September, two companies of the former being just too late to block the Germans' passage of the Rovuma east of Bangalolo. ….

14. …. The Royal Navy has, as ever, co-operated most loyally, and has often either anticipated my requests or given even more than I asked for. ….

I have the honour to be, My Lord, Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

J. L. VAN DEVENTER, Lieutenant-General, Commander-in-Chief, East African Force.

31358 - 23 MAY 1919

SUDAN OPERATIONS

ARMY DESPATCH dated 26 February 1919

(10 pages)

31383 - 3 JUNE 1919

PALESTINIAN CAMPAIGN - NAVAL MENTIONS

ARMY DESPATCH dated 5 March 1919

War Office, 5th June, 1919.

The following despatch has been, received by the Secretary of State for War from General Sir E. H. H. Allenby, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., Commander-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force:

General Headquarters, 5th March, 1919.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward herewith a list of Officers, Nurses, Other Ranks and Civilians, whom I consider worthy of mention for their services during the period from the 19th September, 1918, to the 31st January, 1919.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your most obedient servant,

E. H. H. ALLENBY, General. Commander-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

Royal Navy.

Unwin, Comdr. (A./Commodore) E., V.C., C.M.G

Commands & Staff

(including)

Armstrong, Lt.- Col. & Bt. Col. (T./Brig.- Gen.) St. G. B., C.M.G., R. Marines

Trew, Maj. (T.- /Brig.- Gen.) E. F., C.M.G., D.S.O., R. Marines.

31385 - 3 JUNE 1919

SALONIKA CAMPAIGN - NAVAL MENTIONS

ARMY DESPATCH dated 9 March 1919

War Office, 5th June, 1919.

The following Despatch has been received by the Secretary of State for War from Lieutenant-General Sir G. F. Milne, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., Commanding-in-Chief, British Salonika Force:

General Headquarters, British Salonika Force, Constantinople. 9th March, 1919.

SIR,

I have the honour to submit herewith a list of names of the Officers, Warrant Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, Men and Nursing Staff, whom I desire to bring to your notice for their distinguished and gallant services during the period from 1st October, 1918, to the 1st March, 1919.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient Servant,

G. F. MILNE, Lieut.- General, Commanding-in-Chief, British Salonika Force.

Royal Navy.

Forbes, Comdr.(A./Capt.) C. H.

Kiddle, Lt.- Comdr. R. W.

Staveley, Capt. C. M., C.M.G.

Unwin, Commodore E., V.C., C.M.G.

Wallace, Boatswain J. E.

Watts, Warrant Shipwright W. P.

Adams, O.N. 198293 Ldg. Seaman J. L.

Glanville, O.N. 271579 Chief Engine Room Artfr. W. H. T. G.

Vickers, O.N. 157216 P.O. H.

Wright, O.N. 344431 1st Cl. Shipwright S.

Royal Naval Reserve.

Donaldson, Lt. E.

Scott-Smith, Lt. H. E. G.

Stewart, T./Paymaster Lt. J.

Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve.

Summers, T./Lt.- Comdr. H. C.

(followed by Army etc. lists).

31386 - 3 JUNE 1919

MESOPOTAMIAN CAMPAIGN - NAVAL MENTIONS

ARMY DESPATCH dated 7 February 1919

War Office, 5th June, 1919.

The Secretary of State for War has received the following despatch addressed to the Chief of the General Staff, India, by Lieutenant-General Sir W. B. Marshall, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., Commanding-in-Chief, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force:

General Headquarters, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, 7th February, 1919.

Sir,

With reference to paragraph 39 of my despatch dated 1st February, 1919, I have the honour to submit herewith a list of names of those officers, ladies, warrant and non-commissioned officers and men serving, or who have served, under my command, whose distinguished and gallant services and devotion to duty I consider deserving of special mention.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant,

W. B. MARSHALL, Lieut-General Commanding-in-Chief, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force

(mainly Army lists)

INDIAN ARMY.

(including)

Sea Transport.

Lennox, T./Lt. H., R.I.M.

Maxwell, T./Lt.- Comdr., R. D., R.I.M.

Stewart, T./Lt. W. M., R.I.M.

Turbett, Lt.- Comdr. (T./Comdr.) L. T. R. W., R.I.M.

Masters of Transports.

Cooke, Master Mariner G. T.

Davidson, Master Mariner J.

Inland Water Transport.

(including)

de Woolfson, T./Maj. A. H. F., R.E. (R.I.M.).

Hall, T./Maj. L. J., R.E. (Lt.- Comdr., R.N.R.).

Milne-Henderson, T./Maj. T. M. S., R.E. (Lt., R.I.M.).

Chalk, 1395 Fitt. S. H., R.I.M.

Abdul Ghani, C/899 1st Cl. Engine-Dvr., R.I.M.

Abdul Jaffer, 8793 2nd Cl. Master, R.I.M.

Asaad Ali, 1191 1st Cl. Engine-Dvr., R.I.M.

Bassa Meah, 8908 1st Cl. Engine-Dvr., R.I.M.

Ghani Meah, 8448 2nd Cl. Master, R.I.M.

Gustadji Elavia, 9491 Clk., R.I.M.

Lal Meah, 8 2nd Cl. Master, R.I.M.

Namthali, C/88 Sailmaker, R.I.M.

Ram Gulam, 60748 Tindal.

Shaikh Ibrahim Ameen, 9720 T./Gnr., R.I.M.

Port Traffic.

(including)

Rawson, Lt. G., R.I.M.

31387 - 3 JUNE 1919

EAST AFRICAN CAMPAIGN - NAVAL MENTIONS

ARMY DESPATCH DATED 20 January 1919

War Office, 5th June, 1919.

The following despatch has been received by the Secretary of State for War from Lieutenant-General Sir J. L. Van Deventer, K.C.B., C.M.G., Commanding-in-Chief, East African Force:

Pretoria, 20th January, 1919.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward herewith my recommendations in favour of the undermentioned Officers, Ladies, Warrant Officers, Non-commissioned Officers and Men for valuable services rendered during the period 1st August, 1918, to the conclusion of hostilities.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient Servant,

J. L. VAN DEVENTER, Lieutenant-General. Commanding-in-Chief, East African Force.

Royal Navy.

Tallack, ON. 345569 Shipwright, 1st Cl., C.F.

Royal Naval Reserve.

Morgan, Paymaster J. W. G.

Petersen, Lt. J. F.

Smith, Lt. H. J.

Stuart, Lt. W. W.

Tonge, Lt.- Comdr. (A./Comdr.) C. G.

Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve.

Chamberlain, Lt. H. G.

King, Lt. W. J., D.S.C.

Royal Indian Marine.

Bolton, Engr.- Comdr. R. E. C., D.S.O.

Kerr, Engr.- Lt. T., D.S.C.

Sheikh Essack, Lascar.

Sheikh Jainoo Sheikh Wazuddin, Serang of Lascars.

Naval Transport Establishment.

Commack, Master Mariner F. R., Master of H.M.H.S. "Vita."

Downs, Chief Offr. A., H.M.H.S. "Ebani."

Faill, Master Mariner A., Master of H.M.H.S. "Ebani."

Lumsden, Chief Engr. W., H.M.H.S."Ebani."

Spicer, Master Mariner E., Master of, H.M.H.S. "Dongola." (below - Photo Ships)

Stanley, Master Mariner W. F., Master of H.M.H.S. "Gascon."

Wilson, Master Mariner J. R., Master of H.M.H.S. "Loyalty."

(followed by Army etc lists)

31435 - 4 JULY 1919

WESTERN FRONT - NAVAL MENTIONS

ARMY DESPATCH dated 16 March 1919

War Office, 5th July, 1919.

The following despatch has been received by the Secretary of State for War from Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, K.T., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E., late Commander-in-Chief, the British Armies in France:

General Headquarters. 16th March, 1919.

Sir,

I have the honour to submit a list of names of those Officers, Ladies, Non-commissioned Officers and Men serving, or who have served, under my command during the period 16th September, 1918, to 15th March, 1919, whose distinguished and gallant services and devotion to duty I consider deserving of special mention.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant,

D. HAIG, Field-Marshal, Commander-in-Chief, The British Armies in. France.

Royal Navy.

Hamilton, Capt. D. M., C.M.G., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Kinahan, Comdr. F. W., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Man, Comdr. (A./Capt.) J., C.M.G., O.B.E.

Marescaux, Capt. A. E. H., C.M.G., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Neat, Paymaster-Comdr. E. H.

Steer, Comdr. G. H. T., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Warden, Lt.- Comdr. A. R. S., A.M., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Wonham, Paymaster-Capt. C. S., C. B. E., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Bowles, M/8868 2nd Writer F.

Fry, M/15837 2nd Writer A. R.

Paget, M/23965 2nd Writer H. E.

Royal Marine Artillery.

Cuming, T./Capt. T., D.S.C.

Percy, T./Capt. J. H., 3rd (How.) By.

Poole, Lt.- Col. G. R., C.M.G., D.S.O., attd. 26th Army Bde., R.G.A.

Raikes, Maj. G. L., D.S.C., 1st Siege By.

Stock, T./Lt. O. A., 1st (How.) By.

Vincent, T./Capt. H. B., attd. H.Q., X. Corps, H.A.

Wright, T./Lt. T. E., 8th (How.) By.

Chave, 7466 Clr. Sjt. W. H., attd. 73rd Siege By., S.A.H.A.

Johnstone, 1175 (S) Dvr. (A./L./Bomdr.) G., 10th (How.) By.

Ruffle, 421 (S) Sjt. W. H.

Turner, R.M.A./81 6 (S) Dvr. A. B.

Royal Marines.

Allard, T./Capt. P., O.B.E., attd. 63rd Div. Train.

Borthwick, T./Lt. H., attd. R.M. Lab. Corps.

Chapman, T./Maj. C. L., O.B.E,, attd. 63rd Div. Train.

Cook, T./Maj. W. E., O.B.E., attd. 63rd Div. Train.

Cross, T./Maj. W., attd. R.M. Lab. Corps.

Hargreaves, T./Lt. W. E., attd. R.M. Lab. Corps.

Havelock, T./Maj. G., attd. R.M. Lab. Corps.

McKay, T./Maj. W. K., attd. R.M. Lab. Corps.

Newman, T./Capt. V. C., attd. 63rd Div. Train.

Tait, T./Lt. J., attd. R.M. Lab. Corps.

Traill, T./Lt. R., attd. R.M. Lab. Corps.

Walker, T./Lt. J. M., attd. R.M. Lab. Corps.

Barker, Deal/3664 (6) Cpl. T. E., attd. H.Q., 63rd Div.

Dixon, Po./9999/Po./ A/0642 Pte. T. G.

Harknett, Po./3936/Po./A/0574 Pte. P. J.

Moss, Deal/54024 Pte. (A. /Cpl.) A., attd. 63rd San. Sec., R.A.M.C.

Price, Deal/54026 Pte. (A./Sjt.) A., attd. 63rd San. Sec., R.A.M.C.

Rothwall, Deal/3691 (S) Sjt. H.

Scott, Deal/ 2158 (S) Pte. W., attd. 63rd Div. Train.

Scott, Po./6700/Po./ A/0947 Pte. W.

Seeney, Deal/ 2389 Sick Berth Attendant, F. J., attd. 1st (How.) By., R.M.A.

Tawse, Deal/1709 (S) Pte. A., 63rd Div. Train.

Wilson, Deal/3241 (S) Sjt. P., attd. 149th Fd. Amb., R.A.M.C.

Royal Marine Light Infantry.

Monk, Qrmr. & T./Capt. G. T.

Sandilands, Maj. (A./Lt.- Col.) P., D.S.O., 1st Bn.

Chant, Ch./12679 Sjt. C., 1st Bn.

Goodwin, Ch./7960 Q.M.S. W. J., attd. R.M. Lab. Corps.

Horler, Ply./ 5071 Pte. (A./L./C.) M.

Hughes, Po./14116 S.M. W. G., attd. R.M. Lab. Corps.

Jewell, Ply./4607 Clr. Sjt. C.

March, Ply./ 14568 Sjt. (A./W.O., C1. 1) S. J., 1st Bn.

Milne, Ch./ 15810 Sjt. (A./Q.M.S.) J., attd. H.Q., 190th Inf. Bde.

Smith, Po./10227 Sjt. (A./C.S.M.) P. E. A., 1st Bn.

Todd, Ch./1101 (S) Pte. J. T., attd. 63rd Bn., M.G. Corps.

Yarrow, Po,/8028 S.M. A., attd. R.M. Lab. Corps.

Royal Marine Labour Corps.

Alexander, Deal/8585 (S) Sjt. D.

Baxter, Deal/8599 (S) Sjt. G.

Beatson, Deal/ 12565 Pte. (A./Sjt.) J.

Church, Deal/8076 (B) Pte. (A./Sjt.) J.

Clark, Deal/12393 (S) Pte. C. B.

Dick, Deal/9401 (S) Sjt. J.

English, Deal/12321 (S) Cpl. J.

Fisher, Deal/9014 (S) Sjt. A. B.

Fuller, Deal/8152 Pte. (A./Sjt.) W.

Henthorn, Deal/12325 (S.) Pte. T.

Langdown, Deal/9089 (S.) Sjt. R. H.

Macfarlane, Deal/8264 (S.) Cpl. J.

Millem, Deal/11967 (S.) Pte. (A./Sjt.) W. J.

Mitchell, Deal/8306 (S.) Cpl. C.

Montague, Deal/12546 (S.) Pte. J. J. H.

Nicholson, Deal/8780 (S.) Sjt. A.

Pearson, Deal/9566 (S.) Pte. {A./Cpl.) J.

Peck, Deal/9567 (S.) Sjt. (A./C.S.M.) H. J.

Smee, Deal/9209 (S.) Sjt. W. H.

Swire, Deal/14734 (S.) Pte. G.

Wishart, Deal/8872 (S.) Pte. (A./C.S.M.) J.

Royal Naval Reserve.

Clarke, Paymaster Lt.- Comdr. H. E., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Davis, Lt. W. H., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Flett, Lt. A., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Gittens, Paymaster Sub-Lt. J. H., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Harvey, Lt.- Comdr. H. W., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Lawlan, Lt. S., attd. R. N. Trans. Serv.

Lyndon, Lt. G. F., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

McPhail, Lt. A. D., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Moorhouse, Lt.- Comdr. R., R. D., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Murdoch, Paymaster Sub-Lt. A. G., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

O'Hare, Paymaster Lt. V. J., attd., R.N. Trans. Serv.

