HMS Duke of York in 1942 (NavyPhotos, click to
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HMS
KING GEORGE V-Class Battleship ordered from
John Brown, Clydebank under the 1937 Build Programme
on 28th April 1937. She was laid down on 5th
May 1937 and was intended to be
named
ANSON, but this was changed in December 1938
and she was launched as DUKE OF YORK
on 28th February
1940 by HM Queen Elizabeth,
formerly Duchess of York. This ship was the
8th RN ship
to carry the name, first used for a Hired
Ship in 1664 it and later used for a
series of minor war vessels
until chosen to commemorate the association
of HM King George VI with the Royal
Navy before
his accession to the throne when Duke of
York. He continued to show a very
special relationship
with this ship which he visited during WW2
on more occasions than any other
RN ship.
The ships Badge and Motto are therefore
particularly appropriate. Build
completion was on 4th November 1941 and the
ship had a significant war record in Home
Waters. During her wartime service
this ship at times wore the Flag of five
admirals (Admiral Sir
John Tovey, 1941-43, Admiral
Sir Bruce Fraser - as CinC Home Fleet
1943-44 and as
CinC British Pacific Fleet 1945; Admiral Sir
Henry Moore
1944; Vice
Admiral Sir Alban Curteis 1942 and Vice
Admiral Sir Neville
Syfret 1942).
Her adoption by
the civil community
of Glasgow following a National Savings
WARSHIP WEEK Campaign in
the month of
her completion is most apposite.
B a t t l e H o n o
u r s
ARCTIC 1942-43
- NORTH AFRICA 1942 - NORTH CAPE 1943
H e r
a l d i c
D a t a
Badge:
The White Rose of York upon a
pale surrounded by the Collar of the Order
of
the Garter and ensigned with a Royal Ducal
Crown proper.
M o t
t o
Honi
soit qui mal y pense:
'Shame to him who thinks evil of it'
D
e t a i l s o f W a
r
S e r v i c e
(for
more ship information,
go
to Naval
History Homepage
and type name
in Site Search
1
9 4 1
August
19th
- Commissioned for trials, her CO was
Captain Cecil Halliday Jepson Harcourt,
CBE, RN.
September
4th
- Contractor’s Sea Trials.
9th
- At 0600 hours, battleship DUKE OF YORK,
escorted by the light cruiser PENELOPE,
and the destroyers LIGHTNING, ICARUS, and
VIVACIOUS departed the Clyde for Rosyth
for DUKE OF YORK for final docking and
completion.
(The
reason for moving DUKE OF YORK to
Rosyth was to reduce the risk of her
being damaged by bombing. Whilst the
Luftwaffe regularly bombed the Mersey
and the Clyde they didn’t bomb Rosyth.
The labour for the completion work was
provided by her builders, John Brown
of Clydebank)
10th
– At 1600 hours in approximate position
56-12N, 2-15W, the destroyers LIGHTNING
and ICARUS detached from the escort.
LIGHTENING returned to Scapa and ICARUS
proceeded to Immingham for a refit. At
1900 hours DUKE OF YORK, PENELOPE and
VIVACIOUS arrived off Rosyth, VIVACIOUS
then returned to Scapa Flow. DUKE OF YORK
then entered Rosyth where she embarked
Admiralty stores and completed with her
full complement, which consisted of 85%
"hostilities only" men
October
At
Rosyth where the outstanding builder’s
work was completed and Sea Trials were
continued. (Note: Low forward sheer found
to cause excessive flooding even in
moderate sea conditions.) Whilst at Rosyth
she was fitted with her radar outfit;
1
x Type 273/M/P Surface search
1 x Type 281 Long range air warning
6 x Type 282 Pom-pom directors
1 x Type 284/M/P Main armament director
4 x Type 285/M/P/Q HA directors
November
1st
- Build completion and acceptance into
service.
2nd
- At 0800 hours DUKE OF YORK escorted by
the heavy cruiser BERWICK and destroyers
PUNJABI and ESCAPADE sailed from Rosyth
for Scapa Flow to commence working up. At
1015 hours off the Isle of May the
destroyer TARTAR, en route from Sheerness
to Scapa Flow, joined the force.
3rd
– At 0830 hours in approximate position
58-20N, 3W the destroyer IMPULSIVE from
Scapa Flow joined the force to relieve the
PUNJABI who then proceeded ahead for Scapa
Flow. DUKE OF YORK, BERWICK and destroyers
ESCAPADE and IMPULSIVE then steered for
the west of the Orkneys to carry out
trials. At 1800 hours DUKE OF YORK,
BERWICK and destroyers ESCAPADE and
IMPULSIVE arrived at Scapa Flow to
commence working up.
6th
- At Scapa Flow, Flag of Vice Admiral ATB
Curteis, 2iC Home Fleet, was transferred
from RENOWN until December.
December
At
Scapa, work-up in continuation.
9th
– At 1400 hours Vice Admiral Sir Alban
Thomas Buckley Curteis
CB RN, Vice-Admiral Commanding 2nd Battle
Squadron & Second-in-Command, Home
Fleet transferred his flag to DUKE OF YORK
from RENOWN. Almost immediately Vice
Admiral Curteis struck his flag and
transferred it to the base ship DUNLUCE
CASTLE. At 1600 hours DUKE OF YORK
escorted by the destroyers FAULKNOR,
FORESIGHT and MATABELE sailed from Scapa
for the Clyde.
(On
Sunday, December 7, 1941, Winston
Churchill was dining at Chartwell with
the US special envoy Averell Harriman
and the US Ambassador John Winant. The
radio was on, and the three men were
suddenly attentive to the announcement
of the newsreader that the Japanese,
Axis allies of Germany and Italy, had
attacked Pearl Harbour. Churchill
immediately phoned the US President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, asking for
confirmation. "It's quite true," FDR
said. The prime minister then said he
would come to Washington for talks.
DUKE OF YORK was en route to Greenock
to embark the Prime Minster)
10th
– At 1215 hours when DUKE OF YORK and
escort were in the Firth of Clyde south of
the Isle of Arran they received orders to
immediately return to Scapa.
(When
the Admiralty received the news of the
sinking of the PRINCE OF WALES and
REPULSE the immediate concern was that
the Kriegsmarine would take advantage
of the Royal Navy’s weakness and send
the TIRPITZ on a raiding mission into
the Atlantic. DUKE OF YORK was
recalled to Scapa to be available if
TIRPITZ should attempt a breakout)
11th
– At 1015 hours DUKE OF YORK and
destroyers FAULKNOR, FORESIGHT and
MATABELE arrived back at Scapa. At 1630
hours DUKE OF YORK escorted by the
destroyers FAULKNOR, FORESIGHT and
MATABELE sailed from Scapa for the Clyde.
12th
– At 1500 hours DUKE OF YORK and
destroyers FAULKNOR, FORESIGHT and
MATABELE arrived in the Clyde. At 1530
hours DUKE OF YORK anchored off Greenock.
13th
– At 1100 hours whilst off Greenock the
Prime Minster, Winston Churchill, embarked
on DUKE OF YORK. Among those who embarked
with Churchill were, Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Dudley Pound, The First Sea Lord;
Field Marshal Sir John Dill, Chief of the
Imperial General Staff; Air Chief Marshal
Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air
Staff; and Averell Harriman. At 1500 hours
DUKE OF YORK and destroyers FAULKNOR,
FORESIGHT and MATABELE sailed from the
Clyde for the USA. The intention had been
to take the great circle route but the
weather forecast for the North Atlantic
was so bad that the decision was made to
first head south through the Irish Sea
towards the Azores. This decision meant
accepting the risk of possible U-boat
attack as they crossed the main U-boat
route from the French Biscay ports to the
North Atlantic.
14th
– The weather was a full gale and speed
had to be reduced to enable the destroyers
to keep in contact. Speed had to be
reduced to 6 knots for some time.
15th
– The gale continued.
16th
- The weather abated but there was a heavy
swell which continued to cause problems
for the destroyers.
17th
– The weather again deteriorated and at
0900 hours FORESIGHT experienced steering
difficulties and had to heave to. After a
short time FORESIGHT caught up with the
main group who had been forced to reduce
speed due to the weather. At 0930 hours
DUKE OF YORK increased speed to 19 knots,
which the destroyers were unable to
maintain, so speed was again reduced. At
1800 hours the destroyers were released to
refuel at Ponta Delgada. At 1830 hours in
approximate position 38-30N, 23W DUKE OF
YORK was joined by the destroyers
HIGHLANDER, HARVESTER and LIGHTNING from
Ponta Delgada.
20th
– At 1800 hours in approximate position
35N, 40W, the destroyers HIGHLANDER,
HARVESTER and LIGHTNING detached to Ponta
Delgada.
21st
– In approximate position 38N, 66-30W,
DUKE OF YORK RVed with the USN destroyers
BRISTOL, TRIPPE and WARRINGTON who then
escorted the battleship to Chesapeake Bay.
22nd
– DUKE OF YORK arrived in Chesapeake Bay.
She then proceeded to Norfolk Navy Yard
where Churchill and party disembarked and
travelled to Washington for their series
of meetings which became known as the
ARCADIA conference.
(The
ARCADIA conference and its outcome was
arguably the most important conference
of the war for Great Britain; for as
General Marshall, the chairman of the
US Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated,
"notwithstanding the entry of Japan
into the war, our view is that Germany
is still the prime enemy and her
defeat is the key to victory". FDR
courageously endorsed this view and
took the decision of ‘Germany first’,
for at the time the US population were
clamouring for revenge after Pearl
Harbour and felt less urgency in
securing the defeat of Hitler. So
Churchill achieved what was his main
priority for the conference.
The
two leaders also called for the
formation of a "grand alliance of the
Allies" and between them they drew up
a solemn declaration to be signed by
all nations at war with Germany, as
they had done with the Atlantic
Charter.
On
1/1/42, representatives of 26 Allied
nations signed the "Declaration by the
United Nations". Pledging to support
the Atlantic Charter, the signatories
agreed to commit their full resources
to the defeat of the Axis powers,
promised to make no separate peace,
and agreed to preserve idealistic
virtues such as freedom and justice.
Later it would be said that this
signing was the birth of the United
Nations. At a time when the Germans
controlled the European continent and
the Japanese were sweeping across the
Far East the Philippines and the
Pacific, the Declaration provided
millions with an uplifting message of
hope.
The
conference also established a Joint
Anglo-American Chiefs of Staff to
control the future conduct of the war,
the most complete unification of
military effort ever achieved by two
allied nations)
23rd
– DUKE OF YORK remained at Norfolk, Va to
re-embark the Prime Minster after the
conference, which was scheduled to last a
week
(In
fact, the Prime Minster did not leave
the White House until 14/1/42)
1
9 4 2
January
3rd
– DUKE OF YORK departed Chesapeake Bay,
escorted by destroyers HARVESTER,
HIGHLANDER and LIGHTNING, the destroyers
had arrived on 31/1/41, For Bermuda.
5th
- DUKE OF YORK, HARVESTER, HIGHLANDER and
LIGHTNING arrived at Bermuda, from where
DUKE OF YORK continued her working up
exercises while awaiting the arrival of
Prime Minister for return to the UK.
13th
– HARVESTER, HIGHLANDER and LIGHTNING
departed Bermuda for St Johns,
Newfoundland.
15th
– Churchill and his party arrived by air
at Bermuda from Washington.
16th
– Churchill decided to return to the UK by
commercial flying boat. The members of his
party who were unable to travel on the
aircraft returned on DUKE OF YORK.
17th
– DUKE OF YORK departed Bermuda, escorted
by the US destroyers LANG, EDISON and
NICHOLSON, for the Clyde.
21st
– In approximate position 53N, 38-30W,
HARVESTER, HIGHLANDER and LIGHTNING joined
and LANG, EDISON and NICHOLSON detached.
23rd
– In approximate position 56-30N, 24W, the
destroyers BADSWORTH, LAMERTON, and WIVERN
joined.
25th
– In the North Channel the destroyers
BADSWORTH, LAMERTON, HARVESTER and
HIGHLANDER detached. Later in the day DUKE
OF YORK, LIGHTNING and WIVERN arrived in
the Clyde.
29th
– DUKE OF YORK escorted by the destroyers
HARVESTER, VERITY and the Polish ORP
BLYSKAWICA sailed from the Clyde for Scapa
Flow.
30th
- DUKE OF YORK escorted by HARVESTER,
VERITY and BLYSKAWICA arrived at Scapa
Flow to continue her working up exercises.
February
At
Scapa Flow carrying out working up
exercises.
(On
16/1/42 the German battleship TIRPITZ
had arrived in F¾ttenfjorden, an inlet
at the eastern end of
Trondheimsfjorden, from BrunsbŸttel.
Her presence at this location posed a
serious threat to the Royal Navy, for
she could attempt to break out into
the Atlantic or attack the Russian
convoys. Admiral Tovey the CinC Home
Fleet, whose resources were as usual
over stretched, was most concerned
about the threat TIRPITZ posed. Tovey
was also worried that the German heavy
units at Brest would attempt to join
up with TIRPITZ. Tovey’s worst fears
were almost realised on 12/2/42 when
the battle cruisers SCHARNHORST and
GNEISENAU and heavy cruiser PRINZ
EUGEN returned to Germany via the
English Channel. Fortunately both
SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU were mined
and damaged en route.
The
Admiralty had been aware since 12/2/42
from the GAF Enigma and Traffic
Analysis that further heavy units were
to join TIRPITZ at Trondheim.
The
Kriegsmarine had decided to assemble a
striking force comprising the TIRPITZ,
SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU [both now
damaged] the panzerschiff ADMIRAL
SCHEER and the PRINZ EUGEN. The final
orders for the assembly of this force
were made by the Kriegsmarine during
the 20th and 21st February, these
signals were picked up by the British
Y service but Bletchley Park was at
that time unable to read the naval
Enigma.
At
1110/21/2/42 a RAF Hudson H/53 sighted
a German heavy unit off Jutland,
steering north; this was ADMIRAL
SCHEER and escorting destroyers.
At
0700/23/2/42 the submarine TRIDENT in
position 63-12N, 7E, sighted ADMIRAL
SCHEER and PRINZ EUGEN steering for
Trondheim, TRIDENT fired torpedoes and
hit PRINZ EUGEN in the stern and
disabling her, she later made
Lofjorden)
25th
- With the
build up of German heavy units at
Trondheim and the imminent sailing of
convoy PQ 12 the CinC Home Fleet
terminated DUKE OF YORK’s working up and
ordered her to Hvalfjord, Iceland.
28th
– At 1830 hours DUKE OF YORK, light
cruiser KENYA, escorted by the destroyers
FAULKNOR, ESKIMO, PUNJABI and ECLIPSE
sailed from Scapa for Hvalfjord, Iceland,
to join the Home Fleet and carry out her
first operational sortie.
March
(The
Home Fleet was to cover the passage of
convoys PQ 12 and QP 8. There was a
strong possibility that the next
arctic convoys might be attacked by
Kriegsmarine
heavy surface units the TIRPITZ et
al striking from Trondheim. To
counter this possibility the Home
Fleet mounted an operation with all
its heavy units to provide a heavy
covering force. Admiral Tovey the
CinC Home Fleet believed that the
most dangerous area would be between
Jan Mayer and Bear Islands.
Therefore on 26/2/42 Tovey asked
that the next outward and homeward
Arctic convoys be sailed
simultaneously so that they would
pass through the danger area at the
same time. For the first eight days
of the operation the weather
conditions were extreme with storms
up to force 10, snow showers, icing
and poor visibility. Convoy PQ 12
and QP 8 sailed on 1/3/42 from
Reykjavik and Murmansk respectively)
2nd
– At 1330 hours DUKE OF YORK, light
cruiser KENYA and destroyers FAULKNOR,
ESKIMO, PUNJABI and ECLIPSE arrived at
Hvalfjord from Scapa.
3rd
– At 0600 hours the 2nd Battle Squadron of
the Home Fleet comprising RENOWN (Flag
Vice-Admiral A. T. B. Curteis, CinC 2nd
Battle Squadron and second in-command,
Home Fleet), DUKE OF YORK, KENYA and
destroyers FAULKNOR, FURY, ECHO ESKIMO,
PUNJABI and ECLIPSE sailed from Hvalfjord
northwards around Iceland to provide
distant cover for convoy PQ 12.
4th
- At 0700 hours the 2nd Battle Squadron
was off the NW of Iceland, where FAULKNOR
and ESKIMO were detached to refuel in
Seidisfjord. At 1600 hours BERWICK
detached to return to Scapa with engine
trouble and was escorted by BEDOUIN.
5th
– (At 1300 hours A Fw 200
reconnaissance aircraft of Gruppe 1,
KG40 from Trondheim-Vaernes airfield,
sighted and reported PQ 12 in position
69-22N, 08-27W, 100 miles south of Jan
Mayen Island. The sighting was
made after the KENYA had joined PQ 12
and was reported as 15 merchantmen,
one cruiser and two destroyers. The
signal was picked up by the Y service
and passed to BP who, because they had
broken the GAF Enigma, decoded it
almost immediately. The information
was then passed to Tovey)
(NB:
in this account of the encounter
between the Home Fleet and the
TIRPITZ, German times are one hour
ahead of British times. Also the
weather was generally poor with low
visibility and snow showers)
At
1200 hours the 2nd Battle Squadron was in
position 66-45N, 06-30W about 100 miles
south of PQ 12 and steering northerly.
At
1200 hours the Home Fleet was about 100
miles bearing 154¼ from the 2nd Battle
Squadron and steering northerly.
At
2000 hours the 2nd Battle Squadron altered
course easterly to affect a RV with the
Home Fleet.
6th
– At 1030 hours in position 71-00N, 4-30E
the 2nd battle squadron RVed with the Home
Fleet, the two forces joined together,
continuing to steer northerly.
The
Home Fleet now comprised KING GEORGE V,
RENOWN, DUKE OF YORK, VICTORIOUS and
destroyers ASHANTI, ICARUS, INTREPID,
LOOKOUT, ONSLOW, FURY, ECHO, PUNJABI and
ECLIPSE
(At
1200 hours the TIRPITZ (Flag Vice
Admiral Otto Ciliax) sailed from
F¾ttenfjorden on Operation SPORTPLAST.
At
1315 hours TIRPITZ was joined by the
destroyers HERMANN SCHOEMANN, PAUL
JACOBI and Z25.
At
1430hours the TIRPITZ squadron was
joined by the destroyer FRIEDRICH IHN
and torpedo boats T5 and T12.
At
1600 hours the TIRPITZ squadron
entered the Frohavet Channel and
turned NNE into the Norwegian Sea on
an intercept course for the convoy
reported by the Fw 200 reconnaissance
aircraft at 1300/5/3/42.
At
1801 hours the submarine SEAWOLF
sighted TIRPITZ in approximate
position 64-15N, 9-44E, but was forced
to dive and therefore unable to report
until she surfaced.
At
1945 hours SEAWOLF surfaced and
signalled the Admiralty reporting "a
large warship, either a battleship or
a heavy cruiser".
At
1935 hours the TIRPITZ squadron was in
position 64-44N, 10-17E)
At
1400 hours the Home Fleet altered course
to the south.
7th
– At 0010 hours Tovey received a signal
from the Admiralty giving him SEAWOLF’s
sighting report. Tovey now knew that
TIRPITZ was out but was unsure if TIRPITZ
was intending to attack the convoy or
break out into the Atlantic. The Home
Fleet altered course to the north.
(Early
in the morning Tovey planned that
VICTORIOUS would launch reconnaissance
aircraft to search out to 120 miles in
the sector 065¼ to 115¼. However due
to the severe icing conditions no
flying was possible.
At
1000 hours TIRPITZ released destroyers
FRIEDRICH
IHN, Z 25 and HERMANN SCHOEMANN to
carry out a sweep to the north.
At
1200 hours TIRPITZ in position 70-45N,
10-21E, who at the time was
approximately 90 miles form Tovey, had
planed to launch two Ar 196 aircraft
to fly a reconnaissance, but had to
abandon the reconnaissance for the
same reason as VICTORIOUS’s
reconnaissance)
At
0800 hours the Home Fleet increased to
full speed.
At
1122 hours the Home Fleet altered course
to the south, this put Tovey on a
reciprocal course to TIRPITZ.
(At
1200 hours convoys PQ 12 and QP 8
passed each other 200 miles SW of Bear
Island.
At
this time TIRPITZ was crossing the
mean course of the convoy’s, astern of
PQ 12 and ahead of QP 8.
At
1630 hours in approximate position
72-35N, 10-30E, the German destroyers
found a straggler from QP 8, the
Russian freighter MV IJORA 2815grt,
she was approximately 100 miles astern
of QP 8.