Palmer, Paymaster Sub-Lt. F. J. W., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Parnis, Lt. A., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Rogers, Lt. J. T., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Thirkell, Lt. E. A., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Walshe, Lt. H., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Williams, Lt. K. H., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve.

Andrews, T./Lt. F. J. attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Auld, T./Sub-Lt. (A./Lt.) A. W. F., Anson Bn.

Barnes, T./Sub-Lt. W. T. Drake Bn.

Benson, T./Lt. C. J., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Buckle, T./Comdr. A. W., D.S.O., Anson Bn.

Hodson, Paymaster Sub-Lt. G., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Kirby, T./Sub-Lt. W., Anson Bn.

Lumb, Lt. J., attd. R.N. Trans. Serv.

Lockwood, T./Lt.- Comdr. E. M., Hawke Bn.

Mickle, Lt. C. H., attd. R. N. Trans. Serv.

Nicolson, T./Lt.- Comdr. B. H., M.C., attd. H.Q., 63rd Div.

Pollock, T./Comdr. H. B., D.S.O., Hood Bn.

Watson, T./Sub-Lt. W., Hood Bn.

Bryant. LZ/3161 P.O. J. W., Drake Bn.

Doig, CZ/4812 P.O. A., Drake Bn.

Eddie, CZ/2112 C.P.O. (A./R.Q.M.S.) W., attd. 63rd Bn., M.G. Corps.

Fleming, CZ/1184 A.B. W., Hawke Bn.

Mitchell, CZ/1236 C.P.O. J. J., Hawke Bn.

Nock, TZ/4967 A.B. M. T., Hawke Bn.

Piggin, TZ/333 Ldg. Seaman W. A., attd H.Q., 63rd Div.

Pike, TZ/4493 A.B. H., Hood Bn.

Ramage, L.10/2296 P.O. C. T., Hood Bn.

Ramage, MZ/33 P.O. T., M.M., attd. 63rd Bn., M.G. Corps.

Shaw, CZ/4684 A.B. W., attd. 63rd Bn., M.G. Corps.

Simon, L.5/3122 P.O. (A./C.P.O.) H. J., D.C.M., attd. H.Q., 188th Inf. Bde.

Stevens, ZL/2941 A.B. G. A., attd. 190th L.T.M. By.

Tindall, SX5/234 P.O. C. J., Anson Bn., attd. H.Q., 188th Inf. Bde.

Watford, KP/410 A.B. P., Drake Bn.

Whitehill, CZ/2585 A.B. S., Hood Bn.

Commands & Staff

(including)

Angold, T./Lt. (A./Capt.) H. F., R.M.A.

Bourne, Maj. (T./Lt.- Col.) A. G. B., D.S.O., M.V.O., R.M.A.

Foster, Maj & Bt. Lt.- Col. (T./Lt.- Col) R. F. C., D.S.O., R.M.A.

Jerram, Maj. (T./Lt.Col.) C. F., D.S.O., R.M.L.I.

Montgomery, Maj. & Bt. Lt.- Col. (T./Lt.- Col.) H. F., D.S.O., R.M.L.I.

Tagg, Capt. (T./Lt.- Col.) E. J. B., D.S.O., R.M.L.I.

31476 - 25 JULY 1919

INDIA DURING THE WAR

ARMY DESPATCH dated 19 March 1919

(excerpts)

India Office, 28th July, 1919.

The following despatch from His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India on the part taken by India, including the Indian States, in the prosecution of the war, has been received from the Government of India:

Army Headquarters, India. Dated Delhi, 13th March, 1919.

From the Commander-in-Chief in India,

To the Secretary to the Government of India, Army Department.

SIR,

In continuation of my despatch dated 20th August 1918, I have the honour to submit the following brief review of the part played by India, including the Native States, in the prosecution of the war: ….

1914

….

5. The first request for troops received from His Majesty's Government was for two Infantry divisions' and one cavalry brigade for garrison duty in Egypt and the Soudan. The 3rd and 7th Divisions and 9th Cavalry Brigade were accordingly mobilised and made ready for despatch overseas; but, in informing the Secretary of State of these arrangements, it was urged that the relegation of these troops to garrison duty would be keenly felt by the men themselves, and that it was most desirable from every point of view that India should be represented on the European front. The destination of the contingent was accordingly changed to Marseilles. At the same time a request was received for a complete cavalry division, and subsequently for a second cavalry division, instead of the one cavalry brigade originally asked for; these were at once placed under orders, and the first convoy transporting the contingent to France sailed from Bombay on the 25th August, i.e., within 3 weeks of the declaration of war. The bulk of the force had disembarked at Marseilles before the end of September, and less than a month later were in action in Flanders. The total strength of the original contingent despatched to France amounted approximately to 16,000 British and 28,500 Indian ranks.

6. A request was also received within the first few days of the war for the preparation of a mixed force, including six battalions, to deal with German East Africa, and for three additional battalions for the protection of Zanzibar and the Mombassa-Nairobi railway, the operations of the latter being controlled by the Colonial Office. The despatch of the former was somewhat delayed by shortage of shipping and the difficulty of providing naval escort, - the German cruisers Emden and Konigsberg were at this period at large and the former had appeared off Madras on the night of the 22nd-23rd September - but the force eventually arrived at Mombassa on the 31st October, and sailed for Tanga next day. One of the three battalions for British East Africa sailed on 19th August, and was in action at Tsavo on 6th September. With the arrival of the remaining two battalions the two forces were amalgamated under one command. The strength of these two contingents, which contained a large proportion of Imperial Service Troops, amounted approximately to 1,500 British and 10,250 Indian ranks.

7. In the meantime, the threatening attitude of Turkey had made it necessary to take steps for the protection of the Abadan pipeline, and it was decided to despatch a brigade of the 6th Division (which had been mobilised in anticipation of further demands) to demonstrate at the head of the Persian Gulf, without, however, taking hostile action. This brigade embarked on the 16th October, and arrived at Bahrein on the 23rd. With the declaration of war against Turkey a week later, the brigade was ordered to take Fao, and a second brigade was placed under orders to support it. The remainder of the 6th Division sailed for the Shatt-al-Arab on the 20th November. The strength of this advanced guard of the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force amounted approximately to 4,500 British and 12,000 Indian ranks.

8. A further commitment was accepted by the Government of India in despatching to Egypt, at the request of His Majesty's Government, a force of six infantry brigades (including one composed of Imperial Service troops) and one Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade. While en route to Suez one of these infantry brigades took part in the action at Sheikh Said on 10th November. These troops, numbering approximately 1,500 British and 27,250 Indian ranks, disembarked in Egypt during November and December. A small Indian contingent also co-operated with the Japanese in the attack on the German naval base at Tsing-tao in North China.

9. In addition to the organised forces despatched to France, East Africa, Mesopotamia and Egypt, 32 British Infantry battalions and 20 batteries of artillery, aggregating 35,500 British ranks, were sent independently to England to facilitate the expansion of the army at home, and were gradually replaced by 35 Territorial battalions and 29 Territorial field batteries. The small residue of the pre-war British regular garrison was concentrated in formations on the North West Frontier, while the Territorial units underwent a course of intensive training. These latter fully proved their fighting value during, the later stages of the war; but for the time being they had much to learn as regards warfare under the novel conditions of a country like India. Thus, by the close of 1914, India was maintaining four overseas forces amounting in the aggregate to over 100,000 men of all ranks, and had in addition exchanged 35,500 of her best British regular troops for an equivalent number of semi-trained Territorials with inferior armament and equipment. ….

1915

12. In many respects 1915 was the most critical period of the war as far as India was concerned. The outstanding feature of the year was the growing importance of the campaign in Mesopotamia, involving a steadily increasing demand for men and material at a time when the armed forces of the country had been reduced to a dangerously low level. The year was, in fact, one of strenuous endeavour to comply with demands which constantly threatened to outpace the ability of the country to meet them. During the year contingents from India were engaged in France and Belgium, in Egypt, in Gallipoli, in Mesopotamia, in South and East Persia, in East Africa, in the Cameroons, in the Aden Hinterland, in Somaliland and on the North-West and North-East Frontiers of India, besides garrisons at several colonial stations. The mere enumeration of these theatres will convey some idea of the complex nature of the problem which confronted those responsible for the provision of the necessary men and material.

….

17. In minor theatres, the year brought several lesser commitments. In theatres outside the Indian sphere small contingents were employed in the Cameroons and Somaliland; within the Indian sphere, the incursion of a Turkish force into the Aden Protectorate involved the organization of a small force for the protection of the fortress; and in the Gulf of Oman, minor operations were rendered necessary at Musqat, Jask, and Chahbar. ….

18. …. Repeated efforts were made under German guidance to ship arms to India via Batavia and Siam, but were frustrated by the vigilance of the police, not only in India itself, but at Shanghai, Singapore, and Bangkok. In this and many other connections relating to India's military activities, I have always been able to rely on the civil, naval, and military authorities at Singapore, …. The mutiny at Singapore was an ugly incident which, though occurring outside India, had an unsettling effect. The year was thus one of anxiety both, within and on the borders of India ,,,,,,

1916

21. Except in Mesopotamia, where the campaign continued to grow in scope and importance and called for a determined redoubling of effort, the year brought no outstanding developments as far as the Army in India was concerned. ….

1917.

30. During 1917, the chief events of the year were still centred in Mesopotamia ….

1918.

37. In their effect on India, the German offensive in France and the Turco-German attempt to move eastward across the Caspian were the outstanding features of the closing year of the war. ….

….

53. …. much assistance was rendered by the Indian Rivercraft Board, a voluntary organisation developed under the direction of the Railway Board, and which consisted of representatives of the principal engineering firms at Calcutta, with affiliated committees at Karachi, Bombay, and other ports. Improvements to the port of Basrah have continued uninterruptedly, and it has now been converted into a base capable of handling 180,000 tons of stores a month.

54. …. The great increase of military traffic produced by the war synchronised with a serious shortage of shipping, and this threw upon the Indian railways a volume of traffic, normally sea-borne, which they were never designed to carry. Nevertheless, by the exercise of the utmost resource, foresight and initiative, serious dislocation to traffic has been successfully avoided, and even in circumstances of extreme difficulty, railway administrations have freely surrendered personnel and material for service overseas. The resources of the Royal Indian Marine have similarly been taxed to the utmost. Not only has this service been responsible for the transportation overseas of nearly 950,000 men and 175,000 animals, but it has also been charged with a variety of other duties. Throughout the war, the work of the Royal Indian Marine has been accomplished with commendable efficiency and despatch. ….

________

APPENDIX I.

(including)

Huddleston, Captain E. W., C.I.E., Royal Indian Marine, Principal Marine Transport Officer, Bombay and Karachi.

Newnham, Mr. E. P., Chief Constructor, Royal Indian Marine Dockyard, Bombay.

Wilson, Captain N. F. J., C.M.G., O.B.E., Director of the Royal Indian Marine.

31498 - 8 AUGUST 1919

PALESTINE CAMPAIGN

ARMY DESPATCH dated 28 June 1919

(excerpts)

War Office, 11th August, 1919.

The Secretary of State for War has received the following Despatch from Field Marshal Sir Edmund Allenby, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., Commander-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force:

General Headquarters, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 28th June, 1919.

SIR,

I have the honour to forward a despatch describing events in Syria and Palestine, subsequent to the conclusion of the armistice with Turkey on October 31st, 1918. I have taken the opportunity in this despatch to give a brief general summary of the campaigns in this theatre; and to express my thanks to some of those who have assisted me during my command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. ….

Part II.- General review of the Campaign.

14. The campaigns in Sinai, Palestine and Syria formed an important part of the general Allied effort against the Central Powers; and I propose to give here a brief summary of their relation to the operations in the main theatre on the Western Front, of their general features and results.

The forces employed in this theatre may be regarded in the nature of a detachment from the main forces on the Western Front; but engaged in the same great battle, changing its role and action according to the sway of events in the main theatre and the other minor theatres.

In the first instance, the object of this detachment was the protection of Egypt and the Suez Canal, a vital link in the communications of the Allies. By the summer of 1917, when I assumed command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, Lieut.-General Sir A. Murray's brilliant campaign in Sinai had removed the danger to Egypt, and had forced the enemy back across his own frontiers. ….

18. …. To the majority of men, the weariness and discomforts of a prolonged war are worse than its dangers. Owing to shipping, difficulties, the number of men who could be granted leave to their homes was very limited; and there were many who for 3 and 4 years had no opportunity of returning home. ….

Part III. Appreciation of Services.

….

25. For the cordial support and co-operation of the Royal Navy I am indebted to Rear-Admiral T. Jackson and his successor, Rear-Admiral H. B. Pelly. My thanks are also due to Admiral Varney, commanding the French Naval Division of Syria, for the assistance given me by the French Navy. For the efficiency with which the naval transport service was carried out I desire to thank Commodore Unwin, my Principal Naval Transport Officer, and the naval transport staffs at the various bases. ….

I have the honour to be, sir, Your most obedient servant,

EDM. ALLENBY, General, Commanding-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force

31690 - 12 DECEMBER 1919

HEDJAZ OPERATIONS

ARMY DESPATCHES, starting 27 June 1917

(excerpts)

War Office, 15th December. 1919.

The Secretary of State for War has received the following Despatches from General Sir Reginald Wingate, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., G.B.E., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., on the military operations in the Hedjaz from the 9th June, 1916, to 31st January, 1919:

[Despatch No. 1.] Cairo, 25th June, 1917.

My Lord, I have the honour to present the following report on the progress of military operations in the Hedjaz:

1. The Arab leaders of the anti-Turkish revolt having expressed their desire for material assistance and the advice of Allied officers, the military control and supervision of all arrangements to that end devolved upon me. The selection of the necessary personnel was not an easy matter. Officers with the qualifications for such delicate work, necessitating a combination of military experience, tact, knowledge of Arabs and acquaintance with their language, are extremely difficult to find, but we are fortunate in the few whose services it has been possible to secure. ….

7. In the autumn of 1916, when it was obvious that a direct attack on Medina was most unlikely to succeed, it had become evident that the only way of removing the threat against Mecca and eventually securing the fall of Medina was to undertake raiding tactics on as large a scale as possible against the railway and the enemy lines of communication from the north. With this object in view Emir Feisal, who had been operating against Medina from the west, with his base on Yambo, moved north against Wejh, and, after capturing the town with the aid of H.M. ships on 24th January, 1917, threatened the whole line of the railway from Hadiyah to Moadhdham. It was largely this move which early in January began to relieve the situation and necessitated the withdrawal of the bulk of the Turkish Hedjaz Expeditionary Force to the neighbourhood of Medina, followed by the despatch of considerable reinforcements from Medina to the north for the protection of the railway line. ….

10. The raiding operations which have been instituted against the enemy's lines of communication have attained a considerable measure of success. A training school in demolition work was established at Wejh under Lieut. Garland, and a considerable number of Arabs were trained in demolition work and are now operating against the railway under the personal direction of Lieut.- Colonel S. F. Newcombe, D.S.O., R.E., Captain T. E. Lawrence and Lieut. H. Garland. ….

12. …. I beg also to draw attention to the invaluable help which has always been afforded by the Navy under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, K.C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O. The entire transport of stores, munitions, supplies and personnel has been carried out by the Navy under circumstances of extreme difficulty and in addition to their normally heavy duties. At no time have they failed to afford the utmost possible assistance, and have on many occasions by their active cooperation (notably at the capture of Jeddah and of Wejh) rendered an Arab success possible. It is not too much to say that, had it not been for the whole-hearted cooperation of the Red Sea Patrol, under the command of Captain William Boyle, R.N., a successful revolt of the Sherif would have been impossible.

The lists of material sent to the Hedjaz as forwarded to the War Office by the Egyptian Expeditionary Force are an indication of the measure of assistance given by the Commander-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, and the Vice-Admiral Commanding-in-Chief, East Indies and Egyptian Waters, and of the work carried out by their respective Staffs. ….

________

[Despatch No. 2.] The Residency, Ramleh, 15th June, 1918.

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, a brief account of the military operations conducted in Arabia, south of the line Akaba-Tebuk, during the past twelve months, by the forces of His Highness the King of the Hedjaz. ….

2. …. All these attacks were to be carefully synchronised, whilst, at the same time, a strong diversion was to be carried out in the Maan-Akaba area by the Howeitat under Auda Abu Tayi, accompanied by Captain (now Lieutenant-Colonel) Lawrence, in order to prevent any considerable movement of reinforcements to Medina from the north. ….

11. …. The assistance of the Royal Navy has been very essential to the execution of the military operations on land and I wish to express my warm thanks to Rear-Admiral T. Jackson, C.B., M.V.O., the senior Naval Officers of the Red Sea Patrol, Captain W. H. D. Boyle, C.B., R.N. (until November, 1917), and his successor, Captain H. A. Buchanan-Wollaston, R.N., to the Principal Naval Transport Officer; Commodore E. Unwin, V.C., C.M.G., and his Staff, and to the Commanders of the "G" boats, for their unfailing and invaluable help. ….

________

[Despatch No. 3.] The Residency, Cairo, 27th December, 1918.

My Lord,

I have the honour to submit my third despatch on the military operations in the Hedjaz. ….

9. …. My task has been greatly facilitated by the ready co-operation given me at all times by the Acting Sirdar; by Rear- Admiral Jackson, C.B., MVO., and the officers commanding ships of the Red Sea Patrol ….

I have the honour to be, My Lord, Your Lordship's obedient, humble Servant,

REGINALD WINGATE, General. General Officer Commanding, Hedjaz.

31696 - 16 DECEMBER 1919

SOUTHERN SUDAN OPERATIONS

ARMY DESPATCH dated 22 May 1919

(3 pages)

31700 - 19 DECEMBER 1919

ADEN OPERATIONS - NAVAL MENTIONS

ARMY DESPATCH dated 20 December 1919

War Office, 20th December, 1919.

The names of the undermentioned Officers, Ladies, Warrant Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men have been brought to the notice of the Secretary of State for War for gallant and distinguished services rendered in connection with the military operations at Aden during the period from 1st September, 1918, to 31st December, 1918

Royal Navy.

Buchanan-Wollaston, Capt. H. A.

Palmer, Capt. A. R.

Royal Indian Marine.

Stocken, Comdr. E.

(followed by Army lists)

1920

31728 - 9 JANUARY 1920

ITALY AND MESOPOTAMIA - NAVAL MENTIONS

ARMY LIST dated 12 January 1920

War Office, 12th January, 1920.

(included in Army lists)

The names of the undermentioned Officers, Ladies, Warrant Officers, Non-commissioned Officers and Men are to be added to those brought to notice for distinguished and gallant services and devotion to duty by General F. R. Earl of Cavan, K.P., K.C.B., M.V.O., Commander- in-Chief of the British Forces in Italy, in his despatch of the 18th January, 1919. (Published in the Supplement of the London Gazette, dated- 5th June, 1919. (No. 31384)):

Royal Navy.

Graham, Sub-Lt. H. M., R.N.V.R., attd. Intell. Corps.

Ridgway, Lt.- Comdr. B. H. A., R.N.R.

Rowsell, T./Comdr. & Hon. Capt. C. R.

________

Mesopotamia.

The-names of the undermentioned Officers, Lady, Non-commissioned Officers and Men are to be added to those brought to notice for distinguished and gallant services and devotion to duty by Lieutenant-General W. .R. Marshall, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., Commanding-in-Chief, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, in his Despatch of the 15th April, 1918. (Published in the Supplement of the London Gazette, dated the 27th August, 1918. (No. 30867)):

Sea Transport.

Philby, Lt.- Comdr. R. M., R.I.M.

31759 - 27 JANUARY 1920

War Office

(included in Army lists)

The names of the undermentioned Officers, Warrant Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men have been; brought to the notice of the Secretary of State for War, in accordance with the terms of Army Order 193 of 1919, for gallant conduct and determination displayed in escaping or attempting to escape from captivity. Dated 5th May, 1919:

T./Lt. E. G. Vagg, R. Mar.

R/2167 A./B. D. Rosie, Howe Bn., R.N.D.

31764 - 30 JANUARY 1920

War Office.

The names of the undermentioned have been brought to the notice of the Secretary of State for War by General H. S., Lord Rawlinson, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G., A.D.C., Gen. General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Allied Forces, North Russia, for valuable and distinguished services rendered in connection with the operations in North Russia during the period 25th March to 26th September, 1919. Dated 11th November, 1919:

Archangel.

Royal Naval Reserve.

Fargher, Lt. H. S. L.

Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve.

Edwards, Comdr. P. H., D.S.O. (T./Lt.-Col., Gen. List).

Watson, Lt. G. H.

(followed by Army lists)

________

War Office

The names of the undermentioned have been brought to the notice of the Secretary of State for War by General H. S., Lord Rawlinson, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G., A.D.C., Gen., General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Allied Forces, North Russia, for valuable and distinguished services rendered in connection with the Operations in North Russia during the period 1st March to 12th October, 1919. Dated 11th November, 1919:

Murmansk.

Royal Naval Reserve.

Stenhouse, Lt. J. R., D.S.C.

(followed by Army lists)

Commands & Staff.

Stuart, T./Lt. W. G., R. Marines.

31813 - 5 MARCH 1920

MESOPOTAMIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

ARMY DESPATCH dated 12 November 1919

(6 pages)

31823 - 12 MARCH 1920

OPERATIONS AGAINST AFGHANISTAN

ARMY DESPATCH dated 1 November 1919

(16 pages)

31850 - 2 APRIL 1920

NORTH RUSSIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

ARMY DESPATCHES dated 5 October 1918 to 1 November 1919

North Russian theatre,
click map to enlarge

War Office, 6th April, 1920.

The following despatches on operations in Russia have been received by the Secretary of State for War:

(Note: 1 Russian verst is nearly 2/3rds mile)

DESPATCH No. 1 (with Appendix).

From Major-General F. C. Poole, C..B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces in Northern Russia, covering the period from 24th May to 30th September, 1918.

General Headquarters, Archangel, 5th October, 1918.

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith a report of the action of the North Russia Expeditionary Force from its inception on 24th May, 1918, up to 30th September, 1918.

According to orders received from the War Office, I proceeded to Murman, where I disembarked on 24th May, 1918, to assume command of the Allied Forces in North Russia. My instructions were to organise the Czecho-Slovaks, of whom there were said to be some 20,000 en route to Archangel and Murman, and these troops, together with any local troops I might be able to raise, were to form the bulk of my force, stiffened with a few Allied troops of whom I might ultimately hope to obtain about 5,000.

Situation at Murman on my Arrival.

On arrival at Murman, after discussing the situation with Rear-Admiral Thomas W. Kemp, C.B, C.I.E., S.N.O. White Sea, and with the various Officers of the Garrison. I found that the situation was as follows:

1. Our forces were holding Murmansk with a detachment down at Kandalaksha, thus holding the Kola Peninsula. We also had a Naval detachment from H.M.S. Cochrane (below - CyberHeritage/Terry Philips) holding Pechenga, from which port they had lately driven out a force of White Finns. The rest of the railway line as far as Svanka was nominally held by detachments of the Red Army. Our troops had been landed at Murman to defend the port on the invitation of the Soviet Government of Moscow.

2. No Czechs had arrived at Murman, as through German intrigue they had all been prevented by the Soviet Government. Thus there was no hope of obtaining any help from this source.

3. All Intelligence reports indicated probability of an attack against the railway line by the White Finns, estimated strength about 20,000, at points about Kandalaksha-Kern and Petrozavodsk.

4. The actual Allied forces at my disposal were:

(1) Landing parties from Allied Warships, about 500 men.

(2) A detachment of French scattered down the line, mostly invalids, about 300 men.

(3) About 1,400 Serbs, of whom many were sick and about half had no rifles.

(4) The Russian Red (Railway) Guard, about 1,200 men, in posts down the line as far as Svanka. Their fighting value was very doubtful, and also their attitude towards the Allies.

(5) About 500 Finnish Red Guards, who were in doubt whether to enlist in our service. Of these some 200 were suffering from scurvy and starvation.

(6) Any Russians I might be able to enlist. It was thus obvious that our best chance of defence lay in the fact that the difficulties of the country, which is very boggy and with practically no roads passable in summer, rendered an advance against us an exceedingly difficult operation. The only feasible routes of advance were either along the railway, which is a badly laid single track line with a considerable number of easily destroyed bridges, or else by utilising the waterways, lakes and rivers, of which there are several feasible routes. In either of these cases the transport of large bodies of troops or of guns would be an exceedingly difficult operation, and at the ports themselves of Murman and Pechenga any hostile force arriving would necessarily come under fire of the ships' guns. This fact gave us, at any rate, confidence and moral support.

Arrival of Reinforcements.

On 29th May a reinforcement of 400 Royal Marines arrived in s.s. "Porto." This number was considerably magnified in local opinion, and created a very good political effect.

Arrival of Special Commissioner from Moscow.

About this time the Soviet at Moscow were apparently undecided as to whether to yield to German pressure and submit themselves definitely to their influence, or whether to throw in their lot with the Allies and recommence hostilities. In any case they sent up to Murman a Special Commissioner - Natzaremus - with full powers to act for them and conclude any agreement with the Allies. I had several conversations with him, but as his great anxiety before entering into any agreement was to obtain official recognition of the Moscow Soviet by the Allied Governments, for which of course we had no powers, we were unable to come to any decision. He stated, however, unofficially that the Soviet were determined to fight to defend the ports, and were sending up to Murman the Czechs and two divisions of Red Guards. On the same day we definitely heard from Moscow that there was no hope of getting the Czechs, as they were fighting the Bolsheviks at Penza.

Occupation of Kem.

On June 7th reports from Kem showed that the Finnish White Guards were advancing upon the town, and their advanced patrols were only some 40 versts (25 miles) away. As there was considerable local excitement, I decided to reinforce Kandalaksha with 150 Marines. I sent down Lieut.- Colonel Thornhill, D.S.O., in charge, with instructions to take on from Kandalaksha the armoured train and a force of Serbs and Marines and drive the White Finns out of Kem. I was induced to take this step partly because I was assured that Kem was a good recruiting ground, and that I should be able to raise at least 1,000 men there, and partly because of the effect on public opinion to reassure the waverers and to show that the Allies were in earnest. This force occupied Kem without opposition.

Warning from Moscow to Leave the Country.

On June 8th I received the first intimation that the central Government had definitely decided to throw in its lot with Germany against us. I was requested to attend a meeting of the Sovd-ep, where they read out to me a telegram signed by Lenin and Chicherin, pointing out that the occupation of Murmansk by the Allies was a breach of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, and that we were to be warned to leave the country at once. The Sovdep said that they were pro-Ally, and that they were most anxious that we should not leave. They implied that the result of this order would mean that Murmansk would break away from the Central Government and join the Allies. A telegram from Trotsky intercepted by our secret service ordered the Murman Sovdep to eject us by force.

Start of Recruiting Russians.

Up to this time efforts to recruit Russians had met with little success. The attraction of the Red Guards, with no work, no discipline, good food, and good pay, were infinitely greater than anything I was able to offer. On the 18th of June, though, I was able to interfere in a local riot and save the life of the Commissar of the Red Guard - one Zankevitch, who was about to be murdered by his men. He promptly enlisted to ensure his own safety, and started to obtain other recruits for me. I then inaugurated the Slavo-British Allied Legion for Russians - officers and men who enlist under British discipline to fight to free Russia from German domination. Recruiting has never been a great success, as the voluntary system is foreign to Russian ideas. The Russian is accustomed to wait till he is ordered to mobilise, and although I have personally talked to some hundreds of men who all realise the necessity of fighting for their country, in the majority of cases they say "as soon as we are ordered to mobilise we will come willingly." With the officers the case was different. These men, as a class suffered terribly during the last year. Their self-confidence is undermined, their spirit is broken, and those who have managed to escape and reach our lines have as a rule been only too glad to join us. They are enlisted in a special Officers' Company, and form a valuable cadre for supplying officers for the Russian Army after mobilisation has been started.

Arrival of "Syren" and "Elope" Forces.

On June 23rd the "Syren" and "Elope" staffs and forces arrived - the former under Major-General Maynard, C.M.G., D.S.O., with a small force of one company Infantry, one machine gun company, and one company R.E. This force was detailed to remain in Murmansk, and General Maynard was to take over command of the troops in this area under my general supervision. Meanwhile the "Elope" Force, which consisted of Staff and Instructors under Brigadier-General Finlayson, C.M.G., D.S.O., was destined to accompany me to Archangel, which was the main base of operations.

Opposition from Central Government.