HERMANN
SCHOEMANN
fired a torpedo, which missed then
FRIEDRICH IHN attempted to sink her
by gunfire but failed. HERMANN
SCHOEMANN
and FRIEDRICH IHN then teamed up to
sink her with their main armament.
The Russian merchantman's distress
signal was intercepted by Tovey, but
the sender's position was not clear
to him)
At
1750 hours the Home Fleet altered course
to the east. At the same time the
destroyers ICARUS and INTREPID detached to
Iceland to refuel.
(At
1830 hours in approximate position
72-33N, 8-23E, the three destroyers
rejoined the TIRPITZ.
At
2113 hours TIRPITZ released the
destroyer FRIEDRICH IHN to refuel at
Harstad)
At
2000 hours the Home Fleet was about 150
miles SW of the TIRPITZ and altered course
to the north. Tovey was now on an
interception course with the TIRPITZ. At
the same time the destroyers ONSLOW (D17),
ASHANTI, ECHO, ECLIPSE, FURY and PUNJABI
were detached to sweep north between the
Home Fleet and the Lofoten Islands along
what Tovey considered to be the enemy’s
most likely return route, before returning
to Iceland to refuel.
(The
2000 hour course change was based on
signal traffic analysis from TIRPITZ
that was analysed almost
simultaneously by the AID and the
results passed to Tovey)
(At
2400 hours TIRPITZ was in position 72-
10N, 12-22E and steering east)
At
2400 hours, in approximate position
71-30N, 7-30E, the Home Fleet altered
course to the south so that Tovey could be
in position off the Lofoten Islands to
launch an air strike at dawn. Tovey had
been approximately 120 miles from TIRPITZ
and was now steering away from her.
8th
– At 0400 hours Tovey, who’s Fleet now
comprised KING GEORGE V, VICTORIOUS, DUKE
OF YORK, RENOWN and the destroyer LOOKOUT,
decided that he had missed TIRPITZ and
since he was without destroyers in
dangerous waters, he turned SW towards
Iceland to collect some destroyers.
(At
0740 hours TIRPITZ released destroyers
Z25
and HERMANN SCHOEMANN to
refuel at Tromso, which was
approximately 125 miles distant)
At
0800 hours the destroyers ONSLOW (D17),
ASHANTI, ECHO, ECLIPSE, FURY and PUNJABI,
who were to the north east of Tovey,
having sighted nothing set course for
Seidisfjord to refuel.
At
1800 hours the Home Fleet was steering
south westerly when Tovey received a
signal from the Admiralty suggesting that
TIRPITZ might be south of Bear Island and
still searching for the convoys.
At
1820 hours the Home Fleet in approximate
position 68 -20N, 01W, acting on Admiralty
intelligence, altered course to the north
east. The Home Fleet was again steaming
towards the TIRPITZ.
(At
1730 hours TIRPITZ was in approximate
position 72-54N, 13-24E and steering
255¼)
At
1830 hours Tovey broke radio silence with
a signal to the Admiralty requesting
destroyers and refuelling facilities for
his destroyers.
(On
receipt of this signal the Admiralty
ordered 4 cruisers [heavy
cruisers KENT and LONDON and light
cruisers LIVERPOOL and TRINIDAD]
to positions between Jan Mayer and
Bear Islands to refuel destroyers and
assembled all available destroyers
which were then sailed to the aid of
the Home Fleet)
(At
2130 hours TIRPITZ turned on to a
southerly course and was now moving
away from the convoys.
At
2352 Ciliax took the decision to abort
his mission to find and destroy the
convoys and return to Trondheim)
9th
– At 0240 hours the Home Fleet was in
approximate position 70-20N, 02-30E and
steering north easterly, when Tovey
received a signal from the Admiralty that
Tirpitz was steaming south and not
searching the waters off Bear Island.
At
0245 hours the Home Fleet altered course
to 120¼, steering for Vestfjord, and
increased speed to 26 knots.
At
0640 hours VICTORIOUS flew off a
reconnaissance force of 6 Albacores on a
diverging search between 105 and 155
degrees to a depth of 150 miles.
(At
0800 hours TIRPITZ was in position
68-15N, 10-44E, steaming south when
she was joined by the destroyer FRIEDRICH
IHN who took up position off TIRPITZ’s
starboard bow)
At
0730 hours the Home Fleet was in
approximate position 68-10N, 6-40E, a
strike force of 12 torpedo-carrying
Albacores, 5 from 817 Sqd and 7 from 832
Sqd, was flown off VICTORIOUS. At the time
of launch TIRPITZ was approximately 115
miles to their south east.
(At
0830 hours TIRPITZ was in approximate
position 68N, 10-45E, steering
southerly at 25 knots)
At
0802 hours Albacore F of 832 Sqd sighted
the TIRPITZ and the destroyer FRIEDRICH
IHN sailing south, and made a sighting
report.
(At
0910 hours TIRPITZ sighted two
Albacores dead aft.
At
0931 hours TIRPITZ increased speed to
27 knots and turned on to course 130¼.
At
0932 hours TIRPITZ launched her Arado
196 aircraft for anti-submarine
detection and makeshift fighter
protection.
At
0934 hours TIRPITZ and FRIEDRICH IHN
increased speed to 29 knots and turned
on to course 82¼ heading for Vestfjord
and Narvik)
At
0917 hours TIRPITZ was attacked by the
strike force of 12 torpedo-carrying
Albacores. The attack failed although one
torpedo only missed TIRPITZ’s stern by 30
feet, 2 Albacores were shot down.
(TIRPITZ
reported the torpedo attack by 24
Swordfish type aircraft taking place
between1015 and 1024 hours. Three
downings were claimed two on starboard
and one on port side. Several aircraft
claimed leaving the scene with smoke
trails)
At
0940 hours the Home Fleet turned west then
SW
At
1545 hours the Home Fleet was attacked by
3 Ju 88 bombers, one bomb landed close
astern of VICTORIOUS but no damaged was
caused.
At
1840 hours FAULKNOR, BEDOUIN, ESKIMO and
TARTAR joined the Home Fleet.
(At
1957 hours TIRPITZ anchored in Bogen
Bay, off Ofotfjord)
At
various times during the Home Fleets
return to Scapa the Fleet was joined by
the destroyers that the Admiralty had
assembled at Tovey’s request. These were
the destroyers JAVELIN, INCONSTANT,
VERDUN, LANCASTER, LEDBURY, GROVE,
WOOLSTON and WELLS joined the fleet.
10th
– At 2300 hours DUKE OF YORK, KING GEORGE
V, VICTORIOUS, RENOWN, LOOKOUT, FAULKNOR,
BEDOUIN, ESKIMO, TARTAR, JAVELIN,
INCONSTANT, VERDUN, LANCASTER, LEDBURY,
GROVE, WOOLSTON and WELLS arrived at
Scapa.
(So
ended what for both sides had been a
frustrating operation. The appalling
weather affected both sides
operations. The
Kriegsmarine were
poorly served by the Luftwaffe who
only sighted PQ 12 once and completely
missed QP 8, and B-Dienst were
completely unaware of the Home Fleets
presence until Tovey broke radio
silence. Even so TIRPITZ failed by a
very narrow margin in finding the
convoys. In contrast Tovey was well
served by good intelligence from the
Admiralty which was based on
appreciations by OIC and decoded
intercepts from BP. This intelligence
led to air strike against TIRPITZ
which almost succeeded and was the
only time that the FAA were to attack
TIRPITZ in the open sea)
(The
next operation for the Home Fleet was
to cover the passage of convoys PQ 13
and QP 9. The TIRPITZ was in Trondheim
Fjord with the heavy cruiser ADMIRAL
SCHEER and ADMIRAL HIPPER [arrived
21/3/42]. The Admiralty
considered that another sortie by the
Kriegsmarine
heavy surface units was a
possibility. So Tovey again had to
provide heavy distant cover for the
two convoys. What was not known by
the Admiralty was that the
Kriegsmarine
heavy unit were limited by lack of
destroyers and low fuel stocks. This
operation again took place in
exceptionally bad weather.)
22nd
– At 1400 hours the Home Fleet comprising
KING GEORGE V (Flag Vice Admiral Curteis
2iC Home Fleet), DUKE of YORK, RENOWN,
VICTORIOUS cruisers KENT and EDINBURGH and
destroyers ASHANTI, BEDOUIN, ECHO,
ESCAPADE, ESKIMO, FORESIGHT, ICARUS,
INGLEFIELD, LEDBURY, MARNE, MIDDLETON,
ONSLOW, PUNJABI, TARTAR and WHEATLAND
sailed from Scapa to provide distant cover
for convoys PQ 13 and QP 9. Course was set
for the north east of Iceland.
(At
0720/20/3/42 convoy PQ 13comprising
21merchants sailed from Reykjavik
heading north through the Denmark
Strait. When the Home Fleet sailed PQ
13 was north of Iceland in approximate
position 67-35N, 16-40W. Convoy QP 9
sailed from Kola Inlet on 21/3/42)
23rd
– Late in the evening the Fleet arrived
off
Seydisfjordour
where
the destroyers were detached turn to
refuel.
24th
– In the afternoon, all the destroyers
having refuelled, the Fleet set course for
68N, 10W.
25th
– Early in the morning the Fleet arrived
in position 68N, 10W. Where, for two days,
in temperatures of -35¼, they cruised for
two days.
(Against
convoys PQ 13 and QP 9 the
Kriegsmarine deployed ten U-Boats and
three destroyers. Using intelligence
gained from Enigma the Admiralty was
able to provide details of the U-Boat
dispositions and to warn of the GAF
and destroyer attacks. Most
importantly the Enigma provided the
Admiralty with evidence that none of
the larger enemy units had moved north
with the destroyers. The Admiralty was
therefore able to assure Curteis that
TIRPITZ was not going to sortie
against the convoys)
27th
– Aware from TRINIDAD’s signal, received
late on 25/3/42, informing the CinC Home
Fleet that convoy PQ 13 had been scattered
by a full gale and with the Home Fleet
itself experiencing gale force conditions
that had caused damage to VICTORIOUS and
TARTAR. Curteis decided that he would be
unable to provide assistance to the convoy
in its scattered state so therefore turned
for Scapa. At 0600 hours the Home Fleet
left its patrol area to return to Scapa.
28th
– At 1400 hours the Home Fleet arrived
back at Scapa. Shortly after arrival the
flag of Vice Admiral Curteis 2iC Home
Fleet was transferred from DUKE OF YORK.
April
At
Scapa where she had 8 single 20mm
Oerlikons added, 5 on forecastle, 3 on
quarterdeck.
(The
next operation for the Home Fleet was
to cover the passage of convoys PQ 14
and QP 10. Their cover was required as
the Kriegsmarine heavy units were
still in Trondheim Fjord)
12th
– At 0600 hours the Home Fleet, comprising
KING GEORGE V (Flag CinC Home Fleet), DUKE
OF YORK (Flag Vice Admiral, 2iC Home
Fleet), VICTORIOUS, heavy cruiser KENT,
light cruiser NIGERIA and destroyers
FAULKNOR (D 8), ONSLOW (D 17), OFFA,
ESCAPADE, MIDDLETON, LEDBURY, WHEATLAND
and BELVOIR departed Scapa to cover
convoys P Q 14 and Q P 10. Course was set
north westerly for the Faroe Islands.
(At
1430/8/4/42 convoy PQ 14 comprising 26
merchant ships sailed from
Reykjavik heading north through the
Denmark Strait. When the Home Fleet
sailed PQ 14 was south west of Jan
Mayen Island and having encountered
fog, snow and ice only 8 ships were in
company with the commodore. Convoy QP
10 of 16 merchant ships sailed from
Kola Inlet on 10/4/42)
At
1930 hours when the Home Fleet was south
of the Faroe Islands the destroyers
FAULKNOR, ONSLOW, ESCAPADE and OFFA were
detached to refuel in Skaalefjord.
13th
– At 0430 hours the destroyers SOMALI (D
6), BEDOUIN, ESKIMO, and MATCHLESS joined
the Battlefleet after refuelling in
Skaalefjord.
At
0500 hours, north of the Faroe Islands
FAULKNOR, ONSLOW, ESCAPADE and OFFA
rejoined the Battlefleet.
At
0500 hours the destroyers
MIDDLETON,
LEDBURY and BELVOIR detached to return
to Scapa.
The
Home Fleet then set course for north east
Iceland.
At
1900 hours the Home Fleet arrived off
Seydisfjordour where the
destroyer WHEATLAND detached to escort
the oiler RFA ALDERSDALE from
Seydisfjordour.
The
Home Fleet then set course for a patrol
position 135 miles south west of Jan Mayen
Island.
14th
– At 1000 hours the Home Fleet arrived in
position 62-50N, 6-15W where they
patrolled for the next two days to be
available should the
Kriegsmarine
heavy units sortie from Trondheim.
(Twice
during the period that the Home Fleet
were in the patrol area the Admiralty,
from the lack of Enigma traffic, was
able to assure Tovey that no German
heavy units were at sea)
16th
– In the AM the Home Fleet was about to
leave the patrol area when Tovey received
a report from the LIVERPOOL (with QP 10)
that the convoy was being shadowed by four
aircraft and one U-Boat, and that heavy
air attack was expected. Tovey decided to
remain in the area, to provide support
should it be required.
At
0800 hours the KENT detached from the Home
Fleet to proceed north to reinforce the
escort of convoy QP 10.
At
1500 hours the Home Fleet set course for
Scapa via north east Iceland.
17th
– At 0400 hours off
Seydisfjordour
FAULKNOR,
SOMALI, BEDOUIN and MATCHLESS were
detached to refuel. The Home Fleet then
set course for the north Faroes.
At
1500 hours in position 62-50N, 6-15W the
Fleet was joined by the destroyers
MIDDLETON, LEDBURY, LAMERTON, and HURSLEY
from Skaalefjord. Following which the
ESKIMO, OFFA and ESCAPADE detached to
refuel at Skaalefjord.
At
1630 hours the Fleet was joined by
FAULKNOR, SOMALI, BEDOUIN and MATCHLESS
from
Seydisfjordour.
18th
– At 0500 hours the Home Fleet comprising
KING GEORGE V, DUKE OF YORK, VICTORIOUS,
NIGERIA, escorted by the SOMALI, FAULKNOR,
ONSLOW (D 17), MIDDLETON, LEDBURY,
LAMERTON, HURSLEY, BEDOUIN, and MATCHLESS
arrived back at Scapa.
22nd
– DUKE OF YORK escorted by the destroyers
FAULKNOR (D 8), ESKIMO and ESCAPADE left
Scapa for Hvalfjord, Iceland.
24th
– At 1000 hours DUKE OF YORK and the
destroyers FAULKNOR (D 8), ESKIMO and
ESCAPADE arrived at Hvalfjord.
May
1st
– At 1800 hours DUKE OF YORK (Flag Vice
Admiral Curteis, 2iC Home Fleet), escorted
by the destroyers FAULKNOR (D8) and
ESCAPADE sailed from Hvalfjord to RV with
the Home Fleet. Curteis had been ordered
to sail by Tovey to relieve the CinC Home
Fleet and the KING GEORGE V, following
KGV’s collision damage.
(The
Home Fleet had sailed from Scapa on
28/4/42 and had proceeded to a
position of north east Iceland to
provide cover for convoys PQ 15 and QP
11. The Admiralty, from Enigma
evidence, had alerted the CinC Home
Fleet the on 30/4/42 that the GAF had
bought some units in north Norway to
one hour’s notice for ant-shipping
strikes. However this turned out to a
German fear of an invasion of the
Lofoten Islands)
2nd
– At 2359 hours in position 67-32N,
10-25W, DUKE OF YORK (Flag Vice Admiral
Curteis, 2iC Home Fleet), and the
destroyers FAULKNOR and ESCAPADE RVed with
the Home Fleet; and Vice Admiral Curteis
took command of the Home Fleet.
3rd
– At 0030 hours the KING GEORGE V escorted
by the destroyers MARTIN, MARNE and ORIBI
detached from the Home Fleet for
Seydisfjordour.
The
Home Fleet remained on patrol between
Iceland and Jan Mayen Island.
4th
– At 0400 hours the
destroyers MARTIN,
MARNE and ORIBI rejoined the Home Fleet
on
patrol between
Iceland and Jan Mayen Island.
At
1000 hours the Home Fleet set course to
return to Scapa, leaving US Task Force
99, comprising battleship WASHINGTON
(Flag Rear Admiral Giffen CinC Task
Force 99), heavy cruiser TUSCALOOSA and
destroyers WAINWRIGHT, MADISON, WILSON
and PLUNKETT in the patrol area.
5th
– At 2100 hours the Home Fleet comprising
DUKE OF YORK, VICTORIOUS, KENYA and
destroyers INGLEFIELD, ESKIMO, FAULKNOR,
ESCAPADE, MARTIN, MARNE and ORIBI arrived
at Scapa Flow.
6th
– Tovey transferred his flag, from KING
GEORGE V to DUKE OF YORK.
(The
USN Task Force 99 left the patrol area
for Hvalfjord, where they refuelled
from the oiler USN KAWEAH and
re-provisioned from the supply ship
the USN MIZAR)
15th
– At 0345 hours he Home Fleet comprising
DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC Home Fleet),
aircraft carrier VICTORIOUS, heavy cruiser
LONDON and destroyers FAULKNOR (D 8),
FURY, MARNE, ECLIPSE, ORIBI, WHEATLAND,
BLANKNEY, MIDDLETON and LAMERTON left
Scapa for the south east of Iceland to RV
with Task Force 99..
(The
USN Task Force 99 comprising
WASHINGTON (Flag CinC TF 99),
TUSCALOOSA and destroyers MAYRANT,
RHIND and ROWAN left Hvalfjord at the
same time to RV with the Home Fleet)
16th
– At 0400 hours, in approximate position
62N, 15W, the Home Fleet RVed with TF 99.
The combined Force then carried out
exercises before setting course for
Hvalfjord.
17th
- At 1200 hours the Force arrived at
Hvalfjord.
23rd
– At 0300 hours DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC
Home Fleet), WASHINGTON (Flag CinC TF 99),
VICTORIOUS, WICHITA, LONDON escorted by
destroyers FAULKNOR (D 8), INTREPID,
ICARUS, ECLIPSE, FURY, BLANKNEY, LAMERTON,
MIDDLETON and WHEATLAND left Hvalfjord for
a position between Iceland and Jan Mayen
Island to provide distant cover convoys P
Q 16 and Q P 12.
(21/5/42
convoy PQ 16 comprising 36 merchantmen
sailed from Hvalfjord. On the same day
convoy QP 12 comprising 15 merchantmen
sailed from Kola Inlet)
24th
– At 0100 hours in approximate position
67-20N, 17W, the Force was joined by the
US destroyers WAINWRIGHT, MAYRANT, RHIND
and ROWAN from
Seydisfjordour.
Following
which the destroyers FAULKNOR, INTREPID,
FURY, ICARUS and ECLIPSE were detached
to
Seydisfjordour
to refuel. At 1900 hours FAULKNOR,
INTREPID, FURY, ICARUS and ECLIPSE
rejoined from
Seydisfjordour,
following
which the destroyers MIDDLETON,
LAMERTON, WHEATLAND, and BLANKNEY were
detached to
Seydisfjordour
to refuel.
25th
to 27th – On patrol, in approximate
position 68N, 8W, covering the passage of
convoy’s PQ 16 and QP 12.
(On
27/5/42 the Admiralty was able to
inform Tovey from Enigma that the
TIRPITZ was going to carry out
exercises in Trondheim Fjord during
the following two days)
28th
– At 0300 hours the VICTORIOUS escorted by
the destroyers FAULKNOR, FURY and ECLIPSE
were detached from the Home Fleet for
Hvalfjord. At the same time the remainder
of the Force set course for Scapa. At 1500
hours, in position 66-50N, 11-25W the
destroyers BLANKNEY, MIDDLETON, WHEATLAND
and LAMERTON joined the Force from
Seydisfjordour.
29th
– At 0900 hours, off the Faroe Islands the
destroyers INTREPID and ICARUS detached
from the Force to refuel at Skaalefjord.
At 2300 hours DUKE OF YORK, WASHINGTON,
WICHITA, LONDON escorted by destroyers
BLANKNEY, LAMERTON, MIDDLETON, WHEATLAND
and US destroyers WAINWRIGHT, MAYRANT,
RHIND and ROWAN arrived at Scapa.
June
6th
– His Majesty The King arrived at Scapa
flow aboard the destroyer SOMALI and was
conveyed to DUKE OF YORK where he was met
by the CinC Home Fleet and carried out an
inspection of the flag ship. The King
stayed onboard DUKE OF YORK from 6th to
8th June
7th
- His Majesty The King carried out an
inspection of the US battleship
WASHINGTON.