On the 28th June the intentions of the Central Government to eject us by force from Murmansk became evident. Agitation against the Allies was openly carried out and I found it necessary to take measures to disarm Red Guards who were being despatched against Murman from Kem and Kandalaksha. This work 'was admirably carried out under the supervision of General Maynard and Colonel Marsh, and the whole disarmament in this district was carried out with practically no opposition. Some 3,000 rifles, 1,000,000 rounds S.A.A., and seventeen machine guns were taken. I received news that Natzaremus, with 1,500 men, was advancing from Petrozavodsk against me, and I made arrangements to oppose him south of Kem.

Murman Soviet Declares itself Pro-Ally, and Breaks Off Relations with Central Government.

The immediate result of these events was that the Murman Sovdep now definitely decided to adhere to the Allied cause, and to sever relations with the Central Government at Moscow. Their reason was that they realised that the action of the Bolshevik Government was solely and simply at the bidding of Germany. They realised that Lenin and Trotsky had definitely thrown, in their lot with Germany against the Allies. At a mass meeting on 30th June it was proposed, and unanimously carried, that Murman and District would not obey the orders of the Central Soviet to drive us out of the country. They decided that they would defend Murmansk against the Germans, and they invited the Allies to co-operate and assist them. To this request the Allied Representations agreed.

Position at Archangel.

News received during the past few weeks from Archangel showed very clearly that German propaganda had made headway there, and that our landing would undoubtedly meet with opposition. Mines were laid at the entrance to the channel and the fortification of the Island of Modyugski was vigorously taken in hand. As my available troops were not sufficient to justify any attempt to hold Archangel in face of opposition, I decided to make no attempt until I was reinforced by the French battalion which was under orders to embark.

Situation in Kem and Soroka.

By the end of the first week of July the situation in Kem and Soroka was well in hand. The garrison of Kem had been reinforced and the populace reassured. H.M.S. "Attentive" (below - Photo Ships) had been sent into the White Sea, and Captain Altham, R.N., by his energy and tact, had worked wonders. The Red Guards advanced north along the railway to within 15 versts (10 miles) of Kem, and then retreated southwards, burning the bridges behind them. We occupied Soroka with a small detachment from H.M.S. "Attentive," and the armoured train. After this I handed over the conduct of military operations in this area to General Maynard, whose report on his operations is attached. (Appendix I.).

Occupation of Archangel.

The entrance to the White Sea now being free from ice, I made all my plans for the occupation of Archangel at the earliest possible moment after the arrival of the French battalion, which, reached Murman on 26th July.

By arming every possible officer and man of the "Elope" force, and with the French battalion and details borrowed from "Syren," I had for my landing force almost 1,500, which were, I considered, sufficient for the task. It was, naturally, a considerable risk, but as I could expect no more reinforcements before the end of August, and as the opposition to us was daily growing stronger, I considered that the risk was justifiable and decided to take it. I decided to commence with the capture and occupation of Modyugski Island, and then to push up the channel, via, Economy, Solombola, Archhangel, to Bakharitza, with my main force. I detailed Colonel Thornhill to proceed to Onega with a small force of Serbs and Russians, and to proceed by road on Oboserskaia, which he was instructed to reach at the same time as I entered Archangel, thus cutting the line and preventing the evacuation of rolling stock southwards. This force was unable to reach its destination, owing to the severe opposition encountered; but it fought most gallantly against great odds, and eventually withdrew to Onega, after having inflicted severe casualties on the enemy. It succeeded, however, in diverting a considerable force from my part, and thus was of considerable assistance to my operations.

I had decided to embark from Murman for this expedition on August 3rd; but on July 30th I received information from Mr. Lindley, who had just reached Kandalaksha, that the state in Archangel was so desperate that our friends there had decided that it was impossible to delay any longer, and that they had arranged for a revolution against the Government to start on the 31st, and that unless we could arrive very shortly after the outbreak it would be certainly suppressed. As I was most anxious to take advantage of any internal disturbances, I decided, after consultation with the S.N.O. - Admiral Kemp - that we would start the same night, with H.M.S. "Attentive," H.M. aircraft carrier, "Nairana," the French armoured cruiser, "Amiral Aube," the Trawler Fleet, and 400 soldiers, and that the remainder of the force should follow by midday on 31st. With this force I counted upon being able to overcome the opposition at Modyugski, considering that my seaplanes would very soon be able to silence the batteries should they open fire. Brigadier-General Finlayson proceeded in charge of the military portion of this force with Admiral Kemp, S.N.O., in H.M.S. "Nairana." This force proceeded as fast as possible, as time was so important a factor, and arrived off the island on the morning of 1st August. The ''Aube" had been delayed through striking a sunken wreck, so the "Attentive" and "Nairana" alone reached the rendezvous. The "Attentive" at once seized the lightship and demanded the instant surrender of the island. This surrender, after consideration, was refused, and the shore batteries opened fire. The seaplanes and "Attentive's" fire soon silenced the batteries, and the landing parties cleared up the island with very slight opposition. About thirty prisoners and some rifles and machine guns were captured, but the bulk of the garrison had fled to the south of the island and escaped. The armament consisted of seven 6 in. guns and six 6 in. howitzers. The enemy had been working very hard to complete their defences, and had our attack been delayed a few weeks longer the capture of the island would have constituted a very serious operation. By 10 p.m. we had finished clearing up the island and had made the minefields safe. We had also sent several seaplanes over Archangel to drop pamphlets and encourage our supporters. During the night the Bolshevik Government decided to evacuate the town, after having ordered two icebreakers to be sunk in the fairway to block our passage up the channel. On August 2nd the revolution planned by our supporters broke out at 4 a.m., and was completely successful. The Bolshevik Government was overthrown. The new Government cordially invoked our aid and declared itself pro-Ally, anti-German, and determined not to recognise the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. After some delay caused by exploring a passage between the sunken icebreakers, we were fortunate enough to find that there was just sufficient room to allow a passage for the ships. We then made a triumphal procession up the channel to Archangel, being everywhere greeted with enormous enthusiasm.

Meanwhile the enemy was retiring by boats up the Dvina and by trains down the railway. I organised at once forces to operate down the railway towards Vologda and up the Dvina towards Kotlas under the immediate command of Brigadier-General B,. G. Finlayson, C.M.G., D.S.O., who took up his headquarters at Isakagorka.

Vologda Force.

Of these forces the Vologda Force, under Lieutenant-Colonel Guard, D.S.O., occupied Oboserskaia on 4th September. This force consistently encountered most determined opposition. The enemy, assisted by German officers, was considerably superior in numbers, and by the destruction of all bridges, and occupation of strong, defensive positions, was enabled to render our advance very slow. The country, consisting of practically nothing but forest and bog, presents the most extraordinary difficulties. This renders any attempt at a turning movement both difficult and slow. For a detachment to have to wade waist deep in bog, even on patrol work, is an almost daily occurrence. The success of this operation, which inflicted very heavy casualties on the enemy and took some 200 prisoners, reflects the very greatest praise on all ranks concerned.

This force is at the present time engaged in carrying out operations with a view to the occupation of Plesetskaia.

I have also occupied Onega with a small force of Americans and Slavo-British Allied Legion, under Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke, and have cleared up the country between Onega and Oboserskaia. I have also restored the overland telegraph line from Archangel-Onega-Soroka.

Dvina Force.

The Dvina Force was equipped and despatched under very great difficulties, We were short of ships, as the Bolsheviks had taken all the best and fastest ones. The few ships that we were able to collect were too weak to stand the strain of constant employment, and after a few weeks' began to leak badly, suffer from engine troubles, and need constant overhaul. Moreover, the decks were too flimsy to stand the strain of the shock of discharge of the guns, and thus our guns were constantly going out of action at the critical period. In every "naval" engagement, therefore, in addition to being outnumbered, we also suffered from being outpaced and outranged. We also suffered from shortage of men. In the original expedition I despatched to reinforce the French 200 local Russian troops, of whom 40 were Poles. In inspecting this Detachment I found that the two N.C.Os. had both been N.C.Os. in the German Army, and had both been wounded fighting against us on the Western Front. Two more of the detachment were each short of one arm. They were taken to work machine guns with the one remaining arm. This detachment has done very good service, but the above will show some of the difficulties with which we had to contend. The force was originally under the command of Commandant Ringue, 21st French Battalion d'lnfanterie Coloniale. This capable and gallant officer was, unfortunately, seriously wounded in an attack near Beresnik. He was replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel Josselyn, D.S.O., who is still in command. The force established itself at Beresnik - the confluence of. the Dvina and Vaga rivers. On being reinforced with both ships and men, a most successful operation was carried out against the enemy, who were in considerable force on both banks of the river, and in considerable force also in ships. The result of these operations was that the enemy was completely routed and fled in disorder towards Kotlas, having lost heavily in men, material and prisoners. Four of his ships were sunk with heavy casualties by our fleet. The remainder were able to withdraw in safety, owing to the river having been mined. We have cleared both banks of the river as far south as Nijnitoimi. The enemy has sunk two lines of barges filled with sand, one about Troitsa Verkhoitomski and the other near Krasnovorsk. Mines have also been laid to cover these blockages.

The approach of winter, lateness in arrival of stores, and shortage of tugs to tow the barges of supplies up the river have decided me not to attempt a further advance towards Kotlas until the spring.

This Force has carried out its operations, under most difficult conditions, to my entire satisfaction. All ranks have worked cheerfully and gallantly, and merit the highest praise.

Royal Navy.

I wish to put on record my appreciation of the work of the Royal Navy, and the hearty spirit of co-operation which they have invariably shown me. I would respectfully mention the service of the following officer in particular, and I would request that his name he submitted to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty for consideration:

Rear-Admiral T. W. Kemp, C.B., C.I.E.

It is difficult for me to express the gratitude which I feel for the loyal manner in which this officer has seconded all my efforts. I have worked with him in the closest co-operation for the past five months, and during the whole time he has been assiduous in his endeavours to help me in every possible way. To his skill as a Naval Commander much of our success in the occupation of Archangel is due.

I have brought to the notice of Admiral Kemp the names of various officers and men whose conduct has been particularly noticeable, and I trust that their names will be forwarded by him to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

General Remarks.

In considering the operations carried out by the forces under my command since our arrival at Archangel, I would point out that we have been confronted with many abnormal difficulties. These have been for the most part overcome solely by the display of energy, determination and good will, which has been displayed in a marked degree by all troops under my command.

I attach a list of names of officers and men whose work has been exceptionally valuable, with a view to their being considered for reward by His Majesty's Government.

I have the honour to be Your Lordship's obedient servant,

(Sd.) F. C. POOLE, Major-General. C. in C. Allied Forces in Northern Russia.

________

APPENDIX TO DESPATCH No. 1.

From General Officer Commanding, Allied Forces, Murmansk Region;

to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Northern Russia,

19th September, 1918

SIR,

1. I have the honour to submit the following report on the operations carried out by the Force under my command since its landing in Northern Russia, on 23rd June, 1918.

2. On my arrival it was clear that Bolshevik influence was working strongly against the Allies both at Murmansk and at various other centres on the railway, and that a definite breach with the Bolshevik Government would probably be forced upon us at an early date. This breach occurred towards the end of June and was brought about as follows:

3. On 27th June, whilst proceeding down the railway on a tour of inspection, I encountered unconcealed hostility from several Bolshevik officials, and on arrival at Kandalaksha found a party of some 300 armed Bolshevik Red Guard which was entrained and under orders to proceed to Murmansk. Further parties also were reported to be entraining for the north at Petrozavodsk and other stations. The danger of the presence on my lines of communication of considerable armed forces which, might at any time show open hostility to the Allies was obvious, and I therefore prevented the departure from Kandalaksha of thet train conveying the 300 Bolshevik troops by a display of armed force, and detained the whole detachment, under the supervision of my Kandalaksha garrison. I then proceeded to Kem, where I arrived on 30th June. Here I met other train loads of Bolshevik troops moving north, and these I also felt bound to detain as a military precaution, the more so as I was informed that further troops accompanied by armoured trains were being despatched to the north from Petrozavodsk.

4. Whilst on my return journey to Kandalaksha I received definite news that a considerable Bolshevik force was moving against me from the south. I therefore issued orders for the disarming of the Bolshevik troops at Kem, instructed reinforcements which were being sent to Kem to disarm en route the Bolshevik troops at their main garrison centres on the railway, and proceeded myself to Kandalaksha to carry out the disarming of the Bolshevik Force already assembled there. The disarming was carried out successfully at all the centres determined upon, 60 machine guns and nearly 10,000 rifles being confiscated.

5. The above action resulted in the withdrawal southwards of other Bolshevik troops, who were moving on Kem, a portion of whom retired on Soroka, burning several of the railway bridges between that town and Kem. These were repaired as rapidly as possible, but before railway communication could be reestablished Bolshevik outrages at Soroka necessitated further Allied intervention. H.M.S. "Attentive" proceeded accordingly to Soroka on 6th July, and a detachment of my local forces was sent there also by sea. The Bolshevik troops withdrew on the appearance of H.M.S. "Attentive," after removing all supplies possible and burning a portion of, the town. During their retreat they destroyed all railway bridges for a distance of some 25 miles south of Soroka. On my arrival, however, on the following day, Bolshevik disturbances were occurring on the outskirts of the town, and a landing party from H.M.S. ''Attentive'' was sent to confiscate arms found in the district. This was done successfully, about 700 rifles and large quantities of ammunition being seized.

6. It was evident, however, that Bolshevik influence was still at work at various points on the railway, amongst other indications being an attempt to derail my train. I was therefore forced to extend the disarming policy to all centres known to be disaffected, and in each case this policy was welcomed by the majority of the inhabitants.

7. After establishing myself along the railway I turned my attention to clearing Karelia of the numerous armed parties of Finnish White Guards which, under German leadership, had penetrated far into Karelia, terrorising the inhabitants and attempting to raid various points on the railway. This task I entrusted mainly to locally raised troops. The operations in Southern Karelia have already met with marked success, the Finnish White Guards having been defeated with heavy losses on many occasions, culminating on the 11th September with their complete rout at Ukhtinskaya, which for some time past had been their main base of operations. Our own losses in this theatre have been slight. This success has been due mainly to the able leadership of Lieut.- Colonel P. J. Woods, D.S.O., Royal Irish Rifles, coupled with the bravery and determination of the Karelian troops under his command, who are fighting to free their own homes of the invader.

8. Simultaneously with the operations for clearing Karelia of the Finnish White Guard invaders I despatched a force of British and Serbian troops to the south-east of Soroka to disperse Bolshevik forces which were concentrating in that area. This force drove the .Bolsheviks 40 miles south, inflicting on them appreciable losses in a number of minor engagements. In these operations also our casualties were light.

9. I append a list of officers and other ranks whose good services I wish to bring to notice.

Although, the military operations during the period in question have been on a relatively small scale, they have been conducted over a very wide area, and in circumstances the reverse of favourable. Moreover, the administrative difficulties to be overcome have been exceedingly great, owing to an entire lack of ordinary facilities usually met with in a civilised theatre of operations, and to the adverse influences of an Arctic climate. I trust, therefore, that these considerations may be taken into account when considering for reward those whose names I send forward for recognition.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient Servant,

(Sd.) C. M. MAYNARD, Major-General, Commanding Allied Forces, Murmansk Region.

________

DESPATCH No. 2.

From Major-General C.. M. Maynard, C.B., G.M.G., D.S.O., Commanding-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Murmansk, covering the period from 20th September, 1918, to 28th February, 1919.

General Headquarters, Murmansk. 1st March, 1919.

Sir:

1. I have the honour to submit the following report dealing with the operations carried out by the Allied Forces under my command since 19th September, 1918, the date of submission of my previous despatch:

Situation in, the early Autumn of 1918.

2. Early in the autumn of 1918, and prior to the collapse of the Central Powers, my force was augmented by material reinforcements, and I commenced immediately to put into operation the plans which I had drawn up in anticipation of an increase in my fighting strength. In determining upon these plans I was influenced by three main considerations:

(a) The necessity for retaining at, or in the vicinity of Murmansk and Petchenga sufficient troops to ensure the safety of these ports against such attacks as calculation showed might reasonably be expected.

(b) The extreme importance of compelling Germany to retain in Finland the maximum number of troops for as long a period as possible, thus preventing her despatching reinforcements from this Theatre to the Western Front.

(c) The complete difference in housing and transport facilities, which would be brought about by the advent of winter.

This factor had to be kept in mind constantly, and forced me, in more than one instance, to dispose my troops in a manner other than that I should otherwise have decided upon in order that subsequent moves under trying climatic conditions might be avoided.

Defence of Murmansk.

3. I was compelled to retain at the Port of Murmansk itself a very considerable proportion of my troops for the purpose of furnishing the large permanent working parties necessitated by the lack of civilian labour. In addition, it was essential to provide numerous strong guards owing to persistent attempts at looting made by armed and unarmed gangs of Russians, and to keep in constant readiness a force of sufficient strength to quell local disturbances which, at that time, constituted a very real source of danger.

I relied on the above troops, together with such landing parties as could have been supplied by the Allied Naval Forces, as my general reserve in the event of an attack in force.

4. The situation of Murmansk is such that its all-round defence by a system of works and fortifications could have been undertaken only by a force many times larger than that at my disposal. The perimeter of any defensive system suitable to the strength of my available troops must have been in such close proximity to the inlet as to admit of the enemy bringing howitzer fire to bear on the town, wharf and shipping, whilst the configuration of the ground rendered such enemy howitzers immune from the fire of the guns of the Allied ships.

5. In these circumstances I considered it useless to attempt establishing a fortified zone around the port, and I distributed the remainder of the troops detailed for the protection of Murmansk in the manner best suited to an active defence.

With this in view I constructed a system of defensive works in the neighbourhood of the village of Kola (some six miles south of Murmansk) at the junction of the two main lines of approach - namely, the railways and the Tulema River. Here I stationed as large a reserve, as I could afford, in addition to the garrisons required for the defences, my plan being to employ this reserve for attacking in flank or rear any force attempting to reach Murmansk by a detour either to the east or west. An outpost garrison was also established on the railway some twenty miles to the south sufficiently strong either to push back hostile reconnoitring parties or to delay the enemy and destroy bridges in the event of an advance in force.

6. I was, however, confronted with the difficulty that the transfer of my Kola reserve to the western side of the Kola inlet would occupy a very considerable time; and, although the enemy would have found it a hard task to force the crossing of the inlet from the west, Murmansk itself, including the quay and ships in the inlet, would have been at the mercy of any high-angle-fire guns which he might have been able to bring up to that side. I therefore constructed and garrisoned on the western shore of the inlet, in close proximity to Murmansk, two small defence systems of the bridgehead type, with the object of covering the landing on that bank of reinforcements from Murmansk sufficient to hold the enemy in check until such time as my Kola reserve should be able to cross the inlet.

7. Whilst hoping that the above preparations and dispositions would enable me to prevent the occupation of Murmansk by the enemy, it appeared highly desirable to take such steps as were possible to ensure my retaining a footing at some spot adjacent to the Kola inlet should I be forced to evacuate Murmansk, for thus I might still be in a position to prevent that port being utilised as a submarine base. I arranged accordingly that Alexandrovsk (on the western shore of the inlet and close to its mouth) should be the rallying point for all troops should I be driven from Murmansk, and collected there supplies, stores and ammunition sufficient for 2,000 men for one month. I also placed on board sailing ships and lighters additional stores ready for conveyance to Alexandrovsk should the necessity arise; reconnaissances were made and a defence system mapped out; and plans were drawn up for the conveyance to the rallying point of such troops as might have been driven back down the eastern side of the inlet. As the landing place of the Peterhead cable is at Alexandroysk, I should have been able to maintain communication with England, and the anchorage facilities were found to be such as to promise better co-operation with the Navy than could have been ensured elsewhere.

Defence of Petchenga.

8. Even in summer it is not an easy matter to transfer troops from Murmansk to Petchenga, as there is at the latter place no quay alongside which vessels can lie, and it is only at high water that troops can land by boat or launch without wading through long stretches of deep mud. During the winter .the harbour is icebound, and the landing and embarkation of troops become operations of very great difficulty. The land route between Murmansk and Petchenga is impassable for troops in summer without the expenditure of much time and labour, whilst during winter an arduous and circuitous track must be followed along which shelter is unobtainable except for very small parties.

I preferred, therefore, to strengthen the Petchenga garrison and to treat it as a self-contained force, rather than to hold the defences lightly and trust to reinforcements from Murmansk arriving in time in case of need. As there were many indications of the enemy's intention to attack Petchenga in the autumn of 1918 the furnishing of the garrison, which I considered it necessary to detail for its defence, constituted a severe drain on my resources; the more so as it had been decided to withdraw H.M.S. "Cochrane," complements from which vessel had formed the original garrison and for many months had been the mainstay of the defence. I judged, however, that my decision was fully justified, since, with carefully prepared position and supplies for seven months, I could rest assured that the garrison was capable of carrying out its allotted task without reinforcements from me, unless attacked in overwhelming strength in men and guns.

Necessity for offensive action.

9. It was evident that no purely passive action on my part would induce Germany to retain in Finland troops which she was desirous of transferring elsewhere. If, therefore, I was to succeed in my effort to prevent the despatch of German reinforcements from this theatre to the Western Front it was necessary for me to undertake offensive operations, or at least to produce the impression that such was my intention.

Apart, therefore, from the troops required to complete and man the local defences of Murmansk and Petchenga, and to hold important points on my line of communication, I employed all my available forces in a manner calculated to spread the idea that offensive operations were in contemplation. Increased activity was displayed both in northern and central Karelia, detachments being pushed forward boldly towards the Finnish frontier, and steps being taken to improve the communications running westward from the railway. To the south I occupied Soroka and commenced to repair the railway bridges (destroyed in July, 1918, by the Bolsheviks) between that town and Olimpi. In addition, certain long-distance patrols were furnished with false orders purporting to be signed by Staff Officers of high rank, and making mention of large formations.

Arrangements, which it is believed proved successful, were made for these to find their way into the enemy's hands.

It would appear that the above measures met with some success; for I have in my possession a copy of the instructions issued to a German agent in which the importance is impressed on him of ascertaining, the number of divisions operating in this area, their composition, and the commander of each. Moreover, it has been ascertained on trustworthy authority that General Von Der Goltz, so far from being willing to transfer troops from Finland, sent forward continued demands for reinforcements.

These small operations, with a view to giving an impression of an impending offensive, were carried out to a very large extent by local troops, who had been enlisted and trained by British officers since the arrival of my force, and whose previous military experience, if any, had been of the most limited nature.

Situation after the Armistice.

10. The signing of the Armistice of 11th November, 1918, removed simultaneously one of the main causes of the presence of my troops in this region, and the threat of attack by vastly superior forces with which I had been faced during, the preceding 4 1/2 months. Despite my efforts to force Germany to retain her troops in Finland, the need for reinforcements to check the Allied advance in France proved too pressing, and a large proportion of the German troops in this theatre had been withdrawn by the commencement of November. By the middle of that mouth all danger of the establishment by Germany of submarine bases in Northern Russia had ceased, together with any possibility of an attack on Murmansk or Petchenga by German troops. The situation, however, continued to be one of anxiety; for considerable numbers of Finnish White Guards were concentrated near the eastern border of Finland, and strong parties were still in occupation of portions of Russian Karelia. Moreover, there was every indication that Bolshevik attempts to organise an efficient fighting force were meeting with no small measure of success.

11. The change in my military situation resulting from the collapse of Germany necessitated corresponding alterations in my dispositions. These included a reduction of my Petchenga garrison and a redistribution along the railway of both departmental and fighting troops; and all these moves had to be carried put when the grip of an Arctic winter was already making itself felt. Simultaneously with the above transfer of troops and stores I had to take in hand the exceedingly important task of organising, equipping and assembling my winter mobile columns. This was a matter of no small difficulty, owing to the unavoidably, late arrival of many essential stores, and to the time occupied in unloading, sorting out and despatching to the various organising centres the mass of special equipment required.

As there is no precedent for the formation of such mobile columns in the annals of the British Army I have placed on record in full detail the organisation which I adopted, and which practical experience has proved satisfactory. This is embodied in the pamphlet accompanying this despatch (Not reproduced in the London Gazette).

Present Situation.

12. As a result of continued pressure exercised by my troops on the White Finn and Bolshevik forces since the autumn of 1918 (details of which are given in paragraph 20) the whole of the Murmansk region to as far south as the 64th parallel has been cleared of enemy troops; the Bolsheviks have been driven south of Segeja (60 miles south of Soroka) with severe losses; and the Soroka-Onega route has been opened up and guarded, thus ensuring communication by land with Archangel.

Owing, however, to increased Bolshevik activity in the neighbourhood of Archangel, I have had to despatch thither considerable reinforcements. This has necessitated the withdrawal of further troops from Petchenga, and additional alterations in my dispositions on the Murmansk side. These changes, together with the transfer by land of the reinforcing units for Archangel, have had to be carried out in the face of many transport difficulties, and under the most severe Arctic conditions.

13. The state of disorganisation and unrest in this district, resulting from Bolshevik misrule and the sabotage which found open expression for some time after the expulsion of the Bolshevik armed forces, are at length commencing to disappear. There still exists, however, a strong undercurrent of Bolshevism, which is evidenced by agitations and strikes, and by persistent efforts to foment trouble between the Allies and the local population. At times this has culminated in demonstrations of active hostility, such as the destruction of railway bridges and attempts to derail trains, but the measures which I have been able to enforce have checked materially these open acts of violence. At the same time, the necessity remains for guarding against their recrudescence, whilst I have also to take strict precautions to prevent the frequent and bold attempts at looting made by Russian gangs, whose action is often connived at by the local railway and other authorities. I am thus compelled to furnish large guards over stores, and strong escorts for supply trains which, in addition to being unpopular forms of duty, drain the strength of my fighting force.

14. I am also faced with the task of combating and counteracting a far-reaching scheme of propaganda, engineered by the Bolshevik leaders at Moscow. This scheme embraces the inclusion of highly trained propagandist agents in each batch of former Russian prisoners of war returning to their homes. It was my original intention to prohibit the return of any such prisoners, but the Governor-General did not consider himself justified in acquiescing in this step, in view of the demands for recruits for the new Russian Army. I have therefore instituted a very strict system of search, control and surveillance, with drastic penalties for non-compliance with instructions. This, I hope, will result in the detection of propagandists, or at least in rendering their efforts nugatory, whilst those in whom the Russian authorities can place reliance will be available as recruits.

The importance attributed by the Bolsheviks to the spreading of dissatisfaction amongst my British troops is evidenced by the virulent, anti-Allied pamphlets, printed in English, which have been discovered recently within my lines. I am taking steps to put a stop to this method of Bolshevik propaganda.

In order to counteract Bolshevik influence in territory outside that occupied by my troops, I have constantly extended the activities of my own propaganda department, and have now inaugurated an Inter-Allied Bureau from which I trust to obtain good results.

15. One of my chief sources of anxiety has been the maintenance of railway communication with my southern garrisons. At the time of the Bolshevik withdrawal a large number of railway employees joined the Bolshevik forces and many more fled to the south subsequently owing to my inability to feed and pay them. Those who remained were for the most part discontented and sullen; strikes were frequent; the repair of locomotives ceased; and during the whole of last summer the upkeep of the permanent way was totally neglected - a neglect which is bound to have a most disadvantageous effect on traffic so soon as the thaw commences. With my small railway staff it has been impossible for me to take over the working of a line some 500 miles in length. But I have put into operation a satisfactory liaison system at the more important centres between my officers and the Russian officials; have taken in hand to a limited but useful extent the repair of locomotives by my own men; and have organised my few drivers and firemen as emergency crews on the various sections of the line.

16. In a Force such as that under my command, comprising units of many nationalities, all operating at a great distance from their home bases, administrative difficulties are necessarily accentuated, whilst possibilities of friction are increased correspondingly. It is therefore satisfactory to be able to state that my administrative machinery has run far more smoothly than I had reason to anticipate, and that, by the exercise of a little give-and-take on the part of all concerned, no serious cause for dissatisfaction or misunderstanding has arisen. For this I am indebted in no small measure to the tact and broad-mindedness of the respective commanders of Allied contingents.

17. It is also a source of great gratification to me to be able to report that the relations between the Allied Command and the local Russian Government are now on a highly satisfactory footing, and that the Governor-General of the Region is co-operating with me in the most cordial and whole-hearted manner. This co-operation, which it was impossible to secure during the first five months of my operations, is already bearing fruit in an increased feeling of content amongst the local population and the various Government officials, and I am confident that it will have far-reaching results in ensuring smooth working in the mobilisation of the local Russian forces now being taken in hand, and in the settlement of the many delicate political problems with which we are confronted.