(12/6/42
the WASHINGTON (Flag CinC Task Force
99), WICHITA, WAINWRIGHT, RHIND, ROWAN
and MAYRANT sailed from Scapa for
Hvalfjord, where they arrived on
14/6/42)
(25/6/42
the WASHINGTON (Flag CinC Task Force
99), escorted by the destroyers USS
MAYRANT and RHIND and HMS MARTIN
sailed from Hvalfjord and arrived at
Scapa on 29/6/42)
29th
– At 1700 hours DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC
Home Fleet), WASHINGTON (Flag CinC TF 99),
[WASHINGTON had embarked 50 British
civilian shipyard engineering staff to
study the battleship's engineering plant]
VICTORIOUS (Flag Vice Admiral Bruce Fraser
2iC Home Fleet), heavy cruiser CUMBERLAND,
light cruiser NIGERIA (Flag CS 10) and
destroyers FAULKNOR (D 8), ONSLAUGHT,
MIDDLETON, ESCAPADE, BLANKNEY, MARTIN,
MARNE and WHEATLAND sailed from Scapa and
steered for a patrol position between
Iceland and Jan Mayer Island, to cover the
passage of PQ 17 and QP 13.
(On
18/6/42, the British naval attache in
Stockholm warned the Admiralty that
the Germans were planning a major
attack on the next Arctic convoy. This
information came from a land line
interception. The Kriegsmarine plan,
which was in Admiralty hands, was for
TIRPITZ to wait in Vestfjord and
SCHEER and HIPPER in Altenfjord until
the convoy passed 5¼E. The two forces
would then sail for a position 100
miles north of North Cape. The convoy
was then to be attacked between 20¼E
and 30¼E. Following his assimilation
of this intelligence, Tovey expressed
his fears to the First Sea Lord,
Admiral Pound, declaring that in his
opinion it would be far safer if the
valuable convoy were split into two
parts thus making it easier to defend.
Tovey was overruled and the First Sea
Lord further informed, Admiral Tovey,
that he might order the convoy to
scatter if he thought it faced
annihilation from TIRPITZ, which Tovey
considered would be 'sheer, bloody
murder')
(At
1600/27/6/42 convoy PQ 17 comprising
36 merchantmen sailed from Hvalfjord.
One
of the ships, the SS RICHARS
BLAND, struck
submerged ice off North West
Iceland
and had to return.
On
29/6/42 the ships ran into heavy
ice and 4 ships were damaged and
one, the SS EXFORD returned to
port.
Convoy
QP 13 comprising 35 merchantmen
sailed in two parts, 12 merchantmen
from Archangel on 26/6/42 and 23
merchantmen from Murmansk on
27/6/42. Joining together on 27/6/42)
30th
– Through the day the Battlefleet
continued on a northerly course.
(NB:
in this account of the movements of
Kriegsmarine and British forces,
German times are one hour ahead of
British times)
(At1650/30/6/42,
the
Kriegsmarine became aware from air and
then U-boat reports that convoy QP13
was 180 miles north of North Cape.
From this information they were able
to assume that a PQ convoy was at sea)
July
1st
– At 0640 hours in approximate position
67N, 8W, the destroyers ONSLOW (D 17),
ASHANTI and USS MAYRANT and RHIND joined
the Battlefleet from
Seydisfjordour.
Following which the destroyers FAULKNOR,
ONSLAUGHT, MARTIN, MARNE and ESCAPADE
detached from the Battlefleet to refuel
in
Seydisfjordour.
(During
the morning of 1/7/42, U 456
sighted and reported the position of
PQ 17. At 1300 hours a Luftwaffe Blohm
& Voss BV 138 arrived over the
convoy. The convoy was then
continuously shadowed and reported.
From these reports the Kriegsmarine
calculated that PQ17 would pass
longitude 5¼E during the forenoon of
2/7/42. At 1257/2/7/42 the executive
order for the opening phase of
Operation RÖSSELSPRUNG (KNIGHTS
MOVE), the Kriegsmarine surface
attack on PQ 17, was issued)
At
1432 hours the Luftwaffe signal reporting
the sighting of PQ 17 was intercepted in
the UK.
At
1900 hours the Admiralty signalled all
ships with the news of the sighting.
At
2250 hours FAULKNOR, ONSLAUGHT, MARTIN,
MARNE and ESCAPADE rejoined the Fleet.
At
2330 hours a Luftwaffe FW 200 sights and
reports the Home Fleet, Hurricanes from
VICTORIOUS fail to shoot it down.
(0300/1/7/42
the heavy cruisers LONDON [Flag
Rear Admiral L.H.K. Hamilton CS 1],
NORFOLK, USS WICHITA and TUSCALOOSA
and destroyers SOMALI [Captain
D6] and USS ROWAN and
WAINWRIGHT sailed from Seydisfiord as
the cruiser covering force for P Q 17
and Q P 13)
2nd
– The Battlefleet continued to steer on a
northerly course. Destroyer MIDDLETON
detached from the Battlefleet to refuel at
Seydisfjordour.
Later in the day destroyers WHEATLAND
and BLANKNEY detached from the Fleet to
refuel at
Seydisfjordour.
At 1951 hours DUKE OF YORK picked up an
aircraft on her radar.
(At
2000/2/7/42 TIRPITZ [Flag Admiral Otto
Schniewind] sailed from
F¾ttenfjorden
on Operation RÖSSELSPRUNG. En route
through Trondheimsfjorden TIRPITZ was
joined by the heavy cruiser HIPPER and
the destroyers FRIEDRICH IHN, HANS
LODY, KARL GALSTER and THEODOR RIEDEL
and torpedo boats T7 and T15. The
Force set course for Vestfjord.
At
2130/2/7/42 the heavy cruisers LUTZOW
[Flag
Vice Admiral Oskar Kummetz]
and SCHEER and the destroyers RICHARD
BEITZEN, Z24, Z28, Z29 and Z30 and the
oiler DITHMARSCHEN sailed from Bogen
Bay, off Ofotfjord and set course for
Gimsoystraumen off Vestfjord)
3rd
– The Battlefleet continued on a northerly
course.
(At
0130 hours off the entrance to
Gimsoystraumen the LUTZOW Force
detached the oiler DITHMARSCHEN the
rest of the force then proceeded
slowly in fog to make the passage
through Gimsoystraumen. At 0242 hours,
off Tjeldsund the LUTZOW ran aground,
damaging her stern, Kummetz moved
his flag to the
SCHEER; the Force continued leaving
LUTZOW behind and setting course for
Alta fjord)
At
0112 hours the CUMBERLAND picked up an
aircraft on her radar.
At
0210 hours a FW 200 was sighted and
VICTORIOUS launched a Hurricane that
crashed on takeoff.
At
1200 hours the Battlefleet was in
approximate position 71-30N, 1-40E.
Convoy
PQ 17 was at that time approximately 450
miles to the north east and the TIRPITZ
was 470 miles to the south east.
(At
1400/3/7/42 TIRPITZ with
HIPPER and the destroyers FRIEDRICH
IHN, HANS LODY, KARL GALSTER and
THEODOR RIEDEL arrived off the
entrance to Gimsoystraumen where the
destroyers refuelled from the
DITHMARSCHEN and torpedo boats T7 and
T15. After refuelling the Force set
course to sail through Gimsoystraumen.
When transiting the narrow
Gimsoystraumen channel the destroyers
HANS LODY, KARL GALSTER and THEODOR
RIEDEL ran aground and all sustained
damage that caused them to abort the
operation. TIRPITZ, HIPPER the
destroyer FRIEDRICH IHN and torpedo
boats T7 and T15 continued north for
Alta fjord. En route a message was
received from Hitler ordering
Schniewind to make for Alta fjord and
remain there until further orders.
At
2200 hours the SCHEER Force arrived in
Kaa Fjord)
(From
1200/1/7/42 to 1200/3/7/42 BP were
reading Enigma so the Admiralty had
established that the two German Forces
had left their bases and had moved
northwards up the Norwegian coast and
had entered Alta Fjord.
The
Admiralty kept Tovey informed of these
movements)
4th
– At 0015 hours a Luftwaffe reconnaissance
aircraft sighted the Allied cruiser
covering force, which was north west of
the convoy, and reported it as including a
battleship. The signal was intercepted and
decrypted by BP. At the time the Admiralty
believed that Kriegsmarine thought this
was the main covering force. At 0400 hours
DUKE OF YORK signalled "happy birthday" to
the WASHINGTON. ASHANTI detached from the
Battlefleet to refuel from Force Q, (Force
Q was the oiler RFA ALDERSDALE escorted by
the destroyer DOUGLAS) rejoining in the
p.m.
(At
1010/4/7/42 the TIRPITZ Force arrived
in Kaa Fjord)
At
1200 hours the Battlefleet was in
approximate position 76-21N, 9-40E,
steering easterly, where the light cruiser
MANCHESTER and the destroyer ECLIPSE
joined from Barentsburg, Spitzbergen, on
completion of Operation GEARBOX. This
position was approximately 516 miles North
West of Kaa Fjord. At approximately 1300
hours the Battlefleet turned south.
(At
1918 hours the Admiralty was in
possession of Enigma decrypts up to
1200/4/7/42 and became aware that
TIRPITZ had arrived in Alta Fjord at
0900/4/7/42, joining SCHEER.
Since
1200 hours U-boats had reported at
1327 hours and 1458 hours that they
had sighted "heavy enemy forces", this
sighting was of the cruiser covering
Force.
At
1455 hours the Luftwaffe reported the
cruiser covering Force as "four heavy
cruisers with destroyers".
The
Luftwaffe also reported that an
aircraft carried was near the convoy.
This appreciation was based on
sightings of aircraft from the cruiser
force, including the American Curtiss
Seagull biplane float plane, an
aircraft with which they were not
familiar.
At
2030 hours the First Sea lord Admiral
of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound called a
staff meeting to discuss the TIRPITZ
which was attended by, amongst others,
Commander Denning the head of the OIC.
When Denning left the OIC for the
meeting he was of the opinion that
TIRPITZ had not sailed before 1200
hours. During the meeting the First
Sea lord asked for Denning’s
appreciation of why he believed
TIRPITZ had not sailed. Denning’s
answer was no orders clearing U Boats
from the area, for fear of them
attacking TIRPITZ in error, HF/DF
clearly showed U Boats tailing the
convoy still. There had been no signal
traffic usually associated with
Kriegsmarine surface movements and
finally there had been no
sightings from the Allied submarines
deployed off the North
Cape. Pound would only accept the
fact that TIRPITZ had arrived in Alta
Fjord had was of the opinion that
TIRPITZ had now sailed to attack the
convoy and could reach the convoy by
0200/5/7/42.
During
the meeting on Pound’s orders and
without any consultation with Tovey,
the man on the spot, the following
signals were sent;
2111
hours, to CS1, "Most Immediate.
Cruiser Force withdraw to westward
at high speed"
2123
hours, to CS1, "Immediate. Owing to
threat from surface ships convoy is
to disperse and proceed to Russian
ports"
At
2108 hours and 2110 hours the
Admiralty had signalled Tovey with
the latest intelligence and the OIC
assessment that TIRPITZ had not
sailed from Alta Fjord.
At
2130 hours Denning returned to the
OIC from the meeting and found that
the UIC was still of the opinion
that TIRPITZ had not sailed. But on
Pound’s orders the following signal
were sent;
2136
hours, to CS1, "Most Immediate. My
2123 Convoy is to scatter"
At
2230 hours in approximate position
75-40N, 28-30E the convoy scattered.
The destroyer escort and the cruiser
covering Force headed west away from
the convoy)
At
2230 hours the Battlefleet was in
approximate position 75N, 3E which was
about 450 miles west of the convoy and
steering north eastward.
5th
– At 0500 hours a Luftwaffe reconnaissance
aircraft sighted and reported the
Battlefleet in approximate position
76-08N, 5-46E. At this time the
Battlefleet turned south westerly moving
away from the scattered convoy. The
destroyers INGLEFIELD, INTREPID, ICARUS,
FORESIGHT, BLANKNEY, MIDDLETON and
WHEATLAND left Seydisfiord to join the
Battlefleet.
(At
1200 hours Hitler gave his approval
for the TIRPITZ Force to sail against
the convoy.
At
1237 hours TIRPITZ, SCHEER, HIPPER and
the destroyers FRIEDRICH IHN, RICHARD
BEITZEN, Z24, Z27, Z28, Z29 and Z30
and the torpedo boats T7 and T15
sailed from Alta Fjord)
(At
1700/5/7/42, the cruisers and
destroyers of Hamilton's Force were
sighted by the Luftwaffe so Hamilton
felt it safe to break radio silence.
He reported course and position of his
force to Tovey; this was the first
that Tovey knew that Hamilton was not
with the convoy)
At
1517 hours the Battlefleet was in
approximate position 73-35N, 2E, steering
south westerly, when the Admiralty
signalled Tovey with the latest
intelligence on TIRPITZ. This was timed at
1145 hours, stating TIRPITZ would be at
Rolvsoeysund, one of the exit routes from
Alta Fjord, at 1530 hours. Thus Tovey now
knew that TIRPITZ had sailed.
(At
1800/5/7/42 the TIRPITZ Force was in
approximate position 71-20N, 23-40E
and steering northerly when they were
sighted and reported by the Soviet
submarine K 21. [The Soviet
submarine K 21 claimed to have
torpedoed and badly damaged the
TIRPITZ, but Kriegsmarine records do
not have any record of this event]
At
about this time the TIRPITZ Force
turned easterly.
At
1816/5/7/42 the TIRPITZ Force was
steering easterly when sighted and
reported by an Allied aircraft.
At
2129/5/7/42 the TIRPITZ Force were
sighted and reported by the submarine
UNSHAKEN.
At
2219 hours the TIRPITZ Force was
recalled, when it was realised how
many ships the Luftwaffe and U-boats
were sinking)
When
the TIRPITZ Force turned to return to
their base, the Battlefleet was
approximately 160 miles north east of Jan
Mayer Island and continuing to sail south
westerly.
6th
– At 0645 hours the Battlefleet was in
approximate position 70N, 7W, when it
reversed course and steered north
easterly.
At
1035 hours in approximate position 71N,
4W, the Battlefleet, which was still
steering north easterly, was joined by the
heavy cruisers LONDON (Flag Rear Admiral
L.H.K. Hamilton CS 1), NORFOLK and USS
TUSCALOOSA and WICHITA and destroyers
SOMALI, FURY, LEAMINGTON, KEPPEL, OFFA,
LEDBURY, WILTON and USS WAINWRIGHT and
ROWAN.
MANCHESTER
detached from the Battlefleet to Scapa,
LEAMINGTON detached from the Battlefleet
to Londonderry
The
destroyers INGLEFIELD, INTREPID, ICARUS,
FORESIGHT, BLANKNEY, MIDDLETON and
WHEATLAND joined the Battlefleet from
Seydisfiord.
The
destroyers ONSLOW, MAYRANT, RHIIND,
MARTIN, MARNE, ONSLAUGHT, ESCAPADE and
ECLIPSE detached from the Battlefleet to
fuel at Seydisfiord.
At
1430 hours in approximate position 72N,
2W, the Battlefleet turned easterly. About
one hour later the Battlefleet turned
south for Scapa Flow.
At
approximately 1900 hours the heavy
cruisers NORFOLK, WICHITA, and TUSCALOOSA
detached from the Battlefleet for
Hvalfjord.
At
approximately 2030 hours the destroyers
MARTIN, MARNE and ESCAPADE detached from
the Battlefleet to refuel at Seydisfiord.
The
heavy cruiser LONDON detached from the
Battlefleet for Scapa.
7th
– The Battlefleet continued on course for
Scapa.
At
approximately 1600 hours the destroyers
INGLEFIELD, INTREPID, ICARUS, FORESIGHT,
BLANKNEY, MIDDLETON and WHEATLAND joined
the Battlefleet from Seydisfiord.
At
approximately 1615 hours the destroyers
FAULKNOR and KEPPEL detached from the
Battlefleet to fuel at Skaalefjord.
At
approximately 1900 hours the battleship
WASHINGTON and destroyers WAINWRIGHT,
SOMALI, ASHANTI and ROWAN detached from
the Battlefleet for Hvalfjord.
8th
– The Home Fleet continued on course for
Scapa.
At
1730 hours the CinC Home Fleet in DUKE OF
YORK with the following ships in company,
VICTORIOUS, NIGERIA, CUMBERLAND and
destroyers FURY, OFFA, LEDBURY, WILTON,
FORESIGHT, ICARUS, BLANKNEY, WHEATLAND,
MIDDLETON, INGLEFIELD and INTREPID arrived
at Scapa.
24th
– At Scapa the flag of the CinC Home Fleet
was struck and transferred to the
battleship KING GEORGE V.
26th
– The battleship DUKE OF YORK escorted by
the destroyers HAMBLETON and USS RODMAN,
EMMONS and MACOMB sailed from Scapa for
Hvalfjord.
28th
– DUKE OF YORK and the destroyers
HAMBLETON and USS RODMAN, EMMONS and
MACOMB arrived at Hvalfjord.
August
DUKE
OF YORK at Hvalfjord for the whole month.
September
1st
to 9th – DUKE OF YORK was at Hvalfjord.
(The
next operation that involved DUKE OF
YORK was Operation EV; this was the
passage of Convoys PQ 18 and QP 14.
Following
the debacle of PQ 17 the Russian
convoys were suspended due to the Home
Fleet having to supply units for
Operation PEDESTAL. With the return of
Home Fleet units from the
Mediterranean, the CinC Home Fleet,
Admiral Tovey, was under pressure from
Churchill to resume the convoys.
The
RAF provided dedicated assets for the
next and subsequent convoys that were
to be based in northern Russia. These
were three PR Spitfires, nine
Catalina’s of 210 Squadron and thirty
two Hampden torpedo bombers of 144 and
455 Squadrons.
The
Hampden’s took off on 4/9/42 from
Sumburgh for Afrikanda airbase in
North Russia. The route taken was
across Norway, Sweden and Finland.
Eight of the Hampden’s were lost en
route. One which came down in Norway
was carrying details of convoy PQ 18
and this information fell into German
hands.
Tovey
was of the opinion that future
convoy’s must have an escort that was
large enough to deter a surface
threat. Tovey also reasoned that if
the Home Fleet was to be a creditable
deterrent to the heavy units of the
Kriegsmarine it would have to stay
much closer to the convoy. This would
expose the Home Fleet to concentrated
attacks from the Luftwaffe and U-boats
and was an unacceptable risk. Tovey
and his staff came up with the concept
of the fighting destroyer escort, of
upwards of 16 destroyers. These would
remain with the convoy for the whole
of its passage.
Tovey,
who was disliked by Churchill and
after the PQ 17 fiasco, he had lost
faith in the First Sea Lord, Pound. So
for PQ 18 Tovey decided that he would
control the operation from Scapa Flow
where he had a direct phone line to
the Admiralty. In this manner he could
control the politics and the tactical
situation)
(Operation
EV commenced on 2/9/42 when 39
merchant ships comprising the main
section of convoy PQ 18 sailed from
Loch Ewe)
(On
8/9/42 a Luftwaffe reconnaissance
aircraft sighted and reported the
convoy north east of Iceland. Enigma
deciphered the sighting report and the
CinC Home Fleet signalled Fraser with
the news)
9th
– The battleships ANSON (Flag 2ic Home
Fleet Vice Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser), DUKE
OF YORK, light cruiser JAMAICA and the
destroyers CAMPBELL, MACKAY, BULLDOG,
VENOMOUS and KEPPEL left Hvalfjord for
Akureyri.
10th
- ANSON, DUKE OF YORK, JAMAICA and
destroyers CAMPBELL, MACKAY, BULLDOG,
VENOMOUS and KEPPEL arrived at Akureyri.
11th
- ANSON, DUKE OF YORK, JAMAICA and
destroyers KEPPLE, CAMPBELL, MACKAY,
MONTROSE and BRAMHAM sailed from Akureyri
and headed for Jan Mayen Island to provide
distant cover for convoy PQ 18. The escort
for the Battlefleet was a scratch
collection of destroyers normally employed
on convoy escort. This was because the
fleet destroyers were deployed as the
‘fighting destroyer escort’ for PQ 18.
(11/9/42
a Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft
sighted and reported the Battlefleet
north of Iceland. Enigma deciphered
the sighting report and the CinC Home
Fleet signalled Fraser with the news)
12th
– The Battlefleet operated off Jan Mayer
Island. The Luftwaffe continued to shadow
the Battlefleet during the day. However
the visibility deteriorated and the
Battlefleet was able to loose the
shadower. In Fraser’s judgement the
Battlefleet could add nothing to any
surface battle that might develop 1000
miles away. So leaving the enemy with the
impression that the Battlefleet was still
off Jan Mayer Island, they turned south
for Iceland.
13th
– The Battlefleet sailing south for
Iceland.