18. Taking climatic conditions into consideration, the health of my troops has been good. During the winter months, with their lack of daylight, there has been a somewhat marked tendency towards inertia and depression, resulting in loss of nerve and will-power; but every effort has been made to combat this tendency by the provision of such forms of entertainment and recreation as my limited resources and opportunities allowed. With an increase in the hours of sunlight I hope for a still better record of health; but the advent of spring will prove an anxious time. This is owing mainly to an entire absence of any drainage system throughout the country, and to the apparent impossibility of convincing the Russian working classes of the necessity for ordinary sanitary precautions. My Sanitary Officers are, however, making all possible arrangements to cope with the situation.

19. I have gone somewhat more fully into the conditions ruling within the area occupied by my Force than is customary in a despatch of this nature. The circumstances, however, are very exceptional, and I should not be doing justice to the work of my troops if I failed to bring to notice the difficulties with which they have to contend.

Owing to the extreme shortage of civilian labour, I have been compelled to employ a great proportion of them on permanent working and building parties, and on similar tasks of an uncongenial nature; their accommodation has not always been as suitable as I could have wished; the climate is severe, and trying even to the most healthy; leave to England is necessarily rare; local amusements are confined entirely to such as we are able to provide; any movement of troops by rail is attended by great discomfort, owing to the shortage of suitable rolling stock; and, during the winter, transport by sea and road entail unusual hardships. Moreover, my men have been surrounded for many months by an atmosphere of disorder, dissatisfaction and lawlessness, which cannot but affect adversely even the best disciplined troops.

Military Operations.

20. The military operations carried out since the date of my last despatch, and leading up to the existing situation, have been briefly as follows:

On 28th September, 1918, Finnish troops, reported to be the advance guard of a large force, drove in my outposts near the Norwegian frontier to the west of Petchenga. As telephonic communication between the outposts and Petchenga had been cut, and as I had received persistent reports of an advance in strength by German and Finnish troops, I ordered the immediate despatch to Petchenga of a portion of the reinforcements already detailed for that garrison. These were landed within thirty-six hours. In the meantime, however, my outposts had rallied, and succeeded in driving back the enemy without calling for support. The Finnish troops remained in contact with my covering force for some days, but withdrew finally without further offensive action. Since this occurrence there have been no signs of enemy activity in the Petchenga region.

By the end of September, 1918, my troops operating from Kandalaksha had cleared of White Finn forces the whole area lying between Kandalaksha and the Finnish frontier, and in October they commenced to push forward in a south-westerly direction towards Lake Pyavozero. They succeeded in driving the enemy from a number of posts occupied by him, and in a small but decisive action on the western shore of Pyavozero Lake finally compelled the only remaining formed body of enemy troops in Northern Karelia to retire across the Finnish frontier. This series of minor operations was carried out almost entirely by my Finn Legion, under the leadership of British officers and non-commissioned officers. As there were no tracks in this area suitable for wheel transport, the question of supply presented many difficulties. These, however, were overcome by the institution of a system of water transport, supplemented by carriers.

Meanwhile, a force based on Kem, and consisting chiefly of Karelians, was clearing the country between Kem and the western frontier of Karelia. This force met with strong opposition, the White Finns in this locality being in considerable strength and under German leadership. The successes gained by it, and mentioned in my previous despatch, were, however, continued, the enemy suffering heavy losses both in personnel and material, and only a small remnant contriving to make good its escape across the frontier. Transport difficulties proved even greater than those experienced by the Kandalaksha columns, since the force employed was not only larger, but was operating further from its base. That these difficulties were surmounted successfully speaks highly for the grit and determination of the Karelian troops engaged.

Thus, by the end of 1918, the whole of Karelia to as far south as an east and west line drawn through Soroka had been cleared of White Finn troops; frontier posts had been established; and my two forces, operating, respectively from Kandalaksha and Kem, had gained touch.

Early in January reports were received that the Bolsheviks had established a headquarters and recruiting centre at Rugozerskaya, sixty-five miles south-west of Soroka. As this village was situated in an area from which I hoped to draw future recruits for the Russian Army, I decided to send a strong patrol to ascertain the truth of the report; to gain all intelligence possible; and, if the report were true, to drive out the Bolsheviks should this prove practicable. The enterprise was carried out on 16th January with rapidity and skill by a mixed contingent of Canadian and Karelian troops. Rugozerskaya was found to be held by the enemy, but was captured by a surprise attack, the whole garrison being accounted for, either as killed or prisoners. In view of recruiting possibilities, and the tactical importance of securing a footing on the flank of the enemy's line of communication, I established in the village a permanent post, found by my Karelian Regiment.

I had for some time contemplated the advisability of a sudden and simultaneous attack on the enemy's posts on the railway to as far south as Segeja. From the intelligence at my disposal I knew this to be a feasible undertaking, but, as I was averse from a raid only, and was anxious to hold Segeja should the enterprise prove successful, the question arose as to whether I was justified in thus extending my obligations. I placed before the War Office my reasons for thinking that this justification existed, and the attack was sanctioned, the decision regarding my remaining in occupation of any advanced positions I might gain being left to my discretion. The operation was carried out on 18th February and met with complete success. Every post was captured, and the enemy suffered heavily, his casualties in killed and prisoners alone amounting to 150, or nearly half the estimated strength of his garrison, whilst much booty, including machine guns and rolling stock, fell into our hands. It is certain, too, that further severe losses were inflicted, since enemy reinforcements arriving by rail were subjected to such close and heavy machine-gun fire that they were unable to detrain, and it was with great difficulty that the train was able to withdraw. On the following day the Bolsheviks made a determined effort to recapture Segeja, their infantry being supported by gun fire from an armoured train. The attack broke down, heavy punishment being once again inflicted; and latest reports point to a general enemy withdrawal of some 15 miles. Our casualties were exceedingly slight. The details of the enterprise were arranged by the G.O.C., 237th Infantry Brigade, and the several attacks were carried out by British, Canadian, Serbian and Russian detachments, all of whom displayed high qualities of courage and endurance.

The capture intact of the 400-foot span bridge over the Segeja River (the last of any magnitude between that place and Petrozavodsk), and the opportunity now opened up for rebuilding the bridge over the Onda (20 miles to the north), which is of equal span and was destroyed by the Bolsheviks last July, are matters of very great importance. Had the operation not been carried out before the end of February, it is certain that at least a year must have elapsed before railway communication with the south could have been reopened.

21. Of the Allied troops under my command, the Serbian battalion has proved an invaluable asset since the commencement of my operations, and has never failed to display fighting qualities of the highest order.

There has been little scope for the employment of guns, but the French Artillery Brigade has been the backbone of my artillery strength from the outset.

Circumstances have forced me to employ the Italian Expeditionary Force almost entirely at the base and on my line of communication. Here all ranks have carried out in a most praiseworthy manner the uncongenial but all-important tasks, on the successful performance of which depends the efficiency of the troops in the fighting line.

Of my own troops, those of the small contingent who accompanied me originally merit a special word of praise for their staunchness during more than eight months of campaigning under exceptionally trying conditions, whilst the Canadian detachment has gained distinction on many occasions by its pluck and resourcefulness.

22. In conclusion, I wish to express my appreciation of the cordial manner in which Rear-Admiral J. F. E. Green, C.B., the Senior Naval Officer, White Sea, and his staff have lent me their willing assistance in the many matters necessitating co-operation between the sea and land force.

23. I attach lists giving the names of officers and other ranks whose good services I consider worthy of recognition. Further, I have had the pleasure of bringing to the notice of The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty certain: officers and other ranks of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines who have been attached temporarily to my command, and have performed meritorious service.

I have the honour to be. Sir, Your most Obedient Servant,

(Sd.) C. M. MAYNARD, Major-General, Commanding-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Murmansk.

________

DESPATCH No. 3.

From: Major-General Sir W. E. Ironside,. K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., lately Commanding- in-Chief Allied Forces, Archangel.

To: The Secretary of State for War, War Office.

War Office, 1st November, 1919.

SIR,

I have the honour to submit the following report on the operations carried put by the Allied Forces under my Command during the period from 1st October, 1918, to 11th August,. 1919:

1.- Period before the European Armistice.

The main objectives of the. Allied Force, which had landed in North Russia during the summer of 1918, were:

(a) The reconstruction of any available Russian or Allied Forces in Russia to oppose Germany.

(b) The prevention of access to the sea through Archangel and Murmansk should the Germans continue their advance into Russia.

On landing in October, 1918, and on taking over Command from Major General Poole, I found a Provisional Government installed under the Presidency of M. Tchaikovsky.

The Allied Forces available were as follows:

(a) Contingents from Great Britain, France, America, Italy and Poland, numbering 14,000 men.

(b) Russian Forces numbering 1,500, consisting largely of returned prisoners of war.

(c) Slavo-British Legion, numbering 3,000, consisting of refugees of all nationalities.

At the moment it was impossible to forecast what might happen in Europe, but it was certain that the Archangel Force would be cut off for eight months by ice, and every effort was devoted to securing the position, increasing the Russian Forces, and filling the food, ammunition and clothing depots at Archangel.

I cannot speak too highly of the Supply and Ordnance Authorities in England and Archangel for the manner in which the safety of the Force was ensured. The bringing in of stores under convoy of icebreakers, manned by the Royal Navy, was carried out by the Naval Transport Service under great danger to the crews concerned. That the Force was never short of anything essential is a result which speaks for itself.

2.- Period after the European Armistice.

The Port of Archangel began to freeze up in the first week of November, before the declaration of the Armistice, and it was then too late to withdraw the force until the port opened again.

The Bolshevik Forces, which, at the original landing, had been small in number, increased rapidly in strength and organisation. The most active propaganda was carried out amongst the rank and file of all the Allied Contingents by the enemy, and discontent showed itself in many places.

The British Contingent, thanks to the efficiency of its officers and the systematic physical training, which was found possible even under Arctic conditions, behaved magnificently. Many of the men were of low category, but they withstood the hardships they had to undergo with courage and spirit.

3.- Russian Mobilisation.

The objective of the Force at Archangel had now become the organisation and training of the Russian Forces, so that, with the opening of the port in June, 1919, the Russian Government might be in a position to continue the struggle by itself. Mobilisation was ordered in October, 1918, and proceeded quietly, there being few absentees. Training was under the supervision of British Officers, and the results achieved were excellent. I cannot speak too highly of the young officers sent out from England for this purpose. They raised, organised and trained the Russian Forces to a total of 25,000 men, and earned the respect of the Russians with whom they served.

4.- Winter Campaigning.

As the winter drew on the Bolshevik efforts to turn the Allies out of Archangel became stronger and stronger. The Allied Forces were often hard put to it to maintain their extended positions against superior forces. But during March and April we were successful in. breaking up the final Bolshevik attacks with great loss, and the safety of the Force in Archangel was assured.

The passing of over 2,000 men of General Maynard's Murmansk Force as reinforcements from Soroka to the Archangel front by land route, a distance of 400 miles, using local sleighs, was a military achievement of which all could well be proud.

Fighting took place in over 80 degrees of frost, and, despite the Arctic conditions, the men carried out their duties magnificently. The Bolshevik operations can be divided into four phases, as follows:

(1) Dvina River Offensive (4th October-15th November, 1918).

A strong offensive after heavy bombardment by river gunboats during October and November immediately preceding the freezing of the Dvina. Matters were once or twice critical, but, frost intervening, the weak Allied Force were given a respite. The defeat of our forces was prevented on one occasion by the exceedingly gallant behaviour of the drivers of a Canadian battery; on the 11th November they turned out and annihilated a strong enemy force which had got round the rear of our forces and threatened them with capture.

(2) Shenkursk Offensive (19th January-10th March, 1919.)

Our forces, practically Russian and American, had been pushed forward to this town, the most important after Archangel in the Northern Region. They were, from a military point of view, too far advanced, but it was decided for political reasons to maintain them there during the winter.

The evacuation undoubtedly raised the enemy's moral, and for a time his continued attacks against our Vaga front were the cause of great anxiety.

(3) Offensive to cut of Dvina Force (25th January - 5th April, 1919.)

This took the form of heavy attacks against Tarasevo, Shred Mekrenga and Morjegorskaya. Our forces were forced to evacuate Tarasevo, but the enemy suffered heavy defeats at Shred Mekrenga and Morjegorskaya. Actions at these places were successful owing to the personal bravery and power of leadership of Major G. H. Gilmore, D.S.O., M.C., and Lieut.- Colonel J. W. Carroll, C.M.G., D.S.O. respectively. On several occasions the position was critical at both places, and it was solely due to the energy of these officers that our whole line had not to be withdrawn, which would have meant the collapse of the Dvina. Force.

(4) Vologda Railway Offensive (16th March- 18th April, 1919).

This started with a surprise attack against the village of Bolshe Ozerke, when the garrison of French troops and French Foreign Legion was overwhelmed. Had the enemy attacked on the railway at the same moment it is possible that the railway front would have collapsed. An attack against Volchewitsa was beaten off by Russian troops, and the situation settled down.

5.- Arrival of Relief Force.

The arrival of General Grogan's and General Sadleir-Jackson's Brigades enabled me to free all those who had spent a winter in North Russia and to ensure the disengaging of our forces when the time came to do.

6.- Summer Operations.

During the Spring it was hoped that a junction with the forces of Admiral Kolchak could be carried out near Kotlas, on the River Dvina. If this could have been effected the stability of the North Russian Government and its forces would have been secured and the withdrawal of the Allied troops carried out without difficulty. Owing to the retreat of the Siberian forces, however, it was soon evident that this hope could not be realised. Nevertheless, it was still intended to carry out an offensive on the Dvina as far as Kotlas, with the object of occupying the Bolshevik river base at that place. If this could have been reached and the enemy's river craft, wharves, .depots, etc., destroyed, the withdrawal of the Allied troops down the Dvina to Archangel could have been carried out without danger of any serious interference from the .Bolsheviks. But, owing to the abnormally low water in the Dvina, which prevented our flotilla proceeding so far up the river, this project had to be abandoned and a disengaging blow struck at the enemy with a more limited objective.

With this intention an attack was carried out on the Dvina under Brigadier-General Sadleir-Jackson on 10th August. The attack was a complete success, very well carried out, and executed with a minimum of losses. All objectives were taken, and the advance ended with, the capture of Puchega and Borok, 20 miles from our original position. We captured 2,296 prisoners. The enemy's casualties were estimated at 1,200 killed and wounded, whilst our losses were thirty-seven killed, eighty-five wounded and twenty-two missing. On the other fronts operations were limited to disengaging our troops and substituting Russian troops and Russian administration for the existing British organisation.