14th
- ANSON, DUKE OF YORK, JAMAICA and
destroyers KEPPLE, CAMPBELL, MACKAY,
MONTROSE and BRAMHAM arrived back at
Akureyri.
19th
- ANSON, DUKE OF YORK, JAMAICA and
destroyers KEPPEL, MACKAY, CAMPBELL,
MONTROSE and BROKE sailed from Akureyri to
cover convoy Q P 14.
22nd
- ANSON, DUKE OF YORK, JAMAICA and
destroyers KEPPEL, MACKAY, CAMPBELL,
MONTROSE and BROKE arrived at Hvalfjord.
24th
– DUKE OF YORK, light cruiser JAMAICA
escorted by the destroyers CAMPBELL,
MONTROSE, MACKAY and BROKE sailed from
Hvalfjord for Scapa.
26th
– At 1100 hours DUKE OF YORK, JAMAICA and
destroyers MACKAY, CAMPBELL, MONTROSE and
BROKE arrived at Scapa.
29th
– At Scapa Flow, where her new CO, Captain
George Elvey Creasy, DSO, RN, relieved
Captain Harcourt on his promotion to Rear
Admiral.
October
15th
– DUKE OF YORK and battle cruiser RENOWN,
escorted by destroyers FAULKNOR,
MIDDLETON, ESCAPADE, and MARNE left Scapa
for Rosyth for docking.
16th
- DUKE OF YORK and battle cruiser RENOWN,
escorted by destroyers FAULKNOR,
MIDDLETON, ESCAPADE, and MARNE arrived at
Rosyth for docking.
17th
– At Rosyth, where the Flag of Vice
Admiral Sir Edward Neville Syfret, CinC
Force H, was transferred to DUKE OF YORK
from the MALAYA.
27th
– DUKE OF YORK escorted by the destroyers
ECHO, IMPULSIVE and LEDBURY left Rosyth
for Scapa.
28th
- DUKE OF YORK escorted by the destroyers
ECHO, IMPULSIVE and LEDBURY arrived at
Scapa.
(The
next operation that DUKE OF YORK took
part in was Operation TORCH the allied
invasion of North West Africa. For
Operation TORCH DUKE OF YORK was the
flag ship of Vice-Admiral Sir Edward
Neville Syfret CB RN the CinC Force H.
The task of Force H was to hold off
any attack by the Italian fleet and to
provide cover for the Centre and
Eastern Task Forces that would land at
Oran and Algiers)
30th
– At 1630 hours Force X comprising the
battleships DUKE OF YORK (Flag
Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Neville Syfret CB
RN CinC Force H) and NELSON, battlecruiser
RENOWN, light cruiser ARGONAUT and the
destroyers MILNE, MARTIN, METEOR, ASHANTI,
TARTAR, ESKIMO and HMAS QUIBERON sailed
from Scapa to RV with carrier force from
the Clyde.
31st
– At approximately 1700 hours in position
55-30N, 10W Force X RVed with the carrier
force comprising the aircraft carriers
VICTORIOUS (Rear Admiral Aircraft
Carriers, Home Fleet) and FORMIDABLE and
the destroyers PATHFINDER, PARTRIDGE,
PORCUPINE, QUENTIN and QUALITY. The
combined force became Force H which then
set course for Gibraltar.
November
5th
– At 1400 hours Force H arrived off the
approaches to the Strait of Gibraltar. At
this point Force H split with DUKE OF YORK
and RENOWN with a destroyer screen
proceeding into Gibraltar to refuel. At
1900 hours they arrived in Gibraltar,
anchored and immediately commenced
refuelling.
6th
– In the early hours the remainder of
Force H passed through the Strait of
Gibraltar and entered Gibraltar to refuel.
At 0600 hours DUKE OF YORK and RENOWN with
a destroyer screen sailed from Gibraltar
and proceeded east into the Mediterranean
to await the remainder of Force H to join
the Flag. At about 1800 hours in
approximate position 36N, 3W the remainder
of Force H joined the Flag.
Force
H now comprised the battleships DUKE OF
YORK (Flag Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Neville
Syfret CB RN CinC Force H) and RODNEY,
battlecruiser RENOWN, aircraft carriers
VICTORIOUS and FORMIDABLE, light cruisers
BERMUDA and SIRIUS and the destroyers
BEAGLE, BOREAS, BULLDOG, ESKIMO, TARTAR,
MILNE, MARTIN, METEOR, PANTHER,
PATHFINDER, PARTRIDGE, PENN, PORCUPINE,
QUENTIN, QUALITY, HMAS QUIBERON and
HNethMS ISAAC SWEERS. Force H then sailed
east to their appointed patrol position.
7th
– At 0535 hours Force H was in approximate
position 37-34N, 0-01E, steering east,
lookouts on DUKE OF YORK saw a distant
explosion. This was the US transport
THOMAS STONE, part of convoy KMF(A) 1,
being torpedoed. At 1700 hours spasmodic
air attacks took place on Force H. At 1830
hours in approximate position the
destroyer PANTHER was subjected to a
bombing attack and suffered a near miss
forward, which caused flooding. She
detached and returned to Gibraltar. Late
in the evening RODNEY with destroyers
BEAGLE, BOREAS and BULLDOG detached from
Force H to provide support for the Central
Task Force off Oran.
(The
task of Force H was to patrol off the
Algerian coast, along latitude 38-15N,
as far east as 4-30E, provide distant
cover to prevent any attempt by the
Italian or Vichy French Fleets to
interfere with the landings at Algiers
or Oran. The assault over the beaches
was due at H hour, which was set for
0100/ 8/11/42 for the landing at Oran.
Axis
agents had observed the passage of
large amounts of shipping thought the
Strait of Gibraltar. The Kriegsmarine
was expecting enemy landings at
Tripoli or Benghazi, with the second
possibility of Sicily or Sardinia so
was not surprised by the reports of
the shipping movements. To meet the
assumed threat the Axis concentrated
their submarines and light naval
forces for an attack between Tunis and
Sicily. The enemy was taken by
surprise by the Algerian landings.
On
the morning of 8/11/42, immediately
following the landings Vichy applied
to the Germans for troops and the
re-armament of the French Forces. It
also planned to use the French fleet
at Toulon against the Allied landings.
However these moves were curtailed on
11/11/42 by Admiral Darlan’s surrender
of Vichy forces in North Africa)
8th
– At 0100 hours the assault by the Eastern
and Centre Task forces commences. Force H
cruises along its covering position south
of the Balearic Islands to longitude
4-30E.
At
0430 hours two enemy aircraft flew over
DUKE OF YORK and dropped flares.
At
0545 hours the carriers VICTORIOUS and
FORMIDABLE flew off fighter and
anti-submarine patrols.
At
0930 hours a Martlet of 882 squadron, from
VICTORIOUS, took the surrender of Blida
airfield.
At
1130 hours the BERMUDA detached to carry
out a bombardment of Battery du Lazart at
Fort Matifu In this task BERMUDA was
assisted by Albacores of 820 Squadron from
FORMIDABLE.
At
1715 hours a group of German He 111 and Ju
88 torpedo bombers evaded the fighter
patrols and in the gathering dusk they
attacked Force H. No damage was caused;
much of the credit for repelling the
attack was down to the alertness of
RENOWN’s anti-aircraft batteries.
9th
– The weather was overcast with occasional
showers, which helped to conceal Force H
from the enemy. Spasmodic air attacks took
place through the day. At dusk DUKE OF
YORK was singled out for attack by three
Ju 88’s but they were driven off by AA
fire.
10th
– At 0354 hours, in position 37-53N,
03-57E, U-431 fired four torpedoes at
Force H and reported three hits on a
Leander-class cruiser, which blew up and a
destroyer damaged. However, the only ship
hit was the destroyer MARTIN who blew up
and sank with the loss of 161of her crew.
The only survivors were four Officers and
59 Ratings who were picked up by the
QUENTIN.
11th
– Admiral Darlan surrendered all Vichy
forces in North Africa to the Allies.
15th
– Force H returned to Gibraltar. The flag
of Flag Officer commanding Force H was
transferred to the NELSON.
18th
– At 2230 hours DUKE OF YORK, aircraft
carrier VICTORIOUS (Flag R.A.A/C.) ,
escorted by the destroyers WESTCOTT,
MALCOLM, GLAISDALE, BULLDOG, BEAGLE,
OPPORTUNE sailed from Gibraltar for UK on
release from Operation TORCH.
21st
– At 1017 hours the Force was in
approximate position 46N, 17W, steering
north at 19 knots; when Albacore 817/1
from the VICTORIOUS depth-charged and sank
the outbound U-517 in position 46-10N,
17-08W. The destroyer OPPORTUNE picked up
50 survivors.
22nd
- At 0400 hours in approximate position
the Force was joined by the destroyers
MATCHLESS and LIMBOURNE from Scapa.
22nd
– At approximate 2400 hours in position
55-35N, 7W the destroyers WESTCOTT,
MALCOLM, GLAISDALE, BULLDOG and BEAGLE
detached to Londonderry.
23rd
– At 1100 hours DUKE OF YORK, VICTORIOUS
and the destroyers OPPORTUNE, MATCHLESS,
and LIMBOURNE arrived off Greenock.
25th
– At 1030 hours DUKE OF YORK escorted by
the destroyers LIMBOURNE, OPPORTUNE and
MATCHLESS sailed from Greenock for Scapa.
26th
– At 0930 hours DUKE OF YORK and the
destroyers LIMBOURNE, OPPORTUNE and
MATCHLESS arrived at Scapa.
December
8th
– At 0120 hours DUKE OF YORK escorted by
the destroyers FAULKNOR, FORESTER and
ECLIPSE sailed from Scapa for Rosyth for
refit. At 1230 hours they arrived at
Rosyth where DUKE OF YORK was taken in
hand for a refit. DUKE OF YORK was at
Rosyth under refit for the rest of the
month.
1
9 4 3
January
DUKE
OF YORK was at Rosyth under refit for the
whole month.
February
DUKE
OF YORK was at Rosyth under refit for the
whole month.
March
DUKE
OF YORK at Rosyth under refit. During the
refit she had 24 single 20mm Oerlikons
added, 2 on after boiler room vents, 4
abreast B turret, 6 on No 1 platform, 4 on
each side catapult deck, 2 on each side of
deck forward of X turret.
14th
– DUKE OF YORK sailed from Rosyth escorted
by the destroyers FORESTER, BLANKNEY and
ECHO.
15th
- DUKE OF YORK with he destroyers
FORESTER, BLANKNEY and ECHO arrived at
Scapa to commence working up. For the
remainder of the month DUKE OF YORK was at
Scapa working up.
April
DUKE
OF YORK at Scapa for the whole month
working up.
14th
– The flag of the CinC Home Fleet was
transferred from KING GEORGE V to DUKE OF
YORK.
May
1st
to 30th - DUKE OF YORK at Scapa working
up.
8th
– At 0930 hours the flag of the CinC Home
Fleet, Admiral Tovey was struck and
transferred to the destroyer ONSLOW. At
1015 hours the flag of the new CinC Home
Fleet, Admiral Bruce Fraser, CB, RN, was
transferred from BERWICK to DUKE OF YORK.
(Due
to the transfer of Home Fleet capital
ships to the Mediterranean for
Operation HUSKY, the Home Fleet only
had two modern KGV class battleships.
This was considered insufficient to
counter the threat posed by the
Kriegsmarine capital ships based in
Norway. So the USN was asked to loan
the Home Fleet some of its heavy units
to compensate for the Home Fleet’s
lack of capital ships.
On
19/5/43 USN Task Group 92.4,
comprising the battleships SOUTH
DAKOTA (Flag Rear Admiral Olaf M
Hustvedt USN, Task Group 92.4) and
ALABAMA and five destroyers arrived at
Scapa)
31st
– At 1600 hours the Battlefleet comprising
the battleships DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC
Home Fleet), USS SOUTH DAKOTA and ALABAMA,
heavy cruiser BERWICK escorted by the
destroyers MILNE (D3), OPPORTUNE,
OBDURATE, OBEDIENT and USS ELLYSON,
MACOMB, RODMAN, EMMONS and FITCH sailed
from Scapa for Hvalfjord.
June
2nd
– At 0900 hours the Battlefleet arrived at
Hvalfjord.
(The
next operation involving DUKE OF YORK
was Operation FH, this involved :-
(a)
Conveying relief personnel and stores
to the Norwegian garrison in
Spitzbergen [Operation GEARBOX
III]
(b)
Escorting the corvettes
CAMELLIA
and BLUEBELL
back from North Russia.
(c)
Conveying
mail and stores to H.M. ships and
establishments in North Russia.
The
Battlefleet was to provide distant
cover for the operation)
7th
–At 0300 hours the Battlefleet comprising
the battleships DUKE OF YORK, USS SOUTH
DAKOTA and ALABAMA, aircraft carrier
FURIOUS (with Seafires of 801 Sqd
embarked), heavy cruiser BERWICK, light
cruiser SCYLLA escorted by the destroyers
MILNE, OPPORTUNE, OBDURATE, OBEDIENT,
ECHO,
MIDDLETON
and USS ELLYSON, MACOMB, RODMAN, EMMONS
and FITCH sailed from Hvalfjord for
Akureyri. At 2300 hours the Battlefleet
arrived at Akureyri.
(At
1900 hours,
Force
R consisting of heavy cruiser
CUMBERLAND, light cruiser BERMUDA
escorted by the destroyers ECLIPSE
and HMCS ATHABASKAN left Akureyri
for Operation GEARBOX III)
9th
– At 0800 hours the Battlefleet
comprising the
battleships DUKE OF YORK, USS SOUTH
DAKOTA and ALABAMA, aircraft carrier
FURIOUS, heavy cruiser BERWICK, light
cruiser SCYLLA escorted by the
destroyers MILNE, OPPORTUNE, OBDURATE,
OBEDIENT, and USS ELLYSON, MACOMB,
RODMAN, EMMONS and FITCH sailed from
Akureyri
and headed north westerly for operations
in connection with Operation F H.
10th
– The Battlefleet continued on a north
westerly course.
11th
– At 0600 hours the Battlefleet arrived in
approximate position 72N, 10E, at which
point they turned southerly.
12th
- At 0800 hours USN Task Group 92.4
detached and proceeded to Hvalfjord. The
Home Fleet steered for Scapa.
13th
– At 2200 hours the Home Fleet comprising
DUKE OF YORK, FURIOUS, SCYLLA, and
destroyers MILNE, OPPORTUNE, OBDURATE,
ORWELL and OBEDIENT arrived at Scapa at
the end of Operation F H.
(21/6/43
USN Task Group 92.4 consisting of
battleships SOUTH DAKOTA and ALABAMA
and destroyers ELLYSON, RODMAN, FITCH,
MACOMB, and EMMONS arrived at Scapa.
At
1200/22/6/43 the destroyer USS EMMONS
sailed from Scapa for Invergordon. At
Invergordon she embarked a party
of
officials including Admiral Stark,
Commander US Naval Forces in
Europe,
Mr.
Winant, the American Ambassador to
Great Britain and the First Lord
of the Admiralty, Mr A Alexander
and conveyed them back to Scapa.
On arrival at Scapa the party
carried out an inspection of Task
Group 92.4)
July
DUKE
OF YORK at Scapa.
(The
next operation that DUKE OF YORK took
part in was Operation CAMERA. The
objective of the operation was
to
arouse enemy interest and focus
attention on the South Norwegian
coast by a simultaneous converging
movement on that area by three
forces, Force Q, R and S covered by
the Home Fleet, all designed to
simulate a large scale raid. By
achieving its object it was hoped to
increase the growing "war of nerves"
against Germany and to pin down
enemy forces in Norway before the
launching of the Sicilian campaign,
Operation HUSKY)
6th
- Force S comprising heavy cruisers
BERWICK and NORFOLK and destroyer SCORPION
sailed from Hvalfjord for positions A
(66-13N, 12-05W) and B (66-40N, 10-01W),
for their part in Operation CAMERA.
7th
- At 0700 hours destroyers
OPPORTUNE and OBEDIENT
sailed from Scapa with Force R. This
Force was designed to simulate a convoy.
Force R
comprised the trawlers
MACBETH, SKY, BRESSAY, HAMLET, CAPE
NYEMETZKI, CAPE BARRACUTA, OAK, LARCH,
HAWTHORNE and SYCAMORE and MLs 466, 276,
286, 345, 445 and 452. Course was set
for positions W (61-15N, 01-25W) and X
(61-40N, 01-00E) for their part in
Operation
CAMERA.
At
0900 hours Force Q comprising heavy
cruisers KENT and LONDON, light cruiser
BELFAST and the destroyer ONSLAUGHT sailed
from Scapa for
positions
T (62-20N, 5-30W) where they arrived at
2300 hours and were joined by the
destroyer OBDURATE from Skaalefjord.
Course was then set for position V
(62-20N, 01-00E).
At
1600 hours the aircraft carrier FURIOUS
(with Martlets of 881 Sqd embarked) and
destroyers
MUSKETEER,
METEOR and MAHRATTA sailed from Scapa
for Operation CAMERA.
At
1700 hours the Battlefleet comprising
battleships DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC Home
Fleet),
SOUTH
DAKOTA (Flag Com. Task Group 92.4),
light cruiser GLASGOW and destroyers
MILNE (D3) and the USS ELLYSON, RODMAN,
EMMONS, MACOMB and FITCH sailed from
Scapa for positions Y (62-52N, 1-45W)
and Z (61-20N, 01-00E) for their part in
Operation CAMERA.
At
2100 hours in approximate position the
Battlefleet was joined by the FURIOUS
Force.
8th
- At 1200 hours the Battlefleet arrived in
position Y. They then turned on to a south
easterly course steering for position Z.
At around this time the Battlefleet was
sighted by a Luftwaffe Blohm & Voss Bv
138 reconnaissance aircraft of 1./Agr125
from Billefjord, Finnmark. When it was
certain that the Bv 138 had sent a
sighting report it was shot down by a
Martlet (Pilot, Lieut. Comdr. RA Bird, RN)
from FURIOUS. At 2100 hours the
Battlefleet arrived in position Z. Course
was then set for Scapa.
9th
- At 1000 hours the Battlefleet arrived
back at Scapa.
(The
next operation that DUKE OF YORK took
part in was Operation GOVERNOR. The
objective of GOVERNOR was similar to
Operation CAMERA. Five Forces A, B, C,
D & E were involved in the
operation)
25th
- At 2100 hours Force C comprising the
destroyers
SAVAGE
and RIPLEY,
trawlers SKY, SWITHA,
CEDAR, LARCH, OAK, WILLOW, HAWTHORNE and
LILAC and MLs 252, 286, 442, 473, and
445 and L C I (L) 167 sailed from Scapa
for
Sullom Voe to take part in Operation
GOVERNOR.
26th
- At 1200 hours Force A comprising
battleships ANSON (Flag VA 2iC Home
Fleet), USS ALABAMA, aircraft carrier
ILLUSTRIOUS escorted by the destroyers
MILNE (D3), MAHRATTA, MUSKETEER and METEOR
and US destroyers RODMAN, FITCH, MACOMB,
and EMMONS sailed from Hvalfjord for
positions
N
(66-30N, 08-00W) and P (66-00N, 01-30E)
for
their part in Operation GOVERNOR.
27th
- At 1200 hours Force D comprising light
cruiser BELFAST
(less
destroyers) sailed from Scapa for
position V (62-15N, 5-20W). Then after
being joined by the destroyers ORWELL
and ORIBI from Skaalefjord sail for
position R (62-00N, 00-30E).
At
1600 hours Force B comprising battleships
DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC Home Fleet), USS
SOUTH DAKOTA
(Flag Com. Task Group 92.4), aircraft
carrier UNICORN, light cruiser
BERMUDA escorted by the
destroyers ONSLOW (D17), OBDURATE,
OBEDIENT, GRENVILLE, ULSTER, MATCHLESS,
SAUMAREZ, SCORPION, and IMPULSIVE sailed
from Scapa for
positions W (61-40N, 4-40W) and T
(61-30N, 1-30E)
for
their part in Operation GOVERNOR.
Force
E comprising heavy cruisers
LONDON
(Flag RA CS1), KENT and NORFOLK sailed
from Hvalfjord for position M (67-20N,
02-00W) for their part in Operation
GOVERNOR.
28th
- At approximately 1000 hours Forces A and
B joined. During the day four
Luftwaffe
Blohm & Voss Bv 138 reconnaissance
aircraft were shot down. Three by
Beaufighters of RCAF 404 Sqd and one by
a Martlet (Pilot, Lieut. Comdr. JW
Sleigh, DSC, RN) of 890 Sqd from
ILLUSTRIOUS.
29th
- From 0900 hours the vessels of Forces A
and B, namely DUKE OF YORK, SOUTH DAKOTA
and ALABAMA and destroyers MILNE (D 3),
ONSLOW (D 17), OBDURATE, OBEDIENT,
MUSKETEER, MATCHLESS, MAHRATTA, METEOR,
GRENVILLE, ULSTER, SAUMAREZ, SCORPION,
EMMONS, MACOMB, RODMAN and FITCH commenced
arriving at Scapa on completion of
Operation GOVERNOR.
August
For
the whole of August DUKE OF YORK was at
Scapa.
(On
2/6/43 Admiral Fraser received a KCB
in the King's Birthday
Honours)
6th
- DUKE OF YORK’s new CO Captain Brian
Betham Schofield RN took command.
September
DUKE
OF YORK at Scapa.
(At
0015/6/9/43 the battleship TIRPITZ,
battlecruiser SCHARNHORST and the
destroyers KARL GALSTER, HANS LODY,
ERICH STEINBRINK, THEODOR RIEDEL, Z27,
Z29, Z30, Z31 and Z33 sailed from
Altenfjord on Operation ZITRONELLA.
Operation ZITRONELLA was an attack on
the Allied,
Free
Norwegian manned,
weather station at Barentsburg,
Spitsbergen.
The
German force approached the island
flying the White Ensign. The weather
station managed to get off a report of
British ships approaching before their
radio was destroyed.
At
0430/7/9/43 TIRPITZ and SCHARNHORST
opened fire on the weather station and
its two 3" guns, which were quickly
put out of action, but not before
causing damage to Z29 and Z33. The
destroyers then landed troops to
complete the destruction. At
0900/7/9/43 the German Force departed
and returned to Altenfjord, where they
arrived at 1730/9/9/43.
Photographic
reconnaissance of Altenfjord on 7/9/43
[this
was the first operational flight by
a Spitfire XI of 543 Sqd from North
Russia] showed only LUTZOW
and 2 destroyers present which
indicated that TIRPITZ and
SCHARNHORST were probably in the
attacking force)
8th
- At 1700 hours the Battlefleet comprising
battleships DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC Home
Fleet), ANSON (Flag 2iC Home Fleet),
aircraft carrier USS RANGER, heavy
cruisers LONDON and USS AUGUSTA and
TUSCALOOSA, screened by the destroyers
ONSLOW, ROCKET, MAHRATTA, HMCS IROQUOIS
and HURON, ORP ORKEN and USS BELL,
ISHERWOOD, FORREST, CORRY and HOBSON
sailed from Scapa and headed north for
Spitsbergen to intercept the enemy force.
9th
- At 1800 hours the CinC Home Fleet
received information from the latest
aerial reconnaissance of Altenfjord
informing him that TIRPITZ was back. The
mission was therefore aborted and the
Battlefleet returned to Scapa.
10th
- In the afternoon the Battlefleet
comprising battleships DUKE OF YORK (Flag
CinC Home Fleet), ANSON (Flag 2iC Home
Fleet), aircraft carrier USS RANGER, heavy
cruisers LONDON and USS AUGUSTA and
TUSCALOOSA, screened by the destroyers
ONSLOW, ROCKET, MAHRATTA, HMCS IROQUOIS
and HURON, ORP ORKAN and USS BELL,
ISHERWOOD, FORREST, CORRY and HOBSON
arrived back at Scapa.
October
(The
next operation that DUKE OF YORK took
part in was Operation LEADER. The
objective of LEADER was to carry out
an air strike on the Norwegian port of
Bodo attacking German shipping in the
port and in the Leads)
2nd
- At 1100 hours the Battlefleet comprising
the battleships DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC
Home Fleet) and ANSON (Flag 2iC Home
Fleet), aircraft carrier USS RANGER (with
air group 4 embarked, consisting of VF-4,
Wildcats, VB-4, Dauntlesses, VT-4,
Avengers), light cruiser BELFAST, heavy
cruiser USS TUSCALOOSA, screened by
destroyers MILNE, VIGILANT, OPPORTUNE,
TEAZER and USS FORREST, CORRY, HOBSON,
FITCH and CAPP sailed from Scapa on
Operation LEADER.
3rd
- At 0020 hours east of the Faroes, the
destroyers SAVAGE, SCOURGE and SCORPION
joined the Battlefleet from Skaalefjord.
Course was then set north easterly. At
1830 hours the Battlefleet was in position
67N, 2-30W at which point course was
altered easterly to close the Norwegian
coast.
4th
- At 0618 hours in approximate position
67-09N, 6-12E, RANGER commenced launching
her air strike force. The strike force was
divided into two waves.
At
0618 hours, this was 18 minutes later than
planned due to lack of wind over the deck,
the Northern Attack Group consisting of 20
SBD Dauntless dive-bombers with an escort
of 8 F4F Wildcat fighters, was launched,
their targets were shipping and shore
installations near the port of Bodo.
At
0640 hours the Southern Attack Group
consisting of 10 TBF Avengers and 6 F4F
Wildcats, was launched, their targets were
in the Sandnessjoen area.
At
0800 hours the Battlefleet were in
position 67-18N, 08-03E.
At
0905 hours RANGER commenced recovery of
the strike force.
(The
strike groups found numerous targets
at Bodo and in the Leads. Ten merchant
ships were attacked with bombs and
strafing. The SS RABAT 2719grt and the
SS VAAGEN 687grt were sunk. The MV
TOPEKA 4991grt was set on fire and
beached. The SS MALAGA 2146grt was run
aground after 2 near bomb misses. The
damaged ships were the SS KERKPLEIN
5085grt she had 1551 Russian POW’s
embarked [39 killed or wounded]
and the MV SKRAMSTAD 4300grt who had
834 German soldiers embarked [220
killed or wounded]. The tanker
the SS SCHLESWIG 10234grt was loaded
with fuel for the TIRPITZ was damaged
by 2 bombs and 2 near misses as was
the SS LA PLATA 8056grt was damaged by
2 bomb hits and 2 near misses. Three
of RANGER’s aircraft were shot down,
all by flak. One Dauntless crashed at
Bodo and one made a forced landing in
the water 12 miles west of Bodo. The
third aircraft, an Avenger, was shot
down off Alsten)
At
1255 hours RANGER’s radar reported four
bogies approaching the Battlefleet, the
CAP was vectored on to the bogies. Two F4F
Wildcats piloted by Lt (jg) Boyd N. Mayhew
and Lt (jg) Dean S. Laird shot down a
Junkers Ju 88. Then four F4F Wildcats
piloted by Mayhew, Laird, Lt Earle F.
Craig and Ens Laurence A. Hensley shot
down a Heinkel He 115.
A
F4F Wildcat pilot, Ens Charles R. Hopson,
returning from CAP, made an off centre
landing that disengaged his tail hook,
causing him to end up in the sea. He was
picked up unharmed by the destroyer
SCOURGE.
At
1300 hours following the sighting of the
Battlefleet by the Luftwaffe, the CinC
Home Fleet ordered the fleet to set course
260¼ and speed 18knots for Scapa.
5th
- At 1650 hours the Battlefleet was east
of the Faeroes where the destroyers
SAVAGE, SCOURGE and SCORPION detached for
Skaalefjord.
6th
- At 0830 hours the Battlefleet arrived
back at Scapa. The RANGER was the last
ship into Scapa and was cheered in by all
the ships in the anchorage. At 2000 hours
DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC Home Fleet)
escorted by the destroyers
OPPORTUNE
and TEAZER sailed from Scapa for Rosyth.
7th
- At 0900 hours
DUKE OF YORK and the destroyers
OPPORTUNE
and TEAZER arrived off Rosyth. DUKE OF
YORK then entered ROSYTH for a short
docking.
19th
- At 2000 hours DUKE OF YORK
(Flag CinC Home Fleet
) escorted by the destroyers USS FORREST
and CAPPS left Rosyth at 2000 for Scapa.
20th
- At 0930 hours DUKE
OF YORK and the destroyers USS FORREST
and CAPPS arrived at Scapa.
November
For
the whole of November DUKE OF YORK was at
Scapa. During the month Admiral Fraser
entertained Emir Abdul Illah, Regent of
Iraq, on board DUKE OF YORK
December
9th
- DUKE OF YORK at Scapa, where her new CO,
Captain the Hon Guy Herbrand Edward
Russell RN, took command.
(In
the light of the action that was to
come this was a fortuitous
appointment. Captain Russell had been
the CO of the NELSON during Operations
HUSKY and AVALANCHE. During these
operations he had gained valuable
experience in the use of a
battleship’s main armament at night
and had developed advanced blind
firing and plotting procedures. He was
also aware of the necessity of proper
eye drill to prevent temporary loss of
vision when the main armament was
fired at night. As soon as he took
command of DUKE OF YORK, Captain
Russell instituted drills to ensure
the lessons learned in NELSON were put
into effect. This included a live full
calibre night shoot)
(The
next operation that DUKE OF YORK was
involved in was Operation FV. This was
an operation to provide distant heavy
cover for the passage of convoys JW 55
and RA 55.
Although
TIRPITZ was out of action due to
damage sustained in Operation SOURCE,
the attack by X Class submarines, and
the LUTZLOW had returned to Germany;
heavy cover was still required due to
the presence of the SCHARNHORST in
Altenfjord)
12th
- At 1300 hours DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC
Home Fleet), light cruiser JAMAICA and the
destroyers SAVAGE, SAUMAREZ, SCORPION and
HNoMS STORD, all forming Force 2 for
Operation FV, sailed from Scapa and set
course north.
(Admiral
Fraser the CinC Home Fleet sailed on
12/12/43 to coincide with the sailing
of convoy JW 55A from Loch Ewe. It was
this convoy that Fraser was sure the
SCHARNHORST would attack. Fraser
also decided that should SCHARNHORST
sortie against the convoy he would
break the sanctity of radio silence to
ensure that all units knew where each
were)
(14/12/43
Fraser received intelligence that
convoy JW 55A had been sighted and
reported. On receipt of the Fraser
took the immediate decision to take
DUKE OF YORK into the Barents Sea and
on to Kola Inlet. This would provide
close heavy cover to the convoy.
Further, because he was now receiving
reliable and rapid intelligence from
Enigma decrypts and due to the weaken
state of the Luftwaffe in northern
Norway, he calculated it was an
acceptable risk)
16th
- DUKE OF YORK, JAMAICA and the destroyers
SAVAGE, SAUMAREZ, SCORPION and HNorMS
STORD arrived at Vaenga.
On
arrival the CinC of the Russian Northern
Fleet, Vice Admiral Arseni Golovko paid
a visit and was received with a guard
and band. He later walked round DUKE OF
YORK and appeared to be much impressed
with the efficiency and cleanliness of
the ship. Golovko was particularly
impressed with the ships bakery and
partook of some freshly baked buns which
he praised. On leaving the ship Golovko
was presented with a sack of freshly
baked buns.
17th
- In the afternoon Admiral Fraser visited
the Royal Naval Auxiliary Hospital at
Vaenga. On the evening Admiral Fraser gave
an official dinner party for Admiral
Golovko, members of his staff, the Air
General, Rear Admiral Archer and officers
from Polyarnoe and Murmansk. This was
followed by a performance by the Russian
Red Fleet Concert Party in DUKE OF YORK’s
hanger.
18th
- At 0830 hours DUKE
OF YORK, JAMAICA and the destroyers
SAVAGE, SAUMAREZ, SCORPION and HNorMS
STORD sailed from Kola Inlet for
Iceland.
(Convoy
JW 55A had not, as Fraser had
believed, drawn SCHARNHORST out of
Altenfjord and the convoy arrived at
Kola Inlet on 20/12/43. However Fraser
still believed that SCHARNHORST would
come out, so he sailed for Iceland to
refuel and be ready to protect the
next convoy JW 55B, that was due to
sail from Loch Ewe on 19/12/43.
However due to bad weather the sailing
was postponed for 24 hours)
(On
19/12/43 during a conference held in
Hitler's Wolfsschanze headquarters,
Admiral Doenitz obtained Hitler’s
agreement that the SCHARNHORST
would, provided the chances of
success seemed reasonable, attack
the next convoy that could be
located)
(At
0130/20/12/43 Fraser received a signal
from the Admiralty OIC informing him
of the contents of three Enigma
decrypts:-
At
1823/18/12/43 the Admiral Northern
Waters had ordered the SCHARNHORST
Battlegroup from six to three hours
notice.
At
the same time the Air Officer Lofotens
had been urgently requested for air
reconnaissance against a convoy that
is expected and against a heavy group
which is probably at sea. Battlegroup
is at three hours notice.
At
1030/19/12/43, from the Air Officer
Lofotens reporting that reconnaissance
on the 19th had been cancelled due to
weather at operational airfield. One
hour’s notice ordered for one radar
equipped aircraft)
21st
- At 1300 hours DUKE OF YORK, JAMAICA and
the destroyers SAVAGE, SAUMAREZ, SCORPION
and HNorMS STORD arrived at Akureyri. DUKE
OF YORK led the way into Akureyri at high
speed. The visibility on arrival was very
poor and the ships of the Battlefleet had
difficulty in seeing the next ahead.
However greet confidence was placed on
DUKE OF YORK as she had the best radar in
Fleet.
(At
2330/21/12/43 Fraser received a signal
from the Admiralty OIC informing him
of the latest Enigma decrypt:-
At
1600/21/12/43 the Admiral Northern
Waters had instructed SCHARNHORST o
revert to six hours notice.
Fraser
was given the OIC assessment of this
intercept, which was that SCHARNHORST
had reverted to six hours notice
because of the failure of the
Luftwaffe to locate a convoy)
22nd
- Admiral Fraser and Captain Russell went
ashore to Akureyri. When returning from
Akureyri they saw the local’s ice skating
under floodlight on the ice that had
formed between the ships and the shore.
When Fraser returned to DUKE OF YORK he
asked the Royal Marine band to come on
deck a play Christmas carols for the crew
and the Icelanders.
(At
1200/23/12/43 the destroyer ONSLOW
(D17), Senior Officer of the escort JW
55B, reported the position, course and
speed of the convoy and that it was
being shadowed by two Dornier Do 217’s)
23rd
- At 1800 hours Admiral Fraser called a
meeting of the six CO’s of the ships of
Force 2 which was held on DUKE OF YORK. In
the meeting Fraser
stressed
how vital it was that every officer and
rating must be thoroughly familiar with
his post and with his duties. If all
went well he expected Force 2 would be
presented with a night action against
the SCHARNHORST in which Fraser's stated
prime objective was to close on radar to
a range of 12,000 yards, before opening
fire with star-shell to illuminate the
enemy. As soon as the gun action began
the four destroyers were to form
sub-divisions and take up positions for
torpedo attacks, but must not close
until the enemy’s fire power had been
reduced and Fraser gave the order for
them to go close. As for JAMAICA, Fraser
wanted her to operate in close support
of DUKE OF YORK, thus hopefully
splitting the German fire, but if the
cruiser should be heavily engaged she
was to break away and open the range at
once.
At
2300 hours DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC Home
Fleet) with JAMAICA and the destroyers
SAVAGE, SAUMAREZ, SCORPION and STORD, as
Force 2, left Akureyri and set course
north at 15 Knots to cover the passed of
convoys JW 55B and RA 55A.
(At
2330/23/12/43 Fraser
received a signal from the Admiralty
OIC informing him of the latest Enigma
decrypt:-
At
1045/22/12/43 a Luftwaffe Do 217 on
a weather flight, sighted convoy JW
55B, in poor visibility, and
reported it as a convoy of 40 troop
transports in square 16 west 5410 [63-45N,
5-30W],
course 045¼, speed 10 knots.
At
1330/22/12/43, following this
sighting the SCHARNHORST was brought
back to three hours notice.
At
1430/22/12/43 following the return
of the Do 217 to its base, the
SCHARNHORST was signalled that the
troop transports were merchantmen)
(At
2315 hours ONSLOW (D17)
reported that one shadowing
aircraft had been in contact until
2305 hours and homing)
24th
- In the early hours Force 2 carried out a
rehearsal of Fraser’s battle plan. The
JAMAICA was
detached to represent the SCHARNHORST in
a game of hide-and-seek, in the dark and
appalling weather. In this practice
interception DUKE OF YORK’s radar
operators had no difficulty in
distinguishing between the radar echo of
JAMAICA and those of the even smaller
destroyers. As JAMAICA had only a third
of SCHARNHORST’s displacement and was
over 200ft shorter than SCHARNHORST,
this was an excellent result and a good
omen. For the radar operators of Force 2
the exercise was a great success.
By
1200 hours Force 2 was in approximate
position 68-15N, 13W and Admiral Fraser
knew that he had a possible crisis on his
hands. Convoy JW.55B was being shadowed by
German aircraft and was now equidistant
between the SCHARNHORST in Altenfjord, 400
miles to the east and Force 2, 400 miles
to the south-west. If the SCHARNHORST were
to seize this moment to strike at the
convoy, both Fraser and Vice Admiral
Burnett with Force 1 would be too far away
to intervene. Admiral Fraser's late start
from Akureyri, due in part to the
unscheduled visit to
Vaenga,
was made more problematical by the
limited fuel endurance of his
destroyers. To obtain the maximum
endurance for his destroyers he had
planned a 15 knot approach to the
anticipated battle area in the vicinity
of Bear Island, where JW 55B and RA 55A
were scheduled to cross. This approach
speed would give his destroyers an
operating time in the battle area of 30
hours. Fraser overcame his dilemma by
doing what he had always planned to do
in such an emergency, he broke radio
silence to order a compromise.
At
1400 hours Fraser signalled to the convoy
to reverse course for three hours and not
turn back to the east until 1700 hours. At
the same time he increased the speed of
Force 2 from 15 to 19 knots.
(This
signal was picked up by German radio
stations and accurately D'Fed. Admiral
Kluber the Admiral Commanding Northern
Waters who was also doubling up as
Admiral Commanding U-Boats North,
assessment
of this intercept was that none of
the preconditions for a sortie by
the SCHARNHORST existed. He
signalled his assessment to Rear
Admiral Bey on the SCHARNHORST.
However Gruppe North at Kiel and the
Naval Staff in Berlin took a
different view, they decided to
treat Fraser’s signal as originating
from a convoy straggler and the DF
as a poor fix.
The
Luftwaffe commander Lofotens signalled
his intention of sending out air
reconnaissance on the 25/12/43 to
search for a battle group approaching
from the south west)
(When
Fraser's order came through, Rear
Admiral Boucher retd (Convoy
Commodore) and Captain McCoy (D17)
agreed that to attempt a course
reversal would be unwise in the
prevailing weather conditions. At best
it would be sure to disperse the
convoy even more; at worst, the
plethora of coloured-light signals
required to execute such a tricky
manoeuvre would act like a beacon to
the Luftwaffe. They agreed that the
convoy's estimated position by 1700
hrs would have been about 20 miles
closer to Vice Admiral Burnett’s Force
1 [BELFAST (Flag CS10),
SHEFFIELD and NORFOLK] than
provided for in the original sailing
schedule. So Boucher and McCoy
complied with the spirit rather than
the letter of Fraser's order. They
maintained convoy course, but reduced
the convoy's speed to 8 knots. Though
not as effective as a course reversal
would have been, it resulted in
narrowing the gap by about 100 miles,
a small enough contribution, but one
that would soon prove vital)
25th
- Force 2 continued on a north easterly
course at 17 knots in deteriorating
weather; wind strength rose from Force 6
to a full Force 8 south westerly gale with
a heavy following sea swell.
(Just
after midnight Fraser became concerned
about convoy RA 55A which would be
crossing the danger area without any
substantial heavy cover and due to
convoy JW 55B’s reversal of course
[sic] would not benefit from the
support of JW 55B’s escort.
At
approximately 0030/25/12/43 Fraser
signalled RA 55A to alter course to
the north westwards and at the same
time detach four destroyers, Fraser
left the choice to the SO of the
escort, Captain Campbell who chose the
four with the highest fuel reserves,
these were the four destroyers of the
36th division, MUSKETEER, MATCHLESS,
OPPORTUNE and VIRAGO who were then to
join JW 55B. They joined JW 55B at
1250/25/12/43 in a force 8 gale)
(At
0900/25/12/43 convoy JW 55B crossed
the U-Boat patrol line ‘Eisenbart’ and
was sighted and reported by U 601.
At
1045/25/12/43 U 601 reported convoy in
position 72-25N, 12-30E, course 060¼.
At
1420 hours U 601 again signalled the
convoy’s position, course and speed
and remained in contact until 1800
hours.
Convoy
JW 55B was also sighted and reported
by a Luftwaffe Dornier Do 18.
The
Air Officer Lofotens had sent out
three BV 138 Flying boats, one of
which had radar, to search to the
south west of the convoy.
)
(At
1527/25/12/43
[Zone A time] the
SCHARNHORST received the signal ‘Most
Immediate, OSTFRONT 1700/25/12’ [Operation
OSTFRONT was the code word for the
attack on the convoy] When the
signal arrived
Rear
Admiral Erich Bey was on the TIRPITZ
in Kaa Fjord and was thus unable to
execute the order at 1700 hours.