The extremely successful operations of Jackson's Brigade on the Dvina freed that front completely, and I was able to report to Lord Rawlinson on his arrival as Commander-in-Chief, North Russia, that evacuation could be successfully carried out according to the plans already submitted.

7.- Mentions.

I wish to make special mention of the following:

Brigadier-General H. Needham, C.M.G., D.S.O., who has directed the Administrative Services with complete success under very difficult circumstances.

Brigadier-General R. G. Finlayson, C.M.G., D.S.O., and Brigadier-General C. C. Graham, D.S.O., the Commanders of the Dvina forces.

Colonel R. P. Crawley, M.V.O., D.S.O., R.A.S.C., for the direction of the Supply Services. The forces were never short of food under most difficult conditions of warfare.

Major A. W. Coxon, A.P.D., for his singlehanded work in directing the payments of the various contingents.

Lieut.-Colonel R. S. D. G. Stokes, D.S.O., O.B.E., R.E., ably seconded by Lieut.-Colonel Morriss, U.S. Engineers, in the direction of all engineering work.

Amongst the Officers of the Allied Contingent I wish to make special mention of:

Major Brook Nicholls, U.S. Army, for his stirring work through the winter.

Brigadier-General Wilds P. Richardson, U.S. Army, for his energy and tact in directing the evacuation of the American Forces.

Colonel Donop, French Army, for his help in all the liaison between the British and French troops.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient Servant,

(Sgd.) E. IRONSIDE, Major-General.

________

DESPATCH No. 4.

(With Appendices A and B.)

From General Lord Rawlinson, G.O.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G., A.D.C., Commander-in- Chief, Allied Forces in North Russia, covering the period 10th August to 12th October, 1919.

11th November, 1919.

Decision of H.M. Government to withdraw British troops from, North Russia.

In the spring of 1919 H.M. Government decided to withdraw the British troops from North Russia before the arrival of the winter ice closed again the ports to shipping.

This decision once taken, the question arose as to the best method of putting it into execution.

It was important to keep clearly in view two main objects. The first was that the actual operation of withdrawal, always attended with difficulties, should be conducted at the smallest possible cost to ourselves both in life and material. Secondly, there was the obligation which we owed to our Russian Allies of placing them in a favourable position to continue successfully the struggle against Bolshevism after our departure.

Judged from any sound military standpoint, it was evident that the surest way of attaining this dual purpose was to inflict a severe blow on the enemy forces at some period previous to our final withdrawal. Such an operation, if successful, would not only enable the withdrawal of the British troops to be effected unmolested, but would raise the morale of the Russian forces and strengthen their powers of resistance at what must necessarily be a critical time.

The forces at the disposal of Generals Ironside and Maynard were, however, few in number and composed of low category men selected originally as unsuitable for service in France, and further severely tried by the rigours of an Arctic winter. The despatch of reinforcements was necessary before the operations imposed on us by the decision to withdraw from North Russia in the autumn could be undertaken. Two infantry brigades, under the command of Generals Grogan and Sadleir-Jackson were sent, accordingly, in June to the Archangel front to effect the relief of the tired troops and generally strengthen our position.

The value of this relief force was soon to be demonstrated, for it was the presence of these tried brigades which saved the situation when in July serious mutinies occurred among the Russian battalions on the. Dvina and Onega fronts. The important part they played in the operations which eventually ensured the successful conduct of our withdrawal will be apparent in the course of this despatch.

Appointment and Instructions.

His Majesty's Government having decided to withdraw all British troops from the northern front, I received, on August 2nd, instructions to proceed to North Russia, and on my arrival assume command of the British and Allied troops operating in that theatre.

The intention of H.M. Government, as communicated to me, was the withdrawal of all British troops before the winter set in.

The evacuation of all Allied troops would take place at the same time.

My special task was to co-ordinate the movements of General Ironside and General Maynard on their respective fronts in co-operation with the Senior Naval Officer of the White Sea Fleet, who, though not under my command, would endeavour to meet my requirements as far as the exigencies of the service permitted.

The North Russian Government having expressed the intention of maintaining themselves and their troops after the departure of the Allied forces, I was authorised to afford them all possible assistance compatible with the safety of the British and Allied troops and the arrangements necessary for their timely evacuation.

With this object in view I was at liberty to co-operate with the troops under my command in such operations as the North Russian forces might undertake, and which, in my opinion, were calculated to achieve their purpose and facilitate my withdrawal. I was further authorised to hand over, at my discretion, military equipment, arms, ammunition, stores and supplies to the North Russian Government before my departure.

Departure.

I left England on August 4th for the North Russian front.

Summary of Military Situation on North Russian Front.

At the date of my departure, military operations in North Russia were being conducted by independent commanders in two distinct theatres separated from each other by the White Sea. These theatres will for convenience be called the Murmansk front and the Archangel front.

(a) Murmansk Front.

On this front a Composite Force, under the command of Major-General Sir C. C. M. Maynard, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., consisting roughly of 7,000 Allied troops (5,000 being British) and 9,000 local levies, was in occupation of the ice-free ports of Pechenga and Murmansk, and guarded a long line of communication extending south along the Murman railway through the White Sea ports of Kandalaksha and Kem as far as the northern extremity of Lake Onega, where a short and strong front was held.

The enemy forces were estimated to number some 5,800 men, and occupied a position astride the railway in the area between Lakes Onega and Ladoga. They were based on Petrozavodsk and Petrograd.

Little activity had been shown on this front throughout the winter, but General Maynard had gradually eaten his way forward during the early summer, until he was able from his positions in the neighbourhood of Kyapaselga to threaten Petrozavodsk, whence an advance on Petrograd presented no great difficulties.

The country in which our front line was now established was admirably adapted for defensive purposes. Further, the inhabitants displayed distinct anti-Bolshevik tendencies, so that the danger of a successful advance northward on the part of the enemy, even if attempted at all, was extremely remote.

The chief difficulty which confronted General Maynard on this front was the adequate protection with the small number of troops at his disposal of the single line of railway which formed the main communication with his base at Murmansk some 500 miles distant.

(b) Archangel Front.

On this front Major-General Sir W. E. Ironside, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., commanded an Anglo-Russian Force of approximately 37,000 troops, of whom 13,000 were British, and was opposed by the Bolshevik Sixth Army, the strength of which was roughly 33,000.

The area occupied by General Ironside's force, the headquarters of which were at Archangel, stretched from Onega on the White Sea, Obozerskaya on the Archangel-Vologda railway, Seletskoe on the Yemtsa River, Kitskaya on the Vaga, Troitsa on the Dvina to Pinega due east of Archangel on the Pinega River.

Owing to the physical features of the country, which consisted almost entirely either of virgin forest or long stretches of impassable peaty swamp, locally termed "tundra," operations had been confined to the districts bordering the River Dvina and its tributaries, and astride the Archangel-Vologda railway, which further provided the only practical means of communication.

The Dvina is a large river, navigable for 300 miles up as far as Kotlas, and with an average breadth of about one mile. Its tributaries on which operations were taking place were:

(a) The Yemtsa, which is crossed by the Archangel-Vologda railway about 20 miles north of Plesetskaya, and flows north-east, joining the Dvina 100 miles from Archangel.

(b) The Vaga, which flows due north through Shenkursk into the Dvina 50 miles above the Yemtsa.

(c) The Pinega, which flows due west from Pinega town and joins the right bank of the Dvina 50 miles from Archangel.

The Allied forces on this front had experienced some difficulty during the winter months in maintaining their positions against the Bolshevik attacks, but the arrival in June of Generals Grogan's and Sadleir-Jackson's brigades not only stabilised the situation, but placed General Ironside in a position to deal the enemy a severe blow as and when, the opportunity should occur. The value of the presence in North Russia of these reliable troops was felt when in July two serious mutinies broke out.

The first of these occurred at Troitsa on the Dvina River on July 7th among two Companies of the 1st Battalion of the Slavo-British Legion, recruited originally from Bolshevik deserters and prisoners, and known as "Dyer's Battalion."

The mutiny, the result of a careful Bolshevik plot, was promptly quelled, and the battalion disarmed, but before discipline was restored five British and four Russian officers had been murdered.

A second and more serious mutiny broke out on July 20th among the troops of the Russian National Army holding the Onega sector of the Archangel front. No previous indication of disaffection had been shown, but Bolshevik propaganda was found subsequently to have been carried out on a wide scale, with the result that the whole of the district, which included the town and port of Onega, was handed over by the mutineers to the enemy.

The situation was critical for several days, and, had it not been for the presence of a compact force of British troops, and the prompt manner in which General Ironside handled his available resources, the safety of Archangel itself would have been seriously endangered.

As it was, the Allied forces holding forward positions on the Dvina River and the Vologda railway found the presence of a large hostile force on their western flank a standing menace to their communications with Archangel.

The Commanders of the Allied Forces on both fronts had patiently pursued for some time a declared and consistent policy. This policy was so to organise the Russian civil administration and train the local levies as to render them capable of independent action when later they would be deprived permanently of British leadership and guidance.

Arrival at Archangel.

After a short stay of a few hours at Murmansk, during which I was able to make an inspection of the port, I arrived at Archangel on August 11th.

Policy recommended to the North Russian Government.

My plan for the co-ordination of the withdrawal of the British forces from the Archangel and Murmansk fronts depended to a large extent on the decision which General Miller should reach with regard to the general conduct of the campaign after our departure. The real question he had to decide was whether he would continue to defend both the Archangel and Murmansk fronts, or, simultaneously with our withdrawal, evacuate Archangel and concentrate all his available resources on the western shores of the White Sea.

A careful study of the situation as described in the reports and appreciations of Generals Maynard, Ironside and others, had convinced me that his best and safest course of action from the military point of view was to evacuate Archangel, while maintaining his position on the Murmansk front.

I was anxious, however, before deciding definitely on the nature of the advice which I should tender to the North Russian Government, to make myself acquainted at first hand with General Miller's political and military views as well as those of the commanders on the spot.

I, accordingly, not only discussed the situation very fully and in all its aspects with Generals Ironside and Maynard (who had come over from Kem for the purpose) and Mr. Hoare, the acting British Commissioner at Archangel, but also took the first opportunity of approaching General Miller on the question of the defence of both fronts after our departure.

These conversations only served to strengthen the conclusions I had already formed in my own mind, and I decided to recommend General Miller to agree to the following proposals:

(a) The abandonment of the defence of Archangel after our departure.

(b) The evacuation to other parts of Russia of those amongst the civil population who might be victims of Bolshevik reprisals.

(c) The transfer of the North Russian Government to Kem or Murmansk.

(d) The concentration of all the best elements among the Russian troops for the defence of the Murmansk front.

Arguments in favour of the complete evacuation, of Archangel.

The reasons, both military and political, which influenced my opinion can be briefly stated.

In the first place, the strategic importance of the Archangel front had been greatly reduced by Admiral Koltchak's forced retirement. Any hope of a junction with his Army at Kotlas before the winter had been necessarily abandoned, with the result that small advantage would be gained by a further advance up the Dvina with no definite objective in view.

On the other hand, a successful offensive southward along the Murman railway would not only place General Miller in a position to threaten Petrograd, but would enable him to join hands with the Army of General Yudenitch in combined operations for its capture.

Secondly, as a result of conversations with Generals Maynard and Ironside and a careful study of the reports of their subordinate commanders, I had reached the following general conclusions:

(1) That the troops which would be at General Miller's disposal after our departure were inadequate for the task of defending both fronts against a sustained offensive on the part of the enemy.

(2) That there was danger of the spread of Bolshevism.

I therefore doubted very much General Miller's ability to defend his widely extended lines, should the enemy attack his troops on either front with any determination after our departure.

His chance of making a successful defence would, in my opinion, be greatly improved by the transference of the reliable elements among the Archangel forces to the Murmansk front, where, as I have pointed out, he would also find himself in a more favourable position to take the offensive should an opportunity present itself later.

It is true that the abandonment of Archangel would constitute a moral as well as a physical loss which the enemy would no doubt exploit to the full, but I felt that the risk incurred by an attempt on the part of the North Russian Government to defend that town, endangering as it did the lives of women and children, could not be justified in the face of the strong military argument for concentration on a narrower front.

Further, provided we had taken the precaution of removing those portions of the civil and military population irretrievably committed to the cause of anti-Bolshevism, I very much doubted whether the enemy would resort to excesses after assuming unopposed the government of the district.

Decision of North Russian Government to defend Archangel after our Departure.

I lost no opportunity of pressing my views both on General Miller and the civilian delegations which waited upon me to request a postponement of our departure.

On August 19th, however, General Miller and the leading representatives of the North Russian Duma, though still urging me most strongly not to withdraw the British troops, informed me of their decision to defend Archangel.

Arguments based on the recent improvement in the morale of the Russian. troops, the successful inauguration of a recruiting campaign, and the gradual weakening of the Bolshevik forces in the Northern theatre were advanced in support of this decision, but I was convinced that General Miller and his colleagues were chiefly influenced by the receipt of orders from Admiral Koltchak to hold Archangel at all costs, and feared the loss of prestige which would be entailed by the surrender of Archangel at the moment when General Denikin was gaining important successes in the south.

They did not realise the rapid spread of a powerful Bolshevik propaganda both in the country districts and in the town of Archangel itself.

As a consequence, they were unwilling to admit the difficulties of the position in which they would find themselves after British support had been withdrawn, or to appreciate the fact that the great majority of the population regarded the possible triumph of Bolshevism in the Northern region with indifference, if not with favour.

Importance of undertaking offensive operations previous to withdrawal.

In considering the problem which confronted me I had from the first been impressed by the necessity of undertaking offensive operations on both fronts.

To extricate troops in contact with the enemy is always a delicate operation, and in the case of our withdrawal from North Russia the difficulties were increased by the fact that the enemy not only knew of our intention to withdraw, but was in a position to forecast with accuracy the date when that intention would be put into execution.

It was, therefore, of great importance so to weaken our opponents as to render them incapable of seriously hampering our retirement, and I considered that to deal them a blow previous to its commencement would be the surest method of securing this result.

I had, accordingly, before leaving England cabled to both Generals Ironside and Maynard instructing them to make preparations to carry out a limited offensive on their respective fronts with a view both to facilitating our own withdrawal and also raising the morale of the Russian troops and placing them in as favourable a position as possible to carry on the campaign after our departure.