At
1955/25/12/43 [Zone
A time] the SCHARNHORST [Flag
Rear Admiral Erich Bey]
sailed
from Lange Fjord on Operation
OSTFRONT. At 2040 hours in Altenfjord
she was joined by the destroyers Z29,
Z30, Z33, Z34 and Z38. When the Battle
Group cleared Altenfjord at 2116 hours
they turned into Soroy Sund and on
clearing the Sund set course north.
At
2025 hours Doenitz signalled Bey with
what was intended to inspire him but
was ambiguous and probably had the
opposite effect on Bey, the message
read:-
1.
Enemy attempting to frustrate the
heroic struggle of our Eastern Armies
by sending valuable convoy of supplies
to the Russians.
2.
SCHARNHORST and destroyers will attack
convoy.
3.
Tactical situation must be used
skilfully and boldly. Engagement not
to be broken off with only partial
success achieved. Every advantage must
be exploited. Best chance lies in
SCHARNHORST’s superior fire-power.
Therefore endeavour to deploy her.
Destroyers to operate as seems
suitable.
4.
Disengage at your discretion but
without question if heavy forces
encountered.
5.
Inform crew accordingly. I rely on
your offensive spirit.
It
was a message from a politician not a
naval commander and shows Doenitz as
covering his backside)
(From
2200/25/12/43 Fraser started to
receive the Enigma decrypts giving the
various moves of Kriegsmarine
auxiliaries which were a precursor of
the SCHARNHORST sailing)
26th
- Force 2 continued on a north easterly
course at 17 knots in a Force 8 gale and
mountainous seas. Of the sea conditions
Fraser wrote: ‘Our destroyers had a job to
keep up with DUKE OF YORK, which
was plunging under the huge waves of a
following sea which made her look like a
submarine breaking surface. A number of
anti-aircraft weapons for close-range work
had been fitted on the forecastle. All
these were torn from their mountings, and
water poured through the empty rivet holes
on to the mess decks below’. At 0344 hours
Fraser signalled Force 2 to raise steam
for full speed.
(At
0339/26/12/43 Fraser received the
Admiralty message timed at 0319 hours,
‘appreciation’ that SCHARNHORST is at
sea)
At
0350 hours the weather improved and Fraser
immediately ordered Force 2 to increase
speed to 24 knots.
At
0401 hours Fraser broke radio silence and
sent the following three part signal:-
1.
McCoy (D17) was to swing JW 55B on to a
northerly course. (Wherever
SCHARNHORST was, this would make it
harder for her to close the convoy)
2.
Fraser stated his own position,
(approximately 71-07N, 10-48E), course
080¼, and speed 24 knots. (This meant
that both McCoy and Burnett knew
precisely where he was)
3.
McCoy and Burnett were ordered to state
their own positions, courses and speeds.
(This meant that Force 1, Force 2 and
the convoy escort each knew where they
were in relation to the others)
(At
0400/26/12/43 [Zone Z time]
convoy
JW 55B was in approximate position
73-31N, 18-54E, steering 070¼, nominal
speed 8 knots but closer to 6 knots.
At
0400/26/12/43 Force 2 was
approximately 237 miles south west of
the convoy heading north east.
At
0400/26/12/43Force 1 was in
approximate position 73-52N, 27-12E,
steering 235¼, speed 18 knots. [This
put Force 1approximately 162 miles
east of the convoy]
At
0400/26/12/43 the SCHARNHORST and her
destroyers were approximately 100
miles south east of convoy JW 55B,
heading north at 25 knots.
However Bey was not sure of the exact
position of the convoy)
(After
Fraser received the answers to his 0401,
the positions of Force 1 and the convoy
were added to DUKE OF YORK’s plot. Fraser
then again broke radio silence:
At
0628/26/12/43 he signalled a compound
order;
1.
McCoy (D17) was ordered to turn convoy
JW 55B on to an easterly course [to
close the distance between the convoy
and Force 1]. McCoy received the
signal at 0705 hours.
2.
Force 1 was ordered to close the convoy
for mutual support. Burnett received the
signal at 0651 hours. But Burnett chose
to approach the convoy in a dog leg,
south westerly, and then north westerly
to avoid heading into the heavy swell)
(At
0720 hours the SCHARNHORST made a turn
to the north, this caused her to loose
contact with her destroyers who were
on a south westerly course)
(At
0840 hours BELFAST [Flag CS10]
was steering 325 degrees on the north
westerly dog leg when she obtained a
radar contact on her forward Type 273
surface warning set. At 0844 hours she
signalled he other cruisers of Force
1, 'Jig' [unidentified radar
contact]
bearing
295¼, 35,000 yards. This turned out to
be the SCHARNHORST who Burnett
estimated to be in position 73-35N,
23-23E. At the time Burnett estimated
that the convoy bore 287 degrees from
BELFAST, range 48 miles, putting
SCHARNHORST between Force 1 and the
convoy.
At
this time Force 2 was in approximate
position 71-21N, 16-38E, bearing 040¼,
210 miles from SCHARNHORST.
Therefore
Bey had pulled it off, and if he held
his course and held his nerve he could
go on to score the biggest victory of
any German admiral of the war.
At
0840 hours McCoy
[D17]
estimated
that the SCHARNHORST was about 36
miles, bearing 125¼ from the convoy.
At
0924 hours BELFAST opened fire with
starshell and at 0929 hours NORFOLK
and SHEFFIELD opened fire with AP. In
the engagement NORFOLK registered two
8in hits on the SCHARNHORST; the first
hit caused minor damage and failed to
explode, the second hit was crucial it
destroyed her ‘Seetakt’ radar aerial
and put the port HA director out of
action. During the engagement Force 1
had worked round and positioned itself
between SCHARNHORST and the convoy.
SCHARNHORST
increased speed to 30 knots and
steered east then north and opened the
range between herself and Force 1.
At
1020 hours with SCHARNHORST bearing
078¼ from BELFAST, range 36,000 yards,
Force 1 lost contact with the enemy.
At
1044 hours Burnett signalled Fraser,
‘Have lost touch with the enemy who is
steering north. Am closing the convoy’)
At
0905 hours DUKE OF YORK picked up three
Luftwaffe shadowing aircraft at a range of
8½ miles, these were three radar equipped
Blohm and Voss Bv 138’s, from Tromso.
(At
0912 hours one of the Bv 138’s
signalled the Fliegerfuhrer Lofotens
with a grid square and the message
‘several vessels located’.
At
1035 hours the Fliegerfuhrer Lofotens
was again signalled with the message
‘contact maintained, apparently one
large and several smaller vessels,
believed high speed course south’.
At
this time Force 2 was actually
steering 080¼, speed 25½ knots)
(At
1050 hours the four destroyers of the
36th division, MUSKETEER,
MATCHLESS, OPPORTUNE and VIRAGO joined
Force 1and were ordered to scout ahead)
At
1150 hours Fraser ordered Force 2 to
reverse course to the west. In the sea
state this was a major task for the
destroyers. The Force had to reduce speed
to 18 knots and the manoeuvre took 15
minutes to execute. Force 2 then settled
on course 260¼.
(Fraser
had become concerned that the
SCHARNHORST had given up on attacking
convoy JW 55B and was instead going to
make a bid to break out into the North
Atlantic and he was positioning Force
2 to block this move.
At
1205 hours just as Force 2 had
completed their change of course,
BELFAST regained radar contact with
SCHARNHORST who was steering 230 at 20
knots.
At
1220 hours BELFAST signalled ‘enemy in
sight bearing 090¼’, range 11,000
yards, Burnett then ordered Force 1 to
open fire.
SCHARNHORST
concentrated most of her return fire
on NORFOLK, this because she did not
have flashless ammunition so every
time NORFOLK fired she was lit up like
day.
In
the opening shots both NORFOLK and
SHEFFIELD claimed hits.
By
1225 the range had dropped to 4,100
yards.
At
1227 hours the NORFOLK was hit by two
280mm shells,
one
exploded on X turret, killing an
officer and four ratings. The turret
rose about two feet in the air, and
then dropped back on its mounting, the
gun barrels slumped to the deck. The
second shell struck amidships on the
starboard side and exploded in the
office flat above the engine room
killing two stokers.
At
1241 hours Force 1 checked fire and
the SCHARNHORST increased speed to 28
knots and steering 110¼ with Force 1
shadowing on her port quarter.
At
1300 hours SCHARNHORST altered course
to 155¼ speed 28 knots)
At
1230 hours Force 2 reversed course back on
to 080¼.
At
1300 hours Fraser signalled Burnett with
the position, course and speed of Force 2
and added that one Luftwaffe shadower, a
Bv 138, was still in contact with Force 2.
At
1318 hours Fraser signalled to Burnett
‘Report composition of enemy’
At
1325 hours Burnett replied ‘One heavy
ship’
At
1416 hours, Fraser having decided that the
forthcoming engagement with the
SCHARNHORST would take place after tea,
signalled by light to the other units of
Force 2; ‘if enemy maintains present
course and speed action should be joined
at 1630’. The crew of DUKE OF YORK then
had their tea.
At
1435 hours Fraser signalled Burnett ‘Have
you destroyers in company’
At
1442 hours Burnett replied ‘No, they are
following’
At
1449 hours Fraser signalled Burnett ‘If
practicable intend to engage from the
westward on a similar course’
(Burnett
continued to keep Fraser informed of
the SCHARNHORST’s course and speed)
At
1551 hours Fraser signalled ‘CinC to Home
Fleet in company; the estimated bearing
and distance of the enemy from me are
025¼, 25 miles.
At
1617 hours DUKE OF YORK’s Type 273QR radar
located SCHARNHORST at a range of 45,500
yards, bearing 020¼. Fraser continued on
course narrowing the range.
At
1632 hours DUKE OF YORK’s Type 274M (3)
radar picked up the SCHARNHORST at a range
of 29,700 yards.
At
1635 hours Fraser signalled BELFAST
‘prepare to fire starshell over enemy’.
At
1636 hours the range had closed to 14,000
yards and was closing.
(At
1637 hours the Force 2 destroyers, who
were on station ahead of DUKE OF YORK;
first Sub Division, SAVAGE and
SAUMAREZ to port and second Sub
Division, SCORPION and STORD to
starboard; were ordered by Fraser
‘take up most advantageous position
for firing torpedoes but do not attack
until ordered’
At
the same time DUKE OF YORK was picked
up on BELFAST’s radar at 40,000 yards,
bearing 176¼)
At
1644 hours Force 2 altered course to
starboard on to 080¼ to open DUKE OF
YORK’s ‘A’ arcs.
At
1646 hours Fraser ordered Force 2 to
increase speed to 27 knots. At the same
time he signalled BELFAST ‘open fire with
starshell’.
(At
1647 hours BELFAST opened fire on the
SCHARNHORST with starshell from a
range of approximately 19,000 yards.
However watchers on DUKE OF YORK
didn’t see SCHARNHORST illuminated)
So
DUKE OF YORK’s P2 and P3 portside 5.25in
turrets were ordered to illuminate the
enemy with starshell.
At
1650 hours the SCHARNHORST was perfectly
illuminated by four starshells bursting
behind and along the length of the ship.
The enemy was caught completely by
surprise; SCHARNHORST still had her
turrets trained fore and aft.
At
1651 hours DUKE OF YORK fired her first
14in broadside at a range of 12,000 yards.
The first broadside was a straddle with
hits on SCHARNHORST’s Anton turret and
Bruno turret handling room.
(At
1652 hours the JAMAICA who was
approximately 1000 yards astern of
DUKE OF YORK and conforming to the
flagships movements, opened fire with
a full broadside)
(At
1655 hours the biggest missed
opportunity of the battle occurred.
The destroyer SAVAGE was the leading
destroyer of Force 2, she was ahead
and to port of DUKE OF YORK and was so
close to the SCHARNHORST that the
flagships starshells were illuminating
her. SAVAGE was in the perfect
position for making a torpedo attack,
but her CO Commander Michael Meyrick
was constrained by Fraser’s 1637
signal. Fraser later conceded that his
order had cramped the style of the
destroyers)
(At
1656 hours the SCHARNHORST opened
fire, firing starshell from a
starboard side 150mm turret and a nine
round broadside from Bruno and
Caesar turrets
[Anton turret out of action],
at
the same time she turned to port, and
steered north then east. Her first
salvo fell 2,500 yards short. However
her following salvos began to straddle
DUKE OF YORK.
At
the same time Bey signalled Group
North with his grid reference AC
4677and stating ‘heavy battleship, am
in action’)
As
SCHARNHORST turned away to port, Force 2
altered course to 060¼ to ‘comb’ the
tracks of any torpedoes that the enemy may
have fired in her turn away.
At
1708 hours a shell from DUKE OF YORK
struck the SCHARNHORST between the Caesar
turret and the airplane catapult damaging
the aircraft hangar and starting a fire.
(At
1708 hours the SCHARNHORST settled on
an easterly course and started to open
the range from her pursuers as she
increased speed.
At
1712 hours Force 1 ceased fire.
At
1720 Burnett signalled that he had
‘lost touch’)
(At
1713 hours Fraser signalled his
destroyers ‘destroyers close and
attack with torpedoes as soon as
possible)
At
1715 hours a shell from DUKE OF YORK hit
Bruno turret ventilation system making the
turret unusable because of the smoke from
the guns when fired.
At
1717 hours DUKE OF YORK, now 13,000 yards
from the enemy, commenced firing
broadsides under radar control and settled
down to a stern chase on a parallel
course, to the south of SCHARHORST.
(At
1725 hours Bey signalled Group North
‘SCHARNHORST is surrounded by heavy
units and is being engaged by them)
(At
1800 hours Bey sent a signal to Group
North stating, ‘SCHARNHORST ever
onwards’.
This was probably because Fraser
around this time, believed that with
SCHARNHORST’s 3 knot speed advantage
she was going to escape)
At
1808 hours when the range had now opened
to 16,000 yards and shell splash
observation by radar became difficult;
Fraser signalled the Force 2 destroyers to
report DUKE OF YORK’s fall of shot.
(At
1819 hours Bey signalled Group north,
‘the enemy is firing by radar at a
range of more than 18.000 meters
[19620 yards]. Position AC4965, Course
110 degrees, Speed 26 knots’
At
1820 hours the range was now 21,400
yards and SCHARNHORST ceased fire. In
1½ hours due to her superior speed she
had opened up the range by 7,400
yards.
At
1821 hours a shell from DUKE OF YORK
struck the SCHARNHORST on her
starboard side penetrating into No. 1
boiler room, severing the main
steam-pipe to the turbines which
immediately reduced her speed to 8
knots, but her chief engineer quickly
carried out a repair that enabled her
to steam at 22 knots)
(At
1825 hours Bey signalled Group North
with the signal; ‘To the Fuhrer. We
shall fight to the last shell’
At
1830 hours Bey signalled Group North
with the signal, ‘steering for
Tanafjord, position 71-57N, 28-30E,
speed 20 knots)
A
shell from SCHARNHORST’s last salvo passed
through the foremast and damaged the Type
284M (3) gunnery radar set. Lieutenant H R
K Bates RNVR, who was in charge of the 273
office, immediately climbed the mast and
fixed the aerial, after which the set was
again operational. Bates was awarded a DSC
for his action.
Another
shell from the same salvo hit the after
mast damaging the cables to the Type 281
air warning radar.
At
1824 hours because of the damage to the
Type 284M (3) radar DUKE OF YORK’s
accuracy dropped. So after 52 broadsides,
31 of which were reported as straddles,
fire was checked.
At
1840 hours Fraser signalled to Burnett "I
see little hope of catching SCHARNHORST
and am proceeding to support convoy" while
ordering a turn to south for DUKE OF YORK
and JAMAICA.
But
before the change of course order was
executed, the staff in DUKE OF YORK’s
plotting room realized that SCHARNHORST
was losing speed and Fraser cancelled the
order and instead ordered a turn to the
north east heading straight for the
SCHARNHORST.
(At
1850 hours the SCHARNHORST turned on
to a south westerly then southerly
course)
(When
SCHARNHORST lost speed it enabled the
Force 2 destroyers to gain a
favourable position for a torpedo
attack. SAVAGE and SAUMAREZ were on
SCHARNHORST’s starboard side and
SCORPION and STORD on her port side.
SCORPION
fired 8 torpedoes from an approximate
range of 2100 yards, one probable hit.
STORD
fired 8 torpedoes from an approximate
range of 1800 yards, no hits.
SAVAGE
fired 8 torpedoes from an approximate
range of 3500 yards,
SAUMAREZ
fired 4 torpedoes from an approximate
range of 1800 yards. Just before she
fired a 280mm shell, from
SCHARNHORST’s Caesar turret, exploded
close to SAUMAREZ’s starboard side,
showering the deck with splinters,
which also penetrated the side plating
into the engine room. Her casualties
were 11 killed and 11 wounded. SAVAGE
and SAUMAREZ achieved 3 hits.
At
1852 hours SAVAGE signalled ‘am
proceeding to attack’
At
1852 hours SCORPION signalled ‘attack
completed’
At
1853 hours STORD signalled ‘attack
completed’
At
1853 hours SAVAGE signalled ‘attack
completed’)
At
1842 hours Lieutenant Bates completed his
repair work on the Type 284M (3) radar.
When the radar was restarted the range to
SCHARNHORST was found to be 22,000 yards,
bearing 070¼.
At
1854 hours DUKE OF YORK and JAMAICA turned
easterly towards the enemy.
At
1900 hours DUKE OF YORK and JAMAICA turned
southerly to open their A arcs.
At
1901 hours at a range of 10,400 yards DUKE
OF YORK opened fire on the enemy. Several
of the shells from the first broadside
were seen to land on SCHARNHORST’s
quarterdeck. In this phase of the action
DUKE OF YORK fired 28 broadsides and
obtained many straddles and hits.
(At
1911 hours Bey received his last
communication from Group North
assuring him that all U-boats,
destroyers and aircraft were being
sent to the area to help SCHARNHORST)
At
1915 hours DUKE OF YORK and JAMAICA turned
easterly then north easterly.
At
1919 hours Fraser signalled BELFAST and
JAMAICA ‘finish her off with torpedoes’.
At
1922 hours when observing the fall of shot
from her 72nd broadside, it was noticed on
the radar screens that the echo, after
first appearing as a normal straddle,
developed into a great bunch of width 800
yards either side of the target. At the
same time a large explosion occurred at
SCHARNHORST’s stern.
At
1929 hours DUKE OF YORK checked fire after
77 broadsides, achieving at least 13,
possibly up to 30 hits. At this time
SCHARNHORST was a blazing wreck and
sinking by the stern.
When
DUKE OF YORK ceased fire it marked the end
of an era, it being the last time a Royal
Navy battleship engaged an enemy
battleship.
(At
1925 hours JAMAICA launched three
torpedoes from her port tubes at the
SCHARNHORST. No hits were obtained.
At
1926 hours BELFAST fired four
torpedoes from her starboard tubes. No
hits were obtained.
At
1933 hours the destroyers
MUSKETEER,
MATCHLESS, OPPORTUNE and VIRAGO went
in to attack with torpedoes.
MUSKETEER
and MATCHLESS attacked the port side,
MUSKETEER fired four torpedoes, at a
range of 1000 yards, three of which
were claimed as hits. However
MATCHLESS failed to fire any torpedoes
because a high wave smashed on to the
destroyer amidships cutting
communications between bridge and
tubes.
OPPORTUNE
and VIRAGO attacked the starboard side
firing a total of 15 torpedoes, at
ranges of 2100 to 2800 yards, four of
which were claimed as hits.
At
1937 hours JAMAICA went in to fire
three torpedoes from her starboard
tubes, at a range of approximately
3300 yards, claiming two hits)
(At
1945 hours, after a total of 55
torpedoes and 2,195 shells had been
fired at her, the SCHARNHORST sank in
approximate position 72-16N, 28-41E.
The sinking was picked up on the
sonars of the British ships.
[On
3/10/2000 the wreck of the SCHARNHORST
was located 66 nautical miles
north-northeast of North Cape, Norway.
It lies in 160 fathoms in approximate
position 72-10N, 24-24E. SCHARNHORST’s
hull lies upside down on the seabed.
Her main mast and her rangefinders are
the right way up on the seabed some
distance away. As is her entire stern
with the anchor still in place. The
hull shows extensive damage from both
armour-piercing shells and torpedoes]
At
2012 hours the SCORPION commenced
picking up survivors, rescuing 30.
MATCHLESS
picked up six survivors.