I had at the same time arranged for the dispatch to North Russia, before the end of August of two battalions of infantry, two companies of machine guns, artillery and engineer personnel and five tanks. This force would constitute a general reserve under my orders ready to deal with any further mutinies that might occur or to meet an unforeseen emergency.

Effect of victory on Dvina Front.

On my arrival at Archangel I received news of a very successful operation carried out on August 10th on the Dvina River front. British. and Russian troops, under the command of Brigadier-General Sadleir-Jackson, had attacked the enemy, gaining all their objectives.

The greater proportion of six enemy battalions were killed, captured or dispersed, and over 2,000 prisoners, 12 field and many machine guns taken.

This victory had important consequences. Their severe losses in men and material placed the Bolshevik forces on this front temporarily out of action, and there appeared every chance that our withdrawal down the Dvina would be carried out unmolested, provided it took place before the enemy had time to recover. The result of our attack on the Dvina strengthened my determination to deal the enemy a similar blow on the Murmansk front.

I accordingly instructed General Maynard to prepare a plan of operations for my approval, informing him that I would place at his disposal an infantry battalion, the personnel of two R.F.A. batteries and one field company R.E., these troops forming part of the general reserve, due to arrive in North Russia before the end of August.

General plan for co-ordinating our withdrawal an both fronts.

On my arrival at Archangel I communicated to Generals Ironside and Maynard my general plan for the co-ordination of the withdrawal of the British troops on the two fronts.

The troops on the Archangel front would be withdrawn first. Simultaneously with the commencement of this operation an offensive would be launched on the Murmansk front, to be followed immediately by the withdrawal in their turn of the Allied forces engaged.

I decided that General Maynard's troops should proceed by rail to Murmansk, where they could await in security the arrival of the shipping necessary to transport them to England.

I considered this method of withdrawal preferable to the alternative, which was to embark the troops at Popoff, at the mouth of the Kem River, owing to the unsuitability of that harbour for ships of deep draught.

It was possible, however, that a breakdown on the railway, or some other emergency, might necessitate the use of the sea route, and I therefore gave instructions for a plan of embarkation to be prepared, which could be put into operation should the occasion demand.

As General Maynard had expressed anxiety with regard to the safety of his long line of communication in view of the very limited number of British troops at his disposal, I arranged with Rear-Admiral Green, S.N.O., White Sea Fleet, for the monitor "Erebus" (below - Navy Photos) to be stationed at Popoff when she reached North Russian waters, as well as the battalion of marines which had already arrived.

Approval of General Ironside's plan for Evacuation of Archangel.

The plan which General Ironside had drawn Up for the withdrawal of his British troops, and the evacuation from Archangel of personnel, both British and Allied, together with Russian civilian refugees, was excellent and Had my entire approval. It had been carefully worked out and was sufficiently elastic to meet all eventualities. His scheme of operations provided for the retirement of his troops by successive stages to the inner defences of Archangel, a distance of ten miles from the town itself, which position they would hold until their final embarkation.

I fixed September 1st provisionally for the commencement of the operation. Should, however, the water in the Dvina river be insufficient to allow of the passage down to Archangel of the monitors and other naval craft (which was more than probable owing to the exceptional dryness of the season), the retirement could be postponed provided the final embarkation was completed by September, 30th.

The decision of General Miller to defend Archangel had the effect of considerably simplifying the various administrative problems connected with our withdrawal, especially those arising from our obligation to provide shipping for all such as could reasonably demand evacuation.

Though it was difficult to estimate accurately the numbers who might desire to leave, and the possibility of a panic at the last moment had always to be considered, I was very hopeful that the ships placed at my disposal by the Admiralty would be sufficient to transport practically all Russian refugees direct either to South Russia or the Baltic Provinces, and (that the administrative difficulties entailed by the housing and feeding of a large number of helpless towns-people in the inhospitable region .of the Kola Peninsula would be avoided.

Summary of Events.

The story of the five weeks which preceded the final withdrawal of the Allied troops from North Russia can be grouped under two main headings:

(1) The operations undertaken by Generals Miller and Ironside with my concurrence and support on the Railway and Onega fronts.

(2) The offensive conducted by Generals Maynard and Scobeltsin in the neighbourhood of the Lijma Gulf.

I have already pointed out the important relation which a successful offensive on the Murmansk front would bear to the safe conduct of our withdrawal, and the main object which the main operations were intended to serve. The purpose of the Russian offensive on the Archangel front, however, and more particularly the role played in it by British troops, requires some further explanation.

Postponement of date of withdrawal from Archangel Front.

General Miller had been anxious for some time to commence an offensive on an ambitious scale on the Onega and Railway fronts. Though I had at first felt grave doubts with regard to the wisdom of such a venture in view of the further dispersion of his forces which an increase in the perimeter of the Archangel defences, would necessarily entail, a development in the situation towards the end of August convinced me that a limited offensive undertaken in the early days of September would not only serve to raise the spirits of the Russian troops, but would also materially assist in covering our eventual retirement.

The continuous fine weather had caused the Dvina to fall several feet, and I felt in consequence some anxiety with regard to the withdrawal of the naval craft.

Two monitors, M.25 and M.27, were still in a forward position, and, though they had been lightened by the removal to barges of the guns and the heavy parts of the engines, a rise of nearly two feet must take place before they could pass down over the bars.

I was particularly anxious to save the whole of the naval flotilla, and, in the hope that the river might rise again in the next fortnight, decided to postpone the date for the commencement of General Ironside's withdrawal to September 10th.

As it was calculated that the last defensive line around Archangel could be reached within five days from the commencement of the operation, there was no fear of any failure to complete the evacuation before the end of September.

The postponement of General Ironside's withdrawal had, however, this important consequence. It allowed time for the enemy to recover from the effects of General Sadleir-Jackson's victory on August 10th, and, should he do so, the main purpose which we had setout to achieve would be defeated.

I felt that such a contingency must, be avoided at all costs, and, with this end in view, agreed to support General Miller's project for a general offensive on the Railway, Seletskoe and Onega fronts to be launched in the last days of August. I hoped that these operations would fill the gap between the Dvina attack and the date now fixed for our withdrawal, and serve the same purpose of temporarily weakening the enemy and facilitating our retirement as was intended by the offensive in course of preparation on the Murmansk front.

I made it clear, however, to General Miller that, though his enterprise had my full support, British participation would be confined to the employment of not more than two companies of infantry.

Russian Offensive on Railway and Onega Fronts.

The purpose of the offensive operations originally proposed by General Miller was to gain the line Verkhotoimski-Shenkursk- Tarasovo-Plesetskaya-Onega.

The Russian battalions on the Dvina and Vaga Rivers were, however, too weak both in numbers and moral to permit of the realisation of so ambitious a project, and General Miller was compelled to modify his plan to suit the true facts of the situation.

As a result, the idea of an offensive on the Dvina and Vaga was abandoned, and the plan of operations restricted to the capture of Tarasovo and Plesetskaya (on the Vologda, Railway), while it was further hoped by detaching a force to block the head of.the Onega Valley east of Plesetskaya, to bring about a retirement of the Bolshevik forces from Onega town and district.

General Miller was anxious that simultaneously with the attack on the Railway front troops should be landed to co-operate with Colonel Daniloff's detachment in an advance on Onega town, and he requested my assistance for this purpose.

I consented to the employment of British troops in this enterprise, so soon as I was assured of the success of the main operations. In the meantime, I arranged with Rear-Admiral Green for a naval demonstration, to take the form of a bombardment of the town and port of Onega and a feint at landing troops preparatory to their occupation.

I considered that this display of strength might be sufficient alone to achieve General Miller's main object and prevent the enemy from reinforcing his troops on the railway front, even if it did not compel him to evacuate the Onega Valley altogether. The demonstration was carried out on August 29th and 30th.

Operations commenced on the 29th August with a simultaneous advance of independent columns on the Railway and Seletskoe fronts.

The main attack down the railway, in which the Russian troops were supported by two companies of Royal Fusiliers (which included many Australians) was a complete success in its initial stages, and resulted in the capture of the village and station of Emtsa with ten guns and over 500 prisoners. Later in the day, however, the enemy succeeded, with the aid of several armoured trains, in driving back the Russian troops who had relieved the Fusiliers in Emtsa village, and the ground lost was not finally recovered until the evening of August 30th.

On the Seletskoe front the village of Kodish, 15 miles east of Emtsa, was captured with some 90 prisoners, but an attempt to advance east of Mekherenga River met with no success.

On September 1st the enemy delivered a skilfully planned and determined attack on Bolshoi Oserke, a village situated on our flank and rear 15 miles west of Obozerskaya. Its defeat by the two British companies which had attacked with such success on August 29th, coupled with the effective bombing operations carried out by our airmen, enabled the Russian troops to recover from the check which they had suffered, and to continue their advance on both fronts.

In the meantime, Colonel Daniloff's detachment on the Onega front had not been idle. Nijmozero, on the Onega-Archangel, road, was occupied without opposition on September 4th, and the column advancing along the coast road, supported on the flank by our monitors, entered Onega on the 10th.

By September 10th, the date fixed for the commencement of our withdrawal, the Russian forces had succeeded in reaching the general line Tarasovo-Sheleksa-Onega, and the enemy appeared to be evacuating the whole of the Onega Valley.

General Miller was naturally elated at the successes gained by his troops, and especially at the retirement of the enemy on the Onega front.

He informed me that he had decided to hold the general line Onega-Onega Valley-Plesetskaya-Tarasovo-Beresnik (at the junction of the Vaga and Dvina Rivers) after our withdrawal. It was true that this line had not yet been reached along his whole front, but he considered the Russian morale to be good, and expected further successes.

I, myself, was quite satisfied with the result of the offensive, the success of which, due in large measure to the effective bombing of the enemy's defensive position and lines of communication carried out by our aeroplanes, had exceeded my expectations.

The ease with which large tracts of country had been regained had done much to raise the morale of the Russian forces and increase their confidence in themselves at the critical moment when the departure of the British troops was about to put their fighting abilities to the proof.

At the same time, the operations had served my purpose of so distracting the enemy during the period which intervened between the Dvina attack in August and the commencement of our withdrawal in the second week of September, as to make it improbable that he would find himself in a position to hamper seriously our retirement.

As we shall see, my confidence was justified by the event, and, save for a short-lived outburst of activity on the Dvina and Pinega fronts between September 6th and 10th, the difficult operation of extricating our troops and handing over the defence of the front to the Russians was accomplished without serious hindrance on the part of the enemy.

Offensive on Murmansk Front.

I now come to the second of my two main headings, the offensive operations undertaken by Generals Maynard and Scobeltsin, in the neighbourhood of the Lijma Gulf.

As I have pointed out, it was all-important that the operations, if they were to achieve their main purpose, should immediately precede the date fixed for the commencement of the withdrawal of the Allied troops, and that no long period should intervene between the two events, as had happened on the Archangel front in the case of the Dvina offensive.

Under my general plan for the co-ordination of operations on the two fronts our offensive was timed to take place simultaneously with the initial stages of General Ironside's withdrawal.

The date for the commencement of this operation was now fixed for September 10th, and I therefore decided that General Maynard's main attack should be launched on the 14th. This would allow sufficient time for the final objective to be reached and consolidated, should the operations prove successful, before it became necessary to withdraw the Allied troops which had taken part in the battle.

Under the scheme originally proposed these consisted of a Serbian battalion, two companies of the East Surrey Regiment, and the 6th Battalion, Royal Marine Light Infantry.

The Marines had, however, been engaged in preliminary operations, and General Maynard was anxious to reinforce the small British force detailed to take part in the main attack with the remaining two companies of the East Surreys.

I accordingly agreed to replace these troops on the lines of communication by transferring two companies of the 2nd Battalion, Highland Light Infantry, from Archangel, and instructed General Ironside to this effect.

In view of the limited number of troops at General Maynard's disposal, and the length of his lines of communication, I had in the first instance advised General Scobeltsin, the Russian Commander on the Murmansk front, to hold a defensive line around Medvyejya Gora after, our departure, and suggested that the operations to be undertaken before our withdrawal should be of the nature of a raid on a large scale, no attempt being made to hold the ground won.

I was unable, however, to obtain his consent to this limitation of our offensive action. He assured me that the morale of the Russian troops would be adversely affected by a retirement, even though voluntary, from positions which they had once captured, and advocated an advance of some forty miles to the line of the Suna River.

It is true that, provided the Shunga Peninsula was clear of the enemy, this line would provide the Russian Commander with a short and strong front to hold during the winter months, but the advance would entail a further extension of his already dangerously long lines of communication.

Further, the security of the position was altogether dependent on the permanent command of Lake Onega, for the Russian left flank could be effectually turned at any moment by an enemy landing near Lijma or at Vatenavolok, a contingency which, as we shall see, was actually realised.

I was anxious, however, to meet the wishes of General Scobeltsin as far as possible, and consented to joint operations to gain the Suna position being undertaken, though I made it clear that the arrangements already decided upon for their withdrawal would prevent any Allied troops operating south of the Nurmis River.

The plan of operations drawn up by General Maynard entailed the advance down the railway of two columns, composed of British and Allied troops, with Russians in support.

Simultaneously with the main advance flanking detachments of Russian troops would move against objectives on the railway further south, in order to prevent the destruction of bridges and the escape of the enemy's more northern garrisons.

In addition, a third column, starting from Svartnavolotski, twenty-five miles west of the railway, had orders to take Koikori and proceed by a more westerly route on Konchozero.

General Scobeltsin was in general command of the Allied forces.

The offensive was launched on the 14th September, and in the case of the railway columns, met with considerable success from the start.

Lijma, was taken without difficulty, and by the 16th the Allied troops had occupied the line of the Nurmis after sixty hours' continuous fighting.

In the meantime, however, the third column had remained practically stationary in front of Koikori. The village was defended with some determination, and the Russian troops appeared unable to push home their attacks.

The failure of the third column had far-reaching results on the whole operation, and destroyed any chance there might have been reaching the line of the Suna River.

But, though the offensive had not met with complete success, its main object had been achieved. The morale of the Russian troops was good, and the severe loss inflicted on the enemy, amounting to nearly 1,000 prisoners and a large quantity of stores, had ensured the safe withdrawal of the Allied troops.

Withdrawal of British troops from Archangel Front.

As the date for the commencement of our withdrawal approached there were unmistakable signs of renewed Bolshevik activity along the whole of the Archangel front.

The resistance to the Russian advance on the Railway and Seletskoe fronts had stiffened, and between September 6th and 9th frequent attacks were made on our advanced positions on the Dvina.