Several
hundreds survivors were left in the
sea; officially this was due to risk
of U-boat attack. A total of 1767 crew
were lost from the SCHARNHORST)
[In
this action, as with the engagements
between the PRINCE OF WALES and BISMARCK
,and KING GEORGE V and BISMARCK the 14"
gun turrets failed to perform to their
optimum. The problem was again mechanical
breakdowns in the complex loading
arrangements. In the action DUKE OF YORK
fired 450 x 14-inch shells in 77
broadsides, out of a possible 770. A shell
cage defect in A turret, compounded by
poor loading drill, resulted in one of the
four guns (A3) being unable to fire in 71
of the 77 broadsides; while three guns in
Y turret were unable to fire for a
15-minute period, missing 17 broadsides.
The breakdowns in the loading mechanisms
affected every single 14-inch gun during
the action. The least affected was Bl gun,
in B turret which only missed three
firings.
The ventilation to
some turrets also proved to be inadequate
and some of the guns crews were so
fatigued it affected their rate of fire
towards the end of the action.
She
also fired 755 x 5.25-inch shells, 600 SAP
shells and 155 starshell rounds.
However,
as DUKE OF YORK’s gunnery narrative
stated, the ship's armament and radar
combined together to 'find, fix, fight and
finish off the SCHARNHORST. Which was
something of an over statement.
In
his despatch Admiral Fraser gave the ship
full credit, stating, ‘DUKE OF YORK fought
hard and well having drawn, for over an
hour and a half, the whole of the enemy's
fire. She was frequently straddled with
near misses, ahead, astern and on the
beam. That she was not hit was probably
due to masterly handling aided by accurate
advice from the plot (everybody who saw
it, and many of those who only appreciated
its results, commented upon Captain Guy
Russell's skilful ship-handling). There is
no doubt that DUKE OF YORK was the
principal factor in the battle. She fought
the SCHARNHORST at night and she won. This
is no way detracts from the achievements
of the 'S' Class destroyers who with great
gallantry and dash pressed in unsupported,
to the closest ranges, to deliver their
attacks, being subjected the while to the
whole fire power of the enemy']
At
2100 hours Fraser signalled the Admiralty
‘SCHARNHORST sunk’. So ended the Battle of
the North Cape; the last battleship action
in the history of the Royal Navy.
At
2130 hours Fraser ordered all Force 1 and
Force 2 ships including
the
36th Division destroyers to head for
Vaenga.
At
2351 hours the OIC signalled Fraser
informing him of the contents of an Enigma
decrypt:-‘at 0615 hours the Eisenbart
Group of U-boats had been ordered to steer
at top speed for an area bounded by 72N to
72-18N and 26E to 27E’
27th
- At 1500 hours DUKE OF YORK arrived at
Vaenga.
The remainder of Forces 1 and 2 arrived
during the next two hours. The badly
damaged SAUMAREZ was the last to arrive
at 2224 hours having been escorted in by
SAVAGE and SCORPION.
At
Vaenga the SCHARNHORST’s 36 survivors were
transferred to DUKE OF YORK.
Before
Fraser would allow
DUKE
OF YORK to sail he insisted that the
Type 281 radar was repaired; so the mast
was repaired by a Russian welder and
Lieutenant Bates had to re-splice the
cable.
28th
- At 1800 hours DUKE OF YORK, JAMAICA and
the destroyers MUSKETEER, SAVAGE, STORD,
SCORPION, MATCHLESS, OPPORTUNE and VIRAGO
sailed from Vaenga for Scapa.
1
9 4 4
January
1st
- At 1000 hours DUKE OF YORK with her
battle-ensigns flying,
passed through Hoxa Gate and entered
Scapa Flow leading JAMAICA and the
destroyers MUSKETEER, SAVAGE, STORD,
SCORPION, MATCHLESS, OPPORTUNE and
VIRAGO. As they steamed through the
ships in the flow
each
ship's company massed on deck cheering
as the ships came abreast of them. After
DUKE OF YORK had moored and picked up
the telephone line there was a flood of
congratulatory telegrams and signals
from all parts of the world. It was a
great homecoming. After mooring, DUKE OF
YORK commenced Christmas Day routine.
5th
- At 2330 hours DUKE OF YORK escorted by
the destroyers MILNE (D3) and METEOR
sailed from Scapa for Rosyth.
6th
- At 1100 hours DUKE OF YORK and the
destroyers MILNE (D3) and METEOR arrived
at Rosyth. DUKE OF YORK and MILNE entered
the dockyard and METEOR returned to Scapa.
DUKE OF YORK was taken in hand for a short
refit and repair to the damage suffered in
the battle, most of which had been caused
by the firing of her own guns;
particularly the blast from Y turret when
firing on forward bearings. Also she had
to be re-ammunitioned but before this
could take place the ‘empties’ had to be
removed. Four railway wagons were filled
with the empty Clarkson cases which had
held the half-charges for the 14" shells,
and another eight wagons were needed for
the spent brass cylinders of the 5.25"
fixed ammunition.
24th
- At 2345 hours DUKE OF YORK sailed from
Rosyth for Scapa.
25th
- At 0200 hours off the Eyebroughy Buoy
DUKE OF YORK was joined by the destroyers
OBEDIENT and ORWELL who then escorted her
to Scapa. At 1130 hours DUKE OF YORK and
destroyers OBEDIENT and ORWELL arrived at
Scapa.
February
For
the whole of February DUKE OF YORK was at
Scapa.
March
1st
to 12th - DUKE OF YORK was at Scapa.
13th
- At 1100 hours DUKE OF YORK escorted by
the destroyer MATCHLESS sailed from Scapa
for the Clyde.
14th
- At 0800 hours DUKE OF YORK and the
destroyer MATCHLESS arrived off Greenock.
16th
- At 1000 hours DUKE OF YORK escorted by
the destroyer MATCHLESS sailed from the
Clyde for Scapa.
17th
- At 0800 hours DUKE OF YORK and the
destroyer MATCHLESS arrived at Scapa.
30th
- At 1130 hours the battleships DUKE OF
YORK
(Flag
CinC Home Fleet),
ANSON (Flag Vice Admiral Moore 2iC Home
Fleet), aircraft carrier VICTORIOUS
(with 827
& 829 Barracuda II Squadrons, and
1834 & 1836 Corsair II Squadrons
embarked), light
cruiser BELFAST, escorted by the
destroyers
ONSLAUGHT
and JAVELIN, HMCS SIOUX and ALGONQUIN
and ORP PIORUN sailed as Force 1 from
Scapa on Operations FY and TUNGSTEN.
Force 1 set course for the Cape Wrath
firing range.
(Operation
FY was the provision of heavy cover for
convoy JW 58. [Convoy JW 58 comprising
49 ships, sailed from Loch Ewe on
27/3/44]. [The battleship cover was
provided because OIC was aware that
TIRPITZ had carried out trials on the
15 & 16 March. On 20/3/44 the
Director of Naval Intelligence warned
the Naval Staff that TIRPITZ was
unlikely to proceed to sea for
operations against a well-escorted
convoy but might do so if she was sure
that there was no heavy ships to
contend with] Operation TUNGSTEN
was the FAA attack on the TIRPITZ)
At
1600 hours off Cape Wrath the battleships
carried out a calibration shoot and
aircraft from VICTORIOUS carried out live
bombing practice.
At
1800 hours Force 1 set course north.
(At
1900/30/3/44 Force 2, for Operation
TUNGSTEN, comprising light cruisers
ROYALIST (Flag Rear Admiral
Bisset, RA escort carriers),
JAMAICA
and SHEFFIELD, aircraft carrier
FURIOUS, escort carriers SEARCHER,
EMPEROR, PURSUER and FENCER, RFA
oilers BROWN RANGER and BLUE RANGER
escorted by destroyers VERULAM,
VIRAGO, VIGILANT, SWIFT and WAKEFUL
sailed from Scapa)
31st
- At 0600 hours west of the Faroes the
destroyers MILNE (D3), MARNE, METEOR,
MATCHLESS, URSA and UNDAUNTED joined Force
1 from Skaalefjord. At 0615 hours the
destroyers JAVELIN, HMCS SIOUX and
ALGONQUIN and ORP PIORUN detached from
Force 1 to refuel at Skaalefjord.
April
1st
- (In
the afternoon Fraser received a signal
from the Admiralty informing him that
from Enigma decrypts that, ‘TIRPITZ
was due to carry out full speed trials
on 1/4/44, but shortly before noon on
that day further intercepts disclosed
that this had been postponed for
forty-eight hours’.
Operation
TUNGSTEN had been planned to take
place on 4/4/44. On the morning of
1/1/44 convoy JW 58 was in the Barents
Sea and making good progress and the
Admiralty’s signal meant that there
was now no danger of surface attack on
the convoy. Fraser believed that the
battleship's trials might present a
great opportunity for the airmen
since, when at anchor, TIRPITZ was
well protected by torpedo nets and
smoke screens. So Fraser advanced
TUNGSTEN by 24 hours. The decision to
move the timetable was communicated to
Force 2 by the Leader of Air
Operations [Lt
Cdr Roy Baker-Falkner, DSC, RN]
and the Leader of No. 52 TBR Wing
[Lt Cdr (A) V. Rance, RN], who
flew a Barracuda from VICTORIOUS to
FURIOUS)
2nd
- At 1620 hours in approximate position
71-18N, 9E, Forces 1 & 2 joined. At
1630 hours DUKE OF YORK with the
destroyers MARNE and MATCHLESS detached
from the Battlefleet and steered north to
a covering position for TUNGSTEN.
(The
Battlefleet under the command of VA2
in the ANSON then set easterly for the
flying off position 71-30N, 19-00E for
TUNGSTEN)
3rd
- At 0230 hours DUKE OF YORK with the
destroyers MARNE and MATCHLESS arrived in
74N, 12-30E, where they cruised until
Fraser received a signal from Moore
informing of the success of the first
strike. At 0730 hours course was set to
return to Scapa.
5th
- At 0900 hours DUKE OF YORK with the
destroyers MARNE and MATCHLESS arrived
back at Scapa.
(As
soon as DUKE OF YORK moored to the
telephone buoy the First Sea Lord
Cunningham telephoned Fraser,
demanding a second attack on the
TIRPITZ. Whilst Fraser endorsed the
principle that a battered enemy should
be aggressively kept on the ropes
whenever possible, he disagreed in
this case. Fraser took the view that
the Home Fleet had made the most of a
unique opportunity; the weather
conditions were ideal and would
unlikely to be encountered again, also
the defences which had been caught by
surprise once but which would be alert
and ready for a second attack. Fraser
insisted that a second attack would
only mean the sacrifice of much-needed
aircraft and aircrew, and further the
FAA lacked a suitable weapon to do
lethal damage. The stubbornness with
which he held to his view prompted the
First Sea Lord to some malevolent
accusations in his private diary.
Fraser argued that in the weeks before
the cross-Channel assault the Home
Fleet would be far better employed
attacking German convoys in Norwegian
coastal waters. On 21 April Fraser
sent Moore to attempt a second strike
on the TIRPITZ, with a strike on Bodo
harbour and adjacent sea-lanes as a
secondary objective)
6th
to 30th - DUKE OF YORK was at Scapa.
May
6th
- DUKE OF YORK was at Scapa where she
received a visit from General Montgomery.
10th
- 13th - DUKE OF YORK was at Scapa where
Fraser played host to HM King George V1
during his visit to the Home Fleet. The
King slept on board during his visit.
14th
to 31st - DUKE OF YORK was at Scapa.
June
1st
to 12th - DUKE OF YORK was at Scapa.
13th
- Flag of Admiral Sir Bruce Austin Fraser,
G.C.B., K.B.E. struck in DUKE OF YORK
14th
- Flag of Admiral Sir Henry Ruthven Moore,
K.C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O. the new CinC Home
Fleet, hoisted in DUKE OF YORK
15th
to 28th - DUKE OF YORK was at Scapa.
Whilst at Scapa she had her AA armament
modified by the fitting of two x twin 20mm
Oerlikons on No 1 platform and 8 x single
20mm Oerlikons removed from No 1 platform
29th
- At 1500 hours the battleships DUKE OF
YORK (Flag CinC Home Fleet), ANSON, light
cruisers JAMAICA and BERMUDA escorted by
the destroyers NUBIAN, WHELP and WESSEX
sailed from Scapa on Operation TIGER CLAW.
(Operation
TIGER CLAW was planned as a repetition
of Operations BRAWN and CAMBRIDGE
[repetition of Operation TUNGSTEN] In
the event, both these operations were
again cancelled owing to unsuitable
weather, and Operation LOMBARD [strike
on enemy shipping in the Aalesund
area] was carried out instead.
The
mission of DUKE OF YORK force was to
act a decoy force)
30th
- At 0330 hours north east of the Faroe
Islands DUKE OF YORK force was sighted and
reported by the daily Luftwaffe
meteorological reconnaissance plane. When
the reporting of the Force was confirmed
course was reversed to return to Scapa. At
2000 hours DUKE OF YORK, ANSON, JAMAICA,
BERMUDA and the destroyers NUBIAN, WHELP
and WESSEX arrived back at Scapa.
July
1st
to 13th - DUKE OF YORK was at Scapa.
14th
- At 1400 hours DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC
Home Fleet), aircraft carriers FORMIDABLE
(Flag Rear Admiral McGrigor, RA First
Cruiser Squadron), INDEFATIGABLE and
FURIOUS, heavy cruisers DEVONSHIRE and
KENT, light cruisers JAMAICA and BELLONA
escorted by the destroyers MILNE (D3),
MARNE, MATCHLESS, MUSKETEER, SCOURGE,
VERULAM, NUBIAN, VOLAGE, VIRAGO and
VIGILANT and HMCS ALGONQUIN and SIOUX and
the frigates BURGES (SO 20EG), BULLDOG,
INMAN and HOSTE sailed from Scapa on
Operation MASCOT.
(Operation
MASCOT was an air strike against the
TIRPITZ and was a repeat of Operation
TUNGSTEN)
16th
- At 2400 hours the Home Fleet arrived in
approximate position 71-30N, 18E.
17th
- At 0100 hours the strike force of 44
Barracudas of the 8th Naval TBR Wing,
loaded with 1,000 lb AP and 500 lb bombs
and escorted by 18 Corsairs, 18 Hellcats
and 12 Fireflies, commenced lifting off
from the aircraft carriers FORMIDABLE,
INDEFATIGABLE and FURIOUS.
At
0204 hours an observation post, that had
been set up by the Germans following the
TUNGSTEN attack, gave the alarm and by
0215 hours AA crews closed up and within
10 minutes the shore-based smoke screen,
installed after TUNGSTEN, was well
established.
At
0220 hours the first aircraft commenced
their attack at which time the TIRPITZ was
almost entirely obscured by smoke. The
strike force attacked through the smoke
scoring one near miss.
A
Barracuda and Corsair were lost in the
attack.
A
second strike was cancelled owing to thick
fog and the defensive measures taken by
the enemy.
At
0530 hours The Home Fleet set course for
Scapa.
18th
- In the morning Admiral Moore received a
signal from the Admiralty NIC informing
him of the presence of several U-Boats,
possibly up to 15, in the vicinity of the
Fleet. (On 17/7 the RAF had sunk three and
on 18/7 the RAF sank another).
Although
the weather barely suitable foe flying, Lt
Cdr. Baker-Falkner, CO of 827 Sqd and Wing
Leader for No. 8 TBR, volunteered to fly
off FORMIDABLE to carry out an A/S search.
and sink the enemy subs. He was escorted
by a Corsair of 1841 Sqd flown by Sub Lt
Mattholie. In worsening weather
Baker-Falkner’s Barracuda II squadron code
5K was lost. Mattholie forced landed in
Norway.
19th
- At 1630 hours the Home Fleet arrived
back at Scapa.
18th
to 31st - DUKE OF YORK at Scapa.
August
1st
to 17th - DUKE OF YORK at Scapa.
(Operation
MASCOT had been a failure and TIRPITZ
was now operational again. [It
was known that TIRPITZ had carried out
exercises at sea on 31/7/44 and 1/8/44
with the destroyers Z29, Z31, Z33, Z34
and Z39].
TIRPITZ
was now again a threat to the Russian
convoys and the Admiralty were
impatient to put her out of action.
But
by now, Admiral Moore was convinced
that the Barracudas were too slow to
get from the coastline where they were
reported, and be over TIRPIZ before
the smoke obscured her.
However,
Admiralty felt that a series of
repeated blows over a short period of
forty-eight hours would wear down the
enemy's defences and, a practical
point, exhaust their immediate
supplies of smoke-making canisters. So
a further air strike against TIRPITZ
was planned)
18th
- At 1200 hours DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC
Home Fleet), aircraft carriers
INDEFATIGABLE (Flag Rear Admiral McGrigor,
RA First Cruiser Squadron), FORMIDABLE and
FURIOUS, heavy cruisers BERWICK and
DEVONSHIRE, the destroyers MYNGS (D26),
KEMPENFELT (D27), VIGILANT, ZAMBESI, HMCS
SIOUX and
HNorMS
STORD sailed from Scapa as Force 1 for
Operation GOODWOOD. Course was set
northerly to pass to east of the Faeroe
Islands. (Operation GOODWOOD was a
further air strike against TIRPITZ with
the objective of all the previous
attacks, ie
to
put her out of action for the remainder
of the war. Failing this to cover the
passage of convoys JW 59 and RA 59A,
against attack by TIRPITZ.
Three
Forces were employed for the operation:
Force
1 comprising DUKE OF YORK and the fleet
carriers.
Force
2 comprising the escort carriers NABOB
and TRUMPETER escorted by the frigates
BICKERTON (SO 5EG), AYLMER, BLIGH, KEATS
and KEMPTHORNE.
Force
9, the refuelling group, comprising the
RFA’s BLACK RANGER and BLUE RANGER
escorted by the corvettes POPPY,
DIANELLA and STARWORT)
(15/8/44
convoy JW 59 sailed from Loch Ewe. The
convoy consisted of 34 merchant ships
escorted by the 20th EG)
19th
- At 0200 hours in approximate position
62N, 4W the destroyers SCORPION, SERAPIS,
CAMBRIAN, VOLAGE, VERULAM, VIRAGO,
SCOURGE, WHIRLWIND, WRANGLER and HMCS
ALGONQUIN joined Force 1 from Skaalefjord.
At 0215 hours the destroyers KEMPENFELT
and ZAMBESI detached to refuel at
Skaalefjord.
20th
- The destroyer WHIRLWIND was detached and
returned to Scapa with engine defects.
21st
- At 0600 hours Forces 1 & 2 arrived
in approximate position 71-15N, 19E. The
plan was for the strike force to fly off
in the late morning but the weather, seas
breaking over the carrier’s decks, was not
suitable for operating aircraft. Moore
took the decision to abandon the operation
for 24 hours and so Forces 1 and 2 steamed
westward towards Force 9 to refuel the
destroyers and cruisers. After refuelling
Forces 1 and 2 reversed course and steered
easterly for the flying off position.
22nd
- At 1000 hours Forces 1 and 2 arrived at
the flying off position. At 1100 hours the
strike force lifted off, the strike and
escort consisted of 32 Barracudas (of 820,
826, 827, 828 and 830 Squadrons), eleven
Fireflies of 1770 and eight Seafires of
887 and 24 Corsairs of 1841 and 1842, and
nine Hellcats of 1840. This attack became
known as GOODWOOD 1. When the Barracudas
arrived over the coast they found the area
shrouded in dense cloud so the strike
mission was aborted. The Barracudas and
Corsairs returned to the carriers.
However, the Hellcats and Fireflies
managed to find and attack the TIRPITZ,
achieving a measure of surprise; one hit
with a 500 lb bomb was claimed but in fact
no hits were achieved. Targets of
opportunity were also attacked which
resulted in damage to two small ships and
TIRPITZ’s Arado Ar 196 sea-planes that
were moored nearby. Five enemy aircraft
were destroyed, for the loss of one
Barracuda, one Hellcat and a Seafire.
(Because
the visibility was poor, due to thick
cloud, the minelaying, that was to be
carried out by the Avengers of 846 and
856 Squadrons from Force 2, was
cancelled. Therefore Force 2 with the
KENT moved off to the west)
During
the day Seafires of 894 Squadron from
INDEFATIGABLE, who were flying CAP over
the Fleet, shot down two
Blohm
& Voss Bv 138 reconnaissance
aircraft.
In
the early evening a further strike by 6
Hellcat fighter bombers of 1840
Squadron, escorted by 8 Fireflies of
1770 Squadron from INDEFATIGABLE,
(GOODWOOD II) was carried out against
the TIRPITZ 2 hits with 500 lb bombs
were claimed, but in fact no hits were
achieved. Following recovery of the
strike aircraft Force 1 moved away from
the coast to refuel and await improved
weather.
(At
1716/22/8/44 the NABOB, of Force 2,
was torpedoed by U 354 and at
1724/22/8/44 the BICKERTON was
torpedoed by the same U boat)
24th
- With improved weather conditions Force 1
moved into the flying off position for a
further air strike against the TIRPITZ
(GOODWOOD III). At 1430 hours aircraft
from the FORMIDABLE, FURIOUS and
INDEFATIGABLE commenced lifting off. The
33 Barracudas carried 1,600 lb AP bombs,
the 10 Hellcats each carried a 500 lb HE
bomb, and 5 of the 24 Corsairs carried a
1,000 lb AP bomb, the remainder of the
Corsairs with the 10 Fireflies were tasked
with flak suppression.
At
1547 hours the German defences were
alerted and the smoke screen was started.
The aircraft approached from all
directions at heights from 6,500 feet to
10,000 feet, diving low into the attack.
The attack technique was devised from the
lessons of Operation TUNGSTEN, this mode
of attack made the directing of the
enemy’s AA fire very much more difficult.
By diving low through the smoke screen two
hits were scored for the loss of two
Hellcats and four Corsairs. A 500 lb bomb
landed on top of Bruno turret causing
minor damage to the top and temporarily
damaging the elevating gear of the
starboard gun and destroying the quadruple
20mm AA mounting on top. The other bomb
proved to be the Fleet Air Arm's greatest
disappointment. A 1,600 lb AP bomb hit
just forward of the bridge on the port
side and penetrated the upper deck and the
armoured deck, coming to rest in No. 4
Switch Room on the lower platform deck,
but it failed to explode and when the
Germans finally removed the explosive they
found there was only 100 lb instead of 215
lb there should have been. Had this bomb
exploded it would have caused considerable
damage.
After
recovery of the strike force, Force 1
moved away from the coast and set course
for Skaalefjord to refuel and obtain some
respite from the weather.
(Following
this attack the Germans ordered a
reduction in the required time of
notice for smoke production from 10 to
7 minutes)
26th
- At 0200 hours east of the Faroes the
FURIOUS, KENT and BERWICK and the
destroyer SERAPIS from Force 1 and the
frigates AYLMER, BLIGHT and KEATS from
Force 2, detached from Force1 and returned
to Scapa. The remainder of Force 1 entered
Skaalefjord to refuel.
27th
- At 1000 hours Force 1 sailed from
Skaalefjord and steered northerly to
return to the flying off position.
29th
- With improved weather conditions Force 1
moved into the flying off position for a
further air strike against the TIRPITZ
(GOODWOOD IV). 26 Barracudas, 17 Corsairs,
7 Hellcats and 10 Fireflies were launched
from FORMIDABLE and INDEFATIGABLE. Four of
the 7 Hellcats carried target indicators
but the Germans had sufficient warning and
the battleship was completely obscured by
smoke. The Hellcats bombed blindly and 2
hits were claimed but in fact none were
achieved. 7 Seafires were launched
from INDEFATIGABLE to carry out a
subsidiary attack on Hammerfest harbour.
One Firefly and one Corsair were lost.
After recovery of the strike aircraft the
INDEFATIGABLE with the destroyers
SCORPION, WRANGLER and ALGONQUIN, detached
and set course for Scapa.
(In
the four GOODWOOD attacks two hits
were made on the TIRPITZ, six radar
and W/T stations were attacked and
damaged, 19 vessels [including
a U-boat, 3 destroyers, a tanker, and
a large merchantman] were
attacked and damaged, and various flak
positions, oil tanks, and military
buildings were set on fire. For the
loss of nine aircraft and two damaged)
DUKE
OF YORK, FORMIDABLE, DEVONSHIRE and the
destroyers MYNGS, SIOUX, VIGILANT, VIRAGO,
SCOURGE, CAMBRIAN, VOLAGE and STORD
withdrew to cover convoy RA 59A.
(28/8/44
convoy RA 59A comprising nine merchant
ships sailed from the Kola Inlet)
29th
- The FORMIDABLE with the destroyers
VOLAGE and STORD detached and set course
for Scapa.
30th
- DUKE OF YORK, DEVONSHIRE and the
destroyers MYNGS, SIOUX, VIGILANT, VIRAGO,
SCOURGE and CAMBRIAN set course to return
to Scapa.
September
3rd
- At 0700 hours DUKE OF YORK, DEVONSHIRE
and the destroyers MYNGS, SIOUX, VIGILANT,
VIRAGO, SCOURGE and CAMBRIAN arrived back
at Scapa at the end of Operation GOODWOOD.
Later in the day Captain Angus Dacres
Nicholl, DSO, RN took command of DUKE OF
YORK. Whilst at Scapa DUKE OF YORK was
visited by HM King George VI.
17th
- DUKE OF YORK at Scapa. The Staff of the
Commander in Chief, Home Fleet, were
transferred to FURIOUS.
18th
- At 0800 hours the flag of the Commander
in Chief, Home Fleet, was transferred to
FURIOUS. At 1000 hours DUKE OF YORK
escorted by the destroyers SAVAGE and
HNorMS
STORD sailed from Scapa for Liverpool.
19th
- At 1600 hours DUKE
OF YORK with the destroyers SAVAGE and
STORD
arrived at Liverpool. On arrival at
Liverpool DUKE
OF YORK entered Gladstone Dock where she
was taken in hand for a refit and
modernization by Cammell Laird.
Following docking she paid off.
October
to December
At
Liverpool under refit.
1
9 4 5
January
to February
At
Liverpool under refit. The main purpose of
the refit was to prepare her for service
in the Pacific, to bring her radar fit up
to date and to enhance her close range AA
armament to counter the advent of the
Kamikaze. The work carried out included:
Four
Supermarine Walrus seaplanes and
catapult removed.
The hangars were converted for use as
cinemas and new crew space provided on
catapult deck.
Her AA Armament was modified by the
removal of 18 single 20mm Oerlikons and
the addition of:
Six x 4 barrel pom-poms 2 on
quarterdeck, 2 on sponsons abreast the
bridge, 2 on upper deck abreast B turret
Six x twin 20mm Oerlikon mountings on
the former boat deck.
The platform on the after funnel was
extended forward, this distinguish her
from the other ships of the class.
Her
Radar fit was modified as follows:
Two
x Type 274, one on the fore main
director and one on the aft main
director. The Type 284 removed.
One Type 281B with aerial on the
mainmast, two IFF. 'Headache' with
aerial on foremast, TBS types 86 and 87
with aerials on yard arms, D/F hut and
aerial on quarterdeck. The Type 281
removed.
One Type 293 air warning, with aerial on
foremast. Type 273 removed.
One Type 277 combined air/surface target
indication radar, with aerial at top of
foremast.
Type 282 with aerials on new pom-pom
directors each side of after funnel.
Type 242 for use in conjunction with
Type 281B.
Modifications
were carried out to the boiler oil burners
(atomisers). This was to combat the higher
seawater content of the bunker oil then in
use.
(The
high seawater content was caused by
a number of factors; the KGV class
used fuel oil as part of the Side
Protection System in the liquid
layers of the SPS. As fuel was
consumed, water was allowed to enter
the bottom of the layer to maintain
the defensive qualities. The low
viscosity fuel used in the early
part of war resisted mixing with
seawater and what seawater
contamination did occur was easily
removed. After 1942 the Royal Navy
was forced to use fuel oils with
considerably higher viscosity and
greater seawater content than the
boilers in use could efficiently
utilise.
The poor quality of the oil fuel
combined with the seawater
contamination, [due to having to use
old commercial oil tankers and from
contact with seawater in the SPS
system] reduced the efficiency of
the steam power plant by 10% to 12%
and increased maintenance which was
becoming increasingly difficult to
carry out.
The
Admiralty was aware of this problem
and designed new types of oil sprayers
and burners that could burn the higher
viscosity and ‘contaminated bunker oil
much more efficiently and raise the
boiler full-power capacity back to the
design specification)
On
completion of her refit the displacement
of DUKE OF YORK rose to 39, 780 tons
(standard) 44,790 tons (full load).
March
At
Liverpool where the refit was completed.
Re-commissioned
under same CO,
Captain Angus Dacres Nicholl, DSO, RN.
Carried
out harbour trials.
27th
-
Visited
by HM King George VI and HM Queen
Elizabeth
April
4th
- DUKE OF YORK escorted by the destroyers
CAVENDISH and HMCS HAIDA sailed from
Liverpool for Scapa
5th
- DUKE OF YORK and the destroyers
CAVENDISH and HAIDA
arrived at Scapa.
On
arrival DUKE OF YORK commenced working
up exercises.
25th
- The battleships DUKE OF YORK, ANSON, the
heavy cruiser SUSSEX escorted by the
destroyers
CAPRICE
and CARRON sailed from Scapa to join the
British Pacific Fleet.
27th
- The destroyers CAPRICE and CARRON
detached for Falmouth.
30th
- Arrived at Gibraltar, refuelled and
sailed for Malta.
May
2nd-
Arrived at Malta. At Malta, DUKE OF YORK
entered the dockyard and was taken in hand
to repair a major electrical defect.
26th
- Sailed from Malta for Port Said.
27th
- Carried out gunnery firings off Mersa
Matruh during work-up after repair work.
28th
- Arrived at Port Said.
30th
- Arrived at Suez.
June
3rd
- Arrived at Aden.
8th
- Arrived at Colombo.
24th
- Arrived at Fremantle.
26th
- Arrived off Albany, Western Australia,
for a short visit.
July
1st
- Arrived at Sydney
4th
- Entertained US visitors at reception on
Independence Day.
11th
- HRH the Duke of Gloucester, Governor
General of Australia visited the ship.
17th
- 0800 hours DUKE OF YORK sailed from
Sydney to carry out, replenishment
exercise, target indication and radar
calibration, and an AA shoot. At 2100
hours DUKE OF YORK, anchored in Jervis
Bay.
18th
- Returned to Sydney harbour.
26th
- DUKE OF YORK entered the Captain Cook
Graving Dock, Garden Island, for a bottom
scrape and paint.
30th
- At 0900 hours DUKE OF YORK left dry
dock.
31st
- DUKE OF YORK escorted by the destroyers
WAGER and WHELP sailed from Sydney for
Manus.
August
5th
- DUKE OF YORK and the destroyers WAGER
and WHELP arrived at Seeadler Harbour,
Manus. At Manus the Flag of the CinC of
Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser CinC British
Pacific Fleet was raised.
6th
- (The first atomic bomb, code named
LITTLE BOY, was dropped on Hiroshima)
7th
- DUKE OF YORK, Flag CinC BPC, escorted by
the destroyers WAGER and WHELP sailed from
Seeadler Harbour, Manus for Guam.
9th
- DUKE OF YORK and the destroyers WAGER
and WHELP arrived at Guam for meetings
with US Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz CinC
Pacific Fleet and his staff.
(A
second atomic bomb, code named, FAT
BOY, was dropped on Nagasaki. Also the
USSR
declared war on Japan)
10th
- On board DUKE OF YORK at Guam Admiral
Sir Bruce Fraser invested Fleet Admiral
Nimitz with the Knight Grand Cross of the
Order of the Bath, on behalf of HM King
George VI.
(10/8/45
whilst at Guam, Fraser received the
news
that
Japan was willing to accept the
terms of the Potsdam meeting with
adjustments)
13th
- DUKE OF YORK, Flag CinC BPC, escorted by
the destroyers WAGER and WHELP, now
designated as Task Group 30.2, sailed from
Guam heading towards Japan.
15th
- At sea when the news was received that
Japan had surrendered, at noon Tokyo time.
16th
- DUKE OF YORK, with the destroyers WAGER
and WHELP, TG30.2, arrived off the south
coast of the Island of Honshu and joined
units of the US 3rd Fleet commanded by
Admiral "Bull" Halsey. After joining up
with the US 3rd Fleet Admiral Fraser went
on board the USS MISSOURI, which was the
flagship of Admiral William
Frederick
Halsey the CinC US 3rd Fleet, and
awarded Halsey the Order of the Knight
of the British Empire.
18th
- Off the south coast of the Island of
Honshu DUKE OF YORK and the destroyers
WAGER and WHELP joined the remaining
units of the British Pacific Fleet, now
known as the Token Force and designated
Task Group 38.5, comprising the battleship
KING GEORGE V, aircraft carrier
INDEFATIGABLE, light cruisers NEWFOUNDLAND
and HMNZS GAMBIA and the destroyers
BARFLEUR, TEAZER, TENACIOUS, TROUBRIDGE,
WAKEFUL, WRANGLER and HMAS NAPIER and
NIZAM.
20th
- Carried out a RAS (Replenishment At Sea)
23rd
- DUKE OF YORK and the destroyers WAGER
and WHELP were re-designated Task
Group 30.2 for the entry into Tokyo Bay.
The remainder of Task Group 38.5 were
re-designated Task Force 37.
27th
- DUKE OF YORK the
US Third Fleet, including the British
Token Force, anchored in Sagami
Wan. The following day, sufficient
berths had been swept inside to allow
the entry into Tokyo Bay
29th
- Early in the morning the entry into
Tokyo Bay commenced, lead by the US Fleet
Flagship Group, followed by Task Group
30.2 comprising DUKE OF YORK Flag CinC
BPC, and the destroyers WAGER and WHELP,
followed by US TF 35, followed by TF 37
which comprised the British Token Force
and bringing up the rear was the US TF 31,
which was the Yokosuka Occupation Force..
(The
entry into Tokyo Bay had been
scheduled for26/8/45 but was delayed
for 48 hours due a typhoon that struck
the Home Islands.
The
entry into the bay of the task forces
and groups was covered by an air
umbrella of hundreds of planes from US
TF 38 in case of last ditch Kamikaze
attacks..
There
was a strong feeling among the crews
of the ships of the British Pacific
Fleet that DUKE OF YORK, who had not
fired a shot in anger in the Pacific,
should not have had the honour of
leading the Fleet into Tokyo Bay)
30th-
(Admiral Fraser went aboard the
destroyer WHELP that took him to the
hospital ship USS BENEVOLENCE,
anchored off the naval port of
Yokosuka. The BENEVOLENCE was
processing some of the first
liberated Allied prisoners of war.
Fraser listened to their grim
stories and was clearly affected by
what he saw and heard. When he
returned to DUKE OF YORK he
was mad at the Japanese for their
treatment of the POW’s)
September
2nd
- DUKE OF YORK was in Tokyo Bay for the
official surrender ceremony.
(The
surrender ceremony took place on the
battleship the USS
MISSOURI,
which was anchored in
berth F 71, Tokyo Bay.
It commenced at 0902 hours with an
introductory statement by General
MacArthur after which he directed
the representatives of Japan to sign
the two Instruments of Surrender. At
0904 hours Foreign Minister
Shigemitsu signed, followed two
minutes later by General Umezu.
General MacArthur then led the
Allied delegations in signing, first
Fleet Admiral Nimitz as United
States Representative, then the
representatives of China, the United
Kingdom, the Soviet Union,
Australia, Canada, France, The
Netherlands and New Zealand. The
chairs that the delegates sat on
were supplied from DUKE OF YORK.
At
0914 hours Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser
signed for the United Kingdom;
General
Sir Thomas Blamey signed for
Australia;
Colonel
Lawrence Moore Cosgrave signed for
Canada;
Air
Vice Marshall Leonard M. Isitt signed
for New Zealand.
Following
a few brief remarks by MacArthur, the
ceremonies concluded at 0925 hours.
During
the surrender ceremony a massive
flight of Hellcats and Corsairs from
the US Task Group 38.1, which was
cruising off the south coast of Honshu
Island, flew overhead)
5th
- DUKE OF YORK and the remainder of the
British Pacific Fleet reverted to RN
control.
9th
- DUKE OF YORK, Flag CinC BPF, sailed from
Tokyo Bay for
Okinawa
and Hong Kong.
14th
- Arrived at Hong Kong with CinC
16th
- At the formal surrender ceremony in Hong
Kong.
(Rear
Admiral C J Harcourt, former captain
of ship, signed for Great Britain in
his capacity as CinC Hong Kong and
Head of Administration, Admiral Fraser
as CinC BPF attended as an observer)
21st
- Sailed for Sydney with call at Manila to
refuel.
October
9th
- Arrived at Sydney
November
At
Sydney
3rd
- Sailed from Sydney for visit to
Tasmania.
21st
- Arrived at Sydney from Norfolk Bay,
Tasmania.
December
1st
- Took passage from Sydney for Hong Kong
with calls at Fremantle, Christmas Island
and Singapore.
7th
- At Fremantle.
14th
- At Singapore.
21st
- Arrived at Hong Kong after passage in
extreme weather during which the First
Lieutenant, Lieut. Cdr. May, RN was swept
overboard with several other men from
cable party during work to secure anchors.
All the men were saved except the First
Lieutenant.
26th
- 1,200 of ship’s company were landed as
part of KENNEDY FORCE, the temporary
garrison of the Colony, pending the
arrival of the Army and relieved the naval
personnel landed from the battleship ANSON
when the Japanese surrendered.
1
9 4 6
January
At
Hong Kong
17th
- Sailed from Hong Kong for a Flag Visit
to Amoy.
21st
- Returned to Hong Kong.
February
At
Hong Kong
19th
- Took part in exercises off Hong Kong
which included US Navy ships.
March
At
Hong Kong
10th
- Admiral Fraser and staff left ship.
(Note: BPF was being administered from
Hong Kong pending transfer of Headquarters
from Sydney)
11th
- Passage from Hong Kong for visit to
Japan.
15th
- At Nagasaki
16th
- At Kagoshima
19th
- At Kure. (Note: British Commonwealth
Base was at Kure and later used by RN and
Commonwealth warships during the Korean
War. Visits to Hiroshima to see results of
Atom Bomb attack were arranged)
26th
- At Yokohama. (Note: Ships company able
to visit Tokyo which had been extensively
damaged by allied bombing.)
27th
- Took passage to Sydney.
April
Passage
in Pacific.
10th
- At Sydney for routine docking and leave.
May
At
Sydney
15th
- Sailed from Sydney for Hong Kong.
29th
- Arrived at Hong Kong.
June
7th
- Admiral Lord Fraser embarked for passage
to Singapore.
11th
- Arrived at Singapore. Admiral Lord
Fraser relieved as CinC BPF by Admiral Sir
Denis Boyd. Sailed from Singapore to UK
with Admiral Lord Fraser embarked.
18th
- Sailed from Colombo.
28th
- Sailed from Port Said with calls at
Malta and Gibraltar.
July
8th
- Passage from Gibraltar to Plymouth.
11th
- Arrived at Plymouth.
(Note:
Ship has steamed 58,413 miles since
leaving Scapa Flow in April 1945)
P
o s t W a r
N o t e s
HMS
DUKE OF YORK was
deployed as Home Fleet Flagship until 1949
when she became Flagship of the
Reserve Fleet for two years
and reduced to Reserve status in November
1951. The ship was laid-up in the
Gareloch until 1957 when
she was placed on the Disposal List. Sold to
BISCO for demolition by
Shipbreaking Industries she arrived at Faslane
on
18th February 1958.
Addendum
CONVOY
ESCORT MOVEMENTS of
HMS DUKE
OF
YORK
by
Don Kindell
These
convoy lists have not been cross-checked
with the text above
Date
convoy sailed
|
Joined
convoy
as
escort
|
Convoy
No.
|
Left
convoy
|
Date
convoy arrived
|
|
|
|
|
|
01/03/42
|
06/03/42
|
PQ
012
|
10/03/42
|
12/03/42
|
10/03/42
|
22/03/42
|
PQ
013
|
28/03/42
|
31/03/42
|
21/03/42
|
23/03/42
|
QP
009
|
28/03/42
|
03/04/42
|
26/03/42
|
12/04/42
|
PQ
014
|
18/04/42
|
19/04/42
|
10/04/42
|
12/04/42
|
QP
010
|
18/04/42
|
21/04/42
|
10/04/42
|
02/05/42
|
PQ
015
|
05/05/42
|
05/05/42
|
28/04/42
|
02/05/42
|
QP
011
|
05/05/42
|
07/05/42
|
21/05/42
|
23/05/42
|
PQ
016
|
29/05/42
|
30/05/42
|
21/05/42
|
23/05/42
|
QP
012
|
29/05/42
|
29/05/42
|
26/06/42
|
28/06/42
|
QP
013
|
08/07/42
|
07/07/42
|
27/06/42
|
29/06/42
|
PQ
017
|
04/07/42
|
04/07/42
|
02/09/42
|
11/09/42
|
PQ
018
|
14/09/42
|
21/09/42
|
13/09/42
|
19/09/42
|
QP
014
|
22/09/42
|
26/09/42
|
12/12/43
|
18/12/43
|
JW
055A
|
20/12/43
|
22/12/43
|
20/12/43
|
23/12/43
|
JW
055B
|
27/12/43
|
30/12/43
|
22/12/43
|
23/12/43
|
RA
055A
|
25/12/43
|
01/01/44
|
(Note
on Convoys)
|
